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Nietzsche’s works and abbreviations 
The main critical German editions 
KSA: Sämtliche Werke. Kritische Studienausgabe. 15 volumes. Ed. G. Colli and M. Montinari. 
Berlin: Verlag de Gruyter, 1967.1  
KSB: Sämtliche Briefe: Kritische Studienausgabe. Ed. G. Colli and M. Montinari. Berlin: 
Verlag de Gruyter, 1967. 
SA: Karl Schlechta, Werke in drei Banden. Munich, Hanser, 1956. 
 
Individual works with titles in German and year of publication 
GT: Die Geburt der Tragödie, 1871. 
PHG: Die philosophie im Tragischen Zeitalter der Greichen 1873. 
MAM: Menschliches, Allzumenschliches, 1878. 
S: Der Wanderer und sein Schatten, 1880. 
M: Die Morgenröte, 1881. 
FW: Die fröhliche Wissenschaft, 1882 Books 1 to 4 while Book 5 done by 1887. 
Z: Also sprach Zarathustra 1883-1884. 
JGB: Jenseits von Gut und Böse 1886. 
GM: Zur Genealogie der Moral, 1887. 
GD: Götzen-Dämmerung, oder: Wie man mit dem Hammer Philosophiert, 1888. 
AC: Der Antichrist, 1888. 
 
English translations 
BT: The Birth of Tragedy, trans. Douglas Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
PTAG: “Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks,” trans. Duncan Large The Nietzsche 
Reader (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing House, 2006). 
 
1 The Colli-Montinari is the German critical edition of Nietzsche’s works (KSA) which covers the published 
and the unpublished texts in 15 volumes. Volumes one to six of KSA covers Nietzsche’s published works while 
volumes seven to thirteen comprise of unpublished materials ranging from 1880 to 1885. The unpublished 
materials are mainly Nietzsche’s notes, plans for possible works that never materialized, titles, table of contents 
for works and even extensive quotations and comments from/on some authors that were being read at the time. 
The Stanford University Press has embarked on the translation of Colli-Montinari’s edition into English as: The 
Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche which is currently underway and is planned to have 19 volumes. 
Already some volumes have been completed, such as Unpublished Writings from the Period of Unfashionable 





DS: “David Strauss, the confessor &Writer” in Untimely Meditations, trans. R.J. Hollingdale 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). 
HL: “On the Uses & Disadvantages of History for Life” in Untimely Meditations, trans. R.J. 
Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). 
SE: “Schopenhauer as Educator” in Untimely Meditations, trans. R.J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1983). 
RWB: “Richard Wagner in Bayreuth” in Untimely Meditations, trans. R.J. Hollingdale 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). 
HAH: Human All Too Human, A book for free spirits, trans. R.J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1986). 
AOM: “Assorted Opinions and Maxims” in Human All Too Human, A book for free spirits, 
trans. R.J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986). 
WS: “The Wanderer and his Shadow” in Human All Too Human, A book for free spirits, trans. 
R.J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986). 
D: Daybreak Thoughts on the prejudices of morality, trans. R.J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1982). 
GS: The Gay Science, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1974). 
Z: Thus Spoke Zarathustra, A Book for Everyone and Nobody, trans. Graham Parkes (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2005). 
BGE: Beyond Good and Evil, Prelude to a philosophy of the future, trans. Judith Norman, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
GM: On the Genealogy of Morality, trans. Carol Diethe (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006). 
TI: Twilight of Idols in Twilight of Idols and The Anti-Christ, trans. R.J. Hollingdale (London: 
Penguin Books, 1990). 
AC: The Anti-Christ in Twilight of Idols and The Anti-Christ, trans. R.J. Hollingdale (London: 
Penguin Books, 1990). 
NCW: Nietzsche Contra Wagner in The Portable Nietzsche, ed. Walter Kaufmann (New York: 
Penguin, 1982).  
EH: Ecce Homo, How one Becomes what one is, trans. Duncan Large (Oxford: Oxford 





WP: The Will to Power, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1968). The Notes in this work are mainly found in KSA volumes 11 to 13. 
 
Citing of Nietzsche’s works 
The standard practice is that Nietzsche’s works are cited according to sections. The 
section refers to an aphorism which ranges in size from a sentence to a paragraph or 
paragraphs. Hence, in this dissertation Nietzsche’s works are cited by number of the aphorism. 
For Instance, SE, § 3 implies Schopenhauer as Educator, aphorism number 3 or BGE, § 256 
refers to Beyond Good and Evil, aphorism 256. Such mode of citation affords easy reference 
notwithstanding the edition of Nietzsche’s particular work at one’s disposal. The exception to 
this procedure pertains to the citation from the Colli-Montinari critical edition of Nietzsche’s 
works. With Colli-Montinari two modes of references are employed: 1) In relation to the 
published works, the reference is made to the Volume and page. For instance, KSA,1, 420 
implies KSA, volume 1 and page 420. 2) In relation to the unpublished materials from the 
Notebooks and notes, reference is made to the volume, the Notebook number, and notes in 
square brackets. For instance, KSA 9, 11[141] implies volume 9, Notebook 11 and note 141. 
For SA, Dritter Band, §1, 313 implies Volume 3, aphorism number and page. 
Special note on the citations of Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Twilight of Idols and Ecce 
Homo: For Zarathustra I have consistently referred to the book, title of the section and where 
relevant to the aphorism number. For Instance, Z, III, (On the Vision and Riddle, 1) implies 
Zarathustra, Book three, section title and number. For Twilight of Idols, reference is made to 
the title of the section and the aphorism number as follows: TI “Skirmishes”, §39. And finally, 
for Ecce Homo, the sub-title within this work is given followed by the aphorism number. For 
instance, EH, “clever,” § 9 stands for Ecce Homo, section “Why I am Clever” and the aphorism 
number. There is also EH, “BT,” §2 implying Ecce Homo, sub-title “Why I write such good 
books” where Nietzsche avails prefaces to his works, like “BT,” “HAH,” “GS” i.e. The Birth 






I. The Research setting and question(s) 
The argument in this dissertation revolves around a positive reading of Nietzsche on 
the tragic nature of existence. The specific narrative being advanced is that for Nietzsche, the 
task of individual fashioning must be conceived and examined within the tragic nature of 
existence. In fact, it can be claimed that, on Nietzsche’s account, existence properly conceived 
as tragic ipso facto demands a qualitative individual response. I argue that the qualitative 
response amounts to an affirmation of life via cultivating singular individuality. These 
assertions respond to two related questions: What accounts for Nietzsche’s conception of 
singular individuality as a task? And how to create the necessary conditions for singular 
individuality? Nonetheless, this dissertation also toils with the question of communality and 
tragic existence. If existence is tragic within Nietzsche’s scope, then is a communal response 
tenable enough? Does the aporia of existence fundamentally demand an individual or 
communal response? These questions are precisely engaged with under Nietzsche’s 
Übermensch as the type which properly affirms existence as tragic. 
This research is conceived within two supposedly unrelated settings: Nietzsche’s 
philosophy of the type Übermensch and African ethno-philosophy. The two settings inevitably 
are responding to the same reality, the aporia of existence.  
Within Nietzsche scholarship there are two competing responses to the question of 
what Nietzsche is committed to. The first group of scholars, non-individualists, contend that 
Nietzsche is committed to the enhancement of the human species in general. In an attempt to 
support their human-enhancement stance, they refer among others to a text in Beyond Good 
and Evil where Nietzsche alleges: “everything evil, terrible, tyrannical, predatory, and 
snakelike in humanity serves just as well as its opposite to enhance the species ‘humanity.’”2 
Here, Nietzsche apparently addresses himself to optimum conditions for human enhancement. 
It is worth noting that these non-individualists draw their supporting claims largely from 
Nietzsche’s Nachlass material. But this may not necessarily invalidate their stance. 
The non-individualists also claim that Nietzsche is concerned with a form of human 
existence in terms of culture. Their notion of culture entails societies and states that lie between 
 





individual human and humanity. They augment their argument by alleging that Nietzsche 
values culture as culture, and not instrumentally, by appealing to Nietzsche’s praise of the 
Roman Empire.3 The proponents of the human-enhancement thesis hold that the passage says 
nothing explicit about the production of singular individuals. They hold that Nietzsche’s 
valorisation of the achievement of the Roman Empire must be taken in its own right, as the 
most grandiose form of organization under difficult conditions.4 Their overriding assertion is 
that cultures can be valued in their own right without necessarily appealing to the enhancement 
of singular individuals. The non-individualists apparently do not present a compelling 
argument contra the largely accepted position of Nietzsche that, the locus of value is ultimately 
the singular individual.  
The second group of scholars believe that Nietzsche envisages the attainment of 
individuality (the singular individual) or the life of the type Übermensch as the ethical task of 
his philosophy. This group relies partially on Nietzsche’s strong polemics against the state as 
a justification for their standpoint. To counter the claim of cultural valuation as an end in itself 
they appeal to Nietzsche’s observation that the individuals, not the masses, “form a kind of 
bridge across the turbulent stream of becoming.”5 Then, the task of critical history is spelt out 
as the mediation between individuals, inspiring the production of the great man. The 
proponents of this individuality stance rely partly on Nietzsche’s assertion that “the goal of 
humanity cannot lie in its end but only in its highest exemplars.”6 The highest exemplars as 
Nietzsche alleges from Schopenhauer as Educator onwards, are inseparable from individual’s 
response to life as tragic. Hence, I can claim that Ultimately, the overarching concern from 
Nietzsche’s standpoint is how to honestly respond to existence. This question demands a 
positive engagement with Nietzsche’s narrative on the aporia of existence. Hence, I will 
 
3 The text in question is from AC, §58: “That which stood aere perennius, the Imperium Romanum, the most 
grandiose form of organization under difficult conditions which has hitherto been achieved, in comparison with 
which everything before and everything since is patch-work, bungling, dilettantism . . . Christianity was the 
vampire of the Imperium Romanum —the tremendous deed of the Romans in clearing the ground for a great 
culture which could take its time was undone overnight by Christianity . . . this most admirable of all works of 
art in the grand style, was a beginning, its structure was calculated to prove itself by millennia—to this day 
there has never been such building, to build in such a manner sub specie aeterni has never been so much as 
dreamed of!” 
4
 Joe Ward, “Nietzsche’s Value Conflict: Culture, Individual, Synthesis” in Journal of Nietzsche Studies, Vol. 
41, No. 1 (Penn State University Press, Spring 2011): 7. 
5 HL, § 9. 





largely confine myself to the tragic aspect of Nietzsche’s thought as the justifier for singular 
individuality or otherwise.  
In his first published work, The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche references Silenus’ 
enigmatic response about existence: “not to have been born, not to be, to be nothing. But the 
second-best thing for you is—to meet an early death.”7 The terrors and horrors of existence 
are at the heart of Greek religion according to Nietzsche. Thus, religion served as a response 
to such existence. But Nietzsche wants to pose a radical question: how can man face existence 
on its own terms? One of the principal aims of this dissertation is to demonstrate that 
Nietzsche’s development of singular individuality, through the process of individual 
cultivation, is an attempt to solve the tragic aporia of human existence. It is on these tragic 
grounds and the ensuing singular individuality that I will critique aspects of African philosophy 
of sociality. 
Hence, this dissertation also seeks to evaluate the ethno-philosophical conditions of 
African thought that apparently privilege the communal over the individual. On the communal 
account, I will be arguing, firstly, that African communal tendencies are not first and foremost 
given, but are a response to the tragic nature of existence; secondly, that African philosophical 
discourse on sociality is partly reactionary in relation to Western discourse about Africa. In 
being reactionary, African philosophy of sociality largely fails on the existential aspect of 
appropriating the sense of the tragedy. This dissertation attempts to deconstruct some 
assumptions of African philosophy of sociality. One such assumption is the cliché that 
Africans are communal by nature. One ethno-philosophical communal phenomenon central to 
this dissertation is expressed in one ethnic group’s moral maxim as shienyu ni shienyu. This is 
a communal moral maxim among the Abaluyia ethnic group of Western Kenya which literally 
translates ‘your own is your own.’ However, what it stands for is far more than what it 
expresses. Fundamentally, this notion originates in the understanding of the African 
philosophy of sociality. In engaging with African philosophy of sociality the underlying 
question is: How tenable are the projections of communal moral maxims in facing existence 
in its actuality as tragic? 
 





The position of the philosophy of sociality is that the terrors of existence can only be 
encountered communally. However, this dissertation shows that the stance of African 
philosophy of sociality is challengeable even within the evolving African philosophy itself. 
Proponents of African philosophy of sociality, in their hasty search for identity-oriented 
approach to existence, imposing moral maxims are sought, and existential problems generally 
glossed over. The nagging question in Nietzsche’s narrative of existence as tragic is whether 
he has any social development parameters. Within what schemes could the communal or 
institutions be envisaged by Nietzsche? These questions are raised against the backdrop of a 
common belief that Nietzsche lacks a plausible social program. (Nietzsche talks of the great 
world of action). However, this dissertation will show that a credible social program could 
accrue from the commitment to existence as tragic. In addition, it will be shown that, when life 
is valorised from its existential demands, communal approaches as starting points could be 
inadequate. Having stated the underlying questions and context of the research, I now reaffirm 
the thesis as follows: Nietzsche’s stance on existence as tragic is the conditio sine qua non for 
individual autopoiesis and any critical dialogue with ethno-philosophy and cosmopoiesis. 
II.  The objectives of the research 
The first and very basic objective of this study is to understand Nietzsche’s position on 
singular individuality, how it can be undertaken and sustained within the conditions of the type 
Übermensch as the affirmer of life as tragic. The type Übermensch as the quintessence of the 
possibility for singular individuality will be studied with its allied themes of the will to power 
and the doctrine of the Eternal Recurrence. Nietzsche problematizes the modern culture based 
on how they enhance or limit individual perfection through autopoiesis. 
Secondly, the study seeks to show that, in dialogical terms, Nietzsche’s process of 
producing the singular individuality could be a valuable tool for evaluating some aspects of 
the African ethno-philosophy, particularly the communal aspect. It is demonstrated that fellow-
feeling is largely meant for the preservation of the ethnic group. Thus, moral maxims for 
fellow-feeling like shienyu ni shienyu are largely responding to an existential problem. The 
positive appropriation of Nietzsche’s affirmation of life as tragic requires moving beyond the 





communal identity schemes, which demands embracing the uncertain world. Hence, a 
movement is made from shienyu ni shienyu to shienyu ni shibala. 
And finally, given the experimental nature of Nietzsche’s critique, this study envisages 
individual autopoiesis as the enabler of cosmopoiesis. This innovation here is in the realization 
that Nietzsche’s philosophy of tragedy contains a highly compelling philosophy for social 
change through culture. Nietzsche’s commitment to the singular individual is not an end in-
itself. The cultivation of singular individuality could enable the transformation of customs and 
institutions of nations. Therefore, singularity/individuality is Nietzsche’s ground for values 
and as such is apparently central for responding to the complexities of human existence. These 
objectives are realized in five chapters divided into two parts: I. The conditions for individual 
autopoiesis, which entails chapters one, two and three. II. Dialogue with ethno-philosophy of 
shienyu ni shienyu and cosmopoiesis, covered under chapters four and five. But before the 
systematic presentation of these two parts, clarification of terms is needed. 
III.  Pertinent terminology and usage 
Autopoiesis 
 
In Nietzsche, the term autopoiesis as defined by the Greek Lexicon implies: ‘doing it 
of oneself; freely, spontaneously.’ For Nietzsche, the process of self-cultivation/autopoiesis 
entails overcoming. In this dissertation, autopoiesis implies self-cultivation/self-
production/self-making through the psychology of the Übermensch, which is overcoming. 
This is opposed to the prevailing sense in biological sciences where the underlining objective 
for autopoiesis is self-preservation. 
In the contemporary literary sense, autopoiesis is properly speaking a biological 
science concept. As such, autopoiesis is associated with living systems as autonomous self-
interpretative beings. In early 1970s, there arose academic interests on the link between 
biology and cognition. Two Chilean biologists, H.R. Maturana and F.J. Varela, sought for the 
relationship between cognition and living organisms. They realized that the main character of 





takes place in the dynamics of autonomy proper to living organisms as autopoiesis.8 
Furthermore, they affirmed what biology already knew, that the self-regeneration of the living 
organism is within a cultural, historical, and social context. What apparently intrigued them in 
their work with individual cells was the rationale behind the autonomy perceptible in the cells’ 
generation, remaking, and reformation. The whole process of continual self-making (described 
as generation, remaking and transformation) seems to be the very definition of life.  
Maturana explains that the origin of the term autopoiesis is from the dilemma in Don 
Quixote’s de la Mancha, whether to follow the path of praxis/arms or the path of poiesis 
/creation, production.9 Poiesis is selected as the description of the dynamics of autonomy in 
the living organisms. Hence, Maturana and Varela argue that an autopoietic system remakes 
itself through continual self-recreation, reproduction, reinvention, and renovation. As a 
system, an autopoietic structure “pulls itself up by its own bootstrap and becomes distinct from 
its environment through its own dynamics, in such a way that both things are inseparable.”10 
These dynamics of living systems are mostly for self-preservation, which is not the objective 
of individual autopoiesis in the case of Nietzsche, who privileges overcoming. 
Cosmopoiesis 
Cosmopoiesis is an architectural terminology understood as the action of “world-
making.”11 It starts from the world already in existence; thus, cosmopoietic making entails re-
making. The usage of this term in this dissertation implies the gradual transformation of the 
world envisaged through autopoiesis. Cosmopoiesis in this dissertation has connotations of 
social change as envisioned through Nietzsche’s philosophy. Nietzsche’s conception of social 
change is that it must be in tandem with the cultivation of the tragic attitude towards existence. 




8 H.R. Maturana and F.J. Varela, Autopoiesis and Cognition: The realization of the living (Boston: D. Reidel 
Publishing, 1980), XVII. 
9 H.R. Maturana, Autopoiesis and Cognition, XVII. 
10 Humberto R. Maturana and Francisco J. Varela, The Tree of Knowledge: the biological roots of human 
understanding, trans. Robert Paolucci (Boston: Shambhala, 1998), 46–47. 
11 Marco Frascari, Eleven Exercises in the Art of Architectural Drawing: Slow Food for the Architect’s 






The earliest trend associated with African philosophy is ethno-philosophy. Ethno-
philosophy is a neologism associated with Kwame Nkrumah. Nkrumah used the term ethno-
philosophy as an academic discipline. However, the association of the discipline of ‘ethno-
philosophy’ with African philosophy elicits serious critique. One basis for such critique is 
when African ethno-philosophy is presented as strongly normative and too broad in scope.12 
In so doing, such African ethno-philosophy tends to neutralize or erase contradictions and 
internal tensions in an ethnic reality. In this dissertation, the moral maxim shienyu ni shienyu 
fits such designations of ethno philosophy. Shienyu ni shienyu represents the normative notion 
of fellow-feeling where strong unanimity is highly espoused. 
Shienyu ni shibala is meant to be the opposite of what shienyu ni shienyu espouses, 
especially the erasing of existential contradictions. Instead, shienyu ni shibala implies ‘one’s 
own is the world.’ Shibala, as world, in this dissertation embodies the actuality of life as tragic, 
where existential enigma is not glossed over, but encountered. 
Négritude  
This term is derived from French ‘nègre.’ The African-Caribbean students in Paris, 
especially Senghor and Césaire, appropriated its noun form ‘Negro’ into a black consciousness 
movement called Négritude. In this dissertation, when implying a movement, I have constantly 
used ‘Négritude’ with an upper case. However, when it is simply used as a notion of either 
identity based on colour or expression of the existential reality of a people, I have used 
négritude with a lower case unless it is the beginning of a sentence. 
Individual, individuality, singular and singularity13  
Individuality/Individualité/Einzelheit: psychological nuance, the quality of being 
differentiated as a unique person. Individuality as being differentiated is related to what 
 
12 On the development of the concept ethno-philosophy and its weaknesses as a ‘philosophy’ see Marcien 
Towa, Essai sur la Probl'matique philosophique dans l'Afri que actuelle (Yaounde: Edititions CLE 1971); 
Kwame Nkrumah, The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah (Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson, 1957). 
13 One can refer to the following dictionaries for a more nuanced understanding. Raymond J. Corsini, The 
Dictionary of Psychology (Philadelphia: Brunner/Mazel, 1999); James Mark Baldwin, ed. Dictionary of 
Philosophy and Psychology (in three volumes), Volume 1 (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1901). It has 
an elaborate entry on the individual and the allied terms, and then, Mairi Robinson, ed. Chambers 21st Century 





psychologists call individualization. Generally, psychologists understand individuation as the 
process whereby an individual becomes distinguished from one or more others. In philosophy, 
individuality is understood as the quality or character belonging to an individual as a single 
entity. Philosophy throughout its history has attempted to define what constitutes individuality. 
Dun Scotus held individuality as a special form (haecceitas) responsible for individuation of 
every being, corporeal or incorporeal. The haecceitas is fused with common nature and 
accounts for the difference in everyone. 
The term individual has a long philosophical history and is rendered as individuus from 
Latin, implying undivided/indivisible, and in German as einzeln. An individual is also 
understood as a single being, distinct from a collection of beings or from a logical object of 
the general concept, or a being at least numerically distinct from all other beings. However, 
individual can technically imply singular and unique. “Singular,” from the Latin singulus 
(separate), signifies a single individual, unique, extraordinary, exceptional, or even unusual or 
strange and, from it, “singularity” (Latin, singularis) is derived as a reference to being singular, 
as are “peculiarity” and “individuality.”  
In this dissertation, singular individuality is mainly used and refers to the exceptional 
quality of being differentiated as an individual. And then the singular individual will imply the 
exceptional individual which Nietzsche designates as one marked with singularity.14 For 
Nietzsche, it is through the quality of singularity that individual uniqueness is manifested. In 
this dissertation the terms singularity/particularity/individuality; and singular one/singular 
individual are employed interchangeably. 
Type and typology  
A type in this dissertation is generally presented as an entity exemplifying some 
qualities of a higher or lower species. One of the entries in New Webster’s International 
Dictionary describes a type as determinable characters held in common of a homogenous 
human group.15 Then typology becomes a theory of types. However, more pertinently for 
Nietzsche, typology is about differences of value. There are two contrary types compared in 
this dissertation: the type last human being (Letzte Menschen) and the type Übermensch. When 
 
14 SE, §3. 
15 Philip Babcock Gove, ed. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, unabridged (Massachusetts: 





the two are compared, the last human being is considered the despicable type, while the 
Übermensch is viewed as the best type. The type last human being is despicable given that it 
fails to penetrate the basic problem of morality, which in Nietzsche’s purview is supposed to 
be life. In its failure, the type last human being resorts to universal-rationalistic principles. On 
this account the type last human being is also called the moral type. This type may not advance 
the course of individual autopoiesis.  
Contra the type last human is the type Übermensch which, on Nietzsche’s account, 
penetrates the basic problem of morality without seeking overarching principles. The type 
Übermensch is a psychological type, since it espouses the will to power as the guarantor of the 
nature of life. Such psychology of types cherishes reality as becoming, thus promising multiple 
possibilities. Throughout this dissertation, the term type when applied to the Übermensch 
designates the psychological type. Nietzsche’s term Übermensch has been left deliberately 
untranslated for lack of a proper English equivalent. The closest equivalent could be over-
human given the Mensch, but some opine that it is overman which is itself not without 
contestation.16 
IV. The Systematic presentation of the dissertation 
In Schopenhauer as Educator (1874), Nietzsche alleges that anyone who does not wish 
to belong to the mass needs only to cease taking himself easily. He goes on to demand that 
such a one ought to follow ‘his conscience’ which calls on him to follow this maxim: “Be 
yourself! All you are now doing, thinking, desiring, is not yourself.”17 Then later in the same 
work, Nietzsche claims that: “Each of us bears a productive uniqueness within, as the core of 
[our] being.”18 The awareness of this uniqueness necessitates the realization of what Nietzsche 
calls ‘a strange penumbra which is the mark’ of singularity. This singularity/individuality 
apparently is the antithesis of those who belong to the mass. One of the immediate questions 
could be, is being oneself equivalent to the attainment of individuality, assuming that 
individuality is related to uniqueness? In The Gay Science (1882) Nietzsche poses: “What does 
 
16 The translators involved in the project of The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche hold the position that 
Übermensch could be rendered in English as super-human. Part of their rationale is drawn from BGE, §294 
where the adjective Übermenschlich is used. 
17 SE, §1. 





your conscience say? – ‘You shall become the person you are.’”19 The meaning of ‘conscience’ 
here is not immediately clear.  
But from the various references about the ‘conscience,’ it is correlated to honesty and 
human instinctual nature. In fact, Nietzsche talks of the ‘intellectual conscience’ which he 
considers as a rarity. He claims “the great majority of people lack an intellectual conscience.”20 
Later in the same work, Nietzsche further inquires, “But why do you listen to the voice of your 
conscience? […] Have you never heard of an intellectual conscience? A conscience behind 
your ‘conscience.’”21 The intellectual conscience in Nietzsche must be linked to the basic 
constitutive element of the human beings, the drives. This conception of the human beings as 
drive-centred leads to Nietzsche’s fundamental drive, the will to power. 
Intellectual conscience as honesty obtains when one examines ‘oneself’ and realizes 
that there is no given unified ‘self’ but a multiplicity of drives that are in need of organization. 
For Nietzsche, the human being is “the animal whose nature has not yet been fixed.”22 The 
lack of a fixed nature is what characterizes the drives in general but more so the fundamental 
drive, the will to power, life. Hence, the task of giving style to oneself hinges on such a nature. 
The description for not being fixed or not already organized is chaos, change or simply 
becoming. Nietzsche claims: “We, however, want to become those we are – human beings 
who are new, unique, incomparable, who give themselves laws, who create themselves.”23 
Having a nature not yet fixed implies also some leeway of experimenting with oneself. 
Individual autopoiesis must then be founded on the chaotic/tragic nature in the sense of the 
indeterminate aspects of the human reality, the drives. 
Schopenhauer as Educator offers Nietzsche’s philosophical scheme owing to the 
pertinent theme of singularity and its underlying questions: How can your life, the individual 
life, receive the highest value, the deepest significance? How can it be least squandered? How 
can we find ourselves again? Nietzsche follows up these questions with what seems like his 
response: “Certainly only by your living for the good of the rarest and most valuable 
exemplars, and not for the good of the majority, that is to say those who, taken individually, 
 
19 GS, §270. 
20 GS, §2. 
21 Ibid., §335. 
22 BGE, §62. 





are the least valuable exemplars.”24 Nietzsche calls the exemplars ‘the rarest and most 
valuable.’ These are likely not particular human beings but a type which individuals strive to 
live by in response to the above questions. However, though we may have the type 
Übermensch as the ‘inducer’ to become what one is, such an ethical task is individually 
determined. This plethora of ‘hows’ does not end with early Nietzsche.  
Nietzsche’s last work Ecce Homo (1888) is subtitled ‘How One Becomes What One 
is.’ The standard entry point into this work is largely from some of its claims in the preface: 
“it seems to me essential to say who I am.”25 Nietzsche conceives who he is as a task. Above 
all, he embarks on such a task since he does not want to be mistaken. Hence, Ecce Homo has 
been mostly understood as Nietzsche’s self-explanation and self-justification.26 In the light of 
self-explanation and self-justification, the subtitle of the work could point to Nietzsche’s 
agenda: ‘How one becomes what one is,’ where the emphasis must be on the ‘how.’ 
Nevertheless, this ‘how’ is not a pointer to the work being a blue-print or a promising to be an 
ideal. In the work, Nietzsche alleges: “The last thing I would promise would be to ‘improve’ 
humanity. I do not set up any new idols; let the old ones learn what it means to have legs of 
clay.”27 The work is not offering a recipe since the author claims: “I don’t want any 
‘disciples.’”28 In furtherance of the claim that the book is not a hand-book, Nietzsche alleges, 
he never addresses crowds. In addition, Zarathustra advises his supposed disciples: “Now I bid 
you lose me and find yourselves.”29 It is my considered position that in Ecce Homo’s subtitle, 
Nietzsche manifests consistency about the need for exemplars. 
An exemplar as opposed to a model challenges one to become who he is by being 
faithful to one’s own path beyond the age. The exemplar induces or lures. Zarathustra plays 
the role of an exemplary figure. However, in Nietzsche, the greatest exemplary figure is the 
type Übermensch. Through the type Übermensch, Nietzsche envisions how the individuals 
could be induced to singular individuality through perpetual overcoming. In this regard, Ecce 
Homo’s ‘what one is’ could be largely about the type Übermensch. It through the type 
Übermensch that singular individuality could be justified and the conditions for individual 
 
24 SE, §6. 
25 EH, Preface, 1. 
26 Duncan Large, “Introduction” in Ecce Homo How To Become What You Are, XV. 
27 EH, Preface, 2. 
28 EH, “Destiny,” Preface, §1. 





autopoiesis envisaged. Such conditions are closely linked to the type Übermensch through the 
fundamental will, as will to power and the extra-moral life of the same as the affirmation of 
the Eternal Recurrence. The type Übermensch as the exemplary figure stands above drawing 
individuals onward and upward through self-overcoming to singular individuality. That 
overcoming demands espousing a basic drive to life as the will to power. 
Thus, the basic standpoint in this dissertation is that Nietzsche’s problematic claims 
about becoming who we are and the ‘how’ questions must be interpreted in the realm of life 
as will to power, in other words, espousing existence as tragic. The type Übermensch 
essentially epitomizes such an existence. However, whereas the type Übermensch demands 
individual response, some aspects within ethno-philosophical trends envisage communal 
response to existence as tragic. The weaknesses inherent in communal approaches can be 
discerned from Nietzsche’s own examples about the Greek and the Renaissance period and 
their ensuing institutions. The underlying position in Nietzsche is that singular individuality 
through individual autopoiesis is the guarantor of new world-making, cosmopoiesis. This is 
because singular individuality properly embarked on “does not close back upon itself, but 
transports itself beyond into the world.”30 In this regard, this dissertation presents: I. 
Nietzsche’s conditions that induce individual autopoiesis in the first three chapters, and II. The 
possible dialogue with ethno-philosophy and cosmopoiesis is developed in chapters four and 
five, respectively. The five chapters and their summative claims are as follows: 
 
Part I: Nietzsche Conditions for Individual Autopoiesis 
Chapter One, entitled ‘Nietzsche’s singular individual and the type Übermensch,’ 
focuses on two main aspects of the research, singular individuality, and the type Übermensch. 
The first part of this chapter is on one of the early works of Nietzsche, Schopenhauer as 
Educator. In this work, Nietzsche’s main theme is singularity as the adequate response to the 
aporia of existence. Allied to singularity are the conditions that may or may not promote such 
a task. For instance, the facilitating conditions include the need for taskmasters, exemplars, 
breeders, solitude, helmsmen of one’s life, honesty, and inducement to 
indeterminateness/untimeliness. The pertinence of these conditions is founded on the fact that 
 
30 Michael Haar, Nietzsche and Metaphysics, trans. Michael Gendre (New York: State University of New York 





Nietzsche considered the work Schopenhauer as Educator as his scheme and self-portrait. 
These conditions also colour the entire philosophical periods of Nietzsche. Unfortunately, 
these conditions have not been given sufficient weight in considering Nietzsche’s later themes, 
such as the Übermensch, the will to power, and the Eternal Recurrence of the same. 
The second part of this chapter shows that the conditions mentioned in many ways 
obtain in the role of the type Übermensch. The features presented in Schopenhauer as Educator 
as inimical to singular individual enhancement will, in the middle and later Nietzsche, count 
for the last human type. Such features include, espousing of utilitarian characters, such as 
desire for happiness, the masses, and morality of custom. In this regard, Schopenhauer as 
Educator could be considered as Nietzsche’s programmatic work where the conditions 
necessary for embarking on the task of singular individuality are introduced and later tackled. 
In Schopenhauer as Educator, the nature of the exemplar or taskmaster for the singular 
individual is not clear. On the contrary, it is largely the case later, that the type Übermensch, 
through its fundamental will as will to power, is the desiderata for the task of singular 
individuality. 
Chapter Two, ‘The Psychology of the type Übermensch,’ explains the grounds for 
regarding the Übermensch as the raison d'être for the task of singular individuality. In this 
chapter, the type Übermensch is explained based on the will to power as its constitutive nature. 
This is done first by brief analysis of Nietzsche’s understanding of psychology and will to 
power. Here the will to power is presented as the psychology of the type Übermensch and as 
the ‘affect of command.’ It is through the will as the ‘affect of command’ that the notion of 
the will to power is explained in its twin actions of overcoming and form-giving. Secondly, 
this chapter elucidates the type Übermensch under the auspices of form-giving. The considered 
argument here is that the type Übermensch in its efficacious act of form-giving sustains 
individuals espousing singularities. The type Übermensch in its pure becoming nature, requires 
validation. Thus, it validates itself through its possible forms which in this case are the singular 
individuals. Consistent with the constitutive nature of the type Übermensch, the ensuing forms 
are basically governed by the regime of drives as the basic units for realizing any individual 
singularity. On the grounds of how individuals organize their drives in alignment with or 





the problem in the organization of the drives is also largely influenced by the type of morality 
one endorses. 
Chapter Three, ‘The extra-moral life of the type Übermensch,’ shows the life akin to 
the action of the will to power as unintentional. Such life is beyond the judgemental concepts 
of good and evil. The life of the type Übermensch implies affirmation of becoming through 
and through, which is analysed through Nietzsche’s complex doctrine of the Eternal 
Recurrence. Because of its complexity, this chapter retrieves and interprets the doctrine as 
follows: 1) The brief historical note on Eternal Recurrence. 2) The prevailing scholarly 
approaches to the doctrine in Nietzsche. 3) The Eternal Recurrence in Nietzsche’s corpus. 4) 
The interpretation of the Eternal Recurrence as the formula of affirmation. 5) The extra-moral 
life of the type Übermensch. 6) Morality of custom. This chapter entails the heart of  this 
dissertation whereby  individual autopoiesis demands appropriation of the tragic. The 
appropriation of the tragic is akin to embracing life as will to power. The question is how could 
one affirm life in its extra-moral sense? For Nietzsche, the response lies in the acceptance of 
the doctrine of the Eternal Recurrence as an existential-ethical imperative. The doctrine of the 
Eternal Recurrence is traced from the ancient Greek philosophy of Heraclitus and the Stoics 
where there are at least two possible theories of it, as a cosmological or an anthropological 
theory. Embracing life in its tragic form as will to power, demands some edge over the 
cosmological or anthropological underpinnings of the Eternal Recurrence. Similarly, the 
generic prescriptive interpretation of Eternal Recurrence necessarily requires appropriation of 
it at the existential-ethical imperative level. It is as the existential-ethical imperative that the 
doctrine of Eternal Recurrence for Nietzsche becomes pertinent to individual autopoiesis. 
 
Part II: Dialogue with Ethno-philosophy and Cosmopoiesis 
Chapter Four, ‘The ethno-philosophy of Shienyu Ni Shienyu,’ attempts a different kind 
of response to existence from that envisaged by Nietzsche. One pertinent aspect of the ethno-
philosophy in question here is the ‘communal.’ Hence, a sense of the communal and its 
consequences on singular individuality is developed as follows: 1) Ethno-philosophy and 
communality, which also includes examining an ethno-genesis of the Abaluyia ethnic group in 
Kenya. 2) Shienyu ni shienyu as ethno-philosophy and its ontology is explored. 3) The 





with a critique. The overarching argument revolves around the understanding of the reality of 
the communal as a largely constructed sort of response to existential enigma. But, on the 
positive reading of Nietzsche’s philosophy on tragedy, the challenging fact for the communal 
approach is the appropriation of that enigma of existence at the individual level as the 
prerequisite for the task of singularity. The two models of African philosophy of sociality, 
fronted as Négritude and Ujamaa (espoused by Senghor and Nyerere respectively), obtain 
minimal success given their weakness on the notion of existential tragedy, partly due to 
universalistic approaches. The point is that embarking on a social development trajectory 
presupposes espousing the sense of the tragedy. 
Chapter Five, ‘From Autopoiesis to Cosmopoiesis,’ attempts to fashion Nietzsche’s 
philosophy of social change grounded in individual response to existence as tragic. In this 
regard, more clarity is sought on some attempts of social change devoid of the sense of the 
tragic as it is envisioned in Nietzsche’s philosophy. This is made operational through four 
themes that bring a closure to the entire thesis on individual autopoiesis and critical dialogue 
with ethno-philosophy and cosmopoiesis: 1) The general nature of autopoiesis in Nietzsche, 
where correlation between poiesis and tragedy is discerned. The very fact, of ‘making’ or 
‘cultivating’ presupposes some form of chaos. 2) Nietzsche on the perfection of the social 
world of humanity. This is first and foremost a presentation of Nietzsche’s envisaged social 
program that hinges on individual singularity. Then, secondly, Nietzsche’s own proof from 
history which affirms his claim that individual singularity is a necessary condition for bettering 
institutions and societies. 3) The notion of cosmopoiesis and the type Übermensch. 4) The 
movement beyond African philosophy of sociality. Such a movement, I suggest, gives a way 
forward: to an existential philosophy of sorts grounded on the African experience, from 
Césaire and Frantz Fanon’s perspectives; and the proposal to appropriate the tragedy through 
shienyu ni shibala as opposed to shienyu ni shienyu. 
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Part I: Conditions for Individual Autopoiesis 
 
Chapter 1:  Nietzsche’s Singular Individual and the 
Type Übermensch 
Each of us bears a productive uniqueness within him as the core of his being; and 
when he becomes aware of it, there appears around him a strange penumbra 
which is a mark of his singularity. Most find this something unendurable, because 
they are, as aforesaid, lazy, and because a chain of toil and burdens is suspended 
from this uniqueness. There can be no doubt that, for the singular man who 
encumbers himself with this chain, life withholds almost everything […] (SE, §3). 
Introduction 
In this chapter, the focus is on singular individuality and the type Übermensch from 
two broad approaches: (a) The development and the place of the singular individuality within 
Nietzsche's philosophy, especially how this notion pans out from Schopenhauer as Educator 
(which on the theme of singular individuality can be considered as Nietzsche’s scheme). In 
Schopenhauer as Educator, the focus on the questionableness of man is more pronounced; 
Nietzsche introduces the optimal conditions for production of the singular individual, 
particularly the role of the exemplar, and gives Schopenhauer’s traits as an exemplar/singular 
individual. (b) The link between the type Übermensch (the guarantor of the optimum 
conditions to produce the singular individual) and the singular individual; different nuances of 
the type last human and the type Übermensch. The overriding claim is that, though not 
introduced as a term at the beginning of Nietzsche’s works, the notion and function of the type 
Übermensch underlies Nietzsche’s commitment to singular individuality as the pivot for 
cultural enhancement. The full justification of this claim will entail the entire dissertation. 
This chapter is structured as follows: First is the presentation of Nietzsche’s theme of 
human existence as introduced in Schopenhauer as Educator, a scheme for his philosophical 
projections. The specific question is, how can tragic existence be encountered favourably? In 
his response, Nietzsche appeals to the figure of Schopenhauer as his exemplar which steadily 
develops into the need for breeders, taskmasters, and striving as the conditions for singular 
individual existence. Second is the theme of singularity in Schopenhauer as Educator, with 
the question, under what conditions is singularity envisaged? Third, I have argued that 
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generally for Nietzsche and not just in Schopenhauer as Educator, existence conceived as 
tragic demands singular individuality. And the final main argument is the introduction of the 
type Übermensch as the embodiment of the exemplar, striving, breeding and the affirmer of 
existence as tragic. In this regard, unlike the last human being who embodies self-preservation, 
the type Übermensch through overcoming seems to be the guarantor for singular individuality. 
1.1 Schopenhauer as Educator: Nietzsche’s Scheme 
There is a credible consensus among Nietzsche scholars that the The Birth of Tragedy 
and the Untimely Meditations contain fundamental themes that he later develops as the 
Übermensch and the will to power.1 R. Schacht claims that Nietzsche, both as a lecturer and 
in The Birth of Tragedy, is unwilling to conform to the disciplinary norms of classical 
scholarship and is largely anti-conventional.2 Instead Nietzsche’s preoccupations are with 
prevailing cultural, social, psychological, and philosophical issues. W. Kaufmann is more 
pointed in asserting that Nietzsche’s first works pose the problems and announce the major 
themes that he deals with later.3 The themes include Nietzsche’s polemics against the state and 
evaluations related to the pursuits of art, religion, and philosophy. For Kaufmann, Nietzsche 
saw the state as the archenemy of the concerns of art, religion, and philosophy. 
Schacht observes that generally Nietzsche is concerned with evaluative questions (such 
as that of existence) “posed but not resolved by ancient and modern cultural phenomena.”4 
Nietzsche looks for justification of life within Greek culture: how the Greeks endured and 
affirmed existence despite its absurdity and terror. It can be claimed that Nietzsche is 
committed more clearly to individual existence from the period of the Untimely Meditations 
onwards. This is because in The Birth of Tragedy, though it is asserted that existence is only 
justified as an aesthetic phenomenon, the singular individual is not pointedly proposed as the 
appropriate response to such existence. In Schopenhauer as Educator, individual singularity 
is aligned to affirmation of the tragic existence raised earlier in The Birth of Tragedy.  
 
1 The Untimely Meditations include: David Straus, the confessor and the writer (DS, 1873); On the Uses and 
Disadvantages of history for life (HL, 1874); Schopenhauer as Educator (SE, 1874) and Richard Wagner in 
Bayreuth (RWB) of 1876.  
2 Richard Schacht, Making Sense of Nietzsche: Reflections Timely and Untimely (Chicago: University of Illinois 
Press, 1995), 154. 
3 Walter Kaufmann, Nietzsche, Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist, 4th edition (New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press 1974), 122. 
4 Richard Schacht, Nietzsche (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983), 341. 
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At this point in this research, it can be claimed that Nietzsche’s problem is metaphysical 
(affirmation of existence) even though he may not be inclined to propose traditional 
metaphysical solutions. Such a claim is justified on the basis that Nietzsche is Heraclitean in 
his approach.5 Thus, his philosophy endeavours to affirm reality as becoming. Such a 
designation of reality is the radical way of expressing the nature of life which Nietzsche will 
later christen as the will to power. Life as will to power implies that it invents itself through its 
becomingness.6 The god Dionysus symbolizes the tragic element of reality, which in the last 
analysis is the one and only character in life. Ultimately the task of facing this subterranean 
reality of life is the individual’s. 
In Schopenhauer as Educator Nietzsche poses the question, “But how can we find 
ourselves again? How can man know himself?”7 Nietzsche poses these two specific questions 
after claiming that no one can construct for you the bridge of life, except you yourself. In what 
follows, the argument revolves around an individual response to existence as the main theme 
in Schopenhauer as Educator. M. Buber remarks that: 
The questionableness of man is Nietzsche’s real great theme, which engages him 
from his first philosophical efforts till the end. As early as 1874, in his study of 
Schopenhauer as an educator, he puts a question which is like a marginal note to 
Kant’s fourth question [Was ist der Mensch? -What is man?], and in which our age 
is mirrored […]: ‘How can man know himself.’8 
In this regard, the question of der Mensch as the singular individual is fundamental to 
Nietzsche’s attempt at the affirmation of tragic existence. Nietzsche is basically committed to 
the process of cultivating produktive Einzigkeit (productive uniqueness) within the individual. 
Nietzsche holds that when one becomes aware of internal uniqueness, “there appears around 
him a strange penumbra which is the mark of his singularity.”9 The theme of singular 
 
5 I have presented Heraclitus’s influence on Nietzsche at the end of this chapter and in a detailed manner in 
Chapter Three. According to Hans Urs von Balthasar, Nietzsche’s interest is becoming as “a form of reality,” 
given that reality is nothing but “pure becoming.” See Theo-Drama, Theological Dramatic Theory, Vol. 1 
Prolegomena, trans. Graham Harrison (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1988), 233. 
6 Nietzsche’s notion of will to power is dealt with in chapter two. Henri de Lubac describes Nietzsche’s reality 
of becoming in Dionysian terms as the “depth of being.” Refer, The Drama of Atheist Humanism, trans. Edith 
M. Riley (London: Sheed & Ward, 1949), 37. 
7 SE, §1. 
8 Martin Buber, Between Man and Man, trans. Ronald Gregor Smith (Mansfield: Martino Publishing CT, 2014), 
148. 
9 SE, §, 3; German text, “Schopenhauer als Erzieher” SA, §3. 
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individuality is fundamental to Nietzsche’s project, beginning from Schopenhauer as 
Educator. 
In his last published work, Ecce Homo (written in 1888 but published posthumously in 
1908), Nietzsche references Schopenhauer as Educator as the bearer of his innermost history 
and the inscription of his becoming: 
What I am today, where I am today—at a height where I no longer speak with words 
but with lightning bolts—oh how far away I still was then! —But I could see the 
land—not for one moment did I deceive myself about the path, sea, danger—and 
success!10 
Generally, Nietzsche is of the view that the untimely writings point the path to greatness and 
world historic tasks. I hold the position that the path to greatness presupposes embracing of 
existence as tragic with singular individuality as an envisaged product. These assertions 
support the validity of the thematic importance of Schopenhauer as Educator. 
A closely related theme to singular individuality that makes its appearance from the 
time of Schopenhauer as Educator is ‘the untimely nature’ of the philosopher. Nietzsche 
describes the philosopher as the enemy of his age, which implies being untimely. In 
Schopenhauer as Educator, Nietzsche sets the stage for the critique of his age and its 
institutions. In this work, Nietzsche envisages the individual as a great peering into the future 
(thus untimely). Therefore, Schopenhauer as Educator is likely Nietzsche’s own program of 
being untimely (singular individual). He asserts that: “it is basically not ‘Schopenhauer as 
Educator’ but his opposite, ‘Nietzsche as Educator’, who is given a chance to speak here.”11 
Nietzsche undertakes in Schopenhauer as Educator to educate (erziehen/educare) in singular 
individuality. The only other time that pointed reference is made to education is about 
Zarathustra, Nietzsche’s alter ego, as the teacher of the Eternal Recurrence. The doctrine in 
question is basically Nietzsche’s fine explanation of the tragic nature of existence. I have 
engaged with the doctrine of the Eternal Recurrence in Chapter Three. 
The importance Nietzsche attached to Schopenhauer as Educator is also reflected in 
his correspondence. In a letter of February 19, 1888 to G. Brandes he writes: “The two essays 
on Schopenhauer and Richard Wagner represent, it appears to me to-day, more self-
 
10 EH, “The Untimeliness,” § 3. 
11 Ibid.  
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confessions, above all, more avowals of self, than any real psychology of those masters who 
were both related to me as intimately as they were antagonistically.” Later, on April 10, 1888 
to Brandes again, and specifically about Schopenhauer as Educator, he writes, 
That little performance serves the purpose of a distinguishing mark; he for whom it 
does not contain much that is personal has in all probability nothing in common 
with me. The whole scheme according to which I have ever since lived is drawn up 
in it. It is a rigorous foreshadowing.12 
The argument here is that later major themes such as self-cultivation and the type Übermensch 
are prefigured in Schopenhauer as Educator through singular individuality. The image of the 
philosopher in Schopenhauer as Educator arguably enables Nietzsche to view the person of 
Schopenhauer as his exemplar. This is because Nietzsche understands philosophy as a way of 
life and not a system of doctrines to be passed on.13 
Schopenhauer is distinguished as a philosopher by Nietzsche, not so much by his 
writings, but by how he lived. Nietzsche is pointedly clear about who is an example to him. 
He says: “I profit from a philosopher only insofar as he can be an example. … This example 
must be supplied by his outward life and not merely in his books.”14 He goes on to provide an 
exemplary category: “in the way, that is, in which the philosophers of Greece taught, through 
their bearing, what they wore and ate, and their morals, rather than by what they said, let alone 
what they wrote.”15 In appealing to the Greeks’ usage of exemplar—das Bespiel—Nietzsche 
intends to avoid mere imitation. Apart from the imitation, the recourse to the Greeks for 
Nietzsche is intended to show that the Greek character of the ordering of chaos (the vagaries 
of existence) is exceptional. 
An exemplar is not to be taken as a model, given that, in exemplariness, there is a 
demand to remain faithful to one’s own path. In Nietzsche’s understanding, the role of the 
exemplar is the disclosure of the higher self. The higher self comes into view through the 
 
12 The two letters cited are from the translation by A.N. Ludovici, Friedrich Nietzsche, Selected Letters, Private 
correspondence (London: Soho Book Company, 1985), 329 and 338. 
13 Such a view about the Philosopher is prevalent in the lecture notes of Philosophy in the age of Greek tragedy, 
in Schopenhauer as Educator and later in the Beyond Good and Evil. 
14 SE, §3. 
15 Ibid. 
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confrontation with what one trusts and admires in the exemplar.16 Thus, Nietzsche in 
Schopenhauer as Educator masks himself since he apparently does not prescribe for the 
readers an ideal to follow, but persuades them to a higher self. However, Nietzsche also takes 
Schopenhauer as the exemplar who challenged him to a conception of who he wanted to 
become. Brandes observes the following on Schopenhauer's influence on Nietzsche:  
It was a liberating educator of this kind that Nietzsche as a young man looked for 
and found in Schopenhauer. Such a one will be found by every seeker in the 
personality that has the most liberating effect on him during his period of 
development. Nietzsche says that as soon as he had read a single page of 
Schopenhauer, he knew he would read every page of him and pay heed to every 
word, even to the errors he might find. … It is true that for Nietzsche, as for any 
other aspirant [intellectual], there remained one more step to be taken, that of 
liberating himself from the liberator.17  
The standard position is that it is Schopenhauer’s life that educated Nietzsche to the possibility 
of thinking and living, not only above his age, but also independent of the exemplar. It made 
Nietzsche the untimely figure that he became. The figure capable of the type of education 
envisaged in Schopenhauer as Educator and later demonstrated in Thus Spoke Zarathustra 
through the Eternal Recurrence. Schopenhauer serves as exemplar for Nietzsche because he 
was considered so thoroughly a singular one. Hence, Schopenhauer as Nietzsche’s exemplar 
educates him to a life of fearless independence which is inherently the process to singular 
individuality (finding oneself). 
Nietzsche gives the figure of Schopenhauer as one of the possible means of reflecting 
on what singularity entails. Nietzsche says of Schopenhauer's exemplarity, 
[C]ertainly there may be other means of finding oneself, of coming to oneself out 
of the bewilderment in which one usually wanders as in a dark cloud, but I know of 
none better than to think on one’s true educators. And so today I shall remember 
one of the teachers and taskmasters of whom I can boast, Arthur Schopenhauer.18  
Schopenhauer is remembered as “des einen Lehrers und Zuchtmeisters” (one of the teachers 
and taskmasters). The term ‘Zucht’ (which implies breeding and rearing and even can refer to 
 
16 James Conant, “Nietzsche's perfectionism: A reading of Schopenhauer as Educator” in Cambridge 
Companion to Nietzsche, eds. Bern Magnus and Kathleen Higgins (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996), 203. 
17 George Brandes, Friedrich Nietzsche, An Essay on Aristocratic Radicalism (New York: Haskell House 
Publishers, 1972), 10. 
18 SE, §1. 
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cell culture) is prevalent in Nietzsche’s literature. It is associated with breeding of animals and 
plants. In Anti-Christ, Nietzsche talks of what type of human being “one ought to breed.”19 
Then in Ecce Homo, he talks of Selbstzucht (as breeding oneself).20 This is another trait of the 
exemplar apart from being provocateur to individual self-improvement, he also breeds. 
The breeding that Nietzsche probably has in mind is the one which most resembles 
nature. In reference to culture as liberation, he states that “it is imitation and worship of nature 
where nature is in her motherly and merciful mood, it is the perfecting of nature when it 
deflects her cruel and merciless assaults and turns them to good […].”21 Culture as liberation 
at the moment for Nietzsche must imbibe the ways of nature. Nature’s ways entail both 
enabling and constraining aspects leading to optimal condition for any flourishing. I think 
Nietzsche is attempting to understand the modus operandi of nature and its possible application 
to how a human being may flourish. It is a fine observation, but on Nietzsche’s own account 
later, nature itself acts for no purpose (see  Chapter Three). Nevertheless, the constraints act as 
enforcing agents, and that justifies the reference to taskmasters (Zuchtmeister as a sort of 
breeder). In Schopenhauer as Educator, Nietzsche lays out his plan on the main question: ‘how 
can your life, the individual life, receive the highest value, the deepest significance?’ The 
tentative response so far is that for individual uniqueness to flourish it needs an exemplar who 
functions as an inducer and a breeder. Now the focus turns specifically to singular individuality 
and its need for exemplars in Schopenhauer as Educator. 
1.1.1 Singularity in Schopenhauer as Educator 
In Schopenhauer as Educator, Nietzsche talks of timidity-cum-laziness as 
characteristics of people of many lands. Nietzsche claims that, “The man who does not wish 
to belong to the mass needs only to cease taking himself easily; let him follow his conscience, 
which calls to him: ‘Be your self! All you are now doing, thinking, desiring, is not you 
yourself.’”22 Nietzsche recognizes physio−psychological challenges towards the affirmation 
of one’s uniqueness (fear and laziness). In the same text, Nietzsche is subtle: “One has to take 
 
19 AC, §3. 
20 EH ‘Untimeliness,’ §3. 
21 SE, §1. 
22 SE, §1. 
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a somewhat bold and dangerous line with this existence. …”23 The starting point in this case 
for Nietzsche is that the realization of singular individuality is fundamentally a task. 
On singular individuality in Nietzsche as a task, Rudolf Steiner observes that: “The 
single human being does not become ‘perfect’ when he denies himself and resembles a model, 
but when he brings to reality that within him which strives towards realization.”24 Nietzsche’s 
concern is fear and laziness, which result in hiding behind customs and opinions. Nietzsche is 
arguably tackling that which constrains the individual to fear and fail embarking on the task of 
singular individuality. William Hubben, reading Nietzsche on the singular individual, opines 
that Nietzsche wants no disciples, but new “single ones” at a time when the average mass man 
no longer counts.25 The path to singular individuality is unusually inseparable from banishment 
of fear and laziness. The individual acting like a member of the herd will possibly be deemed 
lacking in singular individuality.  
Nietzsche ascribes to Schopenhauer some characteristics as the greatest exemplar of 
singular individuality. For Nietzsche, a true philosopher as an educator implies one “who could 
raise [himself] above [his] insufficiencies insofar as these originated in the age and teach [him] 
again to be simple and honest in thought and life, that is to say to be untimely. …”26 How did 
Schopenhauer educate Nietzsche to untimeliness/singularity? 
Nietzsche references Schopenhauer as a teacher who raised himself above the 
insufficiencies of the age (the mass, the crowd). On exemplars in Nietzsche’s philosophy, 
Steven V. Hicks and Alan Rosenberg believe that Nietzsche’s exemplars (in this case 
Schopenhauer) offer a partial answer to the question, ‘How can one become what one is?’ The 
exemplary figure enables individuals to strive to become who they really are, their own selves. 
Furthermore, exemplary figures are designed to entice individuals into something 
"untimely."27 The exemplar in Schopenhauer as Educator lures one to experience the world 
differently and to think differently about the same. This is basically the world as becoming. 
 
23 SE, §1.  
24 Rudolf Steiner, Friedrich Nietzsche Fighter for freedom, trans, Margaret Ingram deRis (New Jersey: Rudolf 
Steiner Publications, 1960), 66. 
25 William Hubben, Dostoevsky, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Kafka, Four Prophets of our Destiny (New York: 
Collier Macmillan Ltd, 1962), 102. 
26 SE, § 2. 
27 Steven V. Hicks and Alan Rosenberg, “Nietzsche and untimeliness: The philosopher of the Future as the 
Figure of Disruptive Wisdom” in Journal of Nietzsche studies, no. 25 (Penn State University Press, Spring, 
2003): 8–10.  
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But aligning individuality with untimeliness poses a challenge about its concreteness. Since 
the moment individuality is attained, one becomes timely (member of the age) and as such 
ceases to be untimely. On this account, some Nietzsche scholars on individuality like Werner 
Hamacher believe individuality must oscillate between generality and specificity.28 This 
means that even the notion of singular individuality is betrayed by generalized conceptual 
language. Hence, singular individuality must be conceived within the realm of becoming as 
ever a work in progress. The enigmatic nature of singularity is expressed by Nietzsche in 
Schopenhauer as Educator. 
Nietzsche enumerates what he calls constitutional dangers that threatened 
Schopenhauer. He mentions isolation, despair of the truth, and discovery of some limitations 
within. It is in relation to these dangers that Nietzsche asserts, 
Each of us bears a productive uniqueness within him as the core of his being; and 
when he becomes aware of it, there appears around him a strange penumbra which 
is a mark of his singularity. Most find this something unendurable, because they 
are, as aforesaid, lazy, and because a chain of toil and burdens is suspended from 
this uniqueness. There can be no doubt that, for the singular man who encumbers 
himself with this chain, life withholds almost everything—cheerfulness, security, 
ease, honour—that he desired of it in his youth; solitude is the gift his fellow men 
present to him; let him live where he will, he will always find there the desert and 
the cave. Let him see to it that he does not become subjugated, that he does not 
become depressed and melancholic.29 
The complexities of singularity in Nietzsche lie in this text. One could view it as a summary 
of sorts regarding Nietzsche’s philosophical task of education to singular individuality. The 
text contains pertinent constraints for the process of singular individuality. The constraints 
include facing tragic existence singularly, toils, solitariness, and continuous self-cultivation. 
Elaboration on these aspects demands closer analysis of the italicized parts of the text. 
The key word from the highlighted text is singularity. The term Ungewöhnlichen is 
used twice in the above text. In the first instance it is in relation to a ‘strange penumbra’ which 
is seen as a mark of singularity (der des Ungewöhnlichen), and then secondly as the singular 
man (den Ungewöhnlichen). The adjective ungewöhnlich communicates several nuances: 
 
28 On Werner Hamacher's conception of Nietzsche and individuality refer to Werner Hamacher, "Disgregation 
of the will: Nietzsche on the individual and individuality" in Reconstructing individualism-Autonomy, 
Individuality, and the self in Western thought, Thomas C. Heller, Morton Sosna, and David E. Wellbery, inter 
alia (California: Stanford University Press, 1997), 106–121.  
29 SE, § 3 My emphasis. 
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unusual, extraordinary, particular, and even exceptional. The accusative noun form, den 
Ungewöhnlichen, apart from singularity, could also imply particularity, as in the exceptional 
one or the unusual one in terms of differentiation. 
Being the unusual one/single one is largely unendurable. That is because singularity 
entails constraints that can withhold some utilitarian needs, such as happiness. The utilitarian 
needs mentioned by Nietzsche are cheerfulness, security, ease, and honour. Nietzsche will later 
critique the utilitarian notion of happiness as too limited a goal to strive for. The mentioned 
needs can be regarded as timely. But Nietzsche conceives Schopenhauer as his untimely 
teacher, and it is in this un-timelineness that the constitutional dangers are presented. Now how 
does the figure of Schopenhauer embody the above passage on singularity? The answer may 
not lie in the timely utilitarian needs. 
For Nietzsche, though consisting of danger, the manifestation of singular individuality 
in life is an ethical task. How is Schopenhauer an exemplar in expressing that uniqueness? 
Nietzsche says, “I am describing nothing but the first, as it were physiological, impression 
Schopenhauer produced upon me, that magical outpouring of the inner strength of one natural 
creature on to another [ …].”30 The magical outpouring (Ausströmen) of inner strength is most 
likely the expression of Schopenhauer’s singularity.31 On the manifestation of individuality 
Nuno Nabais claims that Nietzsche “adopts an interior viewpoint, conceiving the individual 
[…] from, precisely, his individuality.”32 The linking of uniqueness (core of the human being) 
with singularity/individuality is considerably consistent with Nietzsche’s concern: Aber wie 
finden wir uns selbst wieder? Wie Kann sich der Mensch kennen? (But how can we find 
ourselves again? How can man know himself?).33 These questions touch on the individual 
existential challenge: “How can the individual life (des Einzelnen Leben) retain the highest 
value (Werth) and the deepest significance (Bedeutung)?”34 The answer to such a question for 
Nietzsche cannot be sufficiently sought in those who are fettered by fear and convention, those 
without liberation, but in those who strive for singular individuality. 
 
30 SE, §, 2. 
31 The prefiguration of the notion and role of the will to power. 
32 Nuno Nabais “The Individual and Individuality in Nietzsche” in A Companion to Nietzsche, ed. Keith Ansell 
Pearson (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Limited, 2006), 79. 
33 SE, §1. 
34SE, §6. For some reflection on this text, refer to Vanessa Lemm, “Is Nietzsche a perfectionist? Rawls, Cavell, 
and the politics of culture in Nietzsche's Schopenhauer as educator” in Journal of Nietzsche Studies, No. 34 
(Penn State University Press, Autumn 2007): 10. 
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1.1.2 Elements of Schopenhauer’s Singular individuality 
a. Honesty and Cheerfulness that Enlivens 
For Nietzsche, Schopenhauer as his exemplar is compounded of three elements: 
honesty, cheerfulness, and steadfastness. Nietzsche’s exemplary figure, Schopenhauer is 
“honest because he speaks and writes to himself and for himself, cheerful because he has 
conquered the hardest task by thinking, and steadfast because he has to be.”35 Concerning 
Schopenhauer’s honesty, which in this case means being candid (erhlich), he is described as 
one who “never wants to cut a figure: for he writes for himself and no one wants to be deceived, 
least of all a philosopher who has made it a rule for himself: deceive no one, not even 
yourself!”36 To understand the possible import of honesty ascribed to Schopenhauer, one must 
read further where Nietzsche observes, 
That there is something called honesty and that it is even a virtue belongs, I know, 
in the age of public opinion to the private opinions that are forbidden; and thus I 
shall not be praising Schopenhauer but only characterizing him if I repeat: he is 
honest even as a writer; and few writers are honest that one ought really mistrust 
anyone who writes. I know of only one writer whom I would compare with 
Schopenhauer, indeed set above him, in respect of honesty: Montaigne.37 
Through Montaigne, the possible meaning of honesty as referenced to Schopenhauer and 
singularity can be discerned. Nietzsche scholars hold the possible reason that drew Nietzsche 
to Montaigne is the latter’s respect for sceptics. 
In The Gay Science, Nietzsche joins what he calls “subtler honesty and skepticism.”38 
Nietzsche must have learned the link between honesty and scepticism from Montaigne. 
According to Richard H. Popkin, “Montaigne explicitly rejected academic skepticism. He 
regarded the claim that nothing could be known as just the kind of dogmatic assertion the 
sceptic should reject, and he did not approve of any appeal to probable judgement, as that too 
involves assertion.”39 Montaigne’s thinking is based on the inability of human beings to find 
a satisfactory criterion of knowledge. Thus, in such a situation of inadequacy Montaigne thinks 
 
35 SE, §2. 
36 Ibid. 
37 SE, § 2. On Montaigne, called Michel Eyquem, later Seigneur de Montaigne, refer to the Introduction of The 
Essays of Michael Lord of Montaigne, trans, John Florio, Vol. 1 (London: J.M. Dent &Sons Ltd, 1910), VII–X. 
38 GS, § 110. 
39 Richard H. Popkin, “Scepticism, Renaissance” in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward Craig 
(London: Routledge, 1998), 503. 
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that people should suspend judgement on all matters.40 Apart from suspending judgement, 
generally custom, traditions, and social norms could be followed, but un-dogmatically, where 
toleration for different viewpoints is encouraged.  
J. B. Schneewind writes that Montaigne “declared himself a devout Catholic and 
submitted his judgement in matters of faith to the church, but there was nothing in the human 
realm, including the practices of Christians that he did not look at afresh."41 Considering the 
two testimonies (Popkin’s and Schneewind’s), it can be plausibly inferred that Montaigne’s 
scepticism is not about Cartesian in-dubitability of knowledge but is informed by the diverse 
manifestation of life. Nevertheless, the life of scepticism may not appeal to the majority. For 
instance, if a person is going through some turmoil in life, the last thing such a person requires 
is being sceptical about the situation. But as Schneewind observes, a life of sceptical 
tranquillity could be available at most for the privileged few.42 The honesty of Montaigne for 
Nietzsche lay in his scepticisms based on life forms. Robert Miner holds that “Nietzsche 
ascribes honesty to sceptics partly because he admires their resistance to those who try to force 
a decision on ultimate questions.”43 The sceptic resists the temptation to form judgements 
unrelated to the nature of things. For Nietzsche, Schopenhauer understood how to express the 
profound with simplicity, without rhetoric, while remaining strictly scientific without pedantry 
(dogmatism). Hence, honesty for Nietzsche in this case is the resistance to believing errors, or 
simply the will not to be deceived. Montaigne’s honesty and scepticism led Nietzsche to 
consider him the ‘freest and mightiest of souls.’ These attributes could as well serve as the 
qualities of Montaigne’s singular individuality.  
In Nietzsche’s estimation, honesty and scepticism are pointers to the ‘becoming nature 
of reality’ which is intrinsic to the nature of singular individuality. In Human All Too Human, 
convictions are explained as originating from laziness, which stifles becoming. The inertia of 
the spirit (laziness) lets opinions “stiffen into convictions.”44 The problem of convictions is the 
belief in the possession of unqualified knowledge or the existence of unqualified truth which 
compromises the spirit of becoming. Nevertheless, Nietzsche believes the one “whose spirit is 
 
40Popkin, “Scepticism, Renaissance”, 503. 
41 J. B. Schneewind, Moral Philosophy from Montaigne to Kant, An Anthology, Volume I (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990), 16. 
42 Schneewind, Moral Philosophy from Montaigne to Kant, An Anthology, Volume I, 17. 
43 Robert Miner, Nietzsche and Montaigne (Waco: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 15. 
44 HAH, § 637. 
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free and restlessly alive can prevent this stiffening through continual change. …”45 Some years 
later in Anti-Christ, Nietzsche associates Zarathustra, the teacher of the type Übermensch with 
not being deceived: “One should not let oneself be misled: great intellects are sceptics. 
Zarathustra is a sceptic.”46 The simple, unpretentious approach forms the bulk of Nietzsche's 
historical philosophizing where the focus is on the Heraclitean approach. 
The Heraclitean approach in standard Nietzsche scholarship entails communicating 
becoming without unconditioned claims to truths, and the endeavour to understand the human 
being as a historical product through and through. In this regard, Jonathan Philippe, reading 
Nietzsche from the Deleuzian perspective, observes that the world in flux only acquires sense 
through values created within it by individuals in the process of becoming.47 In Nietzsche, both 
scepticism and honesty operate within the realm of becoming. I hold that the realm of 
becoming is the ‘space’ within which Nietzsche envisages the fashioning of singularity. 
Nietzsche seems to express the potential of the domain of becoming under the aegis of what 
he calls Versuchen wir’s espoused by Montaigne.48 Montaigne's scepticism is experimentally 
based because, as Schneewind opines, 
[I]t could not be cured by finding a new and unshakeable foundation. Rather, 
Montaigne's skepticism was much more Pyrrhonic. It arose from the contrarieties 
that Montaigne found—and delighted in—between one opinion and another, 
between customs in one country and those in another, between his own opinions 
when young and his opinions when old, and, not least, between firm declarations 
on the subject of how to live and vacillating practice by those who made them.49 
This observation mirrors Montaigne's focus, which is about how to live and what to live for. 
Nietzsche's interests are existential and thus Montaigne must have been his natural choice in 
such an endeavour. The element of honesty yields another trait: cheerfulness as the fruit of 
what Nietzsche calls the ‘hardest task.’ From the middle period when Nietzsche introduces the 
doctrine of Eternal Recurrence, he calls it “The greatest weight”50 and “the hardest idea,”51 
 
45 HAH, § 637.  
46 AC, § 54. 
47 Jonathan Philippe, “Nietzsche and Spinoza: New Personae in a New plane of Thought” Jean Khalfa and 
Gilles Deleuze, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Gilles Deleuze (London: Bloomsbury publishing, 2003), 
52. 
48 GS, §51. 
49 Schneewind, Moral Philosophy from Montaigne to Kant, An Anthology, Volume I, 16. 
50 GS, §341. 
51 WP, 1059. 
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among others. I will return to the theme of Eternal Recurrence in Chapter Three. For now, it 
suffices to observe that cheerfulness as the fruit of the hardest task is further evidence that 
Schopenhauer as Educator introduces themes which are elaborated on in middle and later 
Nietzsche. 
As with honesty, Nietzsche links the cheerfulness that cheers with Montaigne: 
Schopenhauer has a second quality in common with Montaigne, as well as honesty: 
a cheerfulness that really cheers. … For there are two very different kinds of 
cheerfulness. The true thinker always cheers and refreshes, whether he is being 
serious or humorous, expressing his human insight or his divine forbearance; 
without peevish gesturing, trembling hands, tearfilled eyes, but with certainty and 
simplicity, courage and strength, perhaps a little harshly and valiantly but in any 
case as a victor: and this it is—to behold the victorious god with all the monsters he 
has combated—that cheers one most profoundly.52 
Before expounding on different nuances of cheerfulness, I need to establish the compelling 
link of cheerfulness with Montaigne. In his address to the reader, Montaigne makes it clear 
that his writings are basically his self-portrayal, and hence not simply for public opinion. He 
says, “I desire therein to be delineated in mine own genuine, simple and ordinary fashion, 
without contention, art or study; for it is myself I portray. My imperfections shall therein be 
read to the life, and my natural form discerned.”53 The thrust of Montaigne’s self-portrayal is 
that there is a convergence between honesty and cheerfulness. This aspect is reflected in his 
volume, Essais de Michel de Montaigne, conveniently called Essays. 
For Montaigne, the Essays are the essays of his form of mind, his ideas and those of 
the authors he read and people he met, judged against his own. Ultimately, the Essays become 
Montaigne’s signature stamp on the good and rejection of counterfeit.54 The Essays signify 
Montaigne’s position on life’s different aspects, which include the pains that are crucially 
important for his self-fashioning. Thus, ‘the cheerfulness that enlivens,’ is the product of the 
continual striving against many trials and errors that aid in self-fashioning.  
Through essaying (attempting, notion of experimenting above) Montaigne portrays 
who he is. In the process of attempting (which entails the pain of endless searching and 
uncertainty), it becomes inevitable that “Self-portrayal is inseparable from self-examination 
 
52 SE, §2. 
53 “The Author to the Reader” in The Essays of Michael Lord Montaigne, trans, John Florio, Volume One, 15. 
54 M.A. Screech, Montaigne & Melancholy, The Wisdom of the Essays, new edition (London: Duckworth, 
2000), 13. 
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and self-discovery.”55 Genuine cheerfulness for Montaigne must be aligned to the struggles 
related to self-examination, where self-examination is marked by the desire not to deceive 
oneself. The cheerfulness that results from the process of self-fashioning (is intrinsically 
coupled with multiple trial and error) and is different from mere self-contentment. Nietzsche 
calls cheerfulness accruing from the process of self-fashioning a ‘cheerfulness that cheers,’ 
(which is the fruit of victory over one’s laziness). Now Nietzsche’s position on two distinct 
forms of cheerfulness and how they are linked to singular individuality can be explained. 
Nietzsche believes that true thinkers’ cheerfulness is founded on some form of struggle. 
He explains that cheerfulness which cheers is not a given, it is a task that is linked to a god 
who must combat all the monsters (cheerfulness in this metaphoric sense implies victory over 
monsters). Nietzsche observes that the penumbra of singularity is found unendurable for two 
reasons: (a) laziness, and (b) the toil and burdens suspended on this uniqueness. And yet, the 
‘singular individual,’ as the one who encumbers himself with this chain of toil and burdens 
and overcomes it through strength and courage, acquires cheerfulness.56 Nietzsche applies the 
cheerfulness that accrues from such striving for singularity to “the works of true thinkers just 
as much as … to any work of art.”57 In this regard the works of art and thinkers will be 
applicable to singular individuality as a fruition of the process. 
Consequently, singularity-cum-cheerfulness can be interpreted as an attempt in 
encountering existence on its own terms. The justification for such interpretation is that the 
content of cheerfulness is the striving over the dreadful, and the serious problems of life (the 
monsters). Cheerfulness, as the fruit of honesty about human reality, apparently supplants the 
‘cheerfulness one encounters in mediocre writers.’ In the words of R. Lanier Anderson, “True 
cheerfulness cannot be simple happiness. It is essentially an equanimity restored.”58 In this 
regard any cheerfulness that does not recognize the life monsters (nature of existence as tragic) 
degenerates into a mediocre, superficial form. 
 
55 R. Lanier Anderson and Rachel Cristy, “What Is ‘The Meaning of Our Cheerfulness’? Philosophy as a Way of 
Life in Nietzsche and Montaigne” in European Journal of Philosophy (John Wiley &Sons Ltd, 2017), 1525. 
Refer also to The Essays of Michael Lord of Montaigne, Volume II, trans, John Florio (London: J.M. Dent & 
Sons Ltd), "Of giving a lie", 18:392. 
56 This is the real cheerfulness that Nietzsche refers to as wirkliche erheiternde Heiterkeit—the cheerfulness 
that really enlivens. 
57 SE, §2. 
58 R. Lanier Anderson and Rachel Cristy, “What Is ‘The Meaning of Our Cheerfulness’? Philosophy as a Way 
of Life in Nietzsche and Montaigne,” 1523. 
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b. The Deceptive Cheerfulness 
The second kind of cheerfulness following Nietzsche’s description is the timely type. 
The cheerful thinker, as opposed to the true thinker, “simply does not see the sufferings and 
the monsters he purports to see and combat; and his cheerfulness is vexing because he is 
deceiving us: he wants to make us believe that a victory has been fought and won.”59 This 
observation about the outlook of the cheerful thinker given the example he cites of David 
Strauss, mirrors Nietzsche's views in the first Untimely Meditation. One of the main concerns 
in the first Untimely Meditation is ‘Bildungphilister.’ 
For Nietzsche the cultural philistines are generally those who do not know or simply 
refuse to accept that “the way toward a national culture is difficult and supremely strenuous.”60 
The lack of acknowledgement of the treacherous path to culture is due to what Nietzsche calls 
Zufriedenheit (contentedness). The contentedness here applies to those who ‘believe that they 
are in possession of a genuine culture,’ (die zufriedenen—the happy ones). The contented, 
those living without much self-knowledge yield a species of man called cultural philistines 
(which may not be an encouraging species to singular individuality). For Nietzsche the 
contented ones are the antithesis “of the man of genuine culture.”61 It can be discerned from 
Nietzsche’s negative stance on cultural philistines that the powers of conventions and the lack 
of the sceptical spirit lead to an atrophic scenario (self-satisfaction) where one lives in delusion 
without much ado. 
Nietzsche is critical of complacency throughout his philosophical project. In his middle 
period, self-satisfaction is exemplified by the fettered spirit and morality of customs.62 In the 
later period, the tendency to complacency is notable in the last man and slave morality.63 
Nevertheless, for Nietzsche, Strauss is a type of cheerful thinker because of what he represents. 
In Nietzsche’s estimation, Strauss’s style in his work (Der alte und neue Glaube, The 
Old Faith and the New, 1872) represents all that is plebeian and expedient. It is projected as a 
hindrance to the understanding of culture as a response to the tragic. The situation of the 
cultural philistine is relevant to this research (on tragic existence and the singular 
 
59 SE, §2. 
60 See introduction Friedrich Nietzsche's Untimely Meditations, by J.P. Stern, IX. 
61 DS, §2. 
62 This stance is mainly in the Human All Too Human dealing with the “The Tokens of Culture” and in 
Daybreak, Book 1. 
63 These themes are prevalent in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Prologue, and BGE, §256. 
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individuality). Given its tendency to promote recourse to tacit conventions about life, cultural 
philistinism compromises the need for individual striving. Such conventions are apparently 
inimical to the cultivation of the singular ones.64 Their degeneration lies in what Nietzsche 
calls: “imponierende Gleichartigkeit (impressive homogeneity), tutti unisomo—everybody, 
together.”65 The system of tutti unisomo is antithetical to culture in so far as homogeneity is 
valorised for its own sake. It is contrary to the conditions that are necessary for culture to 
flourish. For Nietzsche, culture is understood as “the child of each individual’s self-knowledge 
and dissatisfaction with himself.”66 And anyone who believes in culture ipso facto holds, “I 
see above me something higher and more human than I am; let everyone help me to attain it, 
as I will help everyone who knows and suffers as I do. …”67 For Nietzsche, privileging 
contentment on the one hand and lack of self-knowledge on the other may be inimical to human 
flourishing. For culture to flourish, upholding the tragic aspect of life as becoming is 
necessary.68 
The situation of the cheerful thinkers is compromising because there is no struggle, no 
dissatisfaction, but complacency, and yet victory is claimed. Such a scenario simply lacks the 
ingredients for the cheerfulness that cheers, one founded on honesty about tragic human 
existence. Therefore, the cheerful thinker’s claim to cheerfulness is delusive. Nietzsche 
remains critical throughout his philosophical corpus of any projections of life without risks. It 
is in the recognition of existence as a creative risk that individual daring is plausible and 
pertinent. The enduring task of humankind according to Nietzsche in Schopenhauer as 
Educator is: „die Menschheit soll fortwährend daran arbeiten, einzelne grosse Menschen zu 
erzeuge—und dies und nichts anderes sonst ist ihre Aufgabe.“ (Humankind should continually 
work at the production of individual great human beings—that and nothing else is the task).69 
Nietzsche takes the cue from the species of the animal or plant world whose concern is 
supposedly nothing but the individual higher exemplar (einzelne höhere Exemplar) that is 
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more uncommon (ungewöhnlichere), more powerful (mächtgere), more complex 
(kompliziertere) and more fruitful (fruchtbarere). 
1.1.3 Failure to Emerge from Animality 
Nietzsche envisages ‘great human beings’ as “those true human beings, those who are 
no longer animals, the philosophers, artists and saints.”70 In this context, the great human 
beings are responsible for the awakening and lifting of culture. In the context of culture, 
Vanessa Lemm believes that, in Nietzsche, what distinguishes “the human animal from other 
animals is its culture.”71 Now, this culture is largely understood as a phenomenon of life. For 
Jeffrey Church, Nietzsche distinguishes between good and bad culture based on their 
production of great human beings.72 This is because for Nietzsche culture is about fostering 
the best exemplary individuals who in a unique manner espouse existence in its own terms. In 
Schopenhauer as Educator, the three images of philosopher, artist, and saint characterize those 
who have an inkling about the sense of life. 
To live as an animal is described by Nietzsche as a harsh punishment. Two forms of 
suffering are discernible in Nietzsche’s corpus. One is the meaningless suffering which is 
ascribed to animals where the underlying fact is preservation. The second form is the 
affirmative type of suffering which is associated with those who seek to fashion themselves as 
singular individuals. The second form of suffering is redemptive and is associated with self-
overcoming.73 The animalistic suffering entails hanging on to life "with no higher aim than to 
hang on to it; not to know that or why one is being so heavily punished but, with the stupidity 
of a fearful desire, to thirst after precisely this punishment as though after happiness—that is 
what it means to be an animal. …”74 Nietzsche already hinted at this state of affairs in relation 
to self-satisfaction and utilitarianism, where number decides, yet what is truly needed is value. 
Animal existence, being meaningless (Sinnlos), needs redemption, which is only possible 
when it is transcended through the act of singular individuality. The process of redemption is 
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what the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence ultimately entails as a selective project.75 According 
to Maudemarie Clark and Monique Wonderly, for Nietzsche, communal life is simply the 
continuation of animality.76 This assertion must be interpreted in relation to a life of 
contentment coupled with a desire for happiness. 
Nietzsche’s commitment is that through singular individuality, life, though tragic, can 
be affirmed. Hence, simply desiring a life of happiness, one does not rise above the horizon of 
animals. Instead “he only desires more consciously what the animal seeks through blind 
impulse.”77 The hardest reality about happiness desired here is that, it is what the majority “do 
for the greater part” of their lives according to Nietzsche. Those who fail to emerge from the 
conundrum of simple happiness tend to remain in the domain of animality. Such a domain is 
characterized by the suffering that “seems to be senseless.”78 The gravity of senseless suffering 
is expounded on by Nietzsche in the contestation between understanding of Eternal Recurrence 
as cosmological and ethical-imperative.79 In aligning animality and suffering, there is a 
discernible inherent demand: The justification for existence as an individual undertaking 
(affirmation of life). 
Proper exposition of how animality ought to be understood in relation to individuality 
needs a brief consideration of what Nietzsche says about the morality of custom. Nietzsche 
appeals largely to a hypothetical situation of primitive morality as custom. In Daybreak he 
writes, 
Originally all education and care of health, marriage, cure of sickness, agriculture, 
… traffic with one another and with the gods belonged within the domain of 
morality: they demanded one observe prescriptions without thinking of oneself as 
an individual. Originally, therefore, everything was custom [morality understood 
here as obedience to customs, and customs implies the traditional ways of behaving 
and evaluating that is informed fundamentally by appeal to a higher authority] […] 
The most moral man is he who sacrifices the most to custom […] Self-overcoming 
is demanded, not on the account of the useful consequences it may have for the 
individual, but so that the hegemony of custom, tradition, shall be made evident in 
 
75 See Chapters Three and Five. 
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despite of the private desires and advantages of the individual: the individual is to 
sacrifice himself – that is the commandment of morality of custom.80 
Primitive humanity from Nietzsche’s perspective is basically anti-singular individuality, given 
that the community hegemony takes precedence. Nietzsche acknowledges the underlying 
reason for such a scenario. The breaches of custom portended danger for the whole community. 
Hence, for the sake of the harmonious functioning of the community, deviation accruing from 
individual desires was discouraged. In this situation of primitive humanity (where morality is 
custom), Nietzsche seems simply to state the situation and reason why the community was 
valorised. 
But interpretively, primitive humanity simply endeavoured to preserve itself. For 
Nietzsche, life where individual desires and advantages are undermined, and communal 
interests are privileged, qualifies as an animal existence. This means that the concerns raised 
against the morality of custom and the valorisation of the communal over and against the 
individual can be pertinent. 
Nietzsche’s assertion is that usually we fail to emerge from animality and, in such a 
case, our suffering seems senseless. The reason for failure is due to fear and laziness in facing 
existence. Nietzsche posits from the text immediately after our animality that “there are 
moments when we realize this: then the clouds are rent asunder, and we see that, in common 
with all nature, we are pressing towards man as towards something that stands above us.”81 
The immediate context of the text seems to imply, that we become aware of the need to rise 
above animals when life is desired not merely for the sake of happiness. However, more 
remotely and importantly, the realization emerges when laziness-cum-fear are overcome. This 
is Nietzsche’s solution to the question about the constraints that make the individual (den 
einzelnen) to think and act like a member of the herd, and thus lack joy in himself. 
In a later period, the polemical Nietzsche uses the term ‘herd’ and even ‘rabble’ for 
those devoid of singular individuality. For instance, in On the Genealogy of Morality he says, 
“[W]herever there are herds, it is the instinct of weakness that has willed the herd. … For it 
should not be overlooked: the strong are as naturally inclined to strive to be apart as the weak 
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are to strive to be together. …”82 It must be noted that for both the weak and the strong, there 
is striving. The articulation of the slave/weak and master/strong types requires Nietzsche’s 
psychology of types that is taken up in the next chapter. The point here is that the master type 
displays mastery over the self and the high form of singular individuality. On the other hand, 
the weak type is restrained by external forces amounting to inner enslavement since inner 
power is lacking (weak singularity/atrophic or lack of it thus amenable to the herd). 
Nonetheless, in the current context, strong and weak could be justified in terms of the 
cheerfulness that cheers, and the cheerful thinker that is considered above. The cheerfulness 
that cheers though a fruit of a painful process yields some qualitative individual. 
There is a sense in which one can say that being individual empirically (as an 
indivisible entity in terms of spatio-temporal domains) is not in doubt. Instead the qualitative 
aspect of living as an individual (singular individuality) is where the task lies. Nietzsche is not 
only critical of the crowd, but his criticism is mostly directed at the individual members of 
such categories or even types, like the last man. In this regard, John Richardson’s assertion 
that Nietzsche favours and seeks to promote the individual who stands apart from the herd, the 
one who strives to be an exception and not simply like the others, can be understood as 
credible.83 This is because the quality of an individual is what is at stake for Nietzsche. Hence, 
strong or weak individuals are so rendered in terms of singular individuality. The designation 
proper to the individual must be from the value-laden domain, which is singular individuality.  
1.1.4 The Individual and Singular Individuality 
There are two concurrent standpoints in Schopenhauer as Educator concerning the 
individual and singular individuality. First and foremost, Nietzsche acknowledges the 
existence of every empirical individual as the concrete individual over and against his 
neighbour. For the individual (and neighbour) as an empirical entity there is not only numerical 
difference (due to individuals being in the same genus and species), but also a spatio-temporal 
difference. It is in a such sense (spatio-temporal) that the individuum ought to be understood 
as the concrete reality. Individual as empirical refers to that which is not only indivisible, but 
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also particular, as opposed to the logical/abstract universal. In Schopenhauer as Educator there 
is a conception of the individual from the standpoint of singularity/particularity. 
Singular individuality in Schopenhauer as Educator is made possible or impossible 
based on the response to tragic existence. Singular individuality one’s affirmation of the 
empirical existence as an individual is not given (as the case of the individual as the 
individuum). Hence, singular individuality must be a task. Hollingdale’s translation of der des 
Ungewöhnlichen and den Ungewöhnlichen is singularity and the singular man respectively.84 
This is the translation generally accepted even in contemporary Nietzsche literature. Other 
terminologies like einzigkeit (uniqueness) and Einmalig (unique, singular) are essential 
subsidiaries to the overarching term ‘Ungewöhnlich.’ 
On the relationship between the individual and singular individuality, Nabais says that 
“Nietzsche endeavors to justify the empirical existence of each individual, on the basis of an 
imputed, equally empirical, individuality.”85 The standard position is that Nietzsche adopts the 
interior viewpoint by conceiving the individual in terms of both particular and singular terms 
through individuality as the foundation. Nietzsche himself affirms existence as inherently an 
individual endeavour. He posits, “why pay heed to what your neighbour says?’ For Nietzsche, 
the activity of existence as individual is perhaps based on the understanding that: “[t]here exists 
in the world a single path along which no one can go except you: whither does it lead? Do not 
ask, go along it.”86 This means that numerical difference as a trait of the individual is 
incomplete without an internal character to account for a genuine individual. Through singular 
individuality as a task, numerical difference is turned into real difference. For 
singularity/individuality is generally expounded as a process “by which each individual frees 
himself of his general features.”87 Singularity is the quality of the human being who does not 
wish to belong to the mass. 
For Nietzsche, the fear of being oneself originates from the knowledge of life as ‘dark 
and veiled.’ In the Second Untimely Meditation, life is described as “that dark, driving power 
 
84 Refer to SE, §3. Though the rendering of singularity and the singular man, is largely credible, there are other 
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that insatiably thirsts for itself.”88 The insatiability of life could be designated differently in 
Nietzsche: in Chapter Two it will be related to  the will to power and in Chapter Three  to the 
notion of time and the challenge of willing backward. Nietzsche’s singular individual is 
necessarily associated with ‘he who has looked at the scary existence.’ So far, this chapter has 
investigated the elements that inform Schopenhauer’s exemplarity/singularity according to 
Nietzsche: honesty and its fruit, cheerfulness. It has also explored the theoretical conditions 
and obstacles for or against singular individuality. In what follows I attempt to show that the 
appropriate response to the nature of existence (taken on its own terms as tragic) is the 
promotion of singular individuality.  
1.1.5 Affirmation of life: Justification for Singular Individuality 
Nietzsche arguably gives a summary of cultural enhancement in the following text 
from Beyond Good and Evil: 
The discipline of suffering, of great suffering—don’t you know that this discipline 
has been the sole cause of every enhancement in humanity so far? The tension that 
breeds strength into the unhappy soul, its shudder at the sight of great destruction, 
its inventiveness and courage in enduring, surviving, interpreting, and exploiting 
unhappiness, and whatever depth, secrecy, whatever masks, spirit, cunning, 
greatness it has been given:—weren’t these the gifts of suffering, of the disciple of 
great suffering?89 
At the beginning of this chapter, Nietzsche notes the need for the taskmaster, a position he 
carried into the later period. The picture Nietzsche paints in this text is what has evolved so far 
as the underlying current for the singular individuality. That singular individuality demands a 
response to existential obstacles through self-discipline, self-overcoming, and honesty as 
dispositions towards life. In the words of David Owen, Nietzsche envisages the recognition of 
the in-eliminability of tragedy in life as the necessary feature for production of the singular 
individual.90 In this section the claim to be examined is that Nietzsche believes that existence 
in its tragic form is itself a taskmaster and as such demands and can breed singular 
individuality. It should be noted that the unpacking of this claim will entail the psychology of 
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the type Übermensch and the morality of the type Übermensch (considered in Chapters Two 
and Three). 
Though Nietzsche’s understanding of tragedy in terms of terror is derived from 
Schopenhauer, his response to the same seems to be inspired by the Greeks. For Schopenhauer, 
poetry is generally understood as the objectification of the picture of the human condition 
expressed in individual characters. He regards tragedy in terms of poetry, as the summit both 
in greatness of the effect and the difficulty of achievement. The purpose of that highest 
achievement of tragedy, Schopenhauer says, 
is the description of the terrible side of life. The unspeakable pain, the wretchedness 
and misery of mankind, the triumph of wickedness, the scornful mastery of chance, 
and the irretrievable fall of the just and the innocent are all here presented to us; and 
here is to be found a significant hint as to the nature of the world and of existence.91  
For Schopenhauer, tragedy manifests not only the terrible side of life, but apparently is the true 
image of existence. Encountering this Schopenhauerian image of existence is Nietzsche's 
theme from the early to the late works. In the Birth of Tragedy, for instance, on How Art 
Enchants and Seeks to Heal the Horrific he says: “only she [art] can reshape that disgust at the 
thought of the horrific or absurd aspects of life into notions with which it is possible to live: 
these are the sublime, the artistic taming of the horrific, and the comic, the artistic discharge of 
disgust at the absurd.”92 Here, the response to that horrific existence is affirmation of life 
through the sublime (see Chapter Three on laughter). As such, Nietzsche envisages the sublime 
as the artistic conquest of the horrible. 
For Nietzsche, the Greeks are the example of those who looked with boldness into the 
dreadful destructive turmoil of world-history and into the cruelty of nature without yielding to 
Buddhistic resignation.93 Hence, though Schopenhauer’s philosophy is spot on in diagnosing 
tragedy as existential sickness, it fails according to Nietzsche in its prognosis and prescriptions. 
Nietzsche turns to Greek art as a bulwark against Schopenhauer's philosophical pessimism 
toward life. 
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But Nietzsche's figure of the Schopenhaurean image of man embodies some of the 
necessary traits that made him (Schopenhauer) an exceptional figure: “The Schopenhauerean 
man voluntarily takes upon himself the suffering involved in being truthful, and this suffering 
serves to destroy his own wilfulness and to prepare that complete overturning and conversion 
of his being, which it is the real meaning of life to lead up to.”94 Where other common human 
beings seek to conserve their inadequacies and humbugs, those who understand singular 
individuality as a task continuously undertake to overcome them. The singular individuals’ 
(overcoming ones) being truthful towards existence implies believing in an existence that can 
in no way be denied, since it is itself true and without falsehood. 
For Nietzsche, individuals seeking singular individuality descend into the depths of 
existence with a string of curious questions on their lips: why do I live? What lesson have I to 
learn from life? How have I become what I am and why do I suffer from being what I am? 
Such a figure seeking singular individuality torments itself and sees how no one else does as 
he does. The overtones from Montaigne are palpable in this string of questions. Given that, 
Montaigne’s project entailed “writing his life as he lived and perceived it, suppressing nothing, 
altering nothing untouched by his own way of articulating it. Questions of how to live and 
what to live for were among his interests.”95 Thus, honesty taken to its utmost bounds can be 
tormenting since it cannot but touch on the senseless nature of existence. Such deep probing 
and scary undertaking inform Church’s assertion that Nietzsche’s contribution to culture is the 
articulation of the severity of the existential problem.96 The tragic nature of existence can 
necessarily be only affirmed by the individual from the singular individuality perspective.  
The idea of the tragedy occurs throughout Nietzsche’s corpus. In Nietzsche’s own later 
description of tragedy, he relates it to the Dionysian/life affirmation. He observes that the 
psychology of tragedy is:  
‘Saying yes to life, even in its strangest and hardest problems; the will to life 
rejoicing in the sacrifice of its highest types to its own inexhaustibility—this is what 
I called Dionysian, this is what I understood as a bridge to the psychology of the 
tragic poet. Not freeing oneself from terror and pity, not purging oneself of a 
dangerous emotion through a vehement discharge—such was Aristotle’s 
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misunderstanding of it—but, over and above terror and pity, being oneself the 
eternal joy of becoming, that joy which also encompasses the joy of destruction.’97 
This text is elaborately explained in chapter three in relation to the doctrine of Eternal 
Recurrence which entails the eternal joy of becoming that includes destruction. The simple 
description of the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence in this context is the ethical imperative of 
appropriating the becoming nature of life. That appropriation entails recognition of the 
struggles, striving and failures in life. The affirmation of life is being over and above the terrors 
and pity of existence. For offering oneself as an individual to something higher than oneself, 
is what tragedy entails. 
The affirmation of life entails affirming reality as flux. The individual who subscribes 
to the becoming nature of life, in Nietzsche’s view, is free of the terrible anxiety which death 
and time evoke. The individual’s justification for the tragedy is that “at any moment, in the 
briefest atom of his life’s course, he may encounter something holy that endlessly outweighs 
all his struggle and all his distress.”98 This is what Nietzsche calls having the sense of the 
tragic. The affirmation of life (Ja-sagen) is necessarily linked to tragedy, and thus to singular 
individuality. Nietzsche envisages the task of internalizing the sense of the tragic (the sense of 
becoming and the will to power) first on the individual level, then by the community, as the 
only hope and guarantee for the future of humanity. 
In the preface to Ecce Homo, Nietzsche remarks, “I am a disciple of the philosopher 
Dionysus; I would prefer to be a satyr rather than a saint.” Then later in the same work while 
presenting The Birth of Tragedy, on the affirmation of life as being over and above the terror 
and pity, he remarks, “In this sense I have the right to see myself as the first tragic 
philosopher—which means the polar opposite and antipodes of a pessimistic philosopher.”99 
The immediate thought here about a pessimistic philosopher must be about Schopenhauer. 
Nietzsche agrees with Schopenhauer on the tragic nature of life, however, he differs from 
Schopenhauer on the affirmation of that tragic existence. 
For Schopenhauer, given the tragic nature of existence, one of the possible solutions is 
a denial of the individual affirmation of life. Schopenhauer prefers a return to a unity that 
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overcomes individuation (the denial of becoming). This is because for Schopenhauer, the 
world is essentially a monstrosity of energy which is undifferentiated, like the will. Instead for 
Nietzsche, individual affirmation of life is the correct response. Regarding Nietzsche as an 
affirmer of life, Bernard Reginster believes that Nietzsche sees the affirmation of life as his 
defining achievement in philosophy.100 The import of Reginster's assertion can be plausibly 
read as a commentary on Nietzsche’s above text on saying yes to life. In addition to 
acknowledging the tragic aspect of life and its appropriation, it must be added that affirmation 
of life presupposes a human being with a developed sense and affirmation of 
individuality/singularity. Nietzsche links, and credibly so, singular individuality with tragedy, 
becoming, and the will to power. 
By calling himself the disciple of Dionysus, Nietzsche simply means that he is the 
ultimate affirmer of the tragic. With the designation a ‘disciple of Dionysus,’ Nietzsche 
positions himself possibly as the one who has overcome. Whether such a projection of 
Nietzsche is plausible may only be evaluated in line with his claims on Eternal Recurrence. 
Nietzsche reiterates that we learn from the Greeks the meaning of tragedy as the innermost 
foundation of the life of a people. For tragedy both fights mysterious battles and seeks a 
necessary healing. (The two concepts of overcoming and transfiguration are discernible). The 
notable point is that Nietzsche finds in the interplay of the Dionysian and Apollonian actions 
the individual principle: 
We know now that whenever a group has been deeply touched by Dionysiac 
emotions, the release from the bonds of individuation results in indifference, or even 
hostility, towards political instinct. On the other hand, Apollo, the founder of states, 
is also the genius of the principium individuationis, and neither commonwealth nor 
patriotism can subsist without affirmation of individuality.101 
In this text, Nietzsche, through the interplay of Dionysian and the Apollonian forces makes it 
possible to affirm and link the tragic not only with singular individuality, but with development 
of states. It is through the Dionysian force (the feeling of fullness) that the singular individual 
surpasses the determinate institutional arrangements that may scuttle the path to singular 
individuality. 
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However, the Apollonian drive provides the needed individual forms to such Dionysian 
force, enabling the possibility of empirical existence. The interplay between the two in the 
tragedy of life is a continuous process. In this regard, the tragic gives us the image of life as 
the reflection of the human condition as singular. On Nietzsche’s understanding of tragedy and 
the singular, Schacht observes that the prevailing perception occurring here is of human 
individual existence “as existence that is individual rather than merely a part of an 
inexhaustible and indestructible flow of life, and that is human rather than above and beyond 
the conditions to which man is subject.”102 There is an inseparable link between tragedy, 
singular individuality and becoming. 
Existence as tragic is always in the state of flux (constant becoming). If singular 
individuality as a work in progress is to be embarked on, then the reality to be incorporated 
into the individual is that of becoming. Singular individuality, like becoming for Deleuze, 
signifies a “vitalistic” process composed of multiplicity of forces that have ontological priority 
over the domains of society and history.103 For it not to slide back to the mass, the singular 
individual needs to be constantly and consistently attracted to becoming. The focus now shifts 
to the demonstration of how the type Übermensch and the singular individual can justify each 
other.  
1.2 The Übermensch and the Singular Individual 
In Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche says that the philosopher, “being necessarily a 
person of tomorrow and the day after tomorrow, has, in every age, been and has needed to be 
at odds with his today.”104 Nietzsche referred to this characteristic of a philosopher in relation 
to his Schopenhauer as the untimely figure. The philosopher overcomes the age/type in 
himself. From the last section, it emerges that Nietzsche prizes aversion, resistance, and 
opposition (overcoming). Nietzsche values such traits of aversion because they can contribute 
to the production of the singular individual. The singular individual is what Daniel Conway 
refers to as the “philosopher’s next self.”105 In this second section of the chapter, the overriding 
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claim is that the singular individual, to maintain overcoming, needs the type Übermensch. But 
more pertinently, the link between the type Übermensch and the singular individual is 
grounded in Nietzsche’s notion of the will to power as overcoming and form-giving (discipline 
and generative power). In the first section of this chapter, the need for discipline/overcoming 
(constraints or dissatisfactions or breeders) is stressed. In this second section, the stress is on 
the optimum environment for overcoming (becoming) and introduction to the possible 
mechanism (the will to power) of fashioning singular individuality. 
The singular individuality as work in progress must be continuously and steadfastly 
fashioned. It is the passion to overcome that ultimately entails affirmation of life as the 
characteristic note of singular individuality. Singular individuality as a task is “never already 
given, it is what gives itself up projects itself—out of the future as a possibility for the present, 
what has always not quite yet given itself up. … Indeed, there can be no life except where this 
individuality opens itself onto a future possibility.”106 Hence, it can be claimed that singular 
individuality (in its steadfastness) must presuppose some form of in-determinancy. This claim 
is based on Nietzsche’s assertion in Schopenhauer as Educator that “your true nature lies, not 
concealed deep within you, but immeasurably high above you, or at least above that which you 
usually take yourself to be.”107 Church notes that the deep within and high above are correlated. 
After going down to human contradictory nature, there is a need to transcend such a nature and 
seek determination for life.108 It can be submitted that this ‘high above you’ is the prefiguration 
of Nietzsche’s later figure of the type Übermensch. As will be elaborated below, the type 
Übermensch functions as a taskmaster that excites the individual to its qualitative character of 
individuality. 
This indeterminate figure (the type Übermensch) is the possible guarantor for the 
possibility and steadfastness of singular individuality as a task. Hicks and Rosenberg believe 
that Nietzsche’s figures often offer a peculiarly disruptive kind of enticement. The two further 
hold that the figures are designed to ‘persuade’ Nietzsche’s readers into something ‘untimely,’ 
they lure readers into experiencing the world differently and thinking differently about the 
world.109 The type Übermensch not only manifests to the individual the basic material inherent 
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in him, but more importantly it is an experimental figure. The experimentality of the 
Übermensch is generally understood to hinge on persuasion as a style that is open to risks and 
offers possibility for co-existence of different perspectives. I now examine some of these 
claims about the experimental nature of the Übermensch as a term and its appearance in 
Nietzsche's own published works. 
1.2.1 The Übermensch in Nietzsche’s Published Works 
Scholars like Kaufmann and Babette Babich trace the meaning of Nietzsche's 
Übermensch from the 2nd century AD satirist Lucian. Kaufmann links Lucian's hyperanthropos 
with Nietzsche’s Übermensch, on the grounds that Nietzsche as a classical philologist studied 
Lucian.110 On the other hand, Babich probes more through the study of Lucian's Kataplous.111 
Lucian in this work presents a tyrant by the name Megapenthes who passes into the 
underworld. Though the tyrant was powerful on earth, he realizes that the transition to the 
underworld means total democratization (equalization), no poor or rich. In death the powerful 
Megapenthes is stripped of his position (the trappings of power) and possessions. Owing to 
Megapenthes’ power and influence he convinces Micyllus the shoemaker to see him as the 
superman (blessed and taller than the rest of mankind), a hyperanthropos who seemed like a 
divinity. 
However, after death, Megapenthes, (once distinguished as a higher man in the world 
above, and now in the world below/underworld) looks ridiculous. In the underworld, Micyllus 
laughs at not only the look of Megapenthes, but at himself for once standing in awe of that 
trash.  
Babich's inclusion of Lucian’s satire into the projection of Nietzsche’s Übermensch is 
partly due to the play on the terms: above and below; esoteric and exoteric. More importantly, 
the use of satire to explain the human phenomenon of power embodied in hyperanthropos is 
interpreted as ridiculous. This use of satire aligns Lucian’s Kataplous with Nietzsche's work 
Zarathustra (in which Zarathustra is the teacher of the Übermensch), which is partly seen as 
parodic. 
 
110 Kaufmann, Nietzsche, Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist, 307. 
111 This work is translated as “The Downward Journey, Journey into the Underworld.” This explanation is based 
on Babette Babich “Nietzsche Zarathustra and Parodic style: On Lucian's Hyperanthropos and Nietzsche’s 
Übermensch” in Diogenes 58,  no.4: 58–74. 
 
  31 
 
The second preface to The Gay Science links the work Thus Spoke Zarathustra to 
parody apart from tragedy. Nietzsche holds that, it is not only the poets and their beautiful 
lyrical sentiments that vent sarcasm. Rather, Nietzsche asks: “[W]ho knows what victim he is 
looking for, what monster material for parody will soon attract him? ‘Incipit tragoedia’ we 
read at the end of this awesomely aweless book. Beware! Something downright wicked and 
malicious is announced here: incipit parodia, no doubt.”112 This is a reference to Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra, the work that follows The Gay Science. Describing Zarathustra as a parody seems 
to implicate Übermensch as a satirical figure. 
The Übermensch is at the heart of Zarathustra, where the main theme is affirming 
tragic existence. To do that one needs parody. The inseparable link between tragedy and 
parody in Nietzsche is evident from the period of The Birth of Tragedy where the comic is 
interpreted as the artistic discharge of disgust at the absurd.113 The standard interpretation 
about the use of parody in the figures like the Übermensch is that it is part of Nietzsche's 
project of healing the wound of existence. Thus, understanding of the Übermensch must 
encompass life in its intertwined aspects of tragedy and parody. In that case, for Danto the term 
Übermensch is a variable and not a constant.114 This means that attempting to submit it to 
rigorous conceptual schemes may not yield much. Hence, the variableness of the term 
Übermensch makes it appeal to the multiple individual entities and not the imposing 
universal/conceptual categories. 
Nietzsche’s first explicit mention of the term Übermensch is in the context of the 
plurality of norms as the assurance for the sovereignty of individuals. Plurality in this context 
is explained in terms of polytheism. For Nietzsche, polytheism (as the art and gift of creating 
gods) is a medium through which individual ideals can be discharged, since it allows a plurality 
of norms. This form of polytheism neither privileges one god over and against the others, nor 
is it a blasphemy against the one. 
With the multiplicity of norms, Nietzsche observes that the luxury of individuals is first 
permitted. It seems to be Nietzsche's position that, with favourable conditions, everyone has a 
possibility of making himself/herself into something great. More importantly, as Franco Paul 
 
112 GS, Preface §1. The above cited text also makes a reference to GS, § 342, the last aphorism of Book Four, 
which also introduces Thus Spoke Zarathustra. 
113 BT, §7. 
114 Arthur C. Danto, Nietzsche as Philosopher (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), 200. 
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observes, “[I]t is only with polytheism that the ability to view the world through a multiplicity 
of perspectives, an ability that distinguishes human beings from other animals, first 
develops.”115 This is an important observation, because through it we realize under which 
conditions the Übermensch can function and emerge. 
Monotheism (as opposed to polytheism) as the medium for positing individual rights 
could obscure new possibilities. First and foremost, the description of monotheism here is not 
Nietzsche’s considered position on monotheism per se, but its ensuing fruits. Monotheism in 
The Gay Science is aligned with having a single perspective. Nietzsche considers monotheism 
as a rigid consequence “of the doctrine of one normal human type.”116 For Nietzsche, the 
teaching about one normal type with one ultimate norm is highly likely related to the Jewish 
approach (monotheism), as opposed to the above polytheistic view that is Greek in origin. The 
basis for such an association is in Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, ‘On the Thousand Goals and one,’ 
where three model tablets (moral systems) are given (Greek, Persian, and Jewish). About the 
Jews it says, “To honour father and mother,” and Nietzsche’s comment is that: “this tablet of 
overcoming another people hung over itself and became powerful and eternal thereby.”117 
Nietzsche’s denouncement of what underlines monotheism must be conceived on how singular 
individuality is seemingly better enhanced under multiple norms. Thus, the crux of the matter 
here is that a single perspective may not favour the differentiation that Nietzsche envisages 
under plurality of norms. The justification for such a standpoint hinges on the need for the type 
that is neither affected by conceptual schemes that could be imposing nor the moral maxims 
as the givens. This is because what is needed is a type that possibly allows multiplicity of 
perspectives.  
1.2.2 The Last Human Being: Nietzsche’s Despicable Type 
Before looking at how Nietzsche specifically envisages the Übermensch in Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra, it is necessary to present the types that Nietzsche opposes to the type 
Übermensch. One such type is what he calls the last human being. In Ecce Homo, on the type 
Übermensch and some other types, Nietzsche declares, 
 
115 Franco Paul, Nietzsche's Enlightenment, the free spirit Trilogy of the Middle period (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 2011), 138. 
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The word ‘overman’ [Übermensch] as a designation for the type that has turned out 
best, by contrast with ‘modern’ men, ‘good’ men, Christians and other nihilists—a 
word which, in the mouth of a Zarathustra, the destroyer of morality, becomes a 
very thought-provoking word—has been understood almost everywhere, in all 
innocence, in the sense of those values whose opposite was made manifest in the 
figure of Zarathustra, in other words as the ‘idealistic’ type of a higher kind of man, 
half ‘saint’, half ‘genius’…118 
The designation of the Übermensch as a type opposed to other types like modern men, good 
men, and even Christians is the clearest pointer to the fact that the Übermensch is not a concrete 
ontological state. The Ubermensch is not a discursive figure that avails itself to conceptual 
schemes. The type Übermensch is pertinent to this research because as Nietzsche says, it is the 
type that comparatively has turned out the best. For being the best, the type Übermensch 
becomes the figurative exemplar that entices the individuals to become who they are. The 
richness of what the type Übermensch entails becomes clear when it is analyzed over and 
against other types that Nietzsche gives, such as the last human being.  
There is a need for a brief presentation of Nietzsche’s notion of ‘types’ and how the 
last human as a type contributes negatively to the production of singular individuality. This is 
because in Nietzsche, the type and valuing are intertwined. Nietzsche in his characteristic 
element offers no obvious delineation of types. The closest he comes to a description is in 
Beyond Good and Evil: 
We should admit to ourselves with all due severity exactly what will be necessary 
for a long time to come and what is provisionally correct, namely: collecting 
material, formulating concepts, and putting into order the tremendous realm of 
tender value feelings and value distinctions that live, grow, reproduce, and are 
destroyed, – and, perhaps, attempting to illustrate the recurring and more frequent 
shapes of this living crystallization, – all of which would be a preparation for a 
typology of morals.119 
The context of this text is Nietzsche’s discussion on the development of the life forms, entitled 
‘Natural History of Morality.’ It is at the beginning of the section dealing with affects and 
reactions. In this context (concerned with collecting, formulating, and above all aliveness to 
occurrences), typology can be rendered as the study of human traits and tendencies over time. 
The immediate domain of such study is the moral tendencies, in terms of its evolution from 
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the past to the present (this will apply to Nietzsche’s study of moral types in Beyond Good and 
Evil and the On the Genealogy of Morals). For Y. Tuncel typology is a method through which 
philosophical questions are pursued.120 In this case, Tuncel understands typology in a generic 
sense.  
However, for Nietzsche as in the above citation, typology involves specifically human 
traits (this understanding is privileged in this dissertation). The type as a unit of typology is 
not a person, but it can reside in individuals. This is the meaning the last human being or the 
Christian or the Übermensch is referenced as a type. Hence, in relation to individuals, a type 
can claim dominance depending on its intensity. The types are historical, and as such are 
neither eternal nor universal. The realm of typology deals with value, feeling, and distinctions 
that may be forceful and subject to destruction. (For example, the last human being as a type 
is certainly subject to transformation when the best type, the Übermensch, is appropriated). 
This means that types and values are correlated. Thus, the individuals who espouse the type 
Übermensch will live the values of the Übermensch, or if some espouse the ideals of the last 
human being, it will be manifested in their value domain. 
When Nietzsche talks of the modern or last human types, he is ipso facto considering 
the value domains of these types. It follows that the types valued by the individual have a 
bearing on the values of the individual, and ultimately of a culture. For Nietzsche, types serve 
as the ‘typification’ of human character. The typological constitution of the individual 
determines the quality of the ensuing singular individual. The link between types and values 
justifies consideration of the last human being and the Übermensch as the two types that have 
either negative or positive effects on individual autopoiesis. The conditions of the last human 
being may not be optimal in enticing production of the singular individual as Nietzsche 
envisages. Hence, the last human being serves a negative purpose for singular individuality 
given that the key ingredient of autopoiesis, i.e. overcoming, is seemingly atrophic. 
The types mentioned by Nietzsche (modern men, good men, and Christians) in many 
ways encompass tenets that characterize Nietzsche’s last human being. Nevertheless, by giving 
the Übermensch as a type among others, Nietzsche shows that he is not dismissive of them. 
 
120 Yunus Tuncel presented a paper on “Zarathustra in Nietzsche’s Typology” to the Nietzsche Circle in 2006. I 
have partly relied on this paper for the understanding of the types in Nietzsche. Refer also to Douglas Burnham, 
Reading Nietzsche, An Analysis of Beyond Good and Evil (Stocksfield: Acumen, 2007), 107–109. 
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Rather, Nietzsche is basically calling for the return to Greek tragedy, which espouses the 
celebration of the singular individuality as an avenue for creating humanity freed from self-
imposed inhibitions. In Nietzsche’s estimation, the ‘modern human beings,’ the ‘good human 
beings,’ and the ‘Christians’ are compromised on the tragic account of life. 
The modern human beings are described as those ‘fellow men’ who are passionately 
concerned about ‘the theatre of politics’ or masquerade as citizens, priests, or merchants. These 
groups, Nietzsche states in Schopenhauer as Educator, are ‘mindful solely of their comedy 
and not at all of themselves.’ Evidence about how far removed they are from themselves is in 
the response to the question of meaning: ‘To what end do you live?’ Nietzsche says: they will 
quickly answer: ‘To become a good citizen, or scholar, or statesman.’ Though the responses 
are themselves shallow, the crux of the matter is that “they are something that can never 
become something else.”121 From an overall reading of Nietzsche, the expert position is that 
such groups are correlated to those he designates the ‘last human being’ in Zarathustra. The 
last human being in Zarathustra according to Nietzsche, though he raises fundamental 
questions about life, has still a tendency to settle for far too little. 
The last human being is described in the prologue of Zarathustra. In general terms, the 
last human being is lacking knowledge of life as tragedy. The epoch of the last human being 
is presented by Nietzsche as the most despicable. And the overarching spirit of such an epoch 
is depicted as follows: “The time when the human will no longer shoot the arrow of its yearning 
over beyond the human, and the string of its bow will have forgotten how to whir!”122 The 
epoch of the last human being is despicable because there is no zest for life. It is an age where 
even ‘dissatisfaction’ with the self is lost. It is the era when the greatest ingredient for cultural 
development is dead: longing (sehnen). Already in Schopenhauer as Educator, Nietzsche’s 
description of the singular individuality of his Schopenhauer shows how longing is central to 
him: 
Every human being is accustomed to discovering in himself some limitation, of his 
talent,[…] which fills him with melancholy and longing; and just as his feeling of 
sinfulness makes him long for the saint in him, so as an intellectual being he 
harbours a profound desire for the genius in him.123  
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Nietzsche sees the angst caused by dissatisfaction as the root of true culture. Longing is the 
ingredient that enables the human being to fight against his age and be untimely. In the absence 
of such a longing, what obtains is something akin to physical entropy.124 The lack of longing 
explains the propensity for settling for far too little. 
In Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche explains the tension of the spirit and its 
necessity.125 The passage on the tension of the spirit in the preface of Beyond Good and Evil 
mirrors the one in Zarathustra about the modern man/last human being. In Zarathustra, the 
era of the last human being is described as one lacking in chaos: 
I say to you: one must still have chaos within, in order to give birth to a dancing 
star. I say to you: you still have chaos within you. 
Alas! The time will come when the human will give birth to no more stars. Alas! 
There will come the time of the most despicable human, who is no longer able to 
despise itself.126 
Nietzsche is known to be critical of modernity. He traces modernity’s lopsided approach to 
reality generally from Platonic philosophy. In a tense text he notes, 
But the struggle against Plato, or, to use a clear and ‘popular’ idiom, the struggle 
against the Christian-ecclesiastical pressure of millennia—since Christianity is 
Platonism for the “people”—has created a magnificent tension of spirit in Europe, 
the likes of which the earth has never known: with such a tension in our bow we 
can now shoot at the furthest goals. Granted, the European experiences this tension 
as a crisis or state of need; and twice already there have been attempts, in a grand 
fashion, to unbend the bow, once through Jesuitism, and the second time through 
the democratic Enlightenment. … 
But we, who are neither Jesuits nor democrats, nor even German enough, we good 
Europeans and free, very free spirits—we still have it, the whole need of spirit and 
the whole tension of its bow! And perhaps the arrow too, the task, and—who 
knows? the goal.127 
The two texts refer to the need of the tension, longing, and chaos within, for striving. The 
struggle or the possibility to despise is the ingredient for self-enhancement and eventually 
cultural development. In the text from Zarathustra, the problem is the reigning complaceny 
 
124 Refer to the study of Thus Spoke Zarathustra by Stanley Rosen in The Mask of Enlightenment (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995), 54. 
125 EH "BGE", §2, Nietzsche says the following about Beyond Good and Evil: “This book (1886) is in all 
essentials a critique of modernity, not excluding the modern sciences, the modern arts, even modern politics, 
together with pointers towards an opposing type, as unmodern as possible, a noble, yes-saying type.” 
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and the lack of longing or any fruitful self-contempt. The text from Beyond Good and Evil 
reveals reasonably significant development where the longing/spirit exists at least among the 
few.  
In Zarathustra’s prologue, the people simply want to remain ‘last human beings,’ but 
in Beyond and Good Evil, some recognize the need to keep the tension of the bow. The main 
fruit of maintaining the tension of the spirit is the possibility of the furthest goals. One such 
goal could be singular individuality and the type Übermesch. However, the preface to Beyond 
Good and Evil alludes as well to tenets of cultural decay—political and social values, such as 
democracy, equality, and progress—seeing them as means of oppression and as indicators of 
decay and degeneration.128 These are indicators of the modern age (last human being) that 
Nietzsche renders despicable in Zarathustra. The last human being’s despicability is founded 
on the fact that he cannot become anything. The despicability is partly due to lack of the 
passion necessary for striving. As Rosen aptly observes, in the last human being there is no 
new intensity and fecundity of existence.129 Nietzsche pointedly enumerates the fundamental 
characteristics of the last human being that justify the despicable situation further: 
Behold! I show you the last human. 
‘What is love? What is creation? What is yearning? What is a star?'—thus asks the 
last human and then blinks. 
'For the earth has become small, and upon it hops the last human, who makes 
everything small. Its race is as in-exterminable as the ground-flea; the last human 
lives the longest.130 
It was noted that the questions posed in Schopenhauer as Educator are mostly 
ontological/existential given that they revolve around themes of life and suffering. The 
questions have this thematic weight, even though the responses could be considered trivial: 
being a good citizen or a member of a state. On the contrary, the questions of the last human 
being can be anything, but not value-oriented. 
The last human being seems to seek definition-oriented responses, perhaps for the sake 
of conceptual clarity. Such an approach is like the Socratic method of elenchus in Plato’s 
dialogues. Though elenchus was a method of inquiry, ultimately it sought to arrive at a 
 
128 Refer to the introduction to Beyond Good and Evil, by Rolf-Peter Horstmann in the Cambridge edition, 
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conceptual belief not subject to revision. In the wider sense, for Nietzsche, Platonism was at 
the basis of the last human being. The question of ‘What is’ in its abstractive tendency, could 
shield one from the possibility of engaging with human existence (awareness of life) which 
does not present itself conceptually. Therefore, what is needed is, as Rosen says, a hierarchy 
of values, instead of a concentration on things as things.131 A mere focus on ideas could detach 
one from historical or generated existence. The non-evaluative questions of the last human 
being lead also to a solutions or style of life that may hardly produce great individuals. 
There are two notable reasons why the era of the last human being can only produce 
individuals who feebly hide behind customs and institutions. In the absence of any longing, 
homogeneity and trivialization of life seem to be the norm. Nietzsche expresses homogeneity 
as follows: “No herdsman and one herd! Everyone wants the same thing, everyone is the same: 
whoever feels differently goes voluntarily into the madhouse. ‘Formerly the entire world was 
mad’—say their finest and they blink.”132 From the period of the Untimely Meditations, 
Nietzsche is critical of the mass. But in this section of the prologue of Zarathustra, there is the 
crowd that longs to be undifferentiated (this is contrary to Zarathustra's project of seeking 
individuals who can be lured from the herd). 
The stance of the crowd is also contra Nietzsche’s advocacy for the movement towards 
individual differentiation. Homogeneity is representative of the last human being, which D. 
Burnham references as the vast undifferentiated mass of humanity.133 There is a plethora of 
indicators from the text that strongly support Burnham’s stance: the ineradicable race as the 
ground-flea, who hop like insects and are contented; The association of their invented 
happiness with socialistic/egalitarian living (rubbing against each other for the warmth); and 
their cautiousness (toleration—no harbouring of mistrust; they quarrel but make up). 
Homogeneity carries within itself degeneration and stagnation. Rosen describes the 
homogeneity projected by Zarathustra as not only non-eleatic, but discontinuous.134 It is the 
modern designation of ‘différance’ as reduction of sameness to difference, which is merely the 
reinstitution of the tyranny of sameness. The valorisation of sameness fails to acknowledge 
 
131 Rosen, The Mask of Enlightenment, 55. 
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that plurality is essential to the existence of the one. What is needed instead is unity-in-
difference as the essential ingredient for individual enhancement. Nietzsche defends unity-in-
difference through the proposition of the type Übermensch where becoming is espoused. 
One has no room to be different in such homogenized reality. That explains the need 
for a voluntary madhouse for those who may espouse differentiation.135 The underlying reason 
for homogenization is explained by Zarathustra in the repetition of the word, “blink.” The last 
human blinks often: after asking questions, he blinks; contrived happiness, they blink. It 
possibly refers to the short attention span characteristic of the modern age. However, blinking 
can also be the sign of the trivialization of the need for knowing the human goals ahead. 
Blinking is explainable in relation to unfamiliarity with the stars. This unfamiliarity is 
because of the attitude that ‘[o]ne is clever and knows all that has happened.’ Hence, the 
moment (Augenblink) is seemingly what is left when the past is all known and the future is 
deemed under control.136 The earth is reduced, given also the field of vision (blinking relegates 
vision to units lacking goal-oriented vision) where there is no idea of the horizon. Practically 
all that is goal oriented is denied to such a creature that lives in the moment: no knowledge of 
tragic existence; no historical knowledge; and no social involvement can be possible. K. 
Higgins observes that the psychology of Nietzsche’s despicable last human type resembles 
Heidegger’s das Man, since “individuality and individual resolve are largely subsumed by the 
agency of the undifferentiated mass; even in the case of leaders among them, the dominant 
approach to the world is to huddle together instead of taking personal risks.”137 But, for 
Heidegger mere avoidance of conformity may not guarantee individual particularity. 
Heidegger enumerates several characters that could be associated with Nietzsche’s last human 
being: “distantiality,” averageness, and levelling down (the ways of Being for the crowd 
‘they’—das Man).138 
The comparison between Nietzsche’s last human being and Heidegger’s das Man may 
not be compelling enough. For Heidegger, das man as ‘Others’ cannot be thought of as a group 
of “genuinely individual human beings whose shared tastes dictate the tastes of everyone else; 
 
135 Nietzsche reflects on the role of madness and its linkage to differentiation in Daybreak, §14. 
136 Burnham, Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 24. 
137 Higgins, “Festivals of Recognition—Nietzsche’s idealized communities” in Julian Young, Individual and 
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and neither do they constitute an intersubjective or supra-individual being, a sort of communal 
self.”139 The ‘they’ is not a single definite other. In this regard, it may not necessarily resemble 
Nietzsche’s last human being. Nevertheless, Nietzsche's last human being and Heideggerian 
das Man, both in different contexts, demonstrate the unfavourable conditions for obtaining any 
genuine individual authenticity. In Nietzsche’s last human being from Zarathustra, there is 
still that “chaos within” which is a prerequisite for giving birth to a dancing star.140 Chaos must 
be aligned to the uniqueness of the individual that Nietzsche proclaims in Schopenhauer as 
Educator. In Zarathustra’s scheme the Übermensch is the type that has turned out the best. The 
type Übermensch can serve as the effective attraction for the seemingly elusive singular 
individuality. 
1.2.3 The Übermenschen: Nietzsche‘s Best Type 
This section seeks to concretize Nietzsche’s sense of the type Übermensch, and how 
that understanding possibly links with the enhancement of singular individuality. The 
examination of what Nietzsche implies by Übermensch in his published works is mostly from 
Thus Spoke Zarathustra and some references in Twilight of Idols, Anti-Christ, and Ecce Homo. 
It is probably needless to say that Nietzsche’s presentation of the term “Übermensch” is 
ambivalent. However, there is also very little textual material. In this scenario, the modus 
operandi will entail, firstly, looking at the few texts available (mainly Zarathustra and Ecce 
Homo), and secondly, engaging in some hermeneutics through analysis of Nietzsche's concept 
of overcoming that leads to the concept of will to power as the link between the Singular 
individual and the type Übermensch.  
The specific textual reference to Übermensch is within Zarathustra’s first speech to the 
people. Zarathustra says to the people: “I teach to you the Overhuman [den Übermenschen]. 
The human is something that shall be overcome [überwunden]. What have you done to 
overcome it?”141 Zarathustra’s opening speech begins on the typological note. The focus of 
Zarathustra’s probing is not simply on who man is. Rather, it is about a type that overcomes 
and does not seek preservation. The basis for emphasis on the type is made clear in part four 
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of Thus Spoke Zarathustra. On the “Superior Human,” Zarathustra observes, “The most 
concerned minds today ask: ‘How is the human to be preserved?’ But Zarathustra is the first 
and only one to ask, “How is the human to be overcome?”142 Overcoming is the main 
distinction here between the type last human and the type Übermensch. The Übermensch is 
exemplified in overcoming. In Nietzsche, overcoming is generally understood to be the trait 
of the Übermesnch. In The Gay Science book five, written after Zarathustra, Overcoming is 
described in terms of great health as that which is continually acquired through giving up again 
and again.143 Great health is Nietzsche’s conception of the physiological condition of 
Zarathustra as a type. Nietzsche says that he was ambushed by Zarathustra as a type. The 
typological constitution of Zarathustra as the type of great health entails continual self-
creation, new goals, expansive soul, a wide spectrum of experience of the life journey, and 
discontent with the present-day man. Zarathustra is the teacher of the Übermensch, and given 
his type, the Übermensch is valued as the best type. The Übermensch, since it overcomes itself, 
is the first and only concern for Zarathustra. 
The standard understanding of Übermensch is a human type and cannot possibly be a 
single superior being. But the Übermensch as a type is understood to embody a “transformation 
of the mode of existence of the human species.”144 The last human with its embodiment of 
self-preservation is to be surpassed. In Anti-Christ, Nietzsche talks of “various cultures in 
which a higher type does manifest itself: something which in relation to collective 
[humankind] is a sort of superman [Übermensch].”145 The reference to Übermensch as a type 
has ramifications for translation of the term Übermensch into English. In the prologue of 
Zarathustra, Nietzsche uses the plural form Übermenschen (overhumans), which supports the 
understanding of it as a type. However, Übermensch could also be rendered as overman. 
Nevertheless, the prevailing Nietzsche scholarship finds it problematic when 
Übermensch is rendered as superman. Even though there is a necessity for the manifestation 
of the type Übermensch through singular individuality, the Übermensch may not be a 
designation for an empirical reality as such. The term superman is mainly associated with the 
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Darwinian conception of human evolution not Nietzsche’s. From the period of the Untimely 
Meditations to the Later period, Nietzsche disassociates his higher type from the Darwinian 
perspective. 
On producing great humankind as a goal dissociated from the notion of progress, 
Nietzsche believes that “the goal of humanity cannot lie in its end but only in its highest 
exemplars."146 In Anti-Christ, he writes that “[humankind] does not represent a development 
of the better or the stronger or the higher in the way is believed today.”147 Then, in Ecce Homo, 
Nietzsche denies the association of the Übermensch with Darwinism:  
[I]n other words as the ‘idealistic’ type of a higher kind of man, half ‘saint’, half 
‘genius’...It has led some scholarly blockheads to suspect me of Darwinism; people 
have recognized in it even the ‘hero cult’ of that great unknowing and reluctant 
counterfeiter, Carlyle, which I have been so malicious as to reject.148 
The three cited texts allude to two points: (1) Nietzsche’s notion of progress, and (2) the fact 
that Übermensch is not a heroic being. The historian Carlyle believed in a monumental image 
of history, whereby the society has strong dependence on heroes. Such a position, according 
to Nietzsche, has no respect for existence since it promotes an apathetic habit. The defining 
characteristic of the type Übermensch is overcoming, through which existence on its own 
terms is affirmed. The preference of overcoming over and against preservation is founded on 
the fact that, unlike preservation, overcoming affirms the meaning of life though tragic.  
The type Übermensch becomes the meaning of the earth through overcoming. It is the 
symbol of the individual’s journey into his uniqueness. It is the embodiment of existence as 
tragic and becoming. Hence, “[t]he Overhuman is the sense of the earth. May your will say: 
Let the Overhuman be the sense of the earth! I beseech you, my brothers, stay true to the earth 
and do not believe those who talk of over-earthly hopes!”149 The ethical task of realizing 
singular individuality demands honesty about human ontology. The Übermensch as the sense 
(Sinn) of the earth seeks to ground the human being in the existential realm hic et nunc. The 
Übermensch as Nietzsche’s guarantor of the individual’s sense of the earth gives preference to 
a philosophy of personal tastes. The philosophy of personal tastes for Burnham is interpreted 
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as Nietzsche’s philosophy of immanence. Burnham holds that, faithfulness to the sense of the 
earth demands that if there is meaning or virtue, it must be sought and found within the domains 
of the existing things.150 Any despising of the earth risks enhancement of life. The human 
world acquires meaning through the values created within it by singular individuals. 
It can be argued that the Übermensch’s sense of the earth commits Nietzsche’s 
experimental philosophy to certain provisionality. I can arguably claim that provisionality 
encompasses the realm of science where Versuch/attempt is valued. Versuch implies a family 
resemblance of terms like inquiry (patient labouring); research; process of trial and error 
(provisionality); temptation (Nietzsche’s philosophers of the future as Versucher/tempters); 
and the return to concreteness. The Übermensch is largely the appropriate symbol and space 
(as the best type) for Nietzsche’s experimental philosophy. Since experimental philosophy 
seeks to abandon the metaphysical securities of this world and the beyond, it remains virtually 
without the presuppositions of the absolute as the foundation. Above all, experimental 
philosophy is about overcoming (risky self-testing). In this regard there is no suitable 
designation of that philosophy other than the figure of the Übermensch. 
As Nietzsche’s best type, it is the Übermensch that perhaps holds the key to singular 
individual’s expression of human greatness in the concrete human life. The existential 
questionableness of man is largely meant to be affirmed in the type Übermensch. Zarathustra’s 
objective is “to teach humans the meaning of their being: that is the Overman, the lightning 
from the dark cloud of the human.”151 The meaning of human existence ought to incorporate 
the affirmation of its absurdity. The Übermensch as the Blitz (notice the opposition to Blinking 
of the last human being) is interpreted as the pleroma of illumination for justifying singular 
individuality. Now the link between the individual singularity and the type Übermensch can 
be sought. 
1.2.4 The Type Übermensch and Singular Individuality 
To discover the link between the type Übermensch and the singular individuality an 
interpretive approach is necessary. A closer analysis of the textual evidence provided by 
Nietzsche is required on the aspects of the Übermensch as a type and on the singular 
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individuality. The overarching argument here is: the link between the type Übermensch and 
the singular individuality is immanently grounded in the will to power within the larger domain 
of “Nietzsche’s ontology of becoming.” Singular individuality, given its indeterminateness, 
must be justified only through overcoming a feat only claimed by the type Übermensch. A. C. 
Danto aptly observes that man is both Untergang and Übergang and “we go beyond ourselves 
by overcoming something in ourselves, and it is that which goes under, and is put beneath.”152 
As will be explained, continuous affirmation of life requires both (going under and over), 
generally called overcoming. Applied to the singular individual, it implies being always on the 
way (unterweg) as a work in progress. Nietzsche’s type Übermensch may be interpreted as the 
quintessence of the “Ontology of becoming” expressed in the singular individual as self-
overcoming. In the process of overcoming lies the defining link between the type Übermensch 
and the singular individual which is the will to power. Closer engagement on these assertions 
is needed. The basis of such engagement has been already outlined under Nietzsche’s best 
type, the Übermensch, in Thus Spoke Zarathustra and the relevant pre- and post-Zarathustra 
texts. 
The link between the singular individual and the type Übermensch must necessarily be 
gauged from Nietzsche's ontology of becoming. Ontology here simply means what there is. 
Such an understanding of ontology is possibly broad enough to encompass the reality of being 
and becoming. Thus, ontology cannot simply be tied to the Parmenidean-Platonic-being as 
permanence. This is because Nietzsche’s becoming is also an elucidation of reality. J. 
Richardson on Nietzsche and ontology observes that Nietzsche’s insistence on becoming “has 
the sense of specifying an unusual ontology, or metaphysics, and not of renouncing any such 
theory.”153 The implication for Nietzsche is that being is becoming. On this account, 
Richardson believes Nietzsche does have a position on being/ontology/reality, which is 
becoming. Nietzsche’s ontology of becoming is his privileged stance about the nature of 
reality. Before examining how this reality of becoming has been panning out in this chapter, it 
is necessary to engage Nietzsche himself. 
In the beginning of Human All, Too Human, Nietzsche alleges that philosophers 
hitherto lack a historical sense. Hence, such philosophers “will not learn that man has become, 
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that the faculty of cognition has become.”154 Nietzsche, at the end of the aphorism, claims that 
everything has become. In the second volume of the same work, Nietzsche puts forward a 
historical figure putatively associated with reality as becoming: Heraclitus. On the experience 
of life as a flow, Nietzsche holds, 
When we desire to descend into the river of what seems to be our own most intimate 
and personal being, there applies the dictum of Heraclitus: we cannot step into the 
same river twice.—This is, to be sure, a piece of wisdom that has gradually grown 
stale, but it has nonetheless remained as true and valid as it ever was.155 
This passage references Heraclitus' commonly known quote from the river fragments “Panta 
rhei.”156 In The Gay Science, on Heraklitismus Nietzsche writes:  
Only fighting yields 
Happiness on earth, 
And on battlefields 
Friendship has its birth. …157 
Here Nietzsche brings out the theme of contest (agon) inherent in Greek self-understanding as 
it was embodied in Heraclitus. Though Nietzsche's relationship to antiquity in general is rather 
complex and manifold, Heraclitus according to Nietzsche espouses a Hellenic style of life. 
For Nietzsche, Heraclitus embodies the Delphic oracle, “Man know thyself,” through 
his ‘inward turning.’ By seeking self-knowledge, Heraclitus, like the Greeks in general, was 
following the dictates of the oracle which involved: “thinking back to themselves, that is, to 
their real needs, and letting pseudo-needs die out.”158 After a hard struggle and through 
protracted application of the oracle (by focusing on their real needs), Nietzsche observes, the 
Greeks took possession of themselves. The struggle on the part of Heraclitus involved his 
contest with conventional beliefs and trends (he showed aversion toward popular thoughts). 
Thus, according to Dale Wilkerson, the contest (Wettkampf) is at the core of Greek instinct, 
and Heraclitus reaffirmed that instinct by disclosing the innocence of becoming rather than 
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injustice in nature.159 Nietzsche credibly recognizes in this Hellenistic-Heraclitean spirit of 
contest, the inward concentration of force, an instinct for self-affirmation and struggle which 
enabled the Greeks to give birth to flourishing types. Nietzsche believes that the Greeks affirm 
their chaos/tragedy by organizing it without being pessimistic. 
The overriding theme of singular individuality, within the aporetic question of 
existence as tragic, continuously hungers for some reality that justifies it. How can the singular 
individual affirm life as tragic? The general response is by some embodiment of the ontology 
of becoming. In Schopenhauer as Educator, awareness of singular individuality is described 
as a strange penumbra, and something that most find unendurable due to laziness and the toils 
entailed in singular individuality.160 The situation then demands an exemplar as the figure that 
attracts/draws forth the individual to who he is: the singular individual. 
The envisaged role of the type Übermensch is very specific. Zarathustra’s opening 
speech is centred on that role: “The human is something that shall be overcome. What have 
you done to overcome it? All beings so far have created something beyond themselves: and 
you want to be the ebb of this great tide, and even go back to the beasts rather than overcome 
the human?”161 The centrality of overcoming described by Nietzsche is attested to by Adrian 
Caro and Robert Pippin in their assertion that the text of Thus Spoke Zarathustra carries three 
themes: the Übermensch; the Self-overcoming; and the new way of thinking and living.162 
Furthermore, they argue that the themes of the type Übermensch and self-overcoming are 
intertwined. The singular role of the type Übermensch as the sense of the earth (as the giver of 
meaning) is to enable the overcoming of the last human being within the individual as a surety 
to singular individuality.  
In this regard, the practicality of Nietzsche’s philosophy as individual autopoiesis 
begins to take shape only through the role of the type Übermensch. On the practical aspect of 
Nietzsche’s philosophy, Harold Alderman believes that the doctrine of the type Übermensch 
is not to be understood only theoretically. On the contrary, the conception of the type 
Übermensch entails a re-orientation of our experience amounting to a sort of conversion.163 
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The conversion involves openness to the ‘flux of becoming’ which inhabits and is inhabited 
by individuals. With general nuances of the type Übermensch in place, now the specific task 
given to the type Übermensch, overcoming of man, can be examined. 
The type Übermensch is ultimately a Blitz (lightning) in the sense of pure affirmation. 
In the words of Alderman, overcoming man implies a need to create conditions within oneself 
for the type Übermensch (for affirmation). The preliminary condition so far investigated 
demands acknowledgement of existence as tragic. In relation to the type Übermensch, it means 
appropriating within oneself the ontology of becoming. Seeking to appropriate the spirit (Geist, 
life) of the type Übermensch is also the avenue for engaging with the ‘how’ part of the question 
raised at the beginning of the chapter. 
In the original question, the emphasis is on “how:” How can one's life, the individual 
life, receive the highest value, the deepest significance? How can it be least squandered? It 
demands, apart from a theoretical approach (what the current chapter has done by laying down 
what is needed: overcoming, breeding, and embracing the tragic spirit), a methodological 
approach which will be taken up as the Psychology of the type Übermensch (dealing with the 
fundamental human drive, the will to power in chapter two), and will discover how it leads 
into practical living (morality of the type Übermensch in Chapter Three). The type 
Übermensch as pure affirmation embodies life as the will to power. In Deleuze’s interpretation, 
Übermensch is a name that Nietzsche gives to the conglomeration of forces of achievement 
(Wohlgerathenheit).164 This perpetual flux of forces essentially accounts for change in the 
world. However, it is not only change but plurality and differentiation. 
In the next chapter, the will to power will be considered on both psychological and 
methodological grounds (self-overcoming and form-giving) as the enabler for singular 
individuality in the broader process of individual autopoiesis. Through autopoiesis one can 
affirm Alderman's argument that, to overcome the despicable type, each must create within 
himself, “to the extent that [he] can, the Overman.”165 How does one do that? The immediate 
response will be through overcoming, understood as will to power. But the mechanism of it is 
more complex than that. In the current chapter, overcoming is projected as a necessity for both 
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the singular individual and the type Übermensch. Zarathustra as the teacher of individuals and 
not groups aims at teaching everyone the art of self-making. For the singular individuals in 
their own way must strive to live the life of the type Übermensch. One could think of the case 
of humanity as a type and the various individuals as units espousing the elements of humanity. 
Even though none of the individual entities will ultimately be the humanity, the point is that 
each individual entity is expected to espouse humanity to the best of their ability. Thus, though 
the type Übermensch is unattainable in principle by human beings, the struggle of the singular 
individual itself can serve as the sense for human life. 
Failure to struggle is not only akin to the life of animality where existence is Sinnlos, 
but it is the life removed from one’s actuality (existence). Nietzsche through Zarathustra 
describes the human as a “rope, fastened between beast and Overhuman—a rope over an 
abyss,” and also as “[a] dangerous across, a dangerous on-the-way, a dangerous looking back, 
a dangerous shuddering and standing still.”166 This is obviously a complex text. The human 
being as the rope and not on the rope seems obvious. Alderman observes that the human being 
as a rope does not allow the possibility that one may free oneself from the animal to be only 
the Übermensch.167 Instead, Nietzsche's human being as a ‘rope between’ implies that to be a 
singular individual the tension between the animal (in our case here, the herd) and the type 
Übermensch ought not only to be acknowledged, but appropriated. The tension in 
Schopenhauer as Educator was expressed in different nuances such as ceasing to take oneself 
easily and taking a bold and dangerous line with one's existence. 
And the underlying principle of such a life is overcoming. Therefore, singular 
individuality demands a continuous process of overcoming. Singular individuality seems 
always tensile (filled with tension) and as such precarious (over the abyss) between one’s 
actuality (reality of human drives) and one's ideal embodied in the type Übermensch. 
Nietzsche’s description for the link between the singular individual and the type Übermensch 
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Conclusion 
One of the main focuses of this chapter has been to tease out the link between 
Nietzsche’s claims about singular individuality, as projected in Schopenhauer as Educator, 
and the type Übermensch. It has been positively argued that Nietzsche’s aporia about existence 
is outlined in the early work, Schopenhauer as Educator. This work has been presented as 
Nietzsche’s philosophical scheme where the overriding theme is justification for existence 
even though tragic. The basic unit for that affirmation of existence is Nietzsche’s singular 
individual. However, it has also been extensively shown that, such a unit is not given. Instead 
it is an ethical task envisaged to be accomplished under some favourable conditions. Such 
conditions in Schopenhauer as Educator are expressed in such terms as: exemplar, 
taskmasters, breeders, need for honesty-cum-scepticism and striving borne out of 
dissatisfaction. It has been finely shown that Nietzsche ascribes these attributes to ‘his 
Schopenhauer’ who teaches about the tragedy of existence. 
However, in the same work there are contrary attributes to existence as tragic. The 
opposite conditions to the task of singular individuality include self-satisfaction, complacency 
in life, and simply desiring happiness in a culture. Such characteristics largely inform the last 
human being as the representative of the modern age that Nietzsche seeks to undermine. 
Hence, the text Schopenhauer as Educator places existence as tragic at the centre of individual 
autopoiesis. The second pertinent theme of the type Übermensch derives from the obtaining 
conditions for singular individuality in Schopenhauer as Educator. The argument advanced is 
that though the type Übermensch is only introduced in later Nietzsche, it is highly prefigured 
in the role of the exemplar, taskmasters, and breeders and in the notion of striving in 
Schopenhauer as Educator. The type Übermensch becomes the best attraction to the life of 
untimeliness that singular individuality is tasked to embrace. 
The singular character of the type Übermensch is overcoming. Through overcoming, 
life as tragic is affirmed. For Nietzsche, singular individuality is always a work in progress 
(given that it is implicated in life). Singular individuality is always called to overcoming. But 
more importantly, singular individuality ceases the moment one allows oneself to be 
timely/one with his age, to become part of the mass. The constraints necessary for realizing 
singular individuality are grounded in the type Übermensch. However, for that realization to 
work requires the psychological and methodological principle, the will to power.  
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Chapter 2:  The Psychology of the Type Übermensch 
The most concerned minds today ask: ‘How is the human to be preserved?’ But 
Zarathustra is the first and only one to ask: ‘How is the human to be 
overcome?’(Z, IV, 13, 3) 
Introduction 
In the last chapter, the type Übermensch was presented as the necessary exemplar for 
the possibility of singular individuality. However, overcoming as the character of the type 
Übermensch must be realized in the singular individual. Nietzsche’s commitment to the 
psychology of humankind is evident from Human All Too Human with his comments on 
psychological observations. He alleges that “the art of psychological dissection and 
computation is lacking above all in the social life of all classes, in which, while there may be 
much talk about people, there is none at all about man.”168 This could imply that Nietzsche is 
not only interested in the search of an explanatory key for the human being, rather this key 
ought also to offer some amelioration for human life. 
In this chapter, the overarching assertion is that the psychology of the type Übermensch 
is the will to power. Psychology in this chapter and its role is understood in Nietzsche’s sense 
as the explanatory tool for the type Übermensch. The will to power is the 
methodological/explanatory tool for accessing human drives that are at the heart of Nietzsche's 
psychological philosophy and morality. As a method, will to power is justified only within a 
context of becoming. 
The type Übermensch embraces the reality of becoming which subsists in entities as 
the will to power. Furthermore, in its embodiment of becoming, the will to power guarantees 
the existence of diverse entities. In the words of Doyle Tsarina, the will to power is given 
content in a “particular context and is defined by its context.”169 In Chapter One, it was pointed 
out that the type Übermensch finds validation in the existence of the singular individual. 
Nietzsche gives a subtle characterization of the will to power: “The world seen from inside, 
the world determined and described with respect to its ‘intelligible character’—would be just 
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this ‘will to power’ and nothing else."170 This characterization of the will to power as the 
internal, explicative principle arguably will go a long way in not only understanding the type 
Übermensch, but more importantly, the process of individual autopoiesis. 
This chapter is structured as follows: the first section examines Nietzsche’s 
understanding of the psychology of the will to power with an emphasis on self-overcoming; 
and the will to power as form-giving. It will be seen that overcoming and form-giving are 
inherent actions of the will. But for Nietzsche, in engaging with the will as overcoming and 
power as psychology of form-giving, he dissociates himself from the traditional metaphysics 
of conceiving the will as a faculty. For Nietzsche, the will entails a complex action of willing. 
The second aspect of this chapter will focus on the singular individuality and giving style as 
the specific application of the will to power and validation of the type Übermensch. This will 
lead into the notions of strong and weak wills that demand a morality of the type Übermensch 
(a morality with an attitude for seeking to live beyond good and evil). 
 
2.1 Nietzsche: Psychology and the Will to Power 
On the numerous occasions that Nietzsche mentions psychology, it is apparent that he 
is critical of psychology as it has hitherto been practiced: (1) the psychology that he dissuades 
himself from, the one dominated by morality, and (2) the psychology that he advances and 
associates with the philosophers of the future. Such is the psychology of the types, which is 
ascribed to the will to power. This section briefly investigates Nietzsche’s critical approach to 
a psychology dominated by morality, and his commitment to the psychology of types. The 
focus will be on Nietzsche’s psychology of types, given that it promotes the will to power as 
the privileged path for the task of individual autopoiesis. This is because the will to power, as 
Richardson observes, is the engine of diversity, which “gives no overall direction to the 
evolutionary process.”171 The above two designations of psychology (morality dominated and 
of types) differ in their approaches and orientation. For Nietzsche, psychology tied to morality 
relies heavily on the concepts it is apparently imposing, while the psychology of types is 
drives-based and favourable to diversity in its orientation. 
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To justify the above designations (about psychology), a brief analysis of the 
psychology tied to morality is pertinent. The analysis of the psychology dominated by morality 
will grant greater credence to Nietzsche’s own privileged kind of psychology of types. In 
Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche alleges, “All psychology so far has been stuck in moral 
prejudices and fears: it has not ventured into the depths.”172 The type of psychology Nietzsche 
projects here is one that claims universal validity based on the conventional or conceptual 
schemes.173 Fear and depth go hand in hand. In the last chapter, in Schopenhauer as Educator, 
tunneling into oneself meant an attempt at acquiring knowledge of one’s basic contradictory 
existence. Such an awareness elicits terror. Thus, the safer option seems not to tunnel or mine 
and undermine, but simply to make do with some ostensibly liveable conventions.174 However, 
such moral prejudices as Nietzsche holds can be deeply distorting. 
Still, in Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche talks of the psychology that “had put itself 
under the dominance of morality.”175 The reason Nietzsche gives for such domination of 
morality over psychology is supposedly the latter’s belief in opposing moral values. For 
Nietzsche, psychology under the domination of moral values, implies the abstractive type of 
psychology that gives too much leeway to rationalization. And more fundamentally, Nietzsche 
holds that such a psychology interprets the opposites into texts and facts. The reference to texts 
and facts is a pointer to Nietzsche’s philological slant, where the text in this case references 
existence or life. For Nietzsche, Philology entails the correct reading (interpretation) of 
existence that does not falsify. 
Striving towards the correct interpretation of existence is Nietzsche’s focus. The 
“correct reading” as an interpretation of existence will play a key role in understanding 
Nietzsche’s doctrine of Eternal Recurrence. For Nietzsche, psychology dominated by morality 
fails to see that “the opposites inhere not in the thing but in the interpreter’s categories.”176 
According to Nietzsche the opposites are part of the problem of metaphysical philosophy that 
thrives on the assumption that highly valued things must have a miraculous origin in the thing-
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in-itself. For Nietzsche, values for things are not from without, but are conditioned within. 
Simply put, values are perspectival. This notion requires explanation in relation to values. In 
the words of M. Tanner, there cannot be “any value-free scrutinizing of the world followed by 
either acceptance of a value scheme that the world forces on one, or the adoption of a set of 
values based on a decision taken after surveying the way things are.”177 In this regard, Tanner 
explains that Nietzsche’s claim that we create values is both a logical and an ontological one. 
It is logical in the sense that one is mistaken to think that values are imposed from without. It 
is an ontological claim because values are not out there to be discovered. Hence, a perspectival 
approach to values is the recognition that they are drive-centred and thus conditioned in human 
reality. 
More pertinently, the psychology under the domination of morality poses a problem 
regarding the understanding of the will. Psychology under the tutelage of morality is bound to 
see the will as a faculty of choice (free will). Such a conception of the will necessitates, 
according to Nietzsche, seeking always for the accountable party. On free will, Nietzsche 
notes, 
We no longer have any sympathy today with the concept ‘free will’: we know only 
too well what it is—the most infamous of all arts of the theologian making 
[humankind] ‘accountable’ in his sense of the word, that is to say for making 
[humankind] dependent on him. […] I give here only the psychology of making 
men accountable.—Everywhere accountability is sought, it is usually the instinct 
for punishing and judging which seeks it.178 
In this text, Nietzsche gives various expressions of the psychology dominated by moral 
attributes such as responsibility (accountability), intentions, and judgement. These moral 
attributes affect the understanding of the will. Nietzsche is critical of the will as a faculty 
basically because it encompasses being instead of becoming. In starting from moral judgement 
(stress on intention and responsibility develops into notion of punishment), Nietzsche holds, 
becoming is deprived of its innocence. 
In Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche reconstructs a history of morality in three epochs: 
the pre-moral period of humankind; the moral; and the extra-moral.179 The moral epoch is 
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described as the one that embraces the origin of the action as the determination of its value. 
For Nietzsche, the moral epoch is the first attempt at self-knowledge. But it is considered a 
problematic phase since: “Instead of the consequences, the origin: what an inversion of 
perspectives!”180 Grounding morality in the origin of an action for Nietzsche is an inversion, 
since it demands factoring in the notion of intention. Hence, the evaluation of an action is now 
ascribed to the value of the intention behind it. The morality founded on value of intention is 
what is being undermined by Nietzsche. Nietzsche’s contention about the intention is that it is 
“under the sway of this prejudice that one has morally praised, blamed, judged and 
philosophized on earth almost to the present day.”181 Nietzsche’s problem is that on the basis 
of the morality of intentions, judgements are made about good and evil. This point is still 
developed in the context of the Eternal Recurrence in Chapter Three. 
For now, what is at stake is the will as a faculty. In this case, the old psychology 
(dominated by morality), “the psychology of the will” as a faculty, ascribes free will to people 
for the sake of accountability (either to praise or blame). Consequently, Nietzsche holds that 
“every action had to be thought of as willed [intentioned], the origin of every action as lying 
in the consciousness.”182 One can only grasp Nietzsche’s critique of the will as a faculty based 
on his stance about metaphysics of opposites (which embraces dualisms). 
In the realm of being/traditional metaphysics, there is a tendency to be dualistic in 
outlook. For instance, references to cause and effects; substance and qualities; subject and 
predicates; and doers and their deeds. These compose partly the realm of metaphysical 
opposites. The Nietzschean position is that in all these instances, only the second exists, and 
the designations substance/quality, subject/soul, free will are the manifestations of the strong 
psychological need.183 The psychological need here refers to that urge for explanations that 
ultimately for Nietzsche ought to crystalize into the strong will. The need for explanations 
sometimes warrants wrong justifications, for instance about origin of actions. Regarding the 
origin of action, as grounded in consciousness, Nietzsche believes it is the most fundamental 
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falsification made against the very principle of psychology. For Nietzsche, the domineering 
aspect of morality on psychology, as hitherto understood, lies in the concept of consciousness. 
With traditional morality, every willed action is grounded in consciousness. However, 
Nietzsche is critical of consciousness (die Bewuβtheit) conceived as the unity of action. In The 
Gay Science, the following pertinent issues emerge about consciousness: Firstly, Nietzsche’s 
own position is that “[c]onsciousness is the last and the latest development of the organic and 
hence also what is the most unfinished and strong.” Being unfinished, it poses danger, since 
“[b]efore a function is fully developed and mature it constitutes a danger for the organism, and 
it is good if during the interval it is subjected to some tyranny.” Secondly, Nietzsche posits the 
problem about the understanding of consciousness is that “[o]ne thinks that it [consciousness] 
constitutes the kernel of man, what is abiding, eternal, ultimate, and most original in him.” 
With its conception as abiding and eternal, consciousness is taken for a determinate magnitude. 
Therefore, from the second position, it follows that “one denies its [consciousness] growth and 
its intermittences. One takes it for the unity of the organism.”184 Nietzsche seems to be 
problematizing the Cartesian ego, or the Kantian transcendental ‘I’ (of apperception), both of 
which are meant to be referencing the “contentless” ‘I’ as the condition for the unity of 
experiences. Instead, Nietzsche is concerned with the empirical reality of the will which 
subscribes to the phenomenon of becoming. 
Be that as it may, what is relevant for now is the implication of associating the faculty 
of the will to one source: consciousness. The ensuing problem in the words of Steven Hales 
and Rex Welshon is the claim of having a single entity (self), being associated with separate 
actions.185 Thus, the conception of the will as a faculty entails opposites (doer and the deed) 
rooted in the metaphysics of permanence/being. With the metaphysics of being, consciousness 
is projected as enduring and, on this foundation, the moral claims about universal values are 
developed. Nietzsche is more emphatic at the end of the aphorism, holding that the belief that 
one possesses consciousness has incapacitated human beings from seeking to acquire one.  
But more pertinently is the recognition that such a consciousness is related to errors 
(that there are enduring things, there are substances, self/subjects and freedom of will). 
Nietzsche observes that any psychology (built on the consciousness) that is dominated by 
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morality founded on intention is nothing but rudimentary and naïve. In a later text of The Gay 
Science, Nietzsche expresses his sense of consciousness: 
Consciousness does not really belong to man's individual existence but rather to his 
social or herd nature; that, as follows from this, it has developed subtlety only 
insofar as this is required by social or herd utility. Consequently, given the best will 
in the world to understand ourselves as individually as possible, … each of us will 
always succeed in becoming conscious only of what is not individual but ‘average.’ 
Our thoughts themselves are continually governed by the character of 
consciousness—by the 'genius of the species' that commands it−and translated back 
into the perspective of the herd. Fundamentally, all our actions are altogether 
incomparably personal, unique, and infinitely individual. 
This is the essence of phenomenalism and perspectivism as I understand them: 
Owing to the nature of animal consciousness, the world of which we can become 
conscious is only a surface- and sign-world, a world that is made common and 
meaner.186 
In this text, a summary of sorts, Nietzsche expounds his reasons for undermining any 
psychology that may be founded on consciousness. Such a psychology lacks the perspectival 
aspect that is central to the developmental nature of Nietzsche’s thinking. On this 
interpretation, consciousness is not an aspect of man’s individual existence. The implication 
is that consciousness as the kernel or enduring reality does not justify the condition of the 
individual as a perspectival entity. However, the above exposition on consciousness may have 
greater ramifications on Nietzsche’s methodological grounds of individual autopoiesis than is 
currently acknowledged. 
In divorcing his envisaged psychology of the will to power from traditional morality, 
Nietzsche’s project breaks the abstractive limitations by insisting on becoming. The abstractive 
limitations entail the tendency of being fixated on universalistic principles and imposition of 
conceptual frameworks. Nietzsche, in dissociating himself from the conception of the 
subject/self as a unified entity, enables himself to reject the notion of the abstract individual, 
too. Nietzsche understands the will as multiple, efficacious, and present in the many drives 
that constitute an individual. Hence, Nietzsche’s critique of any psychology dominated by 
morality and emphasis on becoming seems to entrench his thinking on human condition. As 
such, in the words of Ian Forbes, Nietzsche frees his method of will to power from being an 
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analysis of a particular society that purports to formulate prescriptions for other societies.187 If 
this is taken to be the case, will Nietzsche’s explanatory tool as will to power not turn out to 
be contentless? Nietzsche’s method focuses on being “the directing force” as opposed to “the 
driving force.”188 The directing force is akin to the reservoir of boundless possibilities, 
potentially waiting to be used up. Such a force epitomizes the type Übermensch, which is the 
focus of Nietzsche’s method. One can credibly ascribe the directing force to the traditional 
reference to the will as blind. The driving force applies to myriad ways in which the directing 
force expresses itself. Driving force is limited in operation and is goal-orientated and 
discharges itself in one particular way. This point on directing and driving force, will be dealt 
with again about the Will as overcoming below. 
For Nietzsche, what guides the production of the singular individual is the psychology 
of the will, and not traditional morality. In the case of consciousness, like rationality, it serves 
a secondary function compared to the primary force of the will to power. In setting the 
psychological needs (of the type Übermensch) above the moral universalistic approach, 
Nietzsche positions his method above any particular individual, culture, or social setting. 
However, this does not imply that Nietzsche’s method is ahistorical; instead, it is what I 
referred to in Chapter One as intra-perspectival. (Refer also to the notion of typology in 
Nietzsche, explained in Chapter One.) Such a method finds realization in different life forms, 
but not in a uniform manner. As such, Nietzsche’s method can be validly applied for the 
appraisal of structures that ensue from traditional morality, like utilitarianism and any 
encompassing moral norms that Nietzsche critiques in the Western cultural setting. Now the 
focus shifts to that psychology which is realized in myriad life forms. 
2.1.1 The Will to Power: The Psychology of the Type 
Types from the last chapter are understood as explainers of human reality. In a famous 
text, Nietzsche describes psychology “as morphology and the doctrine of the development of 
the will to power.”189 To justify his brand of psychology, Nietzsche goes further to claim that 
nobody has ever come close to such a designation even in thought. This seemingly amounts to 
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appropriating the will to power for his own psychology that is not dominated by morality. In 
Twilight of Idols, Nietzsche highlights salient points about his scope of psychology. He 
remarks that a born psychologist is conscious only of the conclusion, the outcome, and “knows 
nothing of that arbitrary abstraction from the individual case.”190 The meaning of the outcome 
here is that it is about the type (the encompassing traits). 
Psychology so understood is not dealing with particular human beings per se but with 
the typical explainers of human actions. (For Nietzsche, it is the will to power as the 
fundamental drive.) It is within such a domain that John Richardson designates Nietzsche’s 
psychology as the delineation of psychological types.191 For his part, Kaufmann is of the view 
that Nietzsche’s will to power is first and foremost a psychological hypothesis.192 As such, will 
to power could be an empirical concept arrived at by induction. The ontology of becoming as 
enshrined in the type Übermensch requires an accompanying psychology that accounts for that 
becoming. In Ecce Homo, Nietzsche is more elaborate in his claims about pathfinding in 
psychology. Convinced that he has developed a psychology contra Christian morality he 
writes, “No one has yet felt Christian morality to be beneath them: for that you need an 
elevation, a far-sightedness, a hitherto quite unprecedented psychological depth and 
bottomlessness. Christian morality has hitherto been the Circe of all thinkers—they were in its 
service.”193 This can possibly be appreciated under psychology tied to traditional metaphysics 
and Nietzsche’s position on a psychology that he values, of types. However, where does his 
psychology of explainers of actions lead to? What does it entail and how does it work? These 
are the questions that will be investigated under the framework of the will to power as the 
explanatory principle of the type Übermensch. The argument revolves around the claim that 
the will to power through its inherent nature of overcoming and form-giving is the guarantor 
of individual autopoiesis through singular individuality. 
Nietzsche links psychology and the will to power through morphology. The term 
morphology from its Greek etymology, (μορϕή) morphē (form) has two possible applications: 
(a) morphē may refer to the external appearance of a thing, the outside shape/structure. This is 
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a common Greek usage in the writings of Homer, or (b) morphē as the nature or essence of a 
thing. The standard understanding of this is the Platonic Είδος, as the Form/Idea.194 In the 
German language, there is die Morphe, a derivative of Greek Morphē/Eίδος, which gives 
nuances such as Geist/Form. The philosophical understanding of Morphologie in German is 
as Science of the doctrine of things, their forms, structure and characteristic development and 
regularities.195 The usage that Nietzsche has in mind is the form as expression of the essential 
aspect of a thing (delineation of a thing as such). Morphology, in Nietzsche’s context, is about 
the fundamental features that comprise an organism, mostly from the psychological and 
biological perspectives. Some Nietzsche scholars, such as Maudemarie Clark, allege that the 
will to power is a psychological drive.196 Clark further argues that Nietzsche thought that all 
human actions could be explained in terms of the will. The standard position is that the 
fundamental psychological unit to which Nietzsche attributes his doctrine of the will to power 
is the drive.197 Thus, for Nietzsche, the formal (essential) structure of the human being is 
grounded in the drives. 
For human beings, the regime of drives constitutes the life of instincts. In Nietzsche’s 
view, the drives form the essential constitution of the human being. Thus, knowledge of the 
drives, though incomplete, provides a major insight into human reality. Nietzsche relates the 
drives to intellectual conscience. He alleges, “A conscience behind your ‘conscience’ … has a 
pre-history in your instincts, likes, dislikes, experiences, and lack of experiences.”198 The 
intellectual conscience lies deeper than the judgmental conscience (which is tied to the 
morality that Nietzsche criticises). The conscience behind the conscience in Nietzsche’s corpus 
is mostly associated with the drives. The drives operate beneath the level of consciousness.199 
The ultimate entity that governs the functioning of the drives is the will, which is a complex 
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reality for Nietzsche. This is because, as it will later emerge, Nietzsche associates the will with 
affects/emotions of command. The affects are explained through the drives. Thus, knowledge 
of the drives entails Nietzsche’s psychology. The link of the drives to psychology is evident in 
Nietzsche’s allegation that psychology is the path to fundamental problems. Nietzsche’s brand 
of psychology through the regime of drives is one such avenue for far-sightedness and 
archaeology of the human type (which entails the instinctual constitution). 
In this regard, Nietzsche’s psychology studies the forms involved in its articulation of 
the type human.200 This is the reason Nietzsche's psychology is about the fundamental human 
drive, the will to power. The fundamental condition of the human being is best described by 
the in-built constraints explainable in terms of drives. In Zarathustra’s passage, ‘On Self-
Overcoming,’ Nietzsche associates the will to power with the unexhausted procreative life-
will, obeying and commanding, even with life. More pertinent is Nietzsche’s claim, “And this 
secret did Life herself tell to me. ‘Behold,’ she said [life], I am that which must always 
overcome itself.”201 Nietzsche perceives the presence of overcoming wherever there is will to 
power, and particularly wherever he finds the living, because for Zarathustra, will to power, as 
it later emerges, is about life in its multiple forms. 
Overcoming in this case underpins the ontological case of life associated more with the 
will. The different aspects of will and power can be discerned in Beyond Good and Evil. 
Nietzsche believes that “life itself is essentially a process of appropriating, injuring, 
overpowering the alien and the weaker, oppressing, being harsh, imposing your own form, 
incorporating, and at least, the very least, exploiting.”202 In the process of overcoming, 
something else takes place, appropriation and imposition of some form. The type Übermensch 
fundamentally requires appropriation and form in the singular individual which is 
accomplished by the will to power. 
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Hence, the will to power as the fundamental drive must be regarded as the disposition 
that structures human affective orientation and exerts remarkable influence. Now, with the 
doctrine of the will to power, the methodological response to Nietzsche’s questions: ‘how can 
your life, the individual life, receive the highest value, the deepest significance? How can it be 
least squandered?’ seem to take some shape. The will to power is emerging as that efficacious 
principle by which human life can be organized to possibly yield singular individuality. In 
Chapter One, the Übermensch is presented as Nietzsche’s best type. The burden of elaborating 
on how the Übermensch is deemed the best type in terms of its effectiveness lies in its 
explainer, the will to power. Thus, articulating human actions (psychology) within the 
ontology of becoming may only be credible through the will to power. 
The will to power explains the mechanism of becoming. Nietzsche envisages the reality 
of becoming “as the embodiment of will to power” which is understood as will to grow, to 
spread, to win dominance. The basis of will to power is not out of any morality or immorality, 
but simply because it is alive, “and because life is precisely will to power.”203 The standard 
interpretation of the aspects of the will to power as growing, winning, and dominance is taking 
them as the character of life. The common inner-character of life is indifference. And as the 
will to power, life is essentially overcoming and form-giving. Nietzsche envisions life as 
beyond good and evil (supra-moral) since it is not out of any morality. This is a complex claim 
that requires more analysis of Nietzsche’s notion of life. 
In the notes of the period 1885–1886 there is an entry on life and value. The outstanding 
stance in the following text is that valuation and even morality must be life-oriented. Such is 
the suggestion from the following text: 
What are our evaluations and moral tables really worth? What is the outcome of 
their rule? For whom? in relation to what?—Answer: for life. But what is life? Here 
we need a new, more definite formulation of the concept ‘life.’ My formula for it 
is: Life is will to power.204 
Life qua life is not governed by moral valuations, since it is simply indifferent. To revert to 
the previous discourse about the moral epoch, life for Nietzsche may not have intentions 
ascribed to it. In Beyond Good and Evil on moral epochs, apart from the moral intentions, he 
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envisages an unintentional realm, called extra-moral. The extra-moral epoch for Nietzsche is 
where “the decisive value of an action resides in precisely that which is not intentional in it.”205 
Nietzsche generally does not ascribe such life of unintentionality to any of his contemporary 
human beings, but he seems to envision it for those he calls the philosophers of the future. The 
indifferent character of life implies there are no obligations supervening on life per se. Thus, 
Nietzsche holds that life is not an abstraction but an outcome since like the will it wills itself. 
For Nietzsche whatever is called morality is nothing but “a system of evaluations that partially 
coincides with the conditions of a creature’s life.”206 In this regard, the conditions of life 
(founded on the drives) ought to be the basis for morality. And like the will, life is efficacious. 
The domains of life, the will to power as the psychology of the type Übermensch 
supports the claim that the life of singular individuality is founded on the regime of the human 
drives. It is within the domain of the will to power, that the notion of singular individuality as 
a task is made credible. This is because the will to power as a fundamental drive operates in 
an immanent manner. As one scholar on Nietzsche’s ontology observes, because of its 
immanence, will to power is not something merely added to the human condition from without, 
but it is inherent in it.207 That inherence is based on the human instinctual life of the drives. 
The drives as affects (unconscious factors) are the main explainers of our actions. Peter 
Poellner believes that Nietzsche conceives explanation/articulation of human actions in terms 
of efficacy.208 In efficacy, the will expresses itself as the affect of command. In this regard, 
espousing becoming (by the singular individual) as demanded of by the type Übermensch is 
not just natural but seems inevitable since it is the raison d'être of the type Übermensch. 
Nietzsche rejects the will as a faculty (will as a moral judgement in the domain of abstraction), 
then he accepts the same as an affect of command (as the distinguishing feature for sovereignty 
and strength). The will, in Nietzsche’s estimation, holds the key for understanding the two 
inseparable acts of the will to power as self-overcoming and form-giving. It has been shown 
so far that the will is not a faculty. Now clarity is needed on the meaning of the will as an 
emotion of command (Affekt des Commando). 
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2.1.2 Will: ‘Affect of Command’ 
The will is conceived by Nietzsche as a multifarious thing both in nature and operation. 
Hence, he thinks that it is a mistake for philosophers to talk about the will as if it is the most 
familiar thing in the world. There is need for caution, since “the will is not just a complex of 
feeling and thinking; rather, it is fundamentally an affect: and specifically the affect of the 
command.”209 The basis of such a will is the instinctual life (that touches on the basic 
composition of the human being, as homo natura). Though assumptive, Nietzsche believes 
that, we cannot get down or up to any “reality” except the reality of our drives (since thinking 
is only a relation between these drives). In this section, the argument is that Nietzsche’s 
conception of the will as the “affect of command” is the raison d'être for the development and 
understanding of the underlying notions of the will to power, self-overcoming, and form-
giving. Furthermore, it will be shown that, psychology as the morphology of the doctrine of 
the will to power, necessarily deals with the action of the will. It is the action of the will that 
accounts for singular individuality (individuals with strong wills, those who live the life of the 
type Übermensch, affirm will to power) or the opposite (weak individuals who espouse traits 
of the type last human being). 
In Schopenhauer as Educator, singular individuality is given as a task. For Nietzsche, 
singular individuality is literally a production that demands requisite raw materials and the 
appropriate engineering to accomplish. To begin with, there is no substantive “self”/ego. This 
is partly explained above in our consideration of the psychology dominated by morality. The 
realm of consciousness (that presupposes existence of a unified ego), considered from the 
regime of drives Nietzsche believes: “is a more or less fantastic commentary on an unknown, 
perhaps unknowable, but felt text.”210 In this aphorism Nietzsche deals with the complexity of 
drives, and as such our knowledge of them will always be incomplete. It is within that 
complexity that even the very notion of the ego unfolds. The word ego is a designation for the 
complexity of the drives and desires whose ultimate law we cannot really know.211 The 
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difficulty in understanding the complexity of the ego, and its later development, hinges on the 
complexity of willing as it is explained in Beyond Good and Evil. 
In Nietzsche’s psychology of the action of the will, the larger question of affirming 
tragic existence is properly encountered. The psychology of the will, as the explanation of the 
influence of the will on human action, is meant to be a bulwark against the fears of tragic 
existence. For Nietzsche, the domain of human activity is centred around the will as 
efficacious. This implies that human actions are largely unconscious and are influenced by the 
drives. More specifically, it is through the psychology of the will that Nietzsche can replace 
the passive pessimism of Schopenhauer with a tragic attitude of “overcoming the flight from 
the world with the transfiguration of the world through art.”212 It must be made clear that the 
transfiguration from Nietzsche’s perspective is through fashioning the individual as a singular 
individual (which is affirmation of existence). The foundation for that fashioning is the regime 
of drives as the basic human condition. 
According to Christoph Cox, as natural beings (opposed to the supernatural), human 
beings are caught up within a nexus of competing world-views and each perspective has origin 
in psychological, physiological, historical, cultural and political beliefs, and values.213 
Nietzsche’s brand of perspectivism deals with the reigning conditions for individuals as 
determiners of values. Perspectival (life from a privileged position) here refers specifically to 
the drives as the inner determinant of any human activity. That perspectival condition is 
fundamentally what the will as will to power is about. It is on its perspectivity (in-built 
constraint) that the will to power can be considered as a sort of standard for carrying out 
critique in Nietzsche.214 The multiple action of the will is explained through the many drives 
that constitute the human condition. 
For Nietzsche, the will involves a complex phenomenon and as such, is only unified in 
word. This controversial claim is explained through the complex phenomenon of willing. In 
every action of the will there is a “plurality of feelings, namely: the feeling of the state away 
from which, the feeling of the state towards which, and the feeling of this ‘away from’ and 
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‘towards’ themselves.”215 The act of willing thus entails a push and pull scenario of the 
impulses. In this first case scenario of the act of the will, at play is the plurality of instincts. 
The second ingredient of the action of the will is thought. This is because in every act of willing 
there is a commandeering thought. However, Nietzsche’s position is that thought and willing 
are inseparable. The linking of will and thought is consistent with what Nietzsche already states 
in Zarathustra: 
‘Body am I and soul’—thus talks the child. … But the awakened one, the one who 
knows, says: Body am I through and through, and nothing besides; and soul is 
merely a word for something about the body. 
The body is a great reason, a manifold with one sense, a war and a peace, a herd 
and a herdsman. 
A tool of the body is your small reason, my brother, which you call ‘spirit,’ a small 
tool and toy of your great reason. 
‘I’ you say, and are proud of this word. But the greater thing—in which you do not 
want to believe—is your body and its great reason: it does not say I, but does I.216 
In this passage, Gedanken (thoughts) must be associated with kleine Vernunft (small reason) 
instead of grosse Vernunft. Thought related to kleine Vernunft serves as the instrumental reason 
for the causal reason (grosse Vernunft). The causal/great reason in the current context (act of 
the will), is willing. Thus, the claim that thought is not to be divorced from willing simply 
emboldens Nietzsche’s position that a human being is body through and through. Affirming 
willing above thought maintains the privileged place of the drives as the basis for any plausible 
Nietzschean production of singular individuality. The credibility of the drives in the willing 
process is clearer in the next aspect of willing. 
On the third aspect of willing Nietzsche alleges that “the will is not just a complex of 
feeling and thinking; rather, it is fundamentally an affect: and specifically the affect of the 
command.” On the affects lies the entire structure of the phenomenon of willing. The affects 
are the result of the drives (as the non-conscious dispositions which generate affective 
orientations). One ought to understand affects as strong inclinations for and aversions to certain 
actions.217 The moral feelings are described as either for or against inclination. But affects, 
described as states of inclinations to or from are constitutive of an action, and like moral 
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feelings they are simply non-cognitive.218 This makes any moral justification a post hoc affair 
given that it is simply the pronouncement after the action. In this case, drives as affects are 
morally undetermined, given that most of the moral determinations are judgments (as the 
affirmation or negation of the act). 
For Nietzsche, moral determination here is in terms of moral feelings and moral 
concepts: whereby “the former are powerful before the action, the latter especially after the 
action in face of the need to pronounce upon it.”219 The morality that Nietzsche campaigns 
against is the one that derives from the moral concepts (rationalized) where universal guiding 
principles tend to originate (morality as a set of principles). Such morality says little about the 
individual reality based on the affects. This is because, as Robert C. Solomon observes, 
morality conceived conceptually (Moralität) tends to rule out all psychological influences (as 
interests or inclinations) from moral worth.220 Morality as understood from a universal 
perspective fails to realize that it is the principle that is universal, and not the property of the 
individual. The individual property refers to the drives and the affects. With this realization 
(affects as inclinations/dispositions and morally indeterminate), Nietzsche seems to succeed in 
his understanding of the will as multiple and perspectival. 
The will is perspectival because the drives as affects are the standpoint through which 
we interpret the world (through their likes, dislikes—inclinations). “Interpret” here implies 
that human affects do adopt a perspective as a standpoint. And that is what entails evaluation. 
By being perspectival, the affects command. Therefore, when the will as will to power is 
presented as the explanatory principle of human life, it is simply implying that the will in the 
sense of the entire regime of drives is the necessary condition (perspective) for any possible 
affirmation of human existence. Thus, the complexity of the will lies in the fact that it entails 
sensory (sensation), cognitive (thought), and affective (affect) aspects. However, from the 
above consideration of the affects as inclinations, it is credible to be summative and say that 
the will is basically the affects. 
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The affective domain espouses the influential complexity of the inner reality of the 
will. Nietzsche’s doctrine of perspectivism is inseparable from the understanding of the affects. 
In On the Genealogy of Morality, Nietzsche affirms the power of affects: 
There is only a perspectival seeing, only a perspectival ‘knowing’; the more affects 
we are able to put into words about a thing, the more eyes, various eyes we are able 
to use for the same thing, the more complete will be our ‘concept’ of the thing, our 
‘objectivity’. But to eliminate the will completely and turn off all the emotions 
without exception, assuming we could: well? would that not mean to castrate the 
intellect?221 
Affects are conditional in the sense that they determine the individual’s life from a certain 
stand- point and thus they form the basic reality of the individual. For Nietzsche, the affects as 
inner conditions provide the aperture into the character of human life. Human existence is 
explainable through its perspectival character. The inner reality of the individual is non-
cognitive, given the complexity of the drives involved. For Nietzsche, the appropriate 
explanation of basic human reality is through the activities of the drives and interests. 
Nietzsche’s doctrine of perspectivism finds its compelling strength in the 
understanding of the affects as units of meaning for human life. The perspective-laden 
individual is necessarily understood through the multiple drives and affects, and in that way, 
whatever is referred to as self, is a reality having multiple power relations of composite wills.222 
The will as a multiple entity demands for its own organization. It is on the account of the 
organization of the drives that singular individuality is continually realized or lost. Hence, the 
need for a commanding will. The will as affect of command implicitly requires response to the 
command, which is obedience. The will as an affect of command has an inner certainty that it 
will be obeyed. The inner certainty of the will is founded on its nature of being efficacious, 
and it is on this basis that it commands. 
The act of willing is a property of every drive, and as Welshon opines, “disciplining 
the drives is the hallmark of a healthy psyche.”223 The need for discipline or taskmasters or 
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dissatisfaction was prominent in chapter one. Those individuals lacking discipline because of 
weak wills could find it hard to embark on singular individuality. This is because, where drives 
are not coordinated under a single drive, or a small cluster of dominating drives, are bound to 
result into failed selves.224 Drives need discipline/coordination for the greater realization of 
power. Nietzsche’s response to the need for taskmasters/discipline is the psychology of the 
will, as will to power. In the will to power, the will as the fundamental affect of command, the 
sensation, the thought and affect are perfectly harmonized. Nietzsche gives the person of 
Goethe as a possible example of that harmonization. Goethe fulfills the perspectival demands 
of the affects and the will in the following description: 
[H]e did not sever himself from life, he placed himself within it; nothing could 
discourage him and he took as much as possible upon himself, above himself, within 
himself. What he aspired to was totality; he strove against separation of reason, 
sensuality, feeling, will. […]; he disciplined himself to a whole, he created 
himself.225  
For Nietzsche, Goethe is understood as one who made a grand attempt to overcome the 18th 
century. Nietzsche understood the 18th century from the moral perspective as the century of 
enthusiasm given that the philosophers of that century operated under the seduction of morality 
(that paralyzed the critical will). Goethe is an exception to that by returning to nature and 
embracing the naturalness of renaissance.226 The attempt to overcome is associated with 
Goethe's strongest instinct for life, which is self-overcoming. 
The greatness of Goethe is given in three expressions: he took as much as possible 
upon himself, above himself, and within himself. It implies that Goethe was his own helmsman-
cum-taskmaster, recognized the exemplar (a provocateur) and organized the regime of the 
drives. Thus, singular individuality as a task is realized in Goethe. The production of the 
singular individual is done in every act of living. This means that the final verdict of one’s 
existence must come from an aesthetic perspective, which evaluates the individual in terms of 
the integration, coherence, and harmony that has been achieved.227 In striving, one implicitly 
gives style (meaning the capacity to continually subject oneself to discipline;it is a work in 
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progress) to his individual life. In this style, Goethe embraces the grand style of the type 
Übermensch which is actualizing difference within the individual without reducing it.228 
Embracing differences without being reductive is learning to love the multiple as they come 
to be within individuals that embody such differences. Reducing differences is akin to being 
contra singularities. Goethe learned to love the reality of the type Übermensch, as it comes to 
be within himself who made it exist in his singular individuality. Goethe also embodies what 
Nietzsche describes as his own nature, which is affirmative. Goethe embodies the will as the 
affect of command. The will to power sets the affirmative journey through its twin operations 
of overcoming and form-giving. 
In the will to power lies the enormous possibilities of producing the singular individual 
within the grand style of the type Übermensch. The type Übermensch is the epitome of the 
will to power. The will to power comprises not only the fundamental drive, but also the 
methodological technics of form giving (stamping becoming with the character of being) to 
the type Übermensch. Hence, the will to power is not essentially what one wills, but how one 
wills.229 That is, it is about the process of organizing the drives, which involves 
striving/overcoming. It is the process of overcoming which determines the strong or the weak 
will. The concrete form of the type Übermensch is the singular individual (one that espouses 
the strong will and right kind of organization). To embark on the course of grand style, two 
concurrent traits of will to power—overcoming/striving and form-giving—are needed. 
a. Will as overcoming 
In this section I attempt to show that the will to power, as the explanatory impulse of 
the type Übermensch, accounts for how singular individuality can be made possible. In the 
previous chapter, I argued that the type Übermensch, as the best type, is necessary for the 
singular individual not only to affirm life, but also to remain indeterminate. The valorisation 
of the type Übermensch is founded on its psychology, which is the will to power. However, 
the mechanism for the affirmation is still lacking. The twin aspects of the will to power as 
overcoming and form-giving will be presented as promising enough for singular individuality. 
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The consideration of the will as overcoming is an attempt to explain how the fundamental drive 
maintains itself as affect of command. The will as overcoming is fundamentally dealing with 
the psychology of the will as the fundamental drive. 
The type Übermensch is described as one that has turned out the best: it organizes the 
multiple drives without reducing them to uniformity. The Übermensch is understood by 
Nietzsche as the type that is synthesized in the right way possible. The type Übermensch as 
the will to power combines, not only the richness of the drives, but also the ability to organize 
through overcoming and form-giving. For Nietzsche, the structuring of the drives is necessary 
because every drive seeks to expand itself and its sphere of influence. This is called mastery. 
Mastery rides on the fact that every single drive “would be only too pleased to present itself as 
the ultimate purpose of existence and as rightful master of all the other drives. Because every 
drive craves mastery.”230 Overcoming must be related to mastery, discipline and untimeliness. 
These three are demands that obtain if singular individuality is to be maintained as a process 
in individual mastery. 
However, the need for mastery is always a process. For the will, as an affect of 
command, entails movement beyond what it now is or does.231 The will as a movement justifies 
it as the unexhausted procreative life-will. The movement explains the activity of the drives, 
where they (the drives) tend beyond their borders. It is the nature of the will to pass beyond 
itself into a stronger drive. (Such is the summative mechanism of will’s own mastery as 
overcoming.) The will as overcoming is figuratively its own greatest enemy since whatever it 
esteems is overthrown in its turn by the next evaluation.232 This phenomenon of overcoming 
needs more exploration: firstly, by briefly demonstrating the meaning of overcoming in 
Nietzsche’s corpus, referencing human life; and secondly, by showing how the nature of the 
will is self-overcoming (commanding and obeying). 
In Thus Spoke Zarathustra, the type Übermensch and the human being are joined by 
the act of overcoming. Zarathustra in the town of Motley Cow pronounces to the people, “I 
teach you the Overhuman. The human is something that shall be overcome. What have you 
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done to overcome it?”233 Zarathustra’s pronouncement about the type Übermensch in the town 
of Motley Cow is itself meaningful. In a philosophical sphere Motley is traced from Plato’s 
The Republic, where it is a description for the democratic state.234 In Plato, democracy is not a 
preferred form of governance, since it is considered the rule of the masses. And Plato’s 
question about democracy is, how can the hoi polloi rule? Nietzsche applies the image of 
Motley Cow in his critique of modernity’s herd-like operations.235 Taken in the broader sense 
as the description of modernity, Motley is present in Nietzsche’s works from the beginning to 
the end. In The Birth of Tragedy, modernity is characterized as a “pandemonium of myths” 
thrown into a “disorderly heap.”236 The following year, in the first Untimely Meditation, 
modernity is described as a chaotic jumble of styles and a market motley.237 Then in Beyond 
Good and Evil, the work specifically meant as a critique of modernity, several references to 
motley culture are prevalent. 
Nietzsche describes the modern European man as “[t]he hybrid European—a tolerably 
ugly plebeian, all in all—definitely requires a costume: he needs history as his storeroom for 
costumes. He realizes, to be sure, that none of them fits him properly—he changes and 
changes.”238 The problem is, though the costumes are many in terms of different epochs 
(romantic, classical, or Christian) that modernity attempts to suit for itself, none of them fit. In 
the words of Young, modern man constantly tries out supposedly new styles in terms of 
customs and arts.239 Further in Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche believes that “democratic 
mingling of classes and races” has plunged Europe into semi-barbarism.240 That the modern 
human being’s instincts now run back in all directions, and ‘we ourselves are a kind of chaos.’ 
However, what seems critical is that modern human beings “accept precisely this confusion of 
colours, this medley of the most delicate, the coarsest and the most artificial, with a secret of 
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confidence and cordiality.”241 Hence, Motley Cow town represents the average man where 
desire for anything higher is almost lost (the sense of overcoming is non-existent). 
The above description of the Motley Cow seems to represent what needs to be 
overcome through the type Übermensch. The term überwinden has several nuances like, to 
overcome a crisis (Krise) or even to get over a sickness (Krankheit). It may also imply to 
conquer or simply outgrow. In relation to the project at hand, singular individuality as the 
appropriate domain for affirmation of life, überwinden ought to be associated with existence 
as it manifests itself in modernity.  
Thus, überwinden is central to encountering Nietzsche’s aporia: how can your life, the 
individual life, receive the highest value, the deepest significance? How can it be least 
squandered? Based on existence and within the crisis of modernity, in understanding 
überwinden, its designation as outgrow/conquer can be favoured. The idea of conquest is closer 
to Überwindung, as the conquest or the overpowering/overcoming as a way of Ja-Sagen 
(affirmation) of tragic existence. It is in linking overcoming to affirmation of life, that one sees 
the possibility of the Übermensch as the epitome of overcoming.  
The type that affirms tragic existence in Nietzsche’s purview is the Übermensch. Thus, 
the type Übermensch at any rate cannot be dissociated from the conception of Überwindung. 
As Kaufmann notes, “Man is something that should be overcome”—and the man “who has 
overcome himself has become an overman.”242 The conquest of the type Übermensch is 
justified by its incorporation of the psychology of the tragedy that entails being over and above 
(conquest) terror and pity, which is the affirmation of life in its complete sense. In Zarathustra’s 
terms, overcoming is an invocation, a sort of a calling. The call takes the form of something 
that shall be overcome. It then follows that, living the life of the type Übermensch that entails 
overcoming is a human being’s calling, though not everybody can respond to the invocation 
positively. As an invocation (soll), it implies that it is not a given, it is a task (an 
obligation/sollen that presupposes the ability) which requires breeding. Proper breeding 
involves the action of the will, which is only possible with the suitable attitude (the theme of 
the next chapter).  
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Association of the will with overcoming is considered by Zarathustra under the 
auspices of human actions (tablet of good and evil). The human evaluation of morality for 
Nietzsche is inherently perspectival. It is in the perspectival conditions of many lands (viele 
Länder) and many peoples (viele Völker) that Zarathustra introduces the will and overcoming. 
Nietzsche’s proposition is that “[n]o people could live without first evaluating; but if it would 
maintain itself, it may not evaluate as its neighbour evaluates.”243 Valuing in the sense of 
estimating, is conditional/perspectival given that the loci of values are the people in specific 
lands. Further elaboration on the diversity of the phenomenon of estimating reads:  
Much that this people deemed good was for another a source of scorn and shame: 
thus have I found it. Many things I found called evil here, and there adorned with 
purple honours. […] A tablet of things held to be good hangs over every people. 
Behold, it is the tablet of its overcomings [Überwindungen]; behold, it is the voice 
of its will to power.244  
Nietzsche here attempts to show that overcoming can be inherent in the human condition, and 
it is described as the will to power.  
The tablet represents the Ten Commandments as some peoples’ response to the tragedy 
of their existence expressed as will to power. The will described as overcoming is what allows 
ruling, conquering, and triumphing over the others. On the strength of its power, the will counts 
“as the lofty, the first, the measure, the meaning of all things.”245 It is on the will as the affect 
of command that the entire human life is discerned as valuable or otherwise. Nietzsche later 
references the will to power as “the strongest, most life affirming impulse.”246 This 
understanding of the will vis-à-viz life yields the fundamental human drive. The fundamental 
drive justifies Zarathustra’s assertion above that no one evaluates as his neighbour does, 
meaning that it is the inherent character of existence to be perspectival and individually valued. 
Human life and valuing can only be properly perceived under one’s own perspective.247 In this 
regard, the inherent nature of human existence as stated above is a conquest/overcoming, one 
that espouses change. 
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Overcoming is fundamentally embracing change, which is a war on what seeks to 
persist. Since the human being existentially cannot stand still, he must overcome or decline.248 
However, the overcoming in question here is of the type Übermensch. The Übermensch 
embodies overcoming as such. The type Übermensch, as the embodiment of the overcoming, 
implies that it is essentially indeterminate and unconditionally powerful. Power here means 
that the type Übermensch as pure overpowering can command, and in these two ways 
(overpowering and command) is transformed into reality as the will to power.249 It means that 
the Übermensch’s desire for power is not achieved in the overcoming per se, but in concrete 
terms, expressed as singular individuals. I will return to this point in a moment. It has been 
demonstrated how Nietzsche in Zarathustra links overcoming to will to power. However, it is 
necessary to understand how he develops self-overcoming in the same work in the aphorism 
on self-overcoming. 
Zarathustra describes self-overcoming as the will to procreate or drive for a purpose. 
The ‘purpose’ implies that which is higher, farther, and more manifold.250 Nietzsche talks of 
Zweck (purpose) and Zwecke (purposes). In Schopenhauer as Educator, on nature and purpose, 
Nietzsche notes, “Nature propels the philosopher into [humankind] like an arrow; it takes no 
aim but hopes the arrow will stick somewhere. But countless times it misses and is depressed 
at the fact. Nature is extravagant in the domain of culture as it is in that of planting and 
sowing.”251 There is purpose (Zweck) in nature, but that purpose is not teleological (no 
determinate end). This almost sounds contradictory, but it may not be. In Zarathustra, he talks 
of struggle (Kampf), becoming (Werden), purpose (Zweck), and conflict of purposes (Zwecke 
Widerspruch). These characteristics of nature are summed in a statement: “Whatever I create 
and however much I love it soon must oppose both it and my love: thus my will wills it.”252 
This means self-overcoming may not be toward a stable fixed telos. Such understanding is 
consistent with nature, which Kaufmann describes as something which has purposes (Zwecke) 
but is not purposeful (zweckmässig).253 Such a conception of nature gives impetus to the need 
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for struggle. The means of nature are insufficient for its realization. That is why man must help 
nature by working at his own perfection. 
Hence, the common position is that overcoming is consistent with striving and 
dissatisfaction as ingredients for singular individuality under the direction of the type 
Übermensch. Zarathustra associates self-overcoming with several nuances of will to power: 
legislation, the will, and its commanding power. The commanding power of the will involves 
its need for mastery. More pertinently for Nietzsche, self-overcoming ipso facto entails 
problematizing of traditional morality that delineates between good and evil. Thus, self-
overcoming problematizes the following aspects that Zarathustra speaks to: 
‘Will to truth’ you call it, you who are wisest, that which drives you and puts you 
in heat? 
Will to the thinkability of all things: thus I call your will! 
All beings you want first to make thinkable: for you doubt with healthy suspicion 
whether they really are thinkable. … 
That is your entire will, you who are wisest, as a will to power; and even when you 
talk of good and evil and of valuations. 
You still want to create the world before which you can kneel: that is your ultimate 
hope and intoxication. 
Your will and your values you have placed on the river of Becoming; what the 
people believe to be good and evil betrays to me an ancient will to power.254 
This is largely the first part of the aphorism on self-overcoming. Here, Zarathustra once more 
perhaps intends to be clear that the will to truth may not necessarily promote overcoming. 
Zarathustra’s description of the will to truth as that which drives and fills one with 
sentimentality can be linked to non-perspectival claims to truth. In Human All Too Human, 
when distinguishing between possessing truth and seeking truth, Nietzsche notes, “And the 
pathos of possessing truth does now in fact count for very little in comparison with that other, 
admittedly gentler and less noisy pathos of seeking truth that never wearies of learning and 
examining anew.”255 The will to truth is linked by Nietzsche to the metaphysical claims of 
absolute, pretentious, and eternal truths (universalistic claims, unconditional). On the broader 
scale, the will to truth reflects more on the individual who purports to live in the non-
perspectival domain of existence. The will to truth (as unconditioned claims) Nietzsche 
associates with the fettered spirits/weak spirits which are necessarily dependent. 
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The fettered spirit is associated with the one who is “faithful to his convictions.”256 In 
Beyond Good and Evil, the fettered spirit is associated with “dogmatists,” and in Anti-Christ, 
Nietzsche talks of “men of conviction, […] man of faith, the believer,” as “necessarily a 
dependent man.”257 In the self-overcoming aphorism from Zarathustra, Nietzsche as he has 
done before in the Thousand Goals and One, seeks to correct the wrong prejudgments imposed 
on reality through the conceptual (rationalization) sphere, by affirming the power of the will 
which is multiple and complex. 
In Beyond Good and Evil, the first aphorism is on the will to truth,  where Nietzsche 
holds, “The will to truth that still seduces us into taking so many risks, this famous truthfulness 
that all philosophers so far have talked about with veneration: what questions this will to truth 
has already laid before us!”258 In Zarathustra, the will to truth, as will to thinkability of things, 
is criticized and necessarily christened as the will to power. This shows that Nietzsche through 
his persona Zarathustra, acknowledges the prejudgments that seem to be wrongly presented in 
universal terms as will to truth. Instead, they need to be taken back to where they appropriately 
belong, to life, hence interpreted as will to power. Commitment to truthfulness inherently 
entails a pervasive suspiciousness, a readiness against being fooled, an eagerness to see 
through appearances to the real structures and motives that lie behind those structures.259 It is 
the desire for truthfulness that ought to drive any process of criticism. Truthfulness is thus 
more akin to the will to power as opposed to merely the will for possession of unconditioned 
truth, which is geared towards will to truth. For Nietzsche, the will to truth is fundamentally 
guided by the need for preservation, and thus a sign of decay. 
Perceiving human life in terms of truthfulness implies the understanding that the 
happenings in the human world are fundamentally the outcome of developments within it. 
These human developments must be understood as entirely inherent in the “internal dynamics 
and the contingencies to which they give rise.”260 In Zarathustra’s aphorism on self-
overcoming, the internal dynamics are justified in the realm of the will to power, as the 
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unexhausted procreative life-will. Nietzsche’s life as will to power is a reality above the moral 
dichotomy of good and evil. In projecting life as beyond good and evil, Nietzsche undermines 
traditional morality as the path to singular individuality and in so doing he valorises the 
psychological path of the will to power. It is the will to power that defines both the basic human 
instinct for growth and the need for development.261 Growth and development of the will 
understood as expansion is what freedom of the will entails. This is the import of the second 
part of the aphorism in Zarathustra that seems to lay bare the different nuances of the will as 
overcoming and form-giving. 
Nietzsche, through Zarathustra, claims that he followed the greatest and the smallest 
path to understand the human. The path in question is the psychological one where the action 
of the will as the affect of command is paramount. The elaboration on the assertion about the 
greatest and the smallest path of life is evident in the following passage: 
But wherever I found the living, there too I heard the speech about obedience. All 
that is living is something that obeys. 
And this is the second thing: whoever cannot obey himself will be commanded. 
That is the way of the living. 
But this is the third thing that I heard: that commanding is harder than obeying. And 
not only because the commander bears the burden of all who obey, and this burden 
can easily crush him:— 
An experiment and a risk appeared to me in all commanding; and always when it 
commands, the living puts its own self at risk.262 
In this passage, one can discern the mechanism of the will to power as the psychology of the 
type Übermensch. Some in-depth analysis of this text from some of Nietzsche’s works after 
Zarathustra is pertinent. I have already demonstrated that the will based on drives is a 
multiplicity. In this regard, the action of the will involves multiple drives. The passage under 
consideration (On Self-overcoming), is about the living. Whatever is being described concerns 
the nature of life, according to Zarathustra. 
In a preamble to the passage above, Zarathustra references the method used in his 
pursuance of the greatest and the smallest path to the living: Observation, as the look into life’s 
eyes through a hundredfold mirror.263 The different perspectives to life are brought out in this 
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part pointing to the nature of life. And it is the eye of life that speaks to Zarathustra. The theme 
of life is discussed through the perspective of life itself. The hundredfold mirror likely implies 
the manifold perspectival nuances involved in life. 
Zarathustra’s expression about life, “that its eye might speak to [him],” is a perspectival 
claim. It possibly implies Nietzsche’s profound method in the affirmation of life (a non-
imposing experimental approach, that lets life express itself). In Twilight of Idols, speaking of 
his nature, Nietzsche alleges,  
To be true to my nature, which is affirmative and has dealings with contradiction 
and criticism only indirectly and when compelled, I shall straightaway set down the 
three tasks for the sake of which one requires educators. One has to learn to see, 
one has to learn to think, one has to learn to speak and write: the end in all three is 
a noble culture.— 
Learning to see—habituating the eye to repose, to patience, to letting things come 
to it; learning to defer judgement, to investigate and comprehend the individual case 
in all its aspects.264 
The relevance of this passage specifically lies in the learning to see. An affirmative attitude 
entails the assimilation of the ontology of becoming where differentiation is espoused as 
opposed to universalization. Universalization is contrary to the perspectival nature of life that 
is innocently becoming. Learning to see is a discipline in self-overcoming whereby there is a 
realization that the “innocence of becoming is rooted in the chaotic interior of external 
order.”265 Learning to see is thus the opposite of the thinkability of beings, it embraces 
becoming and perspectival approaches. Hence, Zarathustra seems to be well educated in noble 
culture, since he lets life speak to him, or rather come to him. The spirit of becoming thrives 
on a genealogical inquiry which always surges towards the bottom of problems, among which 
life is the greatest. 
With so many mirrors, it is possible for one to see round corners and allow access to 
the multifarious perspectives about life. Unlike the all-encompassing traditional metaphysical 
ways, the perspectival approach to life occurs without the obstruction of artifices designed to 
mislead.266 It is from this free rein condition that life speaks of itself to Zarathustra as not only 
obedient but obeys itself and more fundamentally commands itself. Life in commanding itself 
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overcomes itself, and in its overcoming becomes the judge and avenger and sacrificial victim. 
One emerging scenario so far is that the acts of life are also predicated of the will. The will as 
overcoming in general is understood as a conquest, but now there is need to investigate 
overcoming as self-overcoming of life.  
b. Life as self-overcoming 
It is in relation to self-overcoming that Zarathustra lets life proclaim itself: “I am that 
which must always overcome itself.”267 For Zarathustra, the reality of overcoming is the 
expression of the intrinsic character of life. Even Zarathustra’s understanding of life’s source 
seems to be in overcoming given the allegation that “the life that itself cuts into life: through 
its own torment it increases its own knowledge.”268 In overcoming, life enhances itself. It is 
within the phenomenon of overcoming that Nietzsche can claim to have crept into the very 
heart of life and the very roots of life’s heart. Zarathustra’s proclamation of life’s own message 
gives credence to the allegation that singular individuality requires assimilating life on its own 
terms, which is overcoming. And wherever there is life, Zarathustra claims to have found the 
will to power. 
In On the Genealogy of Morals, about the production of the exemplary human beings, 
Nietzsche envisages the necessity for self-overcoming [Selbstüberwindung] by asserting, 
All great things bring about their own demise through an act of self-sublimation 
[Selbstaufhebung]: that is the law of life, the law of necessary ‘self-overcoming’ 
[Selbstüberwindung] in the essence of life, – the lawgiver himself is always 
ultimately exposed to the cry: ‘patere legem, quam ipse tulisti’ [‘Submit to the law 
you have yourself made.’]269  
Here two levels of self-overcoming can be discerned. We have the generic (macro level) self-
sublimation that entails the law of life, and the (specific, perspectival level) self-overcoming 
that demands for the lawgiver and submission to one’s own law. Being consistent with 
Zarathustra’s ‘On Self-Overcoming’ of the individual life beyond the moral domains of good 
and evil, one can fairly assert that Nietzsche’s commitment is to the individual self-
overcoming. Hence, he seems to privilege Selbst-überwindung. 
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The justification for privileging the Selbst-überwindung is founded on Zarathustra’s 
claim: “I would rather go under than renounce this one thing: and verily, where there is going-
under and falling of leaves, behold, there life sacrifices itself—for power!”270 The going-under 
is a key aspect of the human being since what is loved in the human is a going-over (Übergang) 
and a going-under (Untergang). The going-over and the going-under aptly describe the 
condition of singular individuality within the domains of the type Übermensch. For Nietzsche, 
the necessity of striving to encounter and overcome resistance is a feature of human actions.271 
Human actions are not immune from the psychological state. This is because the drives are 
highly involved in the characteristic form of activity (human activities, for Nietzsche, are drive 
motivated). That activity is essentially the order of encountering and overcoming resistance. 
With such a high engagement with the drives, the implication is that apparently human 
activities manifest will to power. In understanding overcoming as going over and going under, 
the current scholarly connection of Selbstüberwindung with the microcosm of the personal 
self-perfection could be credible enough. However, before any ethical claim about personal 
self-perfection is sought, knowledge of the instinctual constitution of the human being is 
paramount. The knowledge in question entails the psychology of the will (which demands the 
engagement with the regime of drives). 
In the words of Conway, the psychology of the will demands developing an individual 
outlook which states that personal self-overcoming is a complex process of destruction and 
creation.272 This is the hallmark of individual autopoiesis which continuously calls for the 
conquering of the current self. Destruction and creation as overcoming marks justify the 
understanding of life as an experiment and a risk. Nietzsche in his middle period works, 
especially in Daybreak and The Gay Science, calls for experimental living. In Daybreak, 
existence is projected as a daring and adventurous affair: “we live existence which is either a 
prelude or a postlude, and the best we can do in this interregnum is to be as far as possible our 
own reges and found little experimental states. We are experiments: let us also want to be 
them!”273 The call to be one’s own ruler is not concrete enough until the overcoming element 
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is factored in. Experimental life is never lacking in dangers/risks, as the apt description of not 
only the philosophers of the future, but also those individuals who embark on the treacherous 
path of singular individuality. The nature of experiment, (Versuch) is a risk. For Nietzsche, the 
operative word for experiment is Versuchen Wir’s (Let us try it).274 The dominating attitude 
for the Versucher (experimenters, Philosophers of the future) is adventure (Abenteuer) and 
danger. 
Philosophers of the future, just like the singular individuals, produce themselves 
through a process encumbered with toil. It is toilsome because, for Nietzsche, the task of the 
philosopher of the future “calls for him to create values.”275 However, the preliminary to the 
creation of values demands a perspectival approach. Such an approach is described by 
Nietzsche as having the capacity to gaze with many eyes and consciences from the heights into 
every distance, from the depths up to every height, from the corner onto every expanse. The 
philosopher or the singular individual with such perspectival traits will possibly encompass a 
range of human values and feelings. The toil is also explained in terms of an inner power that 
renders such great men powerful explosives. In Twilight of Idols, Nietzsche describes great 
men and epochs as “explosive material in whom tremendous energy has been accumulated.”276 
Their greatness is founded on the fact that they expend themselves through self-overcoming 
(given that they do not spare themselves, but use themselves up). 
But Versucher can also imply tempters.277 Self-overcoming has no known formula, and 
in this regard, it is an exercise in self-experimentation. It is a continuous destruction and 
creation. The realm of creating values is ever experimental, cajoling, and marked with 
provisionality. Hence, the entire process of individual autopoiesis is both ever risky and 
indeterminate (experimental). Those who set out on the path of self-overcoming are obliged to 
raze their old “homes” before new ones are yet in sight. Yet it is precisely in the prospect of 
this “homelessness” that singular individuality is conferred its peculiarity and attractiveness.278 
The homelessness is justified within the realm of the psychology of the type Übermensch that 
cajoles individuals to ever overcome themselves. Nietzsche’s philosophers of the future in 
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their role of being commanders and legislators are Übermensch-like, since they ask, “How it 
should be!” They are the ones who first determine the “where to?” and “what for?” of 
people.279 The inherent constraint that justifies the future philosopher’s Übermensch-like 
character is the will to power, which is responsible for their creativity expressed through 
commanding and legislating. Through commanding and legislating, the type Übermensch, like 
the philosophers of the future, create the favourable conditions for singular individuality. 
The theme of overcoming as embodied in the type Übermensch largely accounts for 
the condition of singular individuality as an indeterminate and untimely figure. In the preface 
to Nietzsche Contra Wagner (1888), Nietzsche asks, “What does a philosopher demand of 
himself first and last?” His response: To overcome his time in himself, and to become 
timeless.280 This view of a philosopher is referenced in Beyond Good and Evil, as the “being 
necessarily a person of tomorrow and the day after tomorrow [Mensch des Morgen und 
Übermorgen], has, in every age, been and has needed to be at odds with his today: his enemy 
has always been the ideal of today.”281 The secret that renders all these overcomings possible 
is the assimilation of the essential trait of life as that which always overcomes itself. This is 
life’s character as exemplified in the best type the Übermensch. 
It is pertinent to note that the will to power contains within itself an inner structure of 
command and obedience. The will to power is not simply an undisciplined and chaotic 
outpouring of force. Even though becoming is at the heart of human existence, self-overcoming 
or mastery demands organization and valuation.282 The type Übermensch cannot merely exist 
as becoming, it requires the form, which is realized through the will as form-giving (exercise 
of power). According to Nietzsche, the type Übermensch’s synthesizing self-affirmation is 
credible only “when [it] opens up to the multiplicity of what is, without depriving [itself] of 
the possibility of creating.”283 With the possibility of creating, the type Übermensch makes the 
singular individuality possible. Form-giving occurs in the process of overcoming. Hence, the 
dynamics of the will as commanding and obeying entails power, which I reference as form-
giving. 
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c. Will as form-giving 
This section is meant to show that the type Übermensch, in its need for validation, 
requires some form which is realized by the will as form-giving (power). What is posited in 
the action of willing is power which is understood as the expansion of the will. In this regard, 
commanding and execution/obeying of the command belong together in the will. Hence, this 
is the appropriate section for engaging with the three things that Zarathustra “heard” from life: 
living as obedience; being commanded in absence of obedience; and then commanding as 
harder than obeying. Form-giving entails the dynamics within the will as the one that 
commands and actualizes (effects) its commands. Nietzsche describes form-giving technically 
as follows: “A person who wills—, commands something inside himself that obeys, or that he 
believes to obey.”284 The intrinsic capacity for the will to command and to effect its commands 
expresses the complex nature of willing and its role in the process of singular individuality. 
The argument on the will as form-giving is structured as follows: firstly, evaluations of the 
nuances involved in commanding and obeying; secondly, I will engage with the organization 
of the drives in this mechanism of commands and their effect. 
The will is indeterminate in its nature. This is problematic. In Nietzsche’s scheme, the 
action of the will is apparently the last instance in any attempt to justify human autonomy away 
from a traditional conception of morality. It is problematic given the fact that for Nietzsche the 
will in its multiplicity is simply chaos and not matter. Hence such a will must be the intrinsic 
force that precedes the forms and makes them possible as well as transitory.285 The will that 
precedes forms must be the fundamental will. It is only such a will that can be a force which 
commands and effects changes within itself first and foremost, then on other wills too. But my 
concern here is on the fundamental will as the will to power, and its commanding or effect on 
itself. In Nietzsche’s view, when individuals appropriate into themselves such a fundamental 
will, supposedly they can imbibe the life of the type Übermensch. The will to power as the 
psychology of the type Übermensch enables the Übermensch to realize its differential domain 
and to affirm itself. When one engages with the functioning of the fundamental drive, as the 
 
284 BGE, §19. 
285 Alphonso Lingis, “The Will to Power” in The New Nietzsche, ed. David B. Allison (Cambridge: The MIT 
Press, 1977), 38. 
 
  84 
 
first instance, ipso facto one is explaining the structure and the operation of the type 
Übermensch. 
The will to power, to be able to command, needs to exist in relationship with itself as 
a commanding and an obeying will. It must be efficacious. For Nietzsche, the strangest thing 
about the will and its manifold nature is this: 
On the one hand, we are, under the circumstances, both the one who commands and 
the one who obeys, and as the obedient one we are familiar with the feelings of 
compulsion, force, pressure, resistance, and motion that generally start right after 
the act of willing. On the other hand, however, we are in the habit of ignoring and 
deceiving ourselves about this duality by means of the synthetic concept of the 
‘I.’286 
To understand this passage, one needs to start from the second point about deception: the need 
to dissuade oneself from the position that there is a unified ego. For Nietzsche, anyone who is 
committed to an intellectual conscience founded on the instinctual life (interests, desires), is 
also closer to the human condition of existence as perspectival. The perspectival conception of 
the human condition admits of the attainment of the self as work in progress. For individuals 
to become who they are (as autopoietic), the traditional philosophy’s conception of the self as 
a given can be a hindrance to such a task.  
The claim that the majority make about the ego is a phantom. Nietzsche observes that 
the ego they claim to have or to be is that which is given. Consequently, they (the majority 
with given egos) allegedly dwell in “a fog of impersonal, semi-personal opinions, and 
arbitrary, as well as poetical evaluations” based on someone else’s phantasms too.287 This 
world of phantasms about the ego and its opinions, lives and grows almost independently of 
the people it envelops. 
Ultimately, on such an asymmetrical conception of the ego, the general abstractions 
about man are drawn. On the contrary, intellectual conscience takes it cue from the human 
being’s instinctual constitution. Such is the realm of Nietzsche’s “philosophy of indifference” 
or “instinct for personal diet” or “joy of becoming, and joy of destruction,” founded on the 
drives.288 It is the drives, powered by self-overcoming, that form the materials necessary for 
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the task of individual autopoiesis. Hence, the ethical task of self-cultivation is not ex-nihilo, 
and the possible end-game is the ever-untimely (which is propelled by overcoming) singular 
individuality.289 For Nietzsche, it is through the regime of drives that proper purification of our 
opinions (about the ego) and enhancement of individual autopoiesis is made possible.  
Nietzsche explains the will as form-giving in terms of feelings of compulsion, force, 
pressure, resistance, and motion. These terms stand for the phenomenon of obeying. However, 
this designation of commanding and obeying is for explanatory purposes, since the 
fundamental will is both the one that commands and obeys. (Commanding and obeying are not 
opposites in the will.) Instead, the will to power is conceived as a doctrine on the nature of 
commanding and obeying. In Zarathustra, for the one seeking freedom, he asks: “Can you 
give yourself your own evil and your own good, and hang your will over yourself as a law? 
Can you be your own judge and avenger of your law?”290 At stake here is the will as a legislator 
and executor of its own laws. In On the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche is dismissive of such 
dualisms as the deception of separating the doer and deed or subject and object: 
A quantum of force is just such a quantum of drive, will, action, in fact it is nothing 
but this driving, willing and acting, and only the seduction of language (and the 
fundamental errors of reason petrified within it), which construes and misconstrues 
all actions as conditional upon an agency, a ‘subject’, can make it appear 
otherwise.291 
The will as the quantum of force or a drive for action is the epiphenomenon (as a by-product 
does not causally influence the process) of human acting. In a similar text from The Gay 
Science, Nietzsche is clearer: “I have learned to distinguish the cause of acting from the cause 
of acting in a particular way, in particular direction, with a particular goal.”292 The cause of 
acting is akin to the quantum of force that Nietzsche calls a quantum of dammed-up energy 
that is waiting to be used up somehow, for something. Then, the second kind (acting in a 
particular way) is compared to the energy. However, the will as the drive for action is not 
acknowledged in its entirety, given the nuances of language. 
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For Nietzsche, language is responsible for popular morality’s separation of strength 
from the manifestations of strength. For instance, the doer and the deed. In the domain of the 
will to power, there is no ‘being’ behind the deed, its effect, and what becomes of it; ‘the doer’ 
is invented as an after-thought, the doing is everything. In this case, the commanding will is 
the one which has power to actualize itself.293 The will wills itself (gives itself form, expressed 
as power). The will has the capacity to act on itself (as the affect of command). Power 
designates the way in which the will manifests itself (power entails the desire for the will to 
give itself form). It is the efficacious ability for self-manifestation of the will that brings about 
the validation of the type Übermensch in some individuals that are so inclined. 
From such renderings about power, one can credibly claim that the will wills power 
(Macht) as form-giving. Form-giving includes a family of terms: expanding, mastering, and 
shaping. The objective here is to show how the will realizes some form in its perpetual need 
for mastery. Nietzsche notes, “All willing is simply a matter of commanding and obeying, on 
the groundwork, as I have said, of a society constructed out of many souls.”294 The perpetual 
need for mastery is explicable from the understanding of human reality as a society constructed 
out of many souls (plurality of drives), and the realizable effect is the I (L’effet c’est moi). The 
"I" (in our exploration is akin to the reality of the singular individual) as the effect of the will 
to power of the type Übermensch (part of the process of the fundamental will’s overcoming) 
presupposes the organization of the drives that underlie human reality. 
In the mechanism of form-giving for the type Übermensch, the following scenario is 
possibly foreseeable. Form-giving as mastery is part and parcel of the fundamental drive of 
the Übermensch. It entails a process whereby some drives are brought into subordinate roles 
within the will itself. For instance, in the case of the type Übermensch and the singular 
individual; the drive activities of the singular individual come to be telically contained within 
the fundamental drive of the type Übermensch.295 Consequently, the singular individual in its 
functioning obeys the Übermensch willfully. However, the singular individual does not view 
himself as serving the type Übermensch, but as setting its sights by reference to the type 
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Übermensch’s project.296 In this existential relationship between the type Übermensch and the 
singular individual, it is the latter that is transfigured by embracing more and more its own 
existence (by being and remaining on the path of untimeliness). This is because the type 
Übermensch validates itself through form-giving, rendered as singular individual. 
The form-giving is part of the improvement in terms of the growth of the drive’s 
activity. The mechanism of form-giving is guided by a high level of discipline (part of 
overcoming) that requires the modification of the energy discharged by the will. Hence, form-
giving can be described as the manner of organizing the activity imposed by the drive, and 
cultivating it in a focused, disciplined, and inventive manner.297 Power as form-giving is the 
way in which the Übermensch expresses itself, which is manifested in the singular 
individuality. It must be emphasized that the psychological constitution of the type 
Übermensch is described as the one that has overcome, since it is the type that is well 
synthesized (organized/well-coordinated in its fundamental drives). It can be argued that it is 
the nature of the type Übermensch to express itself given its plenitude. This point needs further 
elaboration. 
The reality of art as an expressive undertaking is one way of explaining the dynamics 
between the type Übermensch and the process of singular individuality. The type Übermensch 
expresses itself in the singular individual through form-giving. As the type Übermensch strives 
to give form to itself, it concurrently enables the possibilities for individual autopoiesis. The 
individual “must will” the life of the type Übermensch or otherwise. Note that the complete 
dynamism of the process of individual autopoiesis can only be clear after understanding the 
ethical stance of the type Übermensch (undertaken in the next chapter). Now, it suffices to say 
that ultimately individual autopoiesis is an individual task under the persuasion of the type 
Übermensch. 
The dynamics involved in such process can be explained analogically through the 
artistic works as expressions. Aesthetics’ experts hold that in ordinary life’s circumstances one 
 
296 This is partly expressed by Nietzsche in his doctrine on incorporation (Einverleibung), knowledge as condition 
for life as one of the main themes in The Gay Science, as specifically explained in §110. Also refer John 
Richardson, on what he calls “Nietzsche’s Power Ontology” in his book, Nietzsche’s system (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1996), 35–70, and 73–77. 
297 Welshon, The Philosophy of Nietzsche, 180. 
 
  88 
 
becomes aware of what he/she feels only by expressing—giving vent to—something within.298 
Expression, when applied to artists as a process, begins in a sort of expulsion—the artist is 
practically not aware of it. In the words of R. G. Collingwood, the artist may be conscious of 
having an emotion, but not necessarily conscious of what the emotion is. Since: 
All he is conscious of is a perturbation or excitement, which he feels going on within 
him, but of whose nature he is ignorant. While in this state, all he can say about his 
emotion is: ‘I feel…I don't know what I feel.’ From this helpless and oppressed 
condition he extricates himself by doing something which we call expressing 
himself. […] he expresses himself by speaking.299  
The excitement, as an inward condition, is expressed or discharged into the artist’s products, 
for instance speaking, as the letting out what is interior. The inner feeling or excitement is both 
clarified and transformed only in the process of expression.300 The excitement is given form 
when developed or allowed to develop into some specific reality. Hence, there is an inseparable 
link between the excitement and what is expressed. In the case of art, the identity of an emotion 
expressed in a work of art, is inextricably linked to the identity of the work of art.301 The nature 
of expressions in art is that they are particularized, in the sense of being individuated. As such, 
expressions in art are not meant to describe or deal with realms of classification 
(conceptualizations). 
The poet proper does not need descriptive words (concepts). The reason is that 
descriptions are by nature generic. Collingwood, almost in Nietzsche-like terms says: “The 
reason why description, so far from helping expression, actually damages it, is that description 
generalizes. To describe a thing is to call it a thing of such and such a kind: to bring it under a 
conception, to classify it. Expression, on the contrary, individualizes.”302 On Collingwood’s 
account, one realizes that the artist reaches a sort of self-knowledge when he succeeds in 
transforming formless and unclarified feeling into something concrete or certain. A similar 
case apparently happens to the type Übermensch, and its expression through singular 
individuality. 
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The type Übermensch, given its perfect embodiment of the psychology of the will to 
power, is necessarily suited for expressing itself through the multiple singular individualities. 
The type Übermensch is the pleroma of overcoming and ipso facto needs self-expression, 
through singular individuality. As a type, the Übermensch oscillates between the narrowest 
and the broadest conception possible.303 Within the type Übermensch, there are enormous 
possibilities where complex and conflicting drives express themselves (part of its grand 
nature). The complexity-cum-conflicting nature of drives demands some form of organization 
that is achieved through discipline-cum-breeding (acts as a taskmaster, Zuchtmeister). The 
process of form-giving is complicated, since it must be guided by discipline. Nietzsche 
describes the value of discipline as follows: 
I will say it again: what seems to be essential … is that there be obedience in one 
direction for a long time. In the long term, this always brings and has brought about 
something that makes life on earth worth living—for instance: virtue, art, music, 
dance, reason, intellect—something that transfigures, something refined, fantastic, 
and divine.304 
For Nietzsche, the conditions under which form-giving obtains are akin to the underpinnings 
of nature, purpose without purposefulness. The obedience in question presupposes the 
command of nature in terms of arbitrariness, harshness, terror, and anti-reason. These are 
ingredients of life as becoming and are the means through which strength and reckless curiosity 
are bred in the culture that is tasked with the production of singular individuality.  
The elements of arbitrariness, terror, harshness and anti-reason are the building blocks 
of what overcoming entails. Thus, it may not be surprising that Nietzsche views the same 
conditions as apt for breeding something refined, and even godly. Nietzsche consistently 
maintaints that morality must be related to life as the main constraint. More pertinently, the 
constraints have a disciplinary role, as the following text shows:  
We can look at every morality in the following way: whatever ‘nature’ it contains 
teaches us to hate the laisser-aller, the all-too-great freedom, and plants in us the 
need for limited horizons and the closest tasks. It teaches a narrowing of perspective 
and so, in a certain sense, stupidity as a condition for life and growth.305 
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There is need for disciplining (Züchtung) and breeding (Zucht). The inherent constraints yield 
power (life and growth). Zucht and Züchtung can be desired as good, since they heighten the 
will to power, providing an opportunity for resistance (overcoming). However, these 
conditions are referenced to the type and not directly to the individual human beings. 
This means that the constraints of breeding can be applicable to any human being 
anywhere who may espouse such conditions in himself, just like will to power. In this regard, 
Nietzsche further remarks, 
‘You should obey someone, anyone, and for a long time: or else you will deteriorate 
and lose all respect for yourself '—this seems to me to be the moral imperative of 
nature, which is clearly neither ‘categorical,’ as the old Kant demanded it to be 
(hence the ‘or else’—), nor directed to the individual (what does nature care about 
the individual!), but rather to peoples, races, ages, classes, and above all to the 
whole ‘human’ animal to the human.306 
The emphasis in the text must be on obeying someone, and where it is directed, it views the 
whole human animal as a type. Form-giving as obedience focuses on the type, and in that way 
respects differentiation as the hallmark to produce singular individuality. The stress on the type 
frees Nietzsche’s psychology of power from the Kantian universalistic categorical imperative 
(Law of morality). Nietzsche is interested in the morality that is founded on the 
inclinations/interests/conditions of the human being (respecting the perspectival approach). 
The privileging of form-giving at the typical level (of the Übermensch) respects the 
nature of the fundamental drive (will to power). Thus, the fundamental drive predominates, 
but still allows possibilities for the expression of other drives.307 When the fundamental drive 
of the Übermensch is incorporated into the individual human being, the same dynamics of 
form-giving via commanding and obeying are supposed to obtain. Power is not over others but 
is basically power over oneself. In On the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche expresses the need 
for power over the individual as the “very instinct for freedom.”308 The presupposition is that 
before one engages in the journey of giving style to oneself, the psychology of power that 
governs the production of singular individuality must be in place. The instinct for freedom, 
implies will to power as the directing force (dirigierende Kraft) and not a driving force 
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(treibende Kraft), is the possible cause for acting in a particular way, in a particular direction, 
with a particular goal.309 The fundamental drive, if incorporated into the individual life, puts it 
on a certain trajectory of embracing experimental traits where contingency is paramount. The 
individual becomes aware of how fluid and dynamic he is with enormous possibilities of being 
cultivated. 
2.2 The Type Übermensch and Giving Style 
In this penultimate section of the chapter, I make sense of the fact that power as form-
giving is qualitative rather than quantitative. This means that there needs to be some notable 
difference between those individuals who espouse in themselves the psychology of the will to 
power, and those who do not (seen in terms of strong and weak wills). Thus, this section will 
be a synthesis of what has transpired in the attempt to respond to the Nietzsche’s guiding 
questions: how can your life, the individual life, receive the highest value, the deepest 
significance? How can it be least squandered? The synthesized response so far is by 
incorporating the fundamental drive that entails the ability to act upon the chaos which 
encompasses human constitution (the ability to discipline oneself). 
For Nietzsche, the basic constitution of the human being is the multiple drives and 
interests. On such a basis, Nietzsche demands an end to what he calls ‘the atomistic need.’ The 
conception of the self as a unity is one such case of atomism. Nietzsche observes that “atomism 
of the self” is an expression signifying “the belief that the soul is something indestructible, 
eternal, indivisible, that it is a monad, an atomon.”310 Such a conception in relation to oneself 
may require very little work to be done, since the self is regarded as basically a given and a 
completed reality. However, Nietzsche refers to the human being as the noch nicht festgestellte 
Tier (the still undetermined animal).311 Being undetermined here should not be construed in 
the philosophical sense of determinism as of free will. The infinitive of the verb feststellen 
carries various nuances like “to determine,” “to locate,” “to fix in a place,” and “to ascertain.” 
Fest alone implies solid or fixed, permanent, and even stable. Festgestellt can be rendered as 
“ascertained” or “established.” 
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Douglas Burnham presents different translations of the noch nicht festegestellte Tier: 
the “as yet undetermined animal;” “the animal that has not yet reached its final form;” or “the 
as yet unstructured animal.”312 The appropriate rendering of noch nicht festegestellte Tier must 
necessarily be linked to life. Hence, the human being as noch nicht festegestellte Tier has the 
implication of the animal that is yet to reach its final form. In this regard, Nietzsche envisages 
“the [self] as a society constructed out of drives and affects.”313 The understanding of the self 
as a multiplicity of drives is consistent with Nietzsche’s project of producing great men. The 
project of regarding oneself as “one’s reges” with the task of founding little experimental 
states, obtains only on some organization of the drives which presupposes the human 
individual as always a work in progress. 
The task of organizing our drives requires giving style. The organizational approach 
to the drives demands the existence of some intrinsic principle of mastery.314 Preference for 
some intrinsic organization is consistent with the interpretation of Nietzsche’s will to power 
as the intra-perspectival constraint. It is this intrinsic organizational constraint that Nietzsche 
gives the directing responsibility in On the Genealogy of Morals when he remarks: 
Fundamentally, it is the same active force as the one that is at work on a grand scale 
in those artists of violence and organizers, and that builds states, which here, 
internally, and on a smaller, pettier scale, turned backwards, in the ‘labyrinth of the 
breast,’ as Goethe would say, creates bad conscience for itself, and builds negative 
ideals, it is that very instinct for freedom (put into my language: the will to power): 
except that the material on which the formative and rapacious nature of this force 
vents itself is precisely man himself, his whole animal old self—and not, as in that 
greater and more eye-catching phenomenon, the other man, the other men.315 
This text is part of what Nietzsche calls the ‘psychology of the conscience.’ For Nietzsche, the 
conscience entails the instinct of cruelty. As such an instinct, the conscience is meant to play 
the same disciplining role as the instinct for freedom, only that it has been turned the wrong 
way. Nietzsche observes about conscience that it is: “turned back on itself when it can no 
longer discharge itself outwards.”316 Cruelty here is inseparable from the nature of life and the 
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basis of life as a conquest. There is need to engage deeply with the theme of cruelty and 
Nietzsche’s understanding of the constitution of the type Mensch. The nature of the type 
Mensch is central to what ‘giving style’ demands. 
For Nietzsche, the philosopher of the future, apart from being the man of tomorrow, is 
also one who is given to self-examination as cruelty (thorough self-scrutiny). The project of 
self-making/giving style is not ex-nihilo, hence, there is the necessity for some knowledge of 
the natural material. Nietzsche elaborates on cruelty in relation to the free spirits: 
‘There is something cruel in the tendency of my spirit’:—just let kind and virtuous 
people try to talk him out of it! In fact, it would sound more polite if, instead of 
cruelty, people were to accuse, mutter about and praise us as having a sort of 'wild 
honesty.'317 
Cruelty here is interpreted as the quintessential condition to produce the future philosophers. 
Cruelty provides possible access to the basic material useful for individual self-fashioning. 
Nietzsche associates the virtue of honesty with the ‘cruel’ operation of nature. The cruelty of 
the virtue of honesty is about thoroughness in engaging with the basic material that can account 
for the human animal. Such honesty is predisposed to take human reality deeply in defiance of 
any simplification or the desire to mask. The virtue of honesty entails the journey into the abyss 
(Abgrund). This is the domain of the crude encounter with ‘What it is.’ The abyss, as the 
groundless, the chaos beneath all the foundations, is the starting point for any differentiation 
(key to giving style).318 This abyss is associated with the will to power as the fundamental 
drive. 
It is a standard position that the abyss is related to the fundamental drive as the 
reflection of the basic constitution of the human animal. It is abysmal because it touches on 
the epitome of life as chaos (the realm of becoming). Nietzsche compares the fundamental 
drive to the the basic human constitution he calls a ‘homo natura.’ The full thrust behind 
honesty as cruelty leads to the recognition of 
[T]he terrible basic text of homo natura … recognized even underneath these 
fawning colors and painted surfaces. To translate humanity back into nature; to gain 
control of the many vain and fanciful interpretations and incidental meanings that 
have been scribbled and drawn over that eternal basic text of homo natura so far; to 
make sure that, from now on, the human being will stand before the human being, 
 
317 BGE, §230. 
318 Lingis, “The Will to Power” in The New Nietzsche, 38. 
 
  94 
 
just as he already stands before the rest of nature today, hardened by the discipline 
of science, —with courageous Oedipus eyes and sealed up Odysseus ears, deaf to 
the lures of the old metaphysical bird catchers who have been whistling to him for 
far too long: “You are more! You are higher! You have a different origin!”319 
The basic material of the human being is called terrible because it is chaotic. This must be 
understood in relation to Nietzsche’s theme of tragic existence and the suitable response. As 
May credibly observes, the capacity to face the raw ‘truth’ will enable one to affirm the same 
through form-giving.320 The raw truth about one’s terrible situation is what creates the need 
for aesthetics, as form-giving. Among the numerous expressions of existence as essentially 
chaotic, the earliest one from The Birth of Tragedy is remarkable: 
[L]ife at the bottom of things, in spite of the passing of phenomena, remains 
indestructibly powerful and pleasurable, this consolation appears in embodied 
clarity in the chorus of satyrs, of creatures of nature who live on as it were 
ineradicably behind all civilization and remain eternally the same in spite of the 
passing of generations and of the history of peoples.321  
Life must be linked existentially to its basic fact, the cruelty of nature, that includes being 
purposeless. Nietzsche’s position on the nature of life as indestructible power seems to run 
through his philosophy. Thus, the task of individual autopoiesis necessarily presupposes a 
good level of knowledge of human life as fundamentally tragic, and the affirmation of such a 
life demands constant overcoming. Knowledge of the inherent indestructible nature of life as 
tragic largely contributes to “who one is” as one who must always overcome, which is the 
mark of the untimely one. The starting point for that knowledge is the principle itself, which 
is life that “torments” itself. 
Nietzsche seems to have appropriated the possibility of gazing into this cruelty of life 
from the Hellenistic culture. The Greeks of the golden age are Nietzsche’s great teachers on 
two accounts: (1) the above reference to Oedipus the King, and (2) Greek exceptionality. 
Before giving style, the individual, like the Greeks, needs to gaze on the “truth” of the human 
being with unshocked Oedipus-eyes. In Oedipus the King, before the prophet Tiresias reveals 
the murderer of Laius, he laments about the encounter with the truth: “How terrible—to see 
 
319 BGE, §230. 
320 May, Nietzsche’s Ethics and his War on ‘Morality,’ 32. 
321 BT, §7. 
 
  95 
 
the truth when the truth is only pain to him who sees!”322 Nietzsche’s allegation about the “un-
shocked eyes of Oedipus,” is in complete contrast to what transpires when the full import of 
the oracle is made known to Oedipus.  
When Oedipus sees the body of his mother-cum-wife hanging by the neck “he digs 
down the sockets of his eyes, crying, You, you’ll see no more that pain is suffered, all the pain 
I caused!”323 Oedipus in front of the abyss wavers, while Nietzsche’s philosopher remains with 
unshocked eyes. Such a philosopher who gazes at the chaos within his nature embarks on what 
one can reference as giving style explained by three related tasks: (a) translating humanity 
back into nature, (b) mastery over the metaphysical interpretations, and (c) making new 
humanity (that presupposes individual autopoiesis). Thus, gazing at the terrible text (the chaos 
within) is the precursor to any possible style giving (making of a new humanity as the raison 
d'être of the type Übermensch).  
The process of identifying the chaos within, as prerequisite for the formation of new 
humanity is evident in Nietzsche’s interpretation of Greek exceptionality. Hence, based on 
“homo natura” and the Greek exceptionality in organizing their chaos, it can be argued that 
Nietzsche’s eternal basic existent is nothing but life as the indestructible power. It is this life 
that remains eternally the same despite the passing of generations and of the history of peoples. 
Eternal here refers to the general character of life as will to power. 
The abiding characteristic of life as will to power can be discerned from the early 
Nietzsche on his observations about the primacy of human violence and weakness:  
It is not justice which here sits in judgement; it is even less mercy which pronounces 
the verdict: it is life alone, that dark, driving power that insatiably thirsts for itself. 
Its sentence is always unmerciful, always unjust, because it has never proceeded 
out of pure knowledge; but in most cases the sentence would be the same even if it 
were pronounced by justice itself.324 
The will to power as instinct for freedom, denotes the need for expansion/mastery, for power. 
However, the primitive energy of direct power over others, now must be transformed into 
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higher creative forms on oneself.325 Hence, self-overcoming as form-giving demands giving 
style to oneself. 
The alternative to giving style to one’s life is preservation which is inherently against 
singular individuality as a task. Nietzsche’s stance on preservation and overcoming is 
proclaimed by Zarathustra: “The most concerned minds today ask: ‘How is the human to be 
preserved?’ But Zarathustra is the first and the only one to ask: ‘How is the human to be 
overcome?’”326 Overcoming is the very nature of the type Übermensch. In Beyond Good and 
Evil, Nietzsche warns, “Physiologists should think twice before positioning the drive for self- 
preservation as the cardinal drive of an organic being. Above all, a living thing wants to 
discharge its strength—life itself is will to power.”327 For Nietzsche the act of willing as 
commanding and obeying is essentially about the groundwork of a human being as a society 
constructed out of many drives. 
Hence the need for style cannot be underestimated. However, giving oneself style 
though great is a rare art. The rarity of this art is because 
[i]t is practiced by those who survey all the strengths and weaknesses of their nature 
and then fit them into an artistic plan until every one of them appears as art and 
reason and even weaknesses delight the eye. Here a large mass of second nature has 
been added; there a piece of original nature has been removed—both times through 
long practice and daily work at it. Here the ugly that could not be removed is 
concealed; there it has been reinterpreted and made sublime. Much that is vague 
and resisted shaping has been saved and exploited for distant views; it is meant to 
beckon toward the far and immeasurable.328 
This text from Book IV of The Gay Science, whose general theme is whether we are still 
ashamed of ourselves. Books II and III of The Gay Science end with the theme of shame. For 
instance in Book II, Nietzsche alleges, 
We should be able also to stand above morality—and not only to stand with the 
anxious stiffness of a man who is afraid of slipping and falling any moment, but 
also to float above it and play. How then could we possibly dispense with art and 
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with the fool? —And as long as you are in any way ashamed before yourselves, you 
do not belong with us.329 
At the end of Book III, Nietzsche poses the question: “What is the seal of liberation?” The 
response is “[N]o longer being ashamed in front of oneself.”330 Nietzsche’s observation on 
being ashamed is an aperture into the appropriation of the inherent nature of life as chaos. 
Those who probably still feel some shame in front of themselves are not yet comfortable 
becoming who they are.331 One thing seems evident: they (those who give style to themselves) 
must be able to stand above morality (Moralität) which ensues from the moral concepts. For 
those above morality this implies that they have embraced the psychology of the type 
Übermensch. 
Those who survey their strengths and weaknesses are obligated by will to power as a 
constraint because it defines them. The only question is: to what extent does one recognize 
himself as a will and to what extent does one will his will as a will to power?332 The recognition 
of oneself as will implies that one acknowledges that fundamentally he is a multiplicity of 
drives, and some organization (form-giving) is required. Those who can survey their strength 
and weaknesses have embraced the tragic nature of life as chaotic. Those who survey their 
strengths and weaknesses are the ones who do not believe in themselves as in complete fully-
developed facts. Instead, they are like gardeners who 
[c]ultivate the shoots of anger, pity, curiosity, vanity as productively and profitably 
as a beautiful fruit tree on a trellis; one can do it with the good or bad taste of a 
gardener … ; one can also let nature rule and only attend to a little embellishment 
and tidying-up here and there; one can, finally, without paying any attention to them 
at all, let the plants grow up and fight their fight out among themselves.333 
I have mostly argued for power (Macht) as form-giving that entails perpetual improvement in 
the individual drive activities. Power over oneself in the case of singular individuality demands 
recognition of some in-built constraint, which is will to power. The will as the fundamental 
drive (in relation to the type Übermensch) can empower itself by subordinating many other 
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drives to its own activity. Nietzsche foresees this organization by a fundamental drive as giving 
style to one’s character and actions.334 Hence, letting nature rule, as Nietzsche opines in the 
above citation from Daybreak, can be interpreted as subscribing to the form-giving tenets of 
life as the fundamental drive. Form-giving is an activity of the will, since it is what the will 
desires. 
Power as form-giving, then, is essentially an aesthetic process of the will to power that 
demands fitting the strengths and weaknesses into an artistic plan. The fitting of the strengths 
and weaknesses to be successively taken demands knowledge of one’s nature as will to power. 
The power desired by the type Übermensch through its psychology of will to power is only 
realized or validated in the singular individual. Thus, wherever there is the type Übermensch 
there must be some differentiated individuals espousing singularities. 
Through the psychology of the type Übermensch, the lacuna in singular individuality 
so pronounced in Chapter One can possibly be found. For instance, in Chapter One, the account 
for the animality of the majority; the lack of dissatisfaction in the last human; the embrace of 
tragedy; and the type Übermensch as the best type, can be justified in their actions depending 
on how they embody the will to power. Nietzsche’s reality of willing (commanding and 
obeying) as will to power accounts for the strong and weak wills.  
 
2.2.1 The Strong and Weak wills 
The strong wills or natures can harmonize the multifarious drives. The strong natured 
also accept chaos as something that can be affirmed through overcoming and cultivation. 
Nietzsche opines that the strong wills enjoy their finest gaiety in the constraint of 
style/discipline under their own law. The strong will unites three aspects man, creature, and 
creator. The strong will is ultimately aesthetic that implies that “in man there is not only matter, 
shred, excess, clay, mire, folly, chaos; but there is also the creator, the sculptor, the hardness 
of the hammer, the divinity of the spectator, and the seventh day—do ye understand this 
contrast?”335 The operative term for the strong will is overcoming, which is the quintessential 
trait of the type Übermensch. Apart from overcoming and form-giving, there is need for an 
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inbuilt attitude towards self-governance and self-fashioning. Such an attitude can encompass 
the valorisation of the historical, becoming, the hypothetical and general indifference to 
metaphysical flights (that can entail needless recourse to the universalizing and disinterested 
approaches to life). 
On the other hand, the weak wills hinge on the fact of preservation. The weak 
characters, those without power over themselves, hate the constraint of style. They are afraid 
and ashamed of the bitter and evil/cruel constraint. The weak will cannot withstand the thought 
that it is essentially a chaos and a mere overcoming.336 The weak will strives to eliminate and 
repress certain forces and drives in an effort to achieve some illusory mastery over itself. The 
weak wills can thrive on the deceptive cheerfulness whose basis is either shame or fear of the 
chaos that constitute essentially the human reality. Such wills (weak) are simply not effective, 
given that they lack the power that they need to accord them the sense of effectiveness. Without 
the sense that one’s will matters, that one can be effective in the world, it is difficult to work 
up a great deal of zest for living and doing.337 For Nietzsche, the weak wills espouse lack of 
mastery over life, and in that way, they are seemingly outsmarted by life, which is evidenced 
in their cherishing preservation (instinct of weakness). Given the inherent weakness in terms 
of the will, the weak wills are more likely to embrace disinterested and dogmatic approaches 
for the sake of preservation. 
Nietzsche provides pointers to weak will or lack of it in his analysis of what he calls 
the believers and their need to believe. The following are the markers of the weak will for 
Nietzsche of 1886/87:338 
(1) The demand for certainty; Nietzsche remarks, “The demand that one wants by all 
means that something should be firm …” is the instinct of weakness that seeks not to create 
systems but to conserve them. For Nietzsche, the need to conserve systems is something that 
smells of weariness, disappointments, and fear of new disappointments. 
(2) Patriotism (Vaterländerei), as chauvinism, the manifestation of the need of support, 
and something to fall back on amid being mastered by life. Patriotism is pertinent to this thesis 
on individual autopoiesis, and its appraisal of African ethno-philosophy, specifically 
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ethnocentric valorisation, and its effects on singular individuality. It suffices to note here that 
patriotism and ethnocentrism can be emblematic of the weak will, and inimical to the 
production of the singular individuals. 
The weak will still requires command but in a different way. The will as the affect of 
command is arguably the guarantor of the overcoming and form-giving for the type 
Übermensch with the validation in the singular individual. Hence, Nietzsche envisages the will 
as the decisive sign of sovereignty and strength. As such, “the less one knows how to 
command, the more urgently one covets someone who commands. Who commands severely—
a god, prince, class, physician, … dogma or party conscience.”339 The weak will yields a 
human being that cannot internally regulate his actions, and instead relies on external 
determination. The knowledge of how to command (for the will to power, command, and 
execution belong together) fundamentally lies in encountering the chaos constitutive of human 
life, the abyss, where the spirit of life which is overcoming/conquest/agony originates. The 
spirit (Geist) of life as that which cuts into life, that which torments life is best expressed in 
the life of the type Übermensch.  
Conclusion 
The import of this chapter has been to demonstrate that the type Übermensch, 
characterized by overcoming, requires a commensurate psychology which is the will to power. 
Nietzsche’s stance on psychology is mostly about its validity and instrumental value in 
ameliorating human existence. In this context two psychologies emerge: the psychology that 
is amiable to morality of intentions, and the psychology of the type. The pertinent question is, 
between the two psychologies, which one is promising enough in the project of affirming 
existence though tragic? It has been demonstrated that the choice between the two must be 
founded on the theme of overcoming. At the centre of the two psychologies is the 
understanding of the will. 
The psychology dominated by morality believes that the will is a faculty of choice. 
Nietzsche critiques the ‘self’ as a unified entity, conscience, and the consciousness based on 
the notion of a will as a unified faculty. Such a psychology is undermined by Nietzsche since 
it evolves imposing structures that supposedly do not serve the demands of human existence. 
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The structures that ensue from the will as a faculty tend to foster preservation and rigidity. The 
end-product from such structures is weak-willed individuals who are apparently at variance 
with life’s demands. However, as will become clear in Chapter Five, with weak-willed 
individuals (meaning those with insufficient embodiment of life as will to power), it equally 
implies weak institutions. Contrary to the will as a faculty is Nietzsche’s own valorisation of 
the will as the affect of command. 
The will as the affect of command is developed within the psychology of the type, 
which is will to power. Such a psychology engages with overcoming and form-giving as the 
key characterization of the act of the will. The underlying fact about the act of the will for 
Nietzsche is the regime of drives. It is through the complex reality of drives that Nietzsche 
stumbles on the fundamental drive as will to power. Such is the instinct for growth since its 
nature is overcoming. This fundamental will/drive is particularized in the multiple forms of 
entities. The reality that best characterizes the will’s overcoming and power is life. It is within 
the objective of affirming existence that the psychology of the type is emphasized as the 
facilitator for humankind’s encounter with the tragic existence. 
The type Übermensch is the highest possible explication of the act of willing, since it 
is validated through its forms, the singular individuals. The Übermensch as the best type 
affirms individuals as they are through the intra-perspectival affect of command, the will to 
power.340 As such, the Übermensch lives in the innocence of becoming simpliciter. However, 
there is need for a different morality that is espoused by the type Übermensch which can be 
heuristic enough for individual self-governance.   
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Chapter 3:  The Extra-Moral Life of the Type 
Übermensch 
‘Bite the head off! Bite it off!' thus it cried out of me, my horror, my hate, my 
disgust, my compassion, all my good and bad cried out of me with a single cry. (Z, 
III, On the Vision and Riddle, 2) 
Introduction 
Life itself as will to power defies the categories of good and evil. Hence, the type 
Übermensch not only embodies the ontology of becoming and the psychology founded on the 
will to power but espouses life in the unintentional realm. The unintentional domain seeks to 
overcome narrow categorizations of good and evil by seeking to embrace life in an extra-moral 
sense. This is the theme of this chapter. Life from the extra-moral perspective essentially 
encompasses transience and destruction as crucially important description for the type 
Übermensch. This chapter is envisioned as the summation of the last two and the orientation 
to Chapters Four and Five. 
In Nietzsche’s view, singular individuals are possibly bred only through the type 
Übermensch. The practical illustration of the life of the type Übermensch is discerned in 
Nietzsche’s difficult and horrifying doctrine of Eternal Recurrence. Nietzsche in his numerous 
descriptions of how the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence dawned on him considers it as the 
highest possible formula of affirmation. The affirmation of life by the type Übermensch is 
justified through innocence of becoming which is meant to overcome any morality that is 
founded on the dichotomy of good and bad or good and evil.341 In examining the doctrine of 
Eternal Recurrence, one engages in a discourse on life of the type Übermensch. 
The argument for the type Übermensch’s unintentional-based morality is structured as 
follows: Firstly, Nietzsche’s possible sources of the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence are traced 
from the philosophy of Heraclitus and the Stoics. From these philosophies, Eternal Recurrence 
is largely understood as a cosmological and an anthropological phenomenon. Secondly, a brief 
scholarly interpretation of Nietzsche’s doctrine of Eternal Recurrence will follow where, apart 
from the above two phenomena, a third one emerges, the prescriptive type. Thirdly, I will 
engage with the doctrine of the Eternal Recurrence from Nietzsche’s corpus. In Nietzsche, the 
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Eternal Recurrence’s normative position demands ultimately in the case of individuals for each 
to evolve his/her own proper constraints. For Nietzsche, the doctrine of the Eternal Recurrence 
is only properly thought when it is appropriated in individual’s life. Hence, it must be 
conceived in an existential ethical-imperative manner. The final section of the chapter will 
briefly present the antithesis to life in the extra-moral sense, the domain of the morality of 
custom. Owing to its centrality to this dissertation, this chapter is comparatively longer than 
the others. 
3.1 Brief Historical Note on Eternal Recurrence 
Nietzsche alludes to the possible sources of the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence: “The 
doctrine of the ‘[Eternal Recurrence]’, in other words of the unconditional and infinitely 
repeated circulation of all things—ultimately this doctrine of Zarathustra’s could also have 
been taught already by Heraclitus. At least the Stoics, who inherited almost all their 
fundamental ideas from Heraclitus, show traces of it.”342 Herein lays the thrust of this section. 
I examine the development of the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence in Greek thought firstly as a 
cosmological reality and secondly as a particular anthropological phenomenon. From this 
Greek foundation, Nietzsche radicalizes the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence in his attempt to 
appropriate it into the individual condition as an existential-ethical imperative. 
3.1.1 The Eternal Recurrence in Heraclitus 
Heraclitus wrote very little. But from the available fragments, his writings are subject 
to conflicting interpretations. Nietzsche provides various positive views on Heraclitus and his 
thought. In the notes of summer 1871 to early 1872, Heraclitus is associated with ideas like 
transfiguration and competition; and the understanding of the world as a game.343 Still in the 
notes from the same period, Nietzsche links Heraclitus with the understanding of the cosmos 
as artistic play.344 In the later published lecture notes on “Tragic Age of the Greeks,” Heraclitus 
is associated with intuition and becoming.345 In “History for Life,” Nietzsche calls Heraclitus 
the emblem of the spirit of the Delphic oracle.346 In 1884 Heraclitus is mentioned among 
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Empedocles, Spinoza, and Goethe, as Nietzsche’s ancestors.347 On such accounts, there is a 
need to look at Heraclitus’s philosophy, particularly its pertinence for the doctrine of Eternal 
Recurrence. 
One of the areas where Heraclitus and Nietzsche are almost in agreement is on the need 
for honesty about existence. On the sense of smell, Heraclitus remarks, “If everything that 
exists should become smoke, nostrils would (still) distinguish (them).”348 Similarly, Nietzsche 
believes that through the sense of smell one discovers “the lie as a lie.” Nietzsche notes, “My 
genius is in my nostrils.”349 In the words of Richard White, “The sense of smell may not be 
idealized or consciously ignored.”350 Honesty to existence, for Heraclitus, is marked by his 
realization that becoming is the singular activity of reality. Kirk thinks that “the universality 
of change, though not its absolute constancy, was a commonplace of early Greek thought 
which Heraclitus cannot have avoided: change is going on everywhere, you only have to use 
your eyes.”351 Hence, the Greeks may have regarded change as an essential property of 
empirical life. 
Heraclitus explains the fact of transformational change in agonistic terms. On war, he 
claims that “[o]ne must realize that war is common, and justice strife, and that all things come 
to be through strife and necessity.”352 He further states, “War is father of all, and king of all.”353 
Kirk et al. interpret these two fragments under a common theme as follows: “The total balance 
in the cosmos can only be maintained if change in one direction eventually leads to change in 
the other, that is, if there is unending ‘strife’ between opposites.”354 The harmony of opposites 
is at the heart of the Heraclitean consideration of cosmic change. According to W. K. C. 
Guthrie, for Heraclitus, any harmony between contrasting elements necessarily and always 
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involved a tension of strife between the opposites of which it was composed.355 The 
contest/tension is never ended. Guthrie further elaborates: “Cessation of struggle would mean 
the disintegration of the cosmos.”356 For Heraclitus, if one seeks for the justification of the 
cosmic recurrence, it must be founded on the nature of the cosmos itself, as fire. Hence, 
Heraclitean thought is possibly alive to the fact of the Eternal Recurrence as a cosmological as 
well as an empirical phenomenon. 
However, Nietzsche in his lecture notes on the tragic age of the Greeks recognizes 
another form of recurrence, of the empirical observer of the cosmos. It must be observed that 
in the extant Heraclitean fragments there is no mention of what one may call particular 
recurrence of entities in the cosmos. Nevertheless, Nietzsche draws his claim of particular 
recurrence possibly from the Heraclitean teachings on the cosmic activities. Nietzsche notes 
that “[w]hile Heraclitus’ imagination was eyeing this never-ceasing motion of the cosmos, this 
‘actuality,’ like a blissful spectator who is watching innumerable pairs of contestants wrestling 
in joyous combat and refereed by stern judges, a still greater intuition overtook him.”357 For 
Nietzsche, Heraclitus’s notable character is intuition. And intuition is projected over and above 
the conceptual thinking that Nietzsche calls “other type of thinking,” which is accomplished 
in concepts and logical thinking.358 The advantage of having intuitive thinking on Nietzsche’s 
part is that, it does not impose conceptual structures over one’s reality. Instead it seemingly 
reveals itself through action. 
Intuition for Nietzsche led Heraclitus to two-fold negations: (1) the denial of the duality 
of totally diverse worlds. He no longer distinguished a physical world from a metaphysical 
one, a realm of definite qualities from an undefinable “indefinite.” The negation of the duality 
of the world gave birth to what Nietzsche calls a far greater negation; (2) the denial of being 
altogether.359 It is from this one world that Nietzsche envisages Heraclitean affirmation of 
becoming as the actuality of the cosmos. It seems from the actuality of the cosmos that the 
spectator of that actuality must share in it. Based on the condition of a spectator of the cosmic 
motion Nietzsche projects another greater intuition: “He could no longer see the contesting 
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pairs and their referees as separate; the judges themselves seemed to be striving in the contest 
and the contestants seemed to be judging them.”360 From this interpretation, it is apparent that 
cosmological recurrence involves also the entities present in the cosmos. But there is no textual 
evidence from Heraclitus in support of particular recurrence. For the question of particular 
recurrence, the early Stoics and the late Stoics were mainly interested in the physical world 
and the individual life respectively.  
3.1.2 The Eternal Recurrence and the Stoics  
On the generation of the world and whether it is eternal, Aristotle testifies, “With 
Empedocles of Acragas and Heraclitus of Ephesus, [they] believe that it alternates, being 
sometimes as it is now and sometimes different and in a process of destruction, and that this 
continues without end.”361 This cannot strictly speaking be taken to be the position of 
Heraclitus. But, based on this Aristotelian interpretation, the early Stoics considered Heraclitus 
as their ancestor.362 The basis of the early Stoics’ doctrine of Eternal Recurrence partly lies in 
these Aristotelian interpretations. If such an assertion is tenable, then Nietzsche’s claim that 
the Stoics are the inheritors of Heraclitus’ teaching of Eternal Recurrence is not entirely 
credible. 
It is also not entirely true that the early Stoics relied only on Aristotle’s interpretation 
of Heraclitus. They had recourse to the Pythagorean and Platonic views as well. The focus will 
be on the early and later Stoics. The early Stoics’ interests centred on nature and are the ones 
commonly associated with Heraclitus. For the Later Stoics, they are mainly associated with 
ethics. Nietzsche’s views on the Stoics in general are ambivalent. They vary between 
denouncement and assimilation of some of their doctrines. 
Nietzsche never gave extensive lectures on the Stoics as with Heraclitus. He mentions 
them in the passing in the early notes on ancient Greek philosophy. One point of Nietzsche’s 
disagreement with the Stoics is on “living according to nature.” In the 1870s he challenges the 
Stoics on their claims about knowledge of the aims of nature and whether one can know 
anything outside nature.363 Then, in 1886, Nietzsche poses the question, “So you want to live 
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‘according to nature?’ Oh, you noble Stoics, what a fraud is in this phrase!”364 This is a 
response to one of the main guiding principles of the Stoics. Zeno of Citium in his work On 
Human Nature taught that “the goal is to live in harmony with nature, which means to live 
according to virtue; for nature leads to virtue.”365 Chrysippus, in his book On Goals believed 
living according to virtue is equivalent to living according to the experience of natural events. 
Chrysippus’s explanation is that our natures are parts of the nature of the universe. The nature 
according to which one should live takes both the universal and the human nature. 
For a plausible account of Eternal Recurrence according to the Stoics, their usage of 
terms requires clarification. On the four elements—fire, water, air, and earth—reference is 
made to Zeno’s work On the Universe and on his fellow early Stoic Chrysippus’s first book, 
Physics. From these two works, an element is “that which from which generated things are 
first generated and into which they are resolved.”366 The four elements together constitute 
unqualified substance, which is matter. Among the elements, Chrysippus singles out fire as the 
element par excellence because the other elements are composed out of it in the first place by 
alternation, and into it lastly everything diffuses and dissolves. For Chrysippus, everything of 
fiery form is called fire.367 Hence in Chrysippus, “element” must in the first place imply fire. 
Fire is the permanent feature of the universe.368 It is the transformations of fire that bring about 
the alternating phases of the cosmic cycle. M. J. White differentiates between archai, 
principles and stoicheia, elements in Stoic thought. The principles are ungenerated and are 
indestructible, while the elements are the traditional four elements that are subject to 
destruction.369 Fire is not only an element, but also a principle of the cosmos. The Stoic concept 
of the cosmos equally warrants clarification for its notion of cosmic cycle. 
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According to Diogenes Laertius’ evidence, the Stoics use the term cosmos in three 
senses:370 (a) of god himself, derived from the whole substance, as indestructible and 
ungenerated. Such a god is also the craftsman of the world’s orderly arrangement and, at set 
periods, takes all substance back into himself and generates it again from himself; (b) the world 
order itself as a cosmos; and (c) the cosmos as that which is composed of both (a) and (b). In 
the words of D. E. Hahn, the perishability of the cosmos for the Stoics must be admitted with 
qualification.371 The cosmos as the particularly qualified matter derivable from the entire 
substance is eternal. In this sense, the cosmos is the principle of the subsequent order. Instead, 
the cosmos as the specific arrangement is generated and thus destructible in an eternal cycle. 
It is in the generation of the cosmic order that destruction ensues. 
The Stoics generally explain the generation and destruction of the cosmic order via the 
term, ekpurōsis. It signifies a tremendous conflagration when everything is changed into fire, 
and then after a period, the cosmos come into existence again. The conflagration seems to 
happen on two levels: cosmic, and then particular entities within the cosmos. On the evidence 
of Nemesius: 
(1) The Stoics say that when the planets return to the same celestial sign, in length 
and breadth, where each was originally when the world was first formed, at set 
periods of time they cause conflagration and destruction of existing things. (2) Once 
again the world returns anew to the same condition as before; and when the stars 
are moving again in the same way, each thing which occurred in the previous period 
will come to pass indiscernibly (from its previous occurrence). For again there will 
be Socrates and Plato and each one of mankind with the same friends and fellow 
citizens; they will suffer the same things and they will encounter the same things, 
and put their hand to the same things, and every city and village and piece of land 
return in the same way.372 
These assertions about cosmic and particular recurrences, though not based on seriously 
adduced evidence, seem to follow from a doctrine associated with Heraclitus. Diogenes’s 
words, ascribed to Heraclitus’s doctrine, read like a summary of the Stoics’ position on fire 
and other elements. It reads: “Fire is the element; all things are an exchange of fire and come 
into being by rarefaction and condensation.” Then, about the cosmos: “It is alternately born 
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from fire and again resolved into fire at fixed periods through all eternity.”373 This passage is 
alluded to in the first paragraph of this section about Aristotle and his interpretation of 
Heraclitus. Still, it can be taken as an Heraclitean thought about the cosmic composition and 
activity in general, but not about Eternal Recurrence. 
Nevertheless, on the part of the Stoics, their position on cosmological and particular 
recurrence is founded on the distinction between the indestructible principle, and the ever-
destructible elements. The argument from the Universal reason/principle is attested to by 
Eusebius about the Stoic doctrine: 
(1) Universal reason having advanced thus far, or universal nature having grown 
and increased, it finally dries up everything and takes it up into itself and comes to 
be in the whole substance. (2) Having returned because of the order from which it 
began to create the world in just such a way, it manufactures the same way of life 
again according to reason, since such periods occur everlastingly without ceasing.374 
The cosmos being governed by mind and providence was a position held by Chrysippus: that 
the cosmos is a living being endowed with reason and fire is its ruling part.375 Apart from 
cosmic recurrence, Chrysippus argues for the human recurrence based on the cosmic renewal, 
where he concludes that “it is evidently not impossible that we too after our death will return 
again to the shape we now are, after certain periods of time have elapsed.”376 Alexander, the 
Aristotelian commentator, testifies to Chrysippus’s assertion: “They (the Stoics) hold that after 
the conflagration all the same things recur in the world numerically, so that even the same 
peculiarly qualified individual as before exists and comes to be again in that world, as 
Chrysippus says in his books On the world…”377 The claim of numerical recurrence is 
grounded on the notion of the moment. 
Marcus Aurelius, a later Stoic, puts a strong case for numerical identity and this 
moment. Aurelius is of the view that “[e]ven if you were to live three thousand years or thirty 
thousand, nevertheless remember that no one loses another life than this which he is living, 
nor lives another life than this which he is losing.”378 As Aurelius explains, no one loses what 
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is past or what is future, and one cannot be deprived of what he does not have. On the account 
of the primacy of the moment Aurelius infers two things: (1) that everything everlastingly is 
of the same kind and cyclically recurrent. It makes no difference whether one should see the 
same things for hundred years or for two hundred or for an infinite time; (2) that the longest-
lived and the quickest to die have an equal loss. This is because it is the present alone of which 
one will be deprived, given that, the present is the only thing that one has.379 Looking at the 
ensuing arguments from Chrysippus’s numerical identity thesis to Marcus Aurelius, one 
wonders how Nietzsche could refer to the Stoics’ doctrine on Eternal Recurrence as “traces.” 
Nietzsche’s approach to Eternal Recurrence is largely from the particular point of view, and 
more pertinently the demands of the moment that accompany the doctrine in Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra. Marcus Aurelius’s argument on particular recurrence is that “all a person has is 
the present moment.”380 The notion of the moment is pertinent to Nietzsche’s doctrine of 
Eternal Recurrence, as is shown later in this chapter. 
The Greek thought on cosmic and particular recurrence is summarized in evidence 
associated with Aristotelian school. In the work Problemata, it is alleged: 
Just as the course of the firmament and of each of the stars is a circle, why should 
not also the coming into being and the decay of perishable things be of such a kind 
that these things again come into being and decay? This agrees with the saying that 
‘human life is a circle.’ To demand that those who are coming into being should 
always be numerically identical is foolish, but one would more readily accept that 
they were identical in kind. And so we should ourselves be prior, and one might 
suppose the arrangement of the series to be such that it returns back in a circle to 
point from which it began and thus secures continuity and identity of 
composition.381 
The context of this text is the understanding of the terms “prior” and “posterior,” in relation to 
human life. The conclusion that the author draws is that, if human life is a circle, and given 
that a circle has neither beginning nor end, then we should not be prior to those who lived 
before nor they prior to us by being nearer to the beginning.382 The survey of the Eternal 
Recurrence in Greek thought has brought to the fore the fact that Nietzsche’s claim to Eternal 
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Recurrence may not be unprecedented. But Nietzsche’s demand for its ethical appropriation in 
the individual human condition may be unprecedented. 
For the Greeks, Eternal Recurrence is understood to be of necessity for the very 
existence of the cosmos. They understood this essential aspect of the cosmos through their 
empirical attentiveness to cosmic activities. From the Greeks, Nietzsche was exposed to 
cosmological and particular nuances of Eternal Recurrence. However, before engaging with 
Nietzsche himself on the doctrine of the Eternal Recurrence, it is pertinent to look briefly at 
some prevailing scholarly approaches. 
3.2 Scholarly Approaches to Nietzsche’s Doctrine of the Eternal Recurrence 
The focus will be on various scholarly interpretations of the doctrine understood as 
cosmological, particular/anthropological, and existential-ethical. I start with some general 
claims about the doctrine. For Heidegger, Nietzsche’s doctrine of the Eternal Recurrence is the 
most difficult thought to bear, because it involves “the tragedy of being as such.”383 
Heidegger’s claim is founded on Nietzsche’s own assertion about Anaximander’s value 
question: 
‘What is your existence worth? And if it is worthless, why are you here? Your guilt, 
I see, causes you to tarry in your existence. With your death, you have to expiate it. 
Look how your earth is withering, how your seas are diminishing and drying up; 
the seashell on the mountain top can show you how much has dried up already. 
Even now, fire is destroying your world; someday it will go up in fumes and smoke. 
But ever and anew, another such world of ephemerality will construct itself. Who 
is there that could redeem you from the curse of [becoming]?’384 
In this text, though Nietzsche is aware of the Greek cosmic nuances of cyclical recurrence, he 
conceives such a phenomenon as an existential enigma. That there is cosmic recurrence seems 
fine from an observer’s standpoint. But that human existence is implicated in the cosmic curse 
of becoming seems unsettling. Hence, Heidegger credibly notes that the “experience of the 
tragic and meditation on its origin and essence are proper to the very basis of Nietzschean 
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thought.”385 In Nietzsche’s purview, the Greek understanding of the cosmic cycles raises 
value-related questions about human life. 
Heidegger, in his lectures on Nietzsche’s doctrine of Eternal Recurrence, 
hypothetically remarks, “If the thought of eternal recurrence of the same is Nietzsche’s 
principal thought, then it will have been present to him during the entire subsequent period of 
his creative life from 1881 to January 1889.”386 Together with the timeframe, Heidegger 
recognizes “incorporation” of the tragic as essential to the doctrine of the Eternal 
Recurrence.387 To show the link between incorporation and the doctrine of the Eternal 
Recurrence, Heidegger notes, “However novel it may be, the doctrine of eternal return does 
not drop out of the blue.”388 This may imply that even though Eternal Recurrence is a 
cosmological doctrine, it requires some form of appropriation. 
Heidegger’s position is that “incorporating” implies thinking the thought of Eternal 
Recurrence “in such a way that right from the start it becomes one’s fundamental stance toward 
reality as a whole.”389 Heidegger’s emphasis is that “[o]nly when the thought has become the 
basic posture of our thinking as a whole has it been appropriated [incorporated]—and taken 
into the body [into the drives]—as its essence demands.”390 The thinking in question entails 
adopting the experimental attitude of innocence that Heidegger suggests in Nietzsche 
“pervades being as a whole.”391 Being here ought to be consistently interpreted in terms of 
Wirklichkeit as actuality that is applicable to the entire cosmic reality. More fundamentally, 
Heidegger’s position is that “the thought of eternal recurrence of the same is not yet thought 
when one merely imagines everything turning in a circle.”392 Whether this is really the case in 
Nietzsche’s presentation of the doctrine of the Eternal Recurrence will be tested below. 
Eternal Recurrence on anthropological grounds correlates to Kaufmann’s claim that 
the value of the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence for Nietzsche was something new and 
paramount. Kaufmann believes that the search for the positive function of the doctrine of 
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Eternal Recurrence mattered for Nietzsche.393 Kaufmann’s reflection is founded on the 
following stance from Nietzsche: 
This life as you live it and have lived it, you will have to live once more and 
innumerable times more; and there will be nothing new in it, but every pain and 
every joy and every thought and sigh and everything unutterably small or great in 
your life will have to return to you, all in the same succession and sequence—even 
this spider and this moonlight between the trees, and even this moment and I 
myself.394 
For Kaufmann, this text elicits the issues of the problem of life and its finality; eternity and 
time; and Eternal Recurrence as an anthropological doctrine. In Kaufmann’s words, one must 
probe his present state of being, such that he would have to answer the demon with anger or 
be in accord with the demon.395 Kaufmann’s thinking is shared by other thinkers, like Schacht. 
For Schacht, the thought of Eternal Recurrence is problematic. The problem is the 
realization that “all events recur eternally, down to the last detail.”396 That last detail here 
references “even this moment.” Schacht’s explanation is that “[t]he thought of the eternal 
recurrence of all events without addition, subtraction, or alteration would, on [Nietzsche’s] 
view, present an even more formidable challenge and test of one’s strength and ability to affirm 
life as it exists.”397 The credibility of Schacht’s observation must be gauged against one’s 
ability to appropriate the thought. Lack of appropriation of the cosmic actuality as becoming 
seems to be the main test. Eternal Recurrence’s challenge depends on the question in each and 
everything, “Do you desire this once more and innumerable times more?”398 Nietzsche adds 
that this question “would lie upon your actions as the greatest weight.”399 Eternal Recurrence 
on the cosmological level exposes human actuality even from the spectator’s perspective to 
existence that is sinnlos. 
Lӧwith draws his attention to Nietzsche’s thinking that the nature of the cosmos ipso 
facto points to meaninglessness. Nietzsche alleges: “Let us think this thought in its most 
terrible form: existence as it is, without meaning or aim, yet recurring inevitably without any 
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finale of nothingness: ‘the eternal recurrence.’”400 Hence, for Lӧwith, Eternal Recurrence on 
cosmological grounds characterizes Nietzsche’s “teaching as the ‘most extreme form of 
nihilism’ and at the same time as the ‘self-overcoming’ of nihilism.”401 In The Gay Science 
text the final question is, “Do you desire this once more and innumerable times more?” Though 
one may say Nein the doctrine says your life is already meaningless. And yet even the Ja is 
problematic, given that you will either be transformed or be crushed by the doctrine. It is a 
Sphinx-like scenario. Lӧwith recognizes the deficiency in the cosmological theory of Eternal 
Recurrence claiming that “the dwarf cannot bear Zarathustra’s most abysmal idea of the 
Eternal Recurrence; but Zarathustra—who, in carrying up the dwarf, carried up the burden of 
his existence—can indeed bear the most abysmal idea.”402 In this regard, it is plausible to claim 
that Eternal Recurrence, thought of as cosmological only, may not entail Zarathustra’s deep-
thought. In what way Zarathustra’s deep thought could be envisaged must be beyond the mere 
cosmological or anthropological underpinnings of the doctrine. This leads into some 
practically oriented interpretations. 
The third interpretation of the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence is commonly rendered as 
a prescriptive type. It takes on different nuances as it is expressed by different scholars. For 
instance, Bernd Magnus interprets Eternal Recurrence as an existential imperative,403 Pierre 
Klossowski sees it as a re-think on one’s current life,404 and Paul Loeb holds that the condition 
of coming to Nietzsche’s Eternal Recurrence is the honesty of life/existence, since our 
condition of life determines how we need to live.405 Magnus relates the normative account with 
ontology of the cosmos. 
The ontological account tends to concern itself with the constitutive aspects of reality 
and its essential character. For Magnus, it is from the ontological account that normative 
questions like “How ought I to behave?” a fortiori emerge.406 In Nietzsche, one comes to know 
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the character of existence through the art of listening. The honest listening in Magnus’ 
interpretation makes Nietzsche’s doctrine of the Eternal Recurrence an existential-imperative. 
This is more than simply alleging that the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence is prescriptive. 
According to Heidegger, there is no schema into which one might pigeonhole the project of 
Eternal Recurrence and make it familiar.407 Instead, each one individually must be on the 
lookout for the project itself, given that whatever pertains to Eternal Recurrence is its own 
schema. 
In this regard, instead of Eternal Recurrence being prescriptive, it is possibly selective. 
As Heidegger further observes, “Whatever is taught there, whatever is thought in the thought, 
recedes before the way it is taught and thought.”408 In keeping with the existential slant of this 
dissertation, existential-imperative nuance of the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence will be sought 
as a selective process. The Eternal Recurrence, owing to the conditions in which it came to 
Nietzsche, can plausibly be approached from the perspective of the attitude(s) that it elicits in 
those who may be possessed by this thought. Now, I engage with Nietzsche himself on the 
doctrine of Eternal Recurrence. 
3.3 Eternal Recurrence in Nietzsche’s Corpus 
In Nietzsche’s own engagement with the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence one must be 
alive to the complex issues surrounding the doctrine. The issues revolve around the 
cosmological, particular/anthropological, scientific/empirical, and practical/prescriptive 
aspects of the doctrine. For Nietzsche, even Greek thought on the everlasting and exclusive 
becoming is itself disturbing for the human observer. Nietzsche calls it a terrible, paralyzing 
thought.409 Nietzsche is making such a claim about cosmic reality simply as a spectator in 
1873, which is a different case in August 1881, when it becomes an existential-imperative for 
him. I will argue that the affirmation of the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence for Nietzsche is 
only viable through the type Übermensch. The following is an attempt at tracing Nietzsche’s 
journey of appropriating the thought of Eternal Recurrence. 
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3.3.1 Eternal Recurrence: Nietzsche’s 1881 Sketches 
In the 1881 notes, a first sketch on the doctrine contains five themes. Three themes are 
about incorporation: (1) of fundamental errors, (2) of passions and (3) of knowledge and of 
renunciatory knowledge. The remaining two themes are (4) the innocent man and the 
individual as experiment, and (5) the new heavy weight: the Eternal Recurrence of the same.410 
Prima facie, there seems to be an important link between incorporation and the doctrine 
of the Eternal Recurrence. Though incorporation appears more clearly in The Gay Science, it 
is alluded to before. 411 In 1874, Nietzsche explains the plastic power of man as “the capacity 
to develop out of oneself in one’s own way, to transform and incorporate into oneself what is 
past and foreign, to heal wounds, to replace what has been lost, to recreate broken moulds.”412 
In this case, without the power to integrate and appropriate, one perishes. The modern man is 
said to drag around with him “a huge quantity of indigestible stones of knowledge.”413 
Indigestibility in this regard is the opposite of what the term incorporation entails in Nietzsche. 
Whatever is indigestible is not assimilated into the body system. The term 
Einverleibung, the equivalent of the English “incorporation,” literally means to take into the 
body or ingest. In the words of Keith, “Nietzsche situates incorporation in the same context of 
problems that come to inform his presentation of eternal return in 1881.”414 Incorporation 
involves the conditions of life, which are ever open-ended, and entails becoming. Thus, in the 
above sketch of 1881, Nietzsche seems to set the necessary prerequisites for Eternal 
Recurrence as an incorporating process. Incorporation as power mastery is expressed in later 
notes as part of the understanding of the living, which “must extend its power and consequently 
incorporate alien forces.”415 Hence, Eternal Recurrence is introduced specifically as the 
[i]nfinite importance of our knowing, erring, our habits, ways of living for all that 
is to come. What shall we do with the rest of our lives—we who have spent most 
of our lives in the most profound ignorance? We shall teach the doctrine—it is the 
 
410 KSA, 9: 11[141]. 
411 In GS, the main theme is appropriation of Knowledge for life, but that appropriation can only be achieved 
under the auspices of what Nietzsche calls incorporation as the measure of the strength of Knowledge, as a 
condition of life. Refer, GS, §110.  
412 HL, §1. The emphasis is mine. 
413 HL, §4. The emphasis is mine. 
414 Keith Ansell Pearson, “The Eternal Return of the Overhuman: The Weightiest Knowledge and the Abyss of 
Light” in The Journal of Nietzsche Studies, Issue 30, (Autumn 2005): 4. 
415 KSA, 13: 14[192] or WP, §728. 
 
  117 
 
most powerful means of incorporating it in ourselves. Our kind of blessedness, as 
teachers of the greatest doctrine.416  
Eternal Recurrence as the new weight and the greatest doctrine is the singular preoccupation 
for Nietzsche in the 1880s. The thought of Eternal Recurrence as schwer implies “weighty” or 
“difficult” or “hard” in the generic sense of “hard to bear.”417 The difficulty of Eternal 
Recurrence for Nietzsche is two-fold: thinking through it and existentially living it. The import 
of the two-fold burden is expressed on numerous occasions. 
In a letter of the same period of 1881, Nietzsche talks of “the intensity” of his feelings 
and “tears of joy and exaltation.”418 In The Gay Science, he hypothesizes, “if this thought 
gained possession of you, it would change you as you are or perhaps crush you.”419 If it is 
incorporated it transforms.420 In the 1881 notes the philosophy of indifference is the link 
between the incorporations and weighty thought of Eternal Recurrence. For Nietzsche, the 
philosophy of indifference among others is characterized by innocence and experiment toward 
existence. In the 1881 notes, there are calls to “adopt a child’s attitude towards” existence.421 
Such an attitude in Nietzsche’s scheme entails understanding reality as becoming.422 It has 
been acknowledged by Nietzsche that “incorporation” has fundamentally involved errors and 
our thinking itself about existence is flawed. Eternal Recurrence takes millennia to be 
incorporated. Hence, Nietzsche warns, 
Let us beware of teaching such a doctrine like a sudden religion! It must sink in 
slowly; entire generations need to build on it and become fruitful—so that it 
becomes a great tree overshadowing all humanity to come. ... For the most powerful 
thought many millennia are needed—long, long.423 
Part of the reason it takes so long to incorporate lies in the fact that there are no external 
sanctions on those who fail to believe in it. Nevertheless, those who fail to incorporate it; are 
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deemed to live fleeting lives.424 Hence, incorporation is vital in conceiving the doctrine of 
Eternal Recurrence, and in this regard it is more than a prescriptive doctrine. 
The ending signature of the sketch itself seems to defy mere interpretation of the 
doctrine as prescriptive. The dating, signature, and location sound obscure. It reads: “Early 
August 1881 in Sils-Maria, 6,000 feet above sea level and much higher above all human 
things!”425 Later in 1888 Nietzsche writes “6000 Fuss jenseits von Mensch und Zeit.”426 The 
obscurity of the location lies in the wording “much higher above all human beings and time.” 
Nietzsche understands becoming as an activity. Like the actuality of the cosmos, characterized 
by constant acting and coming to be, the challenge for Nietzsche is how to appropriate it into 
the human realm. That “how” could include striving. Nietzsche generally links striving in the 
human realm to living in drives and activities.427 This leads to the second sketch of Eternal 
Recurrence found in the same notes of 1881 ordered differently as follows:  
1. The mightiest insight [understood to be of the Eternal Recurrence]. 
2. Opinions and errors transform humankind and grant it its drives, or: the 
incorporated errors. 
3. Necessity and innocence. 
4. The play of life.428 
This sketch apparently manifests the prevailing situation of those who have incorporated the 
Eternal Recurrence and been transformed. It is not the hypothetical situation of “if.” The key 
to such an assertion is the realized state of “the play of life.” The play of life reflects a fragment 
associated with Heraclitus’s dictum: “Lifetime is a child at play, moving pieces in a game.”429  
The child in Nietzsche’s Zarathustra epitomizes the life of creativity, while the notions 
of play and laughter in Zarathustra are marks of a transformed life.430 After experiencing the 
Eternal Recurrence, the shepherd’s situation in Zarathustra is described: “No longer a 
shepherd, no longer man a transformed being, surrounded with light, laughing!”431 For 
Hollingdale, part three of Zarathustra is the pinnacle of Nietzsche’s writings. The reason is 
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that in part three “On the Vision and riddle” the full statement of the theory of Eternal 
Recurrence is reached.432 Hence, the four themes of the second sketch on Eternal Recurrence 
may only be properly validated after one has experienced the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence 
at the existential-imperative level. In Nietzsche’s corpus that experience is in Zarathustra, Part 
Three.  
3.3.2 Eternal Recurrence: The Gay Science, 1882 
Part of the first proclamation of the doctrine in the published works reads, “The eternal 
hourglass of existence is turned upside down again and again, and you with it, speck of 
dust!”433 The eternal hourglass of existence expresses Nietzsche’s version of Eternal 
Recurrence as a cosmological doctrine. Nevertheless, the bulk of the proclamation of the 
doctrine in The Gay Science focuses on the impact of such a thought on the individual life. The 
proclamation is filled with existential nuances: 
What, if some day or night a demon were to steal after you into your loneliest 
loneliness and say to you: This life as you live it and have lived it, you will have to 
live once more and innumerable times more; and there will be nothing new in it, 
but every pain and every joy and every thought and sigh and everything unutterably 
small or great in your life will have to return to you, all in the same succession and 
sequence—even this spider and this moonlight between the trees, and even this 
moment and I myself. 
There is a demand made on the one invaded by the demon for reflection on life at an existential 
level. The “existential” enigma is symbolized by the expression “loneliest loneliness.” 
Nietzsche seems to oppose the existential nuance of Eternal Recurrence to another form that 
he calls the “eternal recurrence of war and peace.”434 This designation in the passage is the 
first reference to the doctrine in published works. It is not clear what such a designation 
implies. But contextually it may imply that cosmic recurrence is not radical enough until its 
demands at the existential level are appropriated.  
3.3.3 The Doctrine of the Eternal Recurrence in Thus Spoke Zarathustra 1883–1885  
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Thematically, The Gay Science gives birth to Zarathustra. In Ecce Homo, he writes, 
“[T]he ‘gaya scienza,’ which gives a hundred indications that something incomparable is near; 
latterly it gives the opening of Zarathustra itself, and in the penultimate section of the fourth 
book it gives Zarathustra’s fundamental thought.”435 The fundamental thought of Zarathustra 
is the Eternal Recurrence. The last aphorism of The Gay Science referred to by Nietzsche above 
is entitled Incipit tragoedia, Tragedy begins. This gives an indication of the link between the 
thought of Eternal Recurrence and tragedy.  
In Zarathustra, Part Two, written in the autumn of 1883, there are two texts that allude 
to the Eternal Recurrence. In the section entitled ‘The Soothsayer,’ after the teaching of the 
doctrine of Eternal Recurrence, there is a sense of mournfulness over humankind given a 
negative belief that “[a]ll is empty, all is the same, all has been!”436 This teaching and belief 
of the prophet, it is remarked, touched Zarathustra’s heart and transformed him. Nevertheless, 
the transformation was only short-lived. This is because thereafter Zarathustra became 
mournful like the rest of humankind. The meaning of the events in this part is unclear. 
However, being a prophecy, it could be the prefiguration of the meaning and the consequences 
of the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence. Aligning the prophecy to the doctrine of Eternal 
Recurrence, it is drawn from the cry of Zarathustra’s alter ego, punctuated with the words, “It 
is time! It is high time!” And then Zarathustra’s asks: “For what is it then high time?”437 What 
follows this question is the mournful teaching about Eternal Recurrence. 
The prophecy is followed by the existential theme of time, couched in terms of the 
redemption of the will.438 The greatest torment to the will is the irreversibility of time. The 
problem of the will and time is stated variously as: “Backwards the will is unable to will; that 
it cannot break time and time’s desire—that is the will’s loneliest sorrow.”439 In addition, the 
fact that “time does not run backwards” arouses the will’s fury. Amid the problem of time, the 
teaching on time is envisaged. 
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However, the problem is not about the past only, but also about now and the future. 
Zarathustra says to his disciples: 
The now and the formerly upon earth—ah! my friends—that is what I find most 
unbearable; and I should not be able to live if I were not a seer of that which must 
come. 
A seer, a willer, a creator, a future himself and a bridge to the future—and alas, also 
as it were a cripple by this bridge: Zarathustra is all this.440 
In this text, Zarathustra acknowledges, like humankind, the unbearable nature of existence. 
But he has an advantage of being a seer. He is a willer of a future and even a bridge to the 
future. Though Zarathustra is a future himself, he is still a cripple. In the words of Rosen, 
Zarathustra “too is crippled by his epoch as a historical person.”441 However, as a seer he 
understands the present moment as the bridge to a healthy future. It is only as a seer that 
Zarathustra can claim that he walks “among human beings as among the fragments of the 
future.”442 The future that he envisages must involve time and will. Hence, ”To redeem that 
which has passed away and to re-create all ‘It was’ into a ‘Thus I willed it!’” is what he calls 
redemption. This will possibly be the work of the doctrine of the Eternal Recurrence when 
appropriated. In the absence of redemption for the will, a phenomenon of revenge sets in. 
Revenge here is understood as the will’s ill-will toward time and its past. Nietzsche’s doctrine 
of Eternal Recurrence as a possible reconciliation of time and existence at this point (1883) is 
only still a theoretical proposition. 
In January 1884, Nietzsche, in the person of Zarathustra, gives a principal discussion 
on incorporation of Eternal Recurrence. It seems an understatement to call it a discussion 
because it entails all possible practical nuances for Eternal Recurrence. Rosen calls Part Three 
of Zarathustra “the most intensely poetic, the part that gives the greatest support to those for 
whom the work is one of inspiration rather than discursive forethought.”443 Nietzsche himself 
already stated in Ecce Homo that Zarathustra is the teacher of the doctrine of Eternal 
Recurrence. The teaching of the doctrine is the import of the two sections “On the Vision and 
the Riddle.” 
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The context of the vision and the riddle is on the ship in the open sea. Zarathustra has 
embarked on a sea voyage from “the Isles of the Blest.”444 The beginning of the voyage is 
clear, but the destination is uncertain. It is remarked about the ship that it “came from far away 
and would sail even farther.” It seems to be a voyage of the “infinite,”445 and to “yet another 
world to be discovered and more than one.”446 More pertinently it is noted: “But Zarathustra 
was a friend to all those who journey far and do not like to live without danger.”447 This 
assertion about danger is consistent with Nietzsche’s position about preparatory human beings: 
“For believe me: the secret of harvesting from existence the greatest fruitfulness and the 
greatest enjoyment is—to live dangerously! Build your cities on the slopes of Vesuvius! Send 
your ships into uncharted seas!”448 The point is that what Nietzsche taught before is now being 
implemented in the person of Zarathustra. And the wider context of the teaching is 
experimentation.449 The reference to the open sea is perhaps an allusion to the needed 
experimental spirit, which is pertinent for the thought of the Eternal Recurrence. 
The riddle is addressed to a specific group: the crew and one unnamed person who 
embarked with Zarathustra. The address affirms the experimental spirit: “To you, bold 
searchers, tempters, experimenters, and whoever has embarked with cunning sails upon 
terrifying seas.” Rosen alleges that the condition of Zarathustra and his friends demands that 
“[t]he price of continuous discovery is detachment from life; the sailors cannot be faithful to 
the earth, because they are immersed in the sea of becoming.”450 The problem is how Rosen’s 
observation about Zarathustra and friends could be understood when compared to 
Zarathustra’s invitation in the prologue: “[S]tay true to the earth and do not believe those who 
talk of over-earthly hopes!”451 One measure of faithfulness to the earth is immersion in the 
activity of life, which is becoming. Detachment from life is contra demand for appropriation 
of the doctrine. The appropriation entails, as Keith notes, the idea “that we, along with 
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everything else that lives, are implicated in the perpetual flux.”452 Hence, the sailors in the 
riddle must largely be understood from the experimental angle as those who are open to the 
activity of life. This type of outlook on experiment is in line with the notions of uncharted seas 
and living dangerously. With clarity about the audience, Zarathustra delves into the 
circumstances in which he received the riddle. 
The riddle contains the “the vision of the loneliest.”453 The term loneliest appears in 
The Gay Science with a qualification as loneliest loneliness. The German rendering Einsamste 
Einsamskeit, implies moments of total desolation and withdrawal into nothingness. It must be 
the existential moment, given the gloomy description of the difficult climb and the spirit of 
heaviness.454 Zarathustra’s purpose of climbing is “to see the grounds of all things and their 
backgrounds.”455 To see the source of reality, Zarathustra must climb over himself onward and 
upward. This is an allusion to the theme of self-overcoming encountered in Chapter Two. 
Nevertheless, the spirit of heaviness and its underlying distractions must be overcome. 
The half dwarf, lames, and those who are laming symbolize human life that calls for pity from 
Zarathustra.456 Pity in this case must be defied. It can be credibly claimed here that pity serves 
as a simple response to a complex existential challenge that is not yet deeply fathomed. The 
dwarf represents those who supposedly need to be pitied and as such need to be overcome. 
The challenge of searching the ground for existence where past efforts failed is described in 
Zarathustra’s experience: “I climbed, I climbed, I dreamed, I thought but everything oppressed 
me.”457 Zarathustra reaches a point of decision-making either to succumb to the voice of past 
failures or to chart a new path to the abyss. 
The turning point is facilitated by what Zarathustra describes as “something I call 
courage.” In courage, Zarathustra confronts the dwarf: “Dwarf! You! or I!” The choice here is 
between two heavy weights, pity representing the hitherto moral response to enigmatic 
existence or the Eternal Recurrence. Hence, the need for courage as “the best of killers: courage 
strikes even pitying dead. But pitying is the deepest abyss: as deeply as the human being sees 
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into life, so deeply does it also see into suffering.”458 This statement leads into a serious 
conundrum. 
If pitying is a deepest abyss, how comes it Zarathustra is charting the path to the abyss, 
too? Heidegger comments that as Zarathustra “climbs the depths themselves increase and the 
abyss first becomes an abyss—not because the climber plunges into it, but precisely because 
he is ascending.”459 It is highly probable that the abyss induced by pity is life-negating since it 
does not see the grounds of all things. Such an abyss is limited, since it has the same depth for 
life and for suffering. Instead, the life affirming abyss-like courage “even strikes death dead, 
for it says: ‘was that life? Well then! One more time!’”460 Instead the abyss through the 
morality of compassion entails pitying that one plunges into. But Zarathustra can rise no higher 
until he overcomes pity for humanity that still pulls him back to the depth.461 The challenge, 
“Dwarf! You! or I!” is resolved in the second section of the Vison and Riddle. 
Zarathustra is forthright: “I or you! But I am the stronger of us two for you do not know 
my abyss-deep thought! That—you would not be able to bear!”462 If the dwarf and those like 
him think existence burdensome as it is, they are mistaken. Zarathustra’s abyss-deep thought 
is more tragic. Since this entails the thought that life as you now live it, and have lived, you 
will live once more and innumerable times more. Apparently with the knowledge that it cannot 
bear the deep-thought, the dwarf jumps down from Zarathustra’s shoulders. However, the 
jumping is with a proviso, “out of curiosity.” The curiosity of the dwarf is possibly founded 
on his mocking of Zarathustra’s attempt of anything new. The dwarf’s mockery of Zarathustra 
partly goes: “O Zarathustra, far indeed you threw the stone—but onto you will it come falling 
back!”463 Gianni Vattimo calls the dwarf'’s mockery a “dwarf-like version of Eternal 
Recurrence.”464 The dwarf's curiosity is perhaps to “wait and see another failed attempt.” 
At the gateway of the Moment, the idea of the Eternal Recurrence begins to be 
theoretically discussed as follows: 
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Behold this gateway, dwarf! I continued. It has two faces. Two ways come together 
here: nobody has ever taken them to the end. 
This long lane back here: it goes on for eternity. And that long lane out there—that 
is another eternity. 
They contradict themselves, these ways; they confront one another head on, and 
here, at this gateway, is where they come together. The name of the gateway is 
inscribed above it: ‘Moment.’ 
But whoever should walk farther on one of them—on and on, farther and farther: 
do you believe, dwarf, that these ways contradict themselves eternally?—  
‘All that is straight lies’, murmured the dwarf contemptuously. 
All truth is crooked; time itself is a circle.’465 
This text contains some of the complex concepts relevant to the interpretation of the doctrine 
of Eternal Recurrence. They include eternity, moment, and time. Zarathustra’s text above talks 
of lanes that go on for eternity. The contradiction is that eternity collapses into the moment. In 
the ordinary understanding, eternity implies endless duration or even timelessness. 
Nevertheless, Nietzsche seems to hold a different notion of eternity. The two ways must be 
related to time, given the reference to backward and forward. The dominant Western tradition 
that views eternity as the overcoming of time is challenged in the little phrase, “Nobody has 
ever taken them to the end.” Eternity in this regard implies no end. In the words of Stambaugh: 
[F]or Nietzsche, eternity, the eternal return of the Same, meant ‘there is no end.’ To 
say there is no end is not the same as to say that the world is endless. What is endless 
never comes to an end, in the sense that it endures on and on without ever 
encountering anything to stop it.466 
This interpretation apparently brings eternity and time into the one realm of becoming. This is 
a complex domain. The complexity, as Deleuze holds, is because becoming is not a moment 
of being. Instead, like the present moment, it “is the passing moment, forces [one] to think of 
becoming, but to think of it precisely as what could not have started, and cannot finish, 
becoming.”467 For Zarathustra eternity and time coalesce in the moment. The moment is 
described as the gateway where the two eternal ways come together. But that conflation must 
be within the understanding of the ‘Moment.’ This is a very complex notion in Nietzsche and 
goes beyond Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Hence, clarification is necessary. 
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a. The moment in Nietzsche 
There is an intimate link between the moment, human beings, and existence. It is within 
the moment that the action of life is accomplished. In the Nachlass 1883-1885, an entry on the 
single moment alleges, 
If we affirm one single moment, we thus affirm not only ourselves but all existence. 
For nothing is self-sufficient, neither in us ourselves nor in things; and if our soul 
has trembled with happiness and sounded like a harp string just once, all eternity 
was needed to produce this one event—and in this single moment of affirmation all 
eternity was called good, redeemed, justified, and affirmed.468 
David Wood envisages Nietzsche’s conception of the moment as an intensity whereby the 
highest possibility of temporal existence is realized.469 Nietzsche makes specific reference to 
the “Moment” and the Eternal Recurrence: “The moment is immortal in which I produced 
return. For the sake of this moment I bear return.”470 And then in Twilight of Idols, the artistic 
productions are realized in conditions where one enriches everything from one’s own 
abundance.471 It is a feeling of positive intoxication filled with plenitude and increased energy. 
In such a condition of fullness one can transform “things until they mirror his power—until 
they are reflections of his perfection.”472 In the case of the “Moment,” its perfection is eternal 
return. And given its own abundance whatever ensues from it can envisage recurrence. 
Zarathustra, in his conversation with the dwarf, expected his arch-enemy to have grasped the 
notion of the “Moment” in such complexity. 
The dwarf’s response simply shows either he has not grasped anything or is simply 
contemptuous. However, from the discussions about time, eternity, and “Moment,” nothing is 
directly said about the union of the two ways, the circularity of time. And in any case, the 
dwarf was ultimately asked what he believes. The question is, “[D]o you believe, dwarf, that 
these ways contradict themselves eternally?” The presentation as is so far given is obscure. As 
such the dwarf’s response may have sincerely sprung from belief. The prevailing belief is that 
the Eternal Recurrence is a cosmological phenomenon that encompasses reality as such. From 
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Zarathustra’s reaction to the dwarf, simple cosmological belief of Eternal Recurrence is 
insufficient. 
Eternal Recurrence understood only from the cosmological aspect is “too light and 
easy.”473 For one to get the riddle right, the entry into the “gateway of the moment” seems 
paramount. Vattimo, reflecting on happenings in the riddle believes that “[w]hat is clear at 
least is that the ‘cosmological’ version of Eternal Recurrence … is rejected, if not as false then 
as a too superficial view of things.”474 Though what Vattimo says is largely plausible, it must 
be clarified that the dwarf’s response contains more than the cosmological view of time. The 
statement that “all that is straight lies” is not a cosmological view, but an allusion to a linear 
conception of time which is discussed later in this chapter. 
From the 1881 notes, without appropriation, the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence is 
perhaps ineffective. And during appropriation, the understanding of the notion of the 
“Moment” is pertinent. Hence, the primacy of the “Moment” is affirmed by further 
explanations and questions as follows: 
Must not whatever among all things can walk have walked this lane already? Must 
not whatever among all things can happen have happened, and been done, and 
passed already? 
And if everything has already been, what do you think, dwarf, of this moment? Must 
this getaway too not already—have been? 
And are not all things knotted together so tightly that this moment draws after it all 
things that are to come? Thus— —itself as well?475 
Most of the comments made above about the “Moment” can be adduced in favour of this text. 
However, the notion of a gateway needs clarification. Initially it is simply a “gateway,” then 
“this gateway” where two ways (of time) come together. Gradually the gateway is inscribed 
with the name “Moment” and is referred to as “this gateway Moment.” Eventually follows the 
statement: “Behold, I said, this moment! From this gateway ‘Moment’ a long eternal lane runs 
backward: behind us lies an eternity.”476 One can discern a progression where Zarathustra is 
gradually implicated into the gateway, from being a bystander at the gateway to being part of 
the structure of the gateway “Moment.” 
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Interpreters like Rosen consider the gateway as the structure of time that applies to all 
human beings, including Zarathustra and the sailors.477 However, it must be added that time 
ought to be appropriated as a human condition for it to ultimately have a transformative 
influence. Stambaugh notes that time as becoming “is a direct contradiction of the idea of time 
as the principle of finitude, as Chronos who devours his own children, as time that inexorably 
rolls out of the future into the past, drawing everything along with it.”478 Nietzsche is 
concerned with time in relation to man as becoming. It is such notion of time that is tied to the 
notion of the “Moment.” 
The “Moment” is described further in terms of “all things knotted together so tightly 
that this moment draws after it all things.”479 This knotting together of things sounds very 
much like the description of the nature of the “Moment.” The “Moment” so conceived is pure 
becoming as the foundation for any return. Deleuze explains something similar in relation to 
the present moment: “The synthetic relation to the moment to itself as present, past and future 
grounds its relation to other moments.”480 The moment is the basis of the entire doctrine of the 
Eternal Recurrence. It is the moment that returns and draws after it all things. 
With the assertion about the moment drawing all things in return, anthropological 
recurrence is also envisaged. Zarathustra reverts to existential expression in The Gay Science: 
And this slow-moving spider, crawling in the moonlight, and this moonlight itself, 
and I and you in the getaway, whispering together, whispering of eternal things—
must we not all have been here before? 
—and must come again and walk in that other lane, out there, before us, in this long 
and dreadful lane—must we not eternally come back again?—481 
It seems there is transitioning from the gateway of the “Moment” to its effects. Based on the 
“Moment,” the recurrence of all things is made possible. The rhetorical question is, must “we” 
not eternally come back again? The dwarf’s prior response is reflected in this question. If it is 
a foregone case that everything recurs, the question remains as to why the initial response of 
the dwarf was rejected. The argument in support of Zarathustra’s version could be that they 
are responses made from different standpoints. Zarathustra’s stance is informed by the 
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experience of the “gateway of the Moment.” But the dwarf’s projection emanates from a 
bystander’s viewpoint. Heidegger, on viewpoints between the dwarf and Zarathustra, argues, 
“The superiority consists in the fact that certain conditions of understanding have been brought 
into play, conditions the dwarf cannot satisfy—because he is a dwarf. These new conditions 
derive from the realization that the second question is based on the Moment.”482 But the 
superiority of the new standpoint is grounded in the fact that the return goes down to the 
minutest detail. The new demand is founded on adopting one’s stance within the “Moment,” 
which is in time as perspectival. 
From the ensuing arguments, it emerges that the contention is not about the adoption 
of Eternal Recurrence as a cosmological phenomenon. Instead the standpoint of whoever 
makes such an assertion must render some weight to the cosmological argument. The weight 
on the cosmological stance is that even if one affirms it as such, there is some bearing on life. 
As Rosen interprets Nietzsche, “From a cosmological standpoint, life is valueless until we 
impose an interpretation on it.”483 Through the gateway one moves into historical time. It is 
within time that he supposedly creates values instead of surrendering to fate. From Nietzsche’s 
schema, the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence is meant to be affirmed from the individual’s 
standpoint. Such an affirmation demands appropriation through experience of the “Moment.” 
This could inform the shift in focus to an individual’s deep involvement with the thought. The 
transition is introduced by Zarathustra’s statement: “Thus was I talking, and ever more softly: 
for I was afraid of my own thoughts and the [ulterior motives].”484 What follows is the 
symbolic and horrifying description of the appropriation of the thought of Eternal Recurrence 
and its eventualities. 
b. The appropriation of the thought of Eternal Recurrence 
The explanation of the vision reaches the climax when Zarathustra’s state is described 
as desolate. This is a reminder of the “loneliest loneliness.” The scene is described thus: 
A young shepherd I saw, writhing, choking, convulsing, his face distorted, and a 
heavy black snake hanging out of his mouth. 
Have I ever seen so much disgust—and pallid horror on one face? 
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Had perhaps been asleep? Then the snake crawled into his throat and there it bit 
fast. 
My hand tugged at the snake and tugged:—in vain! it could not tug the snake out 
of his throat. Then it cried out of me: ‘Bite off! Bite off! 
‘Bite the head off! Bite it off!’—thus it cried out of me, my horror, my hate, my 
disgust, my compassion, all my good and bad cried out of me with a single cry.— 
… 
But the shepherd bit, as my cry had counselled him; he bit with a good bite! Far 
away he spat out the head of the snake—and then sprang up. 
No longer shepherd, no longer human—one transformed, illumined, who laughed! 
Never yet on earth had a human being laughed as he laughed!485 
Zarathustra provides an exegetical key to most of the issues raised in this text in a later text 
titled “The Convalescent.” Hence, the two can be analysed together. For now, the focus will 
be on one point, the decision to bite. Biting the head of the snake is an act of the will undertaken 
only by the shepherd. Biting, like entering the gateway of the “Moment,” is an individual 
decision. For Vattimo, the image of the shepherd who bites off the snake’s head “ties the idea 
of Eternal Recurrence to a decision which man has to make and which is his only means of 
transforming himself.”486 T. B. Strong refers to the act of biting as transformative.487 On the 
other hand Rosen alleges that “Zarathustra is the instrument of persuasion, but only the 
shepherd can save himself by direct action.”488 Two issues must be delineated from the 
thinkers’ observations: (1) The act of the will as transformative, and (2) Zarathustra’s 
standpoint as the teacher of the Eternal Recurrence. 
Zarathustra as the teacher of Eternal Recurrence seems an overriding idea, and thus 
will be examined first. The most potent means of incorporating the doctrine, according to the 
1881 notes, is teaching it. However, there are also requisite qualifications for one to be a 
teacher. The major qualification is espousing a philosophy of indifference, but specifically 
aversion to the morality of compassion. Morality of compassion in the name of being the object 
of pity for Nietzsche is contra the realization of the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence. For 
Zarathustra, more than the terror induced by the thought of Eternal Recurrence, he must 
overcome the morality of compassion. Such an interpretation is consistent with the description 
of the contents of the cry from Zarathustra. In Zarathustra’s account he says: ‘it cried out of 
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me, my horror, my hate, my disgust, my compassion, all my good and bad cried out of me with 
a single cry.’ These elements represent inhibitors to appropriation of Eternal Recurrence. The 
dwarf embodies these elements. Hence Zarathustra’s standpoint as the teacher of Eternal 
Recurrence is akin to nature.489 The stance of nature basically entails no praising and no 
blaming. It is simply an extra-moral stance. 
The act of the will as transformative is evidenced by the shepherd’s action. In general, 
Western philosophy applied the notion of the will to intentional actions. This is the trend that 
Nietzsche seeks to avoid by stating that the will is not a faculty but an emotion. In Beyond 
Good and Evil, the will is called “the affect of the command.”490 The one who wills commands 
something inside him that obeys. As an emotion of command, Nietzsche considers the will 
“the decisive sign of sovereignty and strength.”491 This may sound innovative, but Kant had 
viewed some aspects of the will in terms of command and sovereignty. Kant in Religion within 
the limits of Reason distinguishes between der Wille and die Willkür.492 The work of die 
Willkür is to choose between the promptings of desire and the imperatives stemming from der 
Wille. In the words of J. B. Schneewind, the will as der Wille is identical with practical 
rationality.493 But in addition there is the power of choice. For Kant, it is the power of choice 
that one implies when speaking of freedom. The will itself is neither free nor unfree.494 It is 
this unintentional understanding of the will that Nietzsche apparently endorses. In this case, 
the will wills its own acts. Thus, the act of the will for Nietzsche always gives form, it creates, 
it transforms. This is the import of Magnus’s assertion that the will must be thought of 
“principally as form-giving.”495 The young shepherd can only transform himself through his 
own act of biting the snake’s head.  
Thus, the action of the will is crucially important for the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence. 
In the 1881 notes, one of the pertinent issues was the experience of Eternal Recurrence. In 
involving the act of the will, it implies Eternal Recurrence could ultimately be espoused as a 
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selective thought. Though the act of the will apparently explains the difference between the 
dwarf and the animals, and between Zarathustra and the young shepherd, it complicates the 
doctrine. 
In “On the Vision and Riddle,” Zarathustra recounts the doctrine from without. The 
attempt to explain the doctrine from within is done in the section “The Convalescent.” The 
actors this time are the animals on the one hand and Zarathustra on the other. The setting is in 
the cave where Zarathustra retreated after the voyage: 
Zarathustra sprang up from his pallet like a madman, screamed in a terrifying voice, 
and acted as if there were still someone lying on the pallet who would not get up … 
Get up, abyss-deep thought, out of my depths! I am your cock and morning-
dawning, you sleepy worm: up! up! My voice shall surely crow you awake! … 
And once you are awake you shall stay awake eternally. … 
Zarathustra, the Godless, summons you! 
I, Zarathustra, the advocate of life, the advocate of suffering, the advocate of the 
circle—you I summon, my most abyss-deep thought!496 
In this text, Zarathustra is sounding the wakeup call for the deep-thought of the Eternal 
Recurrence to manifest itself. Zarathustra refers to himself as the cock and morning-dawning 
for Eternal Recurrence. Different nuances are latent within this phrase. In the foreword of 
Twilight of Idols, Nietzsche alleges that part of his work is to: “Sound out idol … and pied 
piper like me, in the presence of whom precisely that which would like to stay silent has to 
become audible…”497 The primary idea here is sounding out, which is like an auscultation 
exercise, while the secondary connection is the enticing element, as pied piper. Prima facie, 
one can submit that the thought of Eternal Recurrence is sounded out by Zarathustra from the 
heart of existence. The heart of existence properly envisaged is expressed in Zarathustra’s own 
three credentials as: “the advocate of life, the advocate of suffering and the advocate of the 
circle.”498 In one word, the three are the description of tragedy. In some form of self-
referencing Nietzsche remarks, 
[T]o realize in oneself the eternal joy of becoming—that joy which encompasses 
joy in destruction. … Birth of Tragedy was my first revaluation of all values: with 
that I again plant myself in the soil out of which I draw all that I will and can—I, 
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the last disciple of the philosopher Dionysos—I, the teacher of the eternal 
recurrence. …499  
It is rather evident from this text that for Eternal Recurrence to be rightly thought, appropriation 
of the tragic nature of existence is inevitable. Nevertheless, it remains to be seen whether what 
Nietzsche claims about sounding out idols, enticing, and letting the silent become audible, here 
in the 1888 text, was ever achieved by Zarathustra in 1883. Nietzsche’s thought of Eternal 
Recurrence may not have been simply a spectacular experience, as he claims in 1881. Instead, 
it must have been a consistent painstaking listening to existence over a period. This point is 
treated in an elaborate manner in the analysis section below. 
Still more pertinent, Zarathustra was laying side by side with “someone who would not 
get up.” And this someone, once awake, stays so eternally. This other apparently is the thought 
of Eternal Recurrence. Heidegger observes, “The thought lies beside him in bed, has not yet 
become one with him, is not yet incorporated in him and hence is not yet something truly 
thought.”500 Hence, the objective of “The Convalescent” is for the thought of Eternal 
Recurrence to be manifested in all its fullness. Its moment of comprehension is of mixed 
reception: “my ultimate depth I have turned out into the light!” And then “let go!”501 Though 
disgusting, it is also the turning moment for Zarathustra. Though the thought of the Eternal 
Recurrence is comprehended by Zarathustra, he is apparently overcome by it, and collapses. 
Shortly he regains awareness, but it is too fragile: “Thus he remained for seven days; but his 
animals did not leave him by day or night.”502 Thereafter, the conversation begins, supposedly 
about Eternal Recurrence. It is supposedly because what turns up in the conversation is first a 
critique of the limitations of language and encounter with existence. The challenges of 
espousing Eternal Recurrence as simply a cosmological thought come to the fore when the 
thought is experienced. The new understanding is the result of appropriating the thought 
through the period of seven days. Zarathustra has a new understanding and sees the situation 
differently.503 The animals like the dwarf may not espouse a similar stance about existence. 
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The animals in their enthusiasm attempt to convince Zarathustra to step out of the cave 
since the world awaits him like a garden. Zarathustra responds:  
 −O my animals, replied Zarathustra, do chatter on thus and let me listen to you! It 
is so refreshing to hear you chatter: where there is chatter, there the world does lie 
for me like a garden. 
How lovely it is that there are words and tones: are words and tones not rainbows 
and seeming-bridges between what is eternally separated? 
To every soul belongs another world; for every soul every other soul is a world 
behind. 
Between just what is most similar does seeming deceive most beautifully: for the 
smallest cleft is the hardest to bridge.504 
Zarathustra’s first reply to the animals sounds simple but could be pertinent to the discourse at 
hand. The pertinence of this initial discourse is premised on the tendency to have overarching 
claims about reality. The tendency to universalize is seen in the animal’s assertions that all 
things are yearning for you. Nietzsche’s campaign against words and conceptual 
universalization goes back to the early writings. In Truth and Falsehood in the Extra-Moral 
Sense (1873) he writes that “a word becomes a concept insofar as it simultaneously has to fit 
countless more or less similar cases—which means, purely and simply, cases which are never 
equal and thus altogether unequal. Every concept arises from the equation of unequal 
things.”505 Nietzsche’s contention is that concepts overlook the individual and the actual.506 
Nature, too, is unacquainted with forms and concepts. Thus, for Nietzsche, the world in its 
actuality remains inaccessible and undefinable for us. The same point is developed in Human 
All Too Human where he claims that through concepts and names of things, man has 
appropriated to himself knowledge of the world.507 For Nietzsche, there is need for the 
realization that in language one is only giving things designations. This is the awareness 
Zarathustra seems to be demanding from his listeners as he convalesces. The words are thus 
referred to as sham bridges connecting what is eternally distinct. There is also a refutation of 
the world as a garden. 
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The garden in Nietzsche’s work is a reference to Epicurus of Athens. In the middle 
period Nietzsche praises Epicurus’s philosophy, especially for its ataraxia.508 However, later 
he is dissatisfied with Epicurus’s philosophy. The reason stated in 1884−1886 note is apt in 
the present context of Eternal Recurrence: 
I have presented such terrible images to knowledge that any “Epicurean delight” is 
out of the question. Only Dionysian joy is sufficient: I have been the first to discover 
the tragic. The Greeks, thanks to their moralistic superficiality, misunderstood it. 
Even resignation is not a lesson of tragedy, but a misunderstanding of it! Yearning 
for nothingness is a denial of tragic wisdom, its opposite!509 
Epicurus’s philosophy apparently lacks the main ingredient of the thought of Eternal 
Recurrence. It is considered as a flight from existence. Nietzsche is clearer on the dissociation 
from Epicurus in 1887: “Thus I gradually learned to understand Epicurus, the opposite of a 
Dionysian pessimist.”510 Epicurus lacks the sense of life as tragic. Heidegger is of the opinion 
that “Nietzsche’s conception of the world does not provide the thinker with a sedate residence 
in which he can putter about unperturbed, like the philosopher of old, Epicurus.”511 
Zarathustra’s warning that, with imposing words and concepts, human beings dance over all 
things is a fair observation. 
Nevertheless, the role of concepts as a way of relating to reality must be recognized. In 
the words of Graham Parkes, concepts “enable the mind to get a grip on at least some aspects 
of the world by excluding what they don’t grasp, through a logic of negation and 
opposition.”512 The animals’ approach to the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence is superficial. The 
animals are determined in their overriding understanding of the world. They proclaim Eternal 
Recurrence as a cosmological phenomenon in their remarks: 
[F]or those who think as we do all things are already dancing: they come and shake 
hands and laugh and flee—and come back again. 
Everything breaks, everything is joined anew; eternally is built the same house of 
Being. Everything separates, everything greets itself again; eternally true to itself 
remains the ring of Being. 
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In every now Being begins; around every here rolls the ball of there. The centre is 
everywhere. Crooked is the path of eternity.513 
The ground for animals’ thinking is embodied in the statement: for those who think as we do. 
In the words of Lӧwith, the animals bear the idea of Eternal Recurrence that “corresponds to 
their nature.”514 The animals themselves are natural and periodic living beings. They are 
implicated in the eternal flow of things without necessarily appropriating those changes. 
Zarathustra’s reply to the animals reveals perspectival demands of the thought: 
How well you know what had to be fulfilled in seven days: and how that monster 
crawled into my throat and choked me! But I bit its head off and spat it forth from 
me. And you—have you simply made a hurdy-gurdy song of it all? But now I lie 
here, still weary from this biting and spitting out, still sick from my own redemption. 
And you simply watched all this? O my animals, are you too cruel?515 
This explanation is supposed to respond to the last questions in “On the Vision and the Riddle”: 
“What did I see then in the parable? And who is it that must come some day? Who is the 
shepherd into whose throat the snake thus crawled? Who is the man into whose throat all that 
is heaviest and blackest will crawl?”516 In all fairness the above purported response applies 
only to one of these questions, about the shepherd. And if the full import about transformation 
in the vision and riddle is taken on board, the implications apparently go beyond the initial 
figure of Zarathustra. 
The end of the first part of Zarathustra reads, “Dead are all Gods: now we want the 
[Übermensch] to live’ −may  this be at the Great Midday our ultimate will!”517 If Zarathustra 
was meant to proclaim the possibility of the type Übermensch through teaching the Eternal 
Recurrence in claiming for himself the transformation of the shepherd, does he become an 
Übermensch himself? It is possible to have a working response to some of these questions. It 
is generally underscored that the approach to Zarathustra as a text is supposed to be within an 
imagined life with a play on images. Thus, what is needed is the participation in the images 
that engage the whole psyche rather than the intellect alone.518 The participation in the 
 
513 Z, III, (The Convalescent, 2). 
514 Lӧwith, Nietzsche’s Philosophy of the Eternal Recurrence of the Same, 73. 
515 Z, III, (The Convalescent, 2). 
516 Z, III (On the Vision and Riddle, 2). 
517 Z, I (On the Bestowing of Virtue, 3). 
518 Parkes, “Introduction” Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, XVII. 
 
  137 
 
transformative demands of the thought of Eternal Recurrence is apparently what sets 
Zarathustra apart from the animals. Müller-Lauter captures the mood when he notes that, 
although Zarathustra likes to listen to the chatter of the animals, “he knows they do not do 
justice to the thought. The animals do not understand its deep seriousness; they do not know 
the pains with which the assimilation of the doctrine of eternal recurrence must come about.”519 
The fact of the animals not knowing is like the dwarf’s situation. The animals make the 
doctrine a simple instrument as “a hurdy-gurdy song.” The dwarf made it too light and easy 
for himself. If the animals and the dwarf do not do justice to the thought of Eternal Recurrence, 
then why does Zarathustra call himself the advocate of the circle? 
There is a discernible difference between Zarathustra’s assertions about the advocate 
of the circle, and the animals’ and dwarf’s claims about the same. The source of Zarathustra’s 
claim is the sickly biting and spitting out that is redemptive. On the other hand, the animals 
were simply by-standers. Zarathustra seems to challenge their knowledge: “How well you 
know what had to be fulfilled in seven days.”520 The implication is that unless you have 
experienced it, your claim to knowledge is still rudimentary. The animals’ and the dwarf’s 
knowledge of existence is not deep enough. Heidegger refers to the animals’ knowing as “their 
knowing is not knowledge.”521 The knowledge about the Eternal Recurrence may not be a 
given, it demands going to the grounds of all things and their backgrounds. Without going to 
the depth of things, what Nietzsche says in On the Genealogy of Morals applies: “being 
knowers who are unknown to ourselves.”522 Lacking deeper knowledge about existence, one 
may not have difficulty with Eternal Recurrence as a given phenomenon. In approaching 
Eternal Recurrence as a given, one remains a spectator. 
The animals’ knowledge of the Eternal Recurrence is from an observer’s viewpoint. 
For Müller-Lauter, the thought of Eternal Recurrence is understood only “superficially 
whenever it takes on the character of a generally valid statement.”523 The thought becomes 
essential and pertinent when viewed not from outside but assimilated. However, the 
affirmation of Eternal Recurrence with the animals and Zarathustra as advocate of the circle is 
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distinct in the consequences of such knowing. Assimilation of the thought of Eternal 
Recurrence assists Zarathustra to understand the meaninglessness of existence if only 
cosmological recurrence is espoused. The consequences of Eternal Recurrence simply 
envisaged as cosmological are thus stated: 
The great loathing for the human being—that is what choked me and had crawled 
into my throat; and what the soothsayer foretold: All is the same, nothing is 
worthwhile, knowing chokes. … 
Eternally it returns, the human being you are so weary of, the small human being 
thus—yawned my mournfulness and dragged its feet and could not go to sleep. … 
—Ah, the human being returns eternally! The small human being returns 
eternally!— 
All-too-small the greatest!—That was my loathing for the human! And eternal 
recurrence even of the smallest! That was my loathing for all existence!524 
This text attempts to show the nihilistic tendencies within the conception of Eternal Recurrence 
from the cosmological aspect. Yet this account is impossible outside of the subjective 
individual appropriation of the thought of Eternal Recurrence. The appropriated knowledge of 
Eternal Recurrence seems to open a Pandora’s box. As Magnus et al hold, “all his knowledge 
and acumen has led Zarathustra to this choking sense of appalling sameness.”525 If Eternal 
Recurrence is maintained on the cosmological scale alone, then human striving is pointless. 
Nietzsche’s concern is how existence can be beaten at its own game. Eternal 
Recurrence at the cosmological level as the animals and dwarf project it, fails the test of tragic 
nature of existence. Maintaining Eternal Recurrence simply at the cosmological level promotes 
resignation to a life where its diminutive characters are still promoted, instead of being 
overcome. If everything turns in a circle, Heidegger, interpreting Nietzsche, argues, then 
“nothing is worth the trouble; so that the result of the teaching is disgust and ultimately 
negation of life.”526 With the Eternal Recurrence as cosmological Zarathustra opines that 
human beings dance over things. Dancing over could imply failure to grasp the existential 
depth of life as a tragedy. As Otto Manthey-Zorn alleges, life for Nietzsche does not merely 
want to preserve itself; rather, life wants to be thoroughly itself as the will to power that is 
constantly striven for through uncovering misinterpretations and misdirection of some powers 
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of life.527 For Nietzsche, misinterpretations and misdirection influence the society and its 
institutions. But even to discover the failure of Eternal Recurrence on the cosmological level, 
the appropriation of the same is inevitable. 
The assimilation of the Eternal Recurrence requires Zarathustra’s wisdom that 
recognizes that “the smallest cleft is the hardest to bridge.”528 Between Eternal Recurrence as 
affirmed by Zarathustra and testified to by the animals lies the need for involvement in 
existence as tragic. That is the knowledge that suffocates. Heidegger observes that such 
knowledge is what “marks the essential and altogether unbridgeable difference between the 
usual kinds of spectation and cognition, on one hand, and proper knowing on the other.”529 In 
Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, the “Moment” is the focal point of striving. 
One final text from part three of Zarathustra is from the “The Seven Seals.” The 
importance of this text is its seeming affinity with the young Nietzsche. About eternity 
Zarathustra says, “Oh how should I not lust after Eternity and after the nuptial ring of all rings 
the ring of recurrence!”530 Then in the 1863 entry on ‘Mein Leben,’ Nietzsche wrote: “As a 
plant I was born close to God’s green acres/cemetery, as a human being in a pastor’s house.” 
And then, it ends with the following words: “And so the human being outgrows everything 
that once surrounded him. He does not need to break the fetters; unexpectedly, when a god 
beckons, they fall away. And where is the ring that ultimately encircles him? Is it the world? 
Is it God?”531 It is not easy to figure out what Nietzsche meant. The attempt to answer 
Nietzsche’s question can be the discourse on the question of the moment. But the fact that 
Nietzsche, as early as 1863, raised a question about recurrence at the anthropological level 
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3.3.4 Eternal Recurrence: in Beyond Good and Evil, 1886 
Beyond Good and Evil’s subtitle, ‘Prelude to a Philosophy of the future,’ bears some 
links with the doctrine of the Eternal Recurrence. In several note entries of Summer-Autumn 
1884 and April-June of 1885 there are various references to Eternal Recurrence.532 In addition, 
in a letter to a friend about Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche notes: “Please read this book 
(even though it says the same things as my Zarathustra−only in a way that is different 
very−different).”533 The work has nine main parts and the reference to the Eternal Recurrence 
is under part three ‘The Religious Nature.’ The aphorism for examination reads: 
Anyone like me, who has tried for a long time and with some enigmatic desire, to 
think pessimism through to its depths and to deliver it from the half-Christian, half-
German narrowness and naiveté with which it has finally presented itself to this 
century, namely in the form of the Schopenhauerian philosophy; anyone who has 
ever really looked with an Asiatic and supra-Asiatic eye into and down at the most 
world-negating of all possible ways of thinking – beyond good and evil, and no 
longer, like Schopenhauer and the Buddha, under the spell and delusion of morality 
–; anyone who has done these things (and perhaps precisely by doing these things) 
will have inadvertently opened his eyes to the inverse ideal: to the ideal of the most 
high-spirited, vital, world-affirming individual, who has learned not just to accept 
and go along with what was and what is, but who wants it again just as it was and 
is through all eternity, insatiably shouting da capo not just to himself but to the 
whole play and performance, and not just to a performance, but rather, 
fundamentally, to the one who needs precisely this performance – and makes it 
necessary: because again and again he needs himself – and makes himself 
necessary. – – What? And that wouldn’t be – circulus vitiosus deus?534 
This is a very dense text and contains the main contours of Beyond Good and Evil. From a 
syntactical perspective the text is a single compound sentence. Kaufmann gives this text among 
others in Beyond Good and Evil as the principal passages for understanding the title of the 
work.535 Laurence Lampert opines that “Given its placement and theme” is one of the most 
important in the book.536 For Heidegger, the fact that the entire passage is constructed as a 
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single sentence, its articulated divisions reflect linguistically the structure of an essential 
thought.537 Beyond its syntax and placement in the book, its relevance must be thematically 
analysed. 
Nietzsche envisages the period after Zarathustra as one of revaluation of previous 
values. The theme of Beyond Good and Evil is envisaged as “in all essentials a critique of 
modernity.”538 The work’s subtitle’s term “prelude” points to the philosophers of the future as 
affirmers of Eternal Recurrence. The philosophy that preludes the future is founded on the 
unintentional. The unintentional implies a philosophy based on actions. In the philosophy that 
privileges action, the dichotomy between the doer and the deed is generally excluded. The 
Eternal Recurrence operates within the unintentional domain that Nietzsche calls extra-moral, 
described in Beyond Good and Evil as “the inverse ideal.”539 It is the inverse to life-negating 
approaches prevalent for Nietzsche in traditional metaphysical approaches. In this regard the 
thought of Eternal Recurrence for Nietzsche entails “the most high-spirited, vital, world-
affirming individual, who has learned not just to accept and go along with what was and what 
is, but who wants it again just as it was and is through all eternity.”540  
However, it should not be construed at all that the experience of the thought of Eternal 
Recurrence is a given. The entry in Beyond Good and Evil on Eternal Recurrence entails a 
two-fold process. The first process is thinking through pessimism to its depths without 
succumbing to any form of resignation. Nietzsche gives two forms of resignation Buddhistic 
and Schopenhauerean which he calls “spell and illusion of morality.”541 The thinking through 
pessimism gives birth to a situation beyond good and evil, which can be rendered as a 
transitional state of becoming. Nietzsche holds by the act of thinking through pessimism, 
which is tragedy, one may affirm life. Now this is problematic. Lampert observes, “Whoever 
pursues the experiences described in the first half of the sentence ‘may perhaps’ undergo the 
experience described in the second.”542 The first part of the sentence is the pessimism towards 
the spell and illusion of morality. And the experiences in the second refer to those accruing 
from the appropriation of the Eternal Recurrence at the individual level.  
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In Schopenhauer as Educator, one characteristic for which Nietzsche calls for 
cultivation is steadfastness.543 The steadfastness demands one to be a helmsman and a 
taskmaster of tragic existence. Manthey-Zorn understands steadfastness in terms of discipline, 
training, and education.544 Hence, Nietzsche’s response to how one can experience the Eternal 
Recurrence is by endeavouring to think pessimism through to the bottom.545 Pessimism 
ordinarily sounds negative but what he means is possibly consistence in the evaluation of one’s 
life. Such pessimism in Schopenhauer as Educator involves self-interrogation: “Do you affirm 
this existence in the depths of your heart? Is it sufficient for you? Would you be its advocate, 
its redeemer? For you have only to pronounce a single heartfelt Yes!—And life, though it faces 
such heavy accusations, shall go free.”546 Then, in On the Genealogy of Morals, in response to 
Zarathustra’s question in “On the Vison and Riddle” posed to the Voyagers (Who is it that 
must yet come some day?), Nietzsche responds, “Antichrist and anti-nihilist, this conqueror of 
God and of nothingness—he must come one day …”547 This is an allusion to the philosophers 
of the future. 
In The Gay Science, Nietzsche is clearer that his brand of pessimism is against a 
“conceptual understanding of existence” and against the desire for preservation.548 Instead, he 
seeks to promote the desire for destruction and becoming as an expression of an overflowing 
energy pregnant with the future. This is Nietzsche’s implication of the ‘Dionysian.’ The 
overflowing energy associated with destruction and change entails the pessimism of the future, 
which he calls Dionysian pessimism. Such pessimism is Nietzsche’s guarantor for experience 
of the thought of Eternal Recurrence.  
In Beyond Good and Evil, the text on Eternal Recurrence ends with a question about a 
god: “And would this not be circulus vitiosus deus?”549 There are several acceptable 
translations: God as a vicious circle; a vicious circle as God; or a vicious circle made god.550 
In Eternal Recurrence, is Nietzsche creating room for the affirmation of life through another 
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God? Nevertheless, even before one attempts to answer this question there must be some 
clarity about the God he seeks to conquer. In the declaration of the death of God, Nietzsche 
claimed, “We have killed him—you and I. All of us are his murderers.”551 Later, perhaps as an 
explanation of the expression, “God is dead,” he notes that “the belief in the Christian God has 
become unbelievable.”552 How did we kill God and how did the belief in the Christian God 
become untenable? The answer to these questions could also explain why God is dead for 
Nietzsche. Heidegger believes that “[t]he God who is viewed in terms of morality, this God 
alone is meant when Nietzsche says, God is dead.”553 This could be consistent with the 
reflections above on pessimism. That over-abstraction seemingly contributed to the 
estrangement of God from concrete human lives. The death of the Christian God apparently 
allows for a different basis for valuing. 
Nietzsche himself in The Gay Science asks, “Must we ourselves not become gods 
simply to appear worthy of it?”554 However, Eternal Recurrence as a selective ethical process 
may not accommodate a thinking towards a single ideal. More pertinently the interpretation of 
the thought of Eternal Recurrence in Beyond Good and Evil entails aspects of individual life. 
Nehamas offers an elaborate commentary on Eternal Recurrence as is projected in Beyond 
Good and Evil: 
The thought is this, Every single aspect of an individual life is equally essential to 
that life being what it is; also, since Nietzsche believes that everything in the world 
consists simply of its interconnections to everything else, every single aspect of the 
world is equally essential to that life being what it is. To want, therefore, even a 
single moment of one’s life to recur is to want the whole world, exactly as it has 
been, to recur again.555 
The experience of the Eternal Recurrence in this case is a demand for accountability in 
everything. For Nietzsche, given the interconnections everything influences positively or 
negatively the development of one’s singular individuality. Nietzsche already in Schopenhauer 
as Educator envisages such a scenario as the prerequisite for social involvement.556 There is a 
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way in which through Eternal Recurrence some human beings can experience the life of the 
gods. Living the single aspects (moments) of the individual’s life could entail such experience.  
The Eternal Recurrence as projected in Beyond Good and Evil is not only 
anthropological, but also ethical and upon it develops the need for Cosmopoeisis. This is 
because Eternal Recurrence in Beyond Good and Evil is the assurance for the need of the 
world-affirming individual. 
From the examinations of the 1881 notes, The Gay Science, texts from Zarathustra and 
the single text from Beyond Good and Good and Evil, the centrality of the Eternal Recurrence 
in Nietzsche’s corpus is undoubtable. In some of the above texts Nietzsche acknowledges its 
cosmological validity. However, it is also very clear that he is more interested in its individual 
appropriation as an existential ethical demand. In the ending of Beyond Good and Evil 
Nietzsche talks of not getting “tired of ‘perfecting’ ourselves in our virtue.”557 For Nietzsche, 
“[a] virtue has to be our invention, our most personal defence and necessity: in any other sense 
it is merely a danger. What does not condition our life harms it.”558 This particularly applies 
to the doctrine of the Eternal Recurrence. If it is left simply on the cosmological level without 
striving for its appropriation, one may not escape the question of meaninglessness of life. The 
onus now is to seek Nietzsche’s interpretation of Eternal Recurrence as a selective ethical 
project and its impact on the project of individual autopoiesis and cosmopoiesis. The Eternal 
Recurrence is meant to be a ‘great cultivating idea’ and in that case it must first be appropriated 
in the individual and then eventually influence a new humanity. 
3.4 The Eternal Recurrence: The Formula of Affirmation 
The emphasis will be on ascertaining the extra-moral life of the type Übermensch and 
its role, if any, in individual autopoiesis.559 Nietzsche scholars who interpret Eternal 
Recurrence as an existential selective imperative are also in favour of its practical ethical 
implications. When the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence is understood as a practical attraction 
to the form of life of the type Übermensch, it becomes pertinent to the project of producing 
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and sustaining singular individuality. I start by analysing the conditions surrounding 
Nietzsche’s own conception of the doctrine and, thereafter, flesh out the envisaged 
consequences regarding the type Übermensch as the affirmer of the Eternal Recurrence. 
In Ecce Homo, Nietzsche associates the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence with the 
affirmation of transience and destruction. He remarks, “[T]he decisive feature of any 
Dionysian philosophy, saying ‘yes’ to opposition and war, becoming, with a radical rejection 
of even the concept of ‘being’—in this I must in any event acknowledge ideas that are more 
closely related to mine than any that have hitherto been thought.”560 The overriding realm of 
the doctrine from Nietzsche’s wording is the ontology of becoming, which is Dionysian in 
scope.561 Nietzsche further notes, “We have uncovered a manifold one-after-another where the 
naïve man and inquirer of older cultures saw only two separate things. ‘Cause’ and ‘effect’ is 
what one says; but we have merely perfected the image of becoming without reaching beyond 
the image or behind it.”562 As a continuum, becoming is what characterizes reality. Becoming 
rules out any doer behind the doing since what is basic in becoming is simply the activity.563 
It is in this Heraclitean view of actuality as becoming that the rejection of being must be 
understood in the above text. 
Hence, germane to the interpretation of the doctrine of the Eternal Recurrence is 
Nietzsche’s insistence on becoming. Nietzsche talks of Eternal Recurrence and infinitely 
repeated circulation of all things.564 Though Nietzsche recognizes the fact of Eternal 
Recurrence as it was first envisaged in Greek thought, he also demands the overcoming of the 
Greeks.565 Nietzsche’s concern is with the effect of the human conception of Eternal 
Recurrence on practical human life. This means it is about the quality of life. The expert stance 
is that Nietzsche is more concerned with ewigen Wiederkunft and not the infinite.566 Eternity 
is closely related to the quality of time as indeterminable, while the infinite is more of a 
mathematical notion and thus a quantitative aspect of things. Infinite is a spatial term, not 
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temporal per se. Nietzsche is touched more by the indeterminateness of time, and how it affects 
practical living. If one stresses the infinite, the like-hood is the interpretation of Eternal 
Recurrence in terms of time as cyclical. The demand to overcome the Greeks is partly about 
overcoming the cyclical conception of time. 
In Ecce Homo again, on Thus Spoke Zarathustra, the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence is 
given primacy of place as the “highest attainable formula of affirmation—belongs to the 
August of 1881.”567 The prerequisite disposition he claims for this thought is the “art of 
listening.” In a letter to Peter Gast of August 14, 1881 Nietzsche recounts his existential 
nuances attributed to Eternal Recurrence as follows: 
Thoughts have loomed upon my horizon the like of which I have not known 
before—I shall not divulge anything about them, but shall remain imperturbably 
calm. … Ah, my friend, sometimes I have a feeling that I am leading a most 
dangerous life, for I belong to the kind of machine that can fly to pieces. The 
intensity of my feelings makes me shudder and laugh—once or twice already I have 
been unable to leave my room for the absurd reason that my eyes were inflamed—
by what? On each occasion I had wept too much on my wanderings the day before—
and not sentimental tears by any means, but tears of joy and exaltation.568 
Though, Nietzsche does not immediately divulge the nature of the thought, it is apparent that 
the thought had affected him. It is fitting to concentrate on the preconditions under which the 
thought ‘came to’ Nietzsche through what he calls the “art of listening.” 
The “art of listening” is a mark of Nietzsche’s philological training. Nietzsche 
generally understood philology as the art of correct reading. Nietzsche recommends slow 
reading, not only of the texts, but more importantly of life. In Philology not all interpretations 
carry the same weight. For Nietzsche, there are two types of philologists: 
You must forgive an old philologist like me who cannot help maliciously putting 
his finger on bad tricks of interpretation: but this ‘conformity of nature to law,’ 
which you physicists are so proud of, just as if—exists only because of your 
interpretation and bad ‘philology.’ It is not a matter of fact, not a ‘text,’ but instead 
only a naive humanitarian correction and a distortion of meaning. …569 
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This is the case of bad philology where conceptual schemes are imposed on reality.570 As such 
bad philology yields wrong interpretations. For Eric Blondel, the falsifying interpretation is an 
equivalent to an absolute lack of intellectual honesty.571 Such an interpretation is against the 
very art of philology, since it falsifies. The alternative to the falsifying interpretation is 
described by Nietzsche as follows: 
This sort of interpreter would show the unequivocal and unconditional nature of all 
‘will to power’ so vividly and graphically that almost every word, and even the 
word ‘tyranny,’ would ultimately seem useless or like weakening and mollifying 
metaphors—and too humanizing. Yet this interpreter might nevertheless end up 
claiming the same thing about this world as you, namely that it follows a ‘necessary’ 
and ‘calculable’ course, although not because laws are dominant in it, but rather 
because laws are totally absent, and every power draws its final consequences at 
every moment.572 
For Nietzsche, this second engagement with the ‘text’ of nature seeks to decipher facts without 
falsifying them. This engagement lets reality express itself as the will to power, which is the 
highest possible affirmation of reality. In this regard, the “art of listening” entails letting life 
as will to power express itself. This entails encountering life on its own terms as tragic. 
The thought of Eternal Recurrence “comes” in the sense that existence in its own 
innermost terms as tragic is manifested in Nietzsche’s own life. Based on good philology, it is 
plausible to claim that the appropriate condition for singular individuality is the interpretation 
of life as will to power. The thought of Eternal Recurrence is meant to lead to such an 
interpretation of life, with solitude as its prerequisite. 
Solitude and hearing are at the heart of encountering existence as will to power. In 
Schopenhauer as Educator, solitude is presented as the gift that humankind accords to the one 
who is in the process of encountering the core of his being through singular individuality. 
Solitude though it entails vulnerability, is for Nietzsche the favourite and supreme condition 
for maximizing one’s critical powers. Solitude is about the contemplation of life and not its 
renunciation. Denial of life for Nietzsche “has nothing in common with the solitude of the vita 
contemplativa of the thinker” that chooses life in its entirety.573 The practical life that does not 
ensue from solitude leads to renunciation that ultimately is never enhanced since it lacks the 
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source. Through solitude, one isolates oneself from the common opinion to encounter and 
bring to the surface one’s own deepest instinctive wisdom.574 It is notable that it is in the 
loneliest and in the most terrifying moments that the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence is 
painstakingly brought to the fore in The Gay Science and Zarathustra respectively. 
The Eternal Recurrence as the formula of affirmation enables one, through the type 
Übermensch, to have a glimpse into the heart of existence as will to power. The possible 
conditions for the reception of the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence are now established.575 In 
the art of listening, the starting point is what there is: ontology. In listening one recognizes this 
ontology that disrupts all projects of identification or conceptual schemes. The credibility of 
Eternal Recurrence, owing to the conditions in which it came to Nietzsche, is grounded in the 
attitude(s) that it elicits in those who may be possessed by this thought. 
One of the compelling consequences of good philology is giving voice to that ontology 
that comes with its differences without falsification. In Deleuzian thought, one of the tasks 
proper to philosophy is to speak of what there is, and this involves voicing differences.576 The 
work of voicing and promoting differences seems to be inherent in the type Übermensch. 
Nietzsche refers to the Eternal Recurrence either as a formula or a doctrine. This could be a 
pointer to its interpretation. Generally, a doctrine articulates an insight whose value to the 
future of one’s conduct of life depends on the ability to bring certain aspects of life into 
manageable focus.577 This means that part of the response to the doctrine is the need for 
espousing some constraints at the individual level. Ultimately, this is the life of the type 
Übermensch, to affirm and create possibilities for differences as the ground for enhancing 
singular individuality. How the Eternal Recurrence performs such a heuristic role is through a 
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3.4.1 Eternal Recurrence: Orientation on Time and the Will 
The rationale of this section is premised on the understanding that the life of the type 
Übermensch affirms the doctrine of the Eternal Recurrence. As it is shown in the 1881 notes 
and reaffirmed in Zarathustra, the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence is more than normative. As 
a heuristic formula, anyone affected by Eternal Recurrence develops some practical imperative 
commensurate to his existential level. I will show the impact of Eternal Recurrence on human 
attitudes about time and the implications on the will. The underlying claim is that thinking 
differently can lead to acting differently. 
The doctrine of Eternal Recurrence given in Zarathustra provides the main themes for 
understanding the life of the type Übermensch in the extra-moral sense. Experimentalism is 
the broader context of the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence. A life of experimentation is 
provisional, and with it, one must learn how to value this world, and its transience.578 It is 
difficult for any human being to affirm transience through and through. Hence, only the type 
Übermensch, as the mark of the ontology of becoming, can suitably account for Eternal 
Recurrence as the formula of affirmation. Nietzsche believes that in appropriating the Eternal 
Recurrence the human individual can live the life of the Übermensch. 
The parameter of embodying the life of the Übermensch is manifested in the 
conversation between Zarathustra and the dwarf.579 Zarathustra justifies his strength thus: “But 
I am the stronger of us two—you do not know my abysmal thought! That—you could not 
bear!”580 In Chapter Two, the abyss is identified with the will to power as the heart of existence. 
However, it is one thing to know about the essential constitution of reality as becoming, but 
completely another to bear it. It is the capacity to affirm the transience of reality that ultimately 
makes the difference in shaping the direction of life. The dwarf, the lame, and the laming 
represent the worldviews that generally valorise disinterested valuation. “Disinterested” here 
refers to the unconditional or impersonal approaches to valuation. It is the opposite of 
perspectival or conditional approaches. The Eternal Recurrence among other themes entails 
the type of temporality that Nietzsche valorises. 
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a. Nietzsche on temporality 
Two things work against Nietzsche’s unintentional morality of the type Übermensch: 
conception of time and the morality of pity. The thought about time influences the moral 
orientation of one’s life. Thought is here understood in Heideggerian terms as “the most 
intrinsic of inner forces.”581 In this section I engage with Zarathustra’s passage on the 
“Moment” as an attitude towards temporality and its effects on singular individuality. It is 
instructive from the Zarathustra text that, only after overcoming the weight of the dwarf, that 
both reach a gateway of the moment which foreshadows the totality of becoming. It is at the 
gateway that Zarathustra and the dwarf have a discourse on the nature of time. 
In the discourse, Zarathustra describes the composition of the gateway. One 
characteristic about the two paths is that they blatantly offend each other, and their only 
meeting point is at the gateway of the moment. Hence, the past and the future, though 
contradictory in nature, can be collapsed into one another. Time meets up with itself in the 
present moment as its inner condition. Richardson believes that in Zarathustra, Nietzsche is 
continuing on the trajectory of perspectivism, whereby temporality is understood as an inbuilt 
viewpoint of the drives.582 Zarathustra expounds on temporal perspectivity in the question he 
poses to the dwarf: “But whoever were to walk one of them further—and ever further and ever 
on: do you believe, dwarf, that these paths contradict each other eternally?”583 This is a 
hypothetical question that Zarathustra thought could be answered based on the explanation of 
the present moment as encompassing the inner determinations of all moments. As some 
scholars have suggested, the dwarf’s answer, though judged as untenable by Zarathustra, 
represents the temporal structure that seems to govern the two on the way to the gateway, and 
regulates all living things. The prevailing temporal structure till the gateway of the moment is 
Time as cyclic or linear. 
The linear or cyclical notion of time is what the dwarf knows. Hence its answer: All 
that is straight lies and all truth is crooked, time itself is a circle. In this response one can 
discern the Greek notion of cosmic time as cyclical. The dwarf on his part valorises time as 
cyclic. However, Zarathustra chastises the dwarf on the grounds of the lazy answer. The 
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dwarf’s reply is consistent with its condition: “on a rock and not on the path, it is not walking.” 
Thus, from the disinterested position, time as cyclic is possible. For Burnham and 
Jesinghausen, from the disinterested position, only abstract descriptions of nature and their 
usage as laws are available.584 This is the case of bad philology seen earlier. The inadequacy 
of the dwarf’s view warrants Zarathustra’s admonition: “Do not make it too easy on yourself!” 
The cyclic view of time, which is basically from the cosmological standpoint, interprets human 
life as repetition and there is no possibility of creation of values.585 The anti-cyclic stance of 
Zarathustra is not only evident in this passage but is expressed in “The Convalescent,” when 
Zarathustra’s animals preach Eternal Recurrence to him as the eternal roll of the wheel.586 
Zarathustra terms their observation foolish on the grounds that they are describing what they 
never experienced; instead, they were merely observers. 
Fundamentally, the cosmological conception of time falls short of healing the 
unhealthy obsession with the past prevalent in traditional morality, as it propagates the 
disinterested birds-eye-view of reality. In Eternal Recurrence, it must be clearly understood 
that Nietzsche is attempting to evolve a human relationship with time which is neither circular 
nor linear.587 The case in point favouring such an assertion is his critique of Socrates’ dying 
wish and the need to overcome the Greeks. 
Socrates’s dying wish: “Crito, we owe a cock to Asclepius; make this offering to him 
and do not forget.’”588 It was a practice among the Greeks that a cock be sacrificed to Asclepius 
by those who were sick in his temples in hope of a cure. On this incident, Nietzsche alleges 
that “Socrates suffered life! And then he still revenged himself—with this veiled, gruesome, 
pious, and blasphemous saying. Did Socrates need such revenge? Did his overrich virtue lack 
an ounce of magnanimity?—Alas, my friends, we must overcome even the Greeks!”589 
Nietzsche’s interpretation is that even for Socrates, life was a disease, to which he longed for 
a cure: death. Nietzsche demands a need to conquer the Greek notion of life as suffering which 
is evident in the Silenus’s oracle. For Nietzsche, the notion of time that one cherishes is 
pertinent to such redemption. 
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The summary of the argument on temporality and the will could be captured in the 
words of Wittgenstein: “The sickness of a time is cured by an alteration in the mode of life of 
human beings, and it was possible for the sickness of philosophical problems to get cured only 
through a changed mode of thought and of life, not through a medicine invented by an 
individual.”590 In investigating the extra-moral life of the type Übermensch, the notion of time 
endorsed determines such mode of life. Hence, a new way of thinking and living is regarded 
as the general orientation of Thus Spoke Zarathustra.591 The project of Zarathustra is more 
broadly understood as being about a whole new way of thinking or imagining, that Nietzsche 
believes is necessary for the needed re-orientation of human life in relation to time. 
The notion of time that Zarathustra seems to privilege is the perspectival one described 
by the notion of the “Moment.” From the gateway “Moment” a long eternal lane runs 
backward, and behind us lies eternity. This implies that Zarathustra experiences the whole of 
time from the standpoint of the “Moment.” In this lies Nietzsche’s difficulty: how does 
Zarathustra possibly describe what he himself is implicated in? In privileging the present 
moment and experiencing it as such, Zarathustra experiences that present moment as “this 
moment.”” Zarathustra’s main insight about this “Moment” lies in the two rhetorical questions: 
“And are not all things firmly knotted together in such a way that this moment draws after it 
all things to come? Therefore—itself as well?”592 The likely way to understand this moment 
must be in terms of eternity. In “At Mid-day,” Zarathustra asks: “What happened to me: 
hearken! Did time just fly away? Am I not falling? Did I not fall—hearken! Into the well of 
eternity? … What? Did the world not just become perfect? Round and ripe?”593 In this solitude, 
some sort of innocence comes to Zarathustra. Time seems to be liberated through the insight 
into the innocence of the “Moment.” For Rosen, “the immersion in the flow of time from 
moment to moment” could be the only experience of eternity that is accessible to humanity.594 
This position mirrors Aurelius’s observation of the moment.595 The implication is that eternity, 
 
590 Ludwing Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Foundation of Mathematics, trans, G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, 1978), 132. 
591 Adrian Del Caro and Robert Pippin, “Introduction” Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Cambridge edition, X. 
592 Z, III (On the Vision and Riddle 2). 
593 Z, IV (At Midday). 
594 Rosen, The Mask of Enlightenment, 225. On how time is liberated refer to Keith Ansell-Pearson’s “The 
Eternal Recurrence of the Overhuman: The Weightiest knowledge and the Abyss of Light” in Journal of 
Nietzsche Studies, Issue, 30 Autumn 2005. 
595 Refer to the Eternal Recurrence and the Stoics above. 
 
  153 
 
as the liberation from the affliction of time, is made possible through the espousing of the 
present moment. 
In Nietzsche, time may not be presented as a disinterested reality; instead, it is a form 
of perspective. Zarathustra, during the midday sleep described above is affected by time from 
within; he is inhabiting time and describes it from within.596 For Peter Berkowitz, a perspective 
must be understood as the condition of all life, but from a particular vantage point.597 The 
present moment must be thought as that singular moment only through eternity. The moment 
is pure becoming, and as such requires some justification. In eternity, we find the justification 
for the differentiation that is experienced at the level of singular individuality. It is eternity that 
justifies the manifold individual perspectival time. 
The life of the type Übermensch can be described as eternal. Eternity does not become, 
has no past or future, it simply is. And when something is eternal, it is with one always. In the 
words of Strong, the eternal does not stretch out into infinity, given that it is eternally 
present.598 The perspectival time is inbuilt into the type Übermensch and its forms through its 
fundamental drive, the will to power. Nietzsche through Zarathustra teaches the doctrine of the 
Eternal Recurrence as the way the Übermensch wills, whereby the fear of becoming has been 
overcome, and thus wills eternal return. 
The affirmation of Eternal Recurrence depends on the disposition of the affirmer. The 
type Übermensch’s condition of the will to power allows it to will eternity. Eternity is 
understood in Boethius’s terms as: the whole, simultaneous and perfect possession of limitless 
life.599 Eternity so conceived is partially independent of time, since it is the limitless fullness 
of life. However, in its fullness, eternity in Nietzsche’s conception contains the present 
moments. Nevertheless, the singular individual’s experience of eternity cannot be simpliciter. 
It is eternity in a derived sense, since singular individual’s sense of eternity is from the flow 
of time as countless moments of the life that will be drawn into eternity.600 But it can be argued 
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that, a distinction about eternity for the type Übermensch and the singular individual, is 
unjustified, given that the type Übermensch and singular individual validate each other. 
The validation process is consistent with the perspectival notion of time. The cyclic or 
even linear views on time cannot originate values for the singular individuals because they 
lack the inner determinations, lack involvement of the person from within. This is the problem 
with the dwarf: the cyclic and linear views tend to foster disinterestedness. By contrast, the 
perspectival notion of time is consistent with the psychological constitution of the type 
Übermensch and its ensuing forms as the will to power.  
Therefore, Eternal Recurrence as the type Übermensch’s way of being-in-time, 
demands willing the way of the Übermensch. Such a view seems to be the import of the 
presentation of the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence in The Gay Science and the transformative 
aspects of the doctrine in the last part of Zarathustra. In willing the Eternal Recurrence, the 
standpoint may not be on the truth-value of the doctrine but its practical-transformative 
implications. Given that the phenomenon of time cannot be escaped, though problematic, the 
perspectival notion of time could be an appropriate manner of being-in-time without time 
necessarily leading to anguish. There is need to see how perspectival time, through the type 
Übermensch as the affirmer of the Eternal Recurrence, is the healthiest way of willing minus 
resentment. 
b. Nietzsche on Perspectival willing 
The thrust of Eternal Recurrence is incomplete without the act of the will. In 
Zarathustra, the young shepherd must decide to bite the head of the snake, as the highest form 
of affirmation of life. As a formula of affirmation, the ultimate testing ground for it is in the 
act of willing. This section is grounded in the belief that for Nietzsche the doctrine of Eternal 
Recurrence is meant to have practical implications. To demonstrate the practicality of the 
doctrine of the Eternal Recurrence, the act of the will is paramount. Firstly, I describe how the 
Eternal Recurrence elucidates the temporality of the type Übermensch; secondly, the practical 
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1) Eternal Recurrence and transformation 
Transformation of hitherto human reality is at the core of Nietzsche’s project. In The 
Gay Science, Nietzsche poses: “When will we complete our de-deification of nature? When 
may we begin to naturalize humanity in terms of a pure, newly discovered, newly redeemed 
nature?”601 In German ‘to naturalize’ is Vernatürlichen, which could imply ‘to change man’ 
in relation to the elemental or native constitution. By the fact that Nietzsche places it in 
question form as: ‘when will we complete… ‘or’ when may we begin…’ is possibly an 
indication that it ought to be conceived as a task. From the Zarathustra’s young shepherd’s 
encounter with the snake, the experience of the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence is made 
manifest.602 The Eternal Recurrence entails the role of transfiguring the human into the life of 
the Übermensch.  
The Eternal Recurrence could be the panacea to the questions: how can your life, the 
individual life, receive the highest value, the deepest significance? How can it be least 
squandered? The transfiguration must be experienced as a terrifying process. The life of the 
type Übermensch is bred through the horrific process of the Eternal Recurrence described by 
the experience of the young shepherd and Zarathustra himself.603 The entire description of the 
young shepherd writhing in pain and seemingly distorted face possibly justifies the 
hypothetical effects of Eternal Recurrence. For Nietzsche had written earlier: “If this thought 
gained possession of you, it would change you as you are or perhaps crush you.”604 The snake 
in the throat represents the thought about life. Hence, Eternal Recurrence is plausibly seen by 
Magnus as an existential imperative meant for transforming human living.605 The existential 
transformation of human living must be centred around the singular individual for it to be 
transformative indeed. For the thought not to destroy its guest, it must be overcome by an act 
of will where personal involvement is paramount.  
Zarathustra tries in vain to free the young shepherd from the snake. Instead, the 
shepherd is transformed by his own act of biting the serpent.606 But there is some persuasion 
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on the young shepherd to bite the snake’s head off. But who persuades the young man’s will 
to engage in that act? There seems to be some unknown voice crying out of Zarathustra: “Then 
it cried out of me: ‘Bite down! Bite down! Bite off the head! Bite down!’ – Thus it cried out 
of me [...].”607 The immediate response is that Zarathustra persuades the young shepherd to 
bite the head off the snake himself.  
However, on a closer scrutiny, Zarathustra is merely the instrument of the main 
provocateur, the type Übermensch. It seems to be the voice of the Übermensch through 
Zarathustra that cajoles the young shepherd to appropriate Eternal Recurrence and transfigures 
him as he is.608 In this case, the role of the Übermensch through the Eternal Recurrence is a 
directing one. The Übermensch rules by persuading and through the Eternal Recurrence, it 
generates and shapes the actions/wills to be better able to will return.609 In this ruling role, the 
extreme relevance of the type Übermensch as the best type, and as the enabler of individual 
autopoiesis is manifest.  
The young shepherd is transfigured from life of the last human, which is defined by 
hatred and pity and to the life of the type Übermensch. The life of the type Übermensch is 
described as: “No longer shepherd, no longer human − one transformed, illumined, who 
laughed! Never yet on earth had a human being laughed as he laughed!”610 The shepherd is 
transformed by his own act of the will through the persuasion of the type Übermensch. As an 
act of the will, freedom for Zarathustra must be conceived as the kind that transforms from 
‘thou shalt’ to ‘I will.’ This freedom arrives in the three metamorphoses of the spirit at the 
beginning of Zarathustra’s speeches. In this act of the will, the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence 
is expressed not as a theory of the cosmos. Instead as Strong observes, it is the state of being 
of an individual.611 As such its willing is conditioned by the stance it takes towards time. The 
impotence towards the past ought to be tested out on Nietzsche’s act of willing as the practical 
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2) Eternal Recurrence: the act of the will 
For Nietzsche, time interpreted only within the cyclic and linear dimensions pose 
irresolvable problem for the will. This is because one cannot will backwards. Such torment of 
time is evident in Nietzsche’s thought of Eternal Recurrence as is given in The Gay Science.612 
The hypothetical scenario is meant to provoke and necessitate some constraints on the 
individual where the emphasis is: Do you desire this once more and innumerable times more? 
Would you lie upon your actions as the greatest weight? From the standard interpretation, the 
focus is on the individual as a creative interpreter of his ongoing experience.613 The burden of 
such life is on the actions of the will.  
For Nietzsche, the comedy of existence is properly encountered in the present moment. 
Hence, the demon talks of the very moment that returns. The demon insists on “your loneliest 
loneliness” and “even this moment.”614 As such, the demon does not envisage the existence of 
any absolute or universal time that can be discerned independent of and outside the 
recurrences. Perspectival time is built into the will of the type Übermensch and its 
differentiated forms. The singular individual in living perspectival time becomes the opening 
through which time is secreted. In this regard, it is the will that encounters the enigma of time. 
The will that ensues from the perspectival notion of time is the one that can take Eternal 
Recurrence as the tremendous moment. Such a will according Keith, experiences the Eternal 
Recurrence as that which comes in a manner that is innocent and wanton, which is the 
singularity of time that always comes as the same.615 Elaborate illustration of this possibility 
is explained in the doctrine of redemption as one of the characteristics of the transfigurations 
made possible by the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence.  
Nietzsche finds most unbearable dealing with the now and the past upon earth. Hence 
the need for liberation envisaged as: Redeeming “that which has passed away to re-create all 
‘It was’ into a ‘Thus I willed it!’”616 For Nietzsche, this is liberation. The will is meant to be 
that liberator and joy-bringer but is generally imprisoned by the inability to will backward. The 
problem with the linear conception of time is the unidirectional nature of time where there is 
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beginning and end. The linear model of time may not involve the constitutive elements of the 
human being, the drives which are directly linked to the will. The challenge with the linear 
model of time is the inability to operate within the auspices of overcoming, which is will to 
power as life. Nietzsche’s emphasis is for one to make himself in accordance with what he is, 
will to power.617 In recognition of will to power ipso facto, the perspectival approaches come 
into play where in the case of Eternal Recurrence the primacy of the present moment is 
acknowledged.  
It is in the affirmation of the present moment as the pivot of the activity of the will that 
the past can be affirmed possibly without revenge. The situation prior to the transformation of 
the Eternal Recurrence on the part of the will is one of gnashing the teeth described as follows: 
‘It was’: thus is called the will’s gnashing of teeth and loneliest misery. Impotent 
against that which has been – it is an angry spectator of everything past. The will 
cannot will backward; that it cannot break time and time’s greed – that is the will’s 
loneliest misery. Willing liberates; what does willing plan in order to rid itself of its 
misery and mock its dungeon? […] That time does not run backward, that is its 
wrath.618 
This is the situation that the perspectival notion of time is meant to cure through the doctrine 
of Eternal Recurrence. The solution though painful, is by going through the gateway of the 
‘Moment’ whereby the will is capable of willing life as will to power. The moment of being 
transformed by the thought of Eternal Recurrence leads to freedom as a selective act which in 
the words of P. A. Bolaños entails “willing, affirming, accepting, desiring, embracing and 
creating.”619 These elements are summed up by Nietzsche as acts of the will. Hence, in the act 
of willing the individual embarks on form-giving expressed in singularity. The selection entails 
the mode of life, not merely parts of that life as the singular practical relevance of the doctrine 
of Eternal Recurrence.  
Nietzsche’s musings about the will leads him to pose: “And who has taught it 
reconciliation with time, and something higher than any reconciliation? […] Who has yet 
taught it to will backwards and want back as well?”620 The experience of the moment of 
eternity, frees the will from the affliction of pastness and time reconstitutes itself in terms of 
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desire of will.621 The will’s desire is simply life, and thus in the transfiguration, the young 
shepherd attains the life of the Übermensch, which is proper freedom.  
For Nietzsche, freedom must be consistent with human fundamental drives. 
Nietzsche’s general orientation to any form of human ethical living must be consistent with 
the regime of the drives. Thus, Reginster observes that the good life according to Nietzsche: 
“[I]s acceptable only if the achievement of what it represents as the good life does not require 
human beings either to deny or fundamentally alter their generic natural constitution (for 
example, to suppress their basic natural needs or desires) or to deny, or withdraw from, this 
‘natural’ world.”622 It is an ethical conception because it is not a demand from without, but 
strictly from within the human being and the underlying material conditions. Thus, freedom 
must be in accord with the will as the expression of the drives. Freedom for Nietzsche is 
described as the capacity to evaluate on one’s own account.623 Evaluating on one’s own 
account is the expression of the strength and the will to self-determination. In this regard, for 
Nietzsche, freedom demands that one is the source of one’s own values. The meaning of 
freedom for Nietzsche in relation to laughter as a life of the type Übermensch warrants some 
consideration. 
3) Freedom and laughter 
Zarathustra describes the transformed life of the Übermensch in terms of a non-human 
laughter. But this laughter comes after its opposite, a cry from the tragic scene. There are 
numerous accounts of laughter in Nietzsche’s corpus. In The Gay Science, he remarks:  
To laugh at oneself as one would have to laugh in order to laugh out of the whole 
truth −to do that even the best so far lacked sufficient sense for the truth, and the 
most gifted had too little genius for that. Even laughter may yet have a future.624  
The general theme of the aphorism is on existence. Next, in Zarathustra, laughter is proposed 
as a bulwark against the spirit of heaviness since: “Not with wrath but with laughter does one 
kill. Come let us kill the spirit of Heaviness!”625 In Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche counsels: 
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“perhaps it’s that, when nothing else from today has a future, our laughter is the one thing that 
does!”626 Nietzsche ranks himself among the philosophers who value laughter and attributes it 
to the type Übermensch and the gods: 
I would go so far as to allow myself a rank order of philosophers based on the rank 
of their laughter – right up to those who are capable of golden laughter. And given 
that even gods philosophize (a conclusion I have been drawn to many times –), I do 
not doubt that they know a new and super-human way of laughing – at the expense 
of everything serious! Gods like to make fun of things: it seems as if they cannot 
stop laughing, even during holy rites.627 
For Nietzsche, laughter is an instrument for gauging one’s perspective on existence. He 
elevates laughter to the level of one’s conception of truth, as 
perspectival/conditional/interested as opposed to disinterested/unconditional projections of the 
same. Laughter must be thus linked to the singular individual’s response to the enigma of 
existence.  
Laughter is related to what Nietzsche calls ‘the whole truth.’ For Nietzsche, truth is 
always an existential matter in the finite world of becoming.628 Existence must be understood 
in its fullness as both tragic and comic. In laughter existence is experienced as both tragic and 
comic. From the realm of becoming, existence is encountered as something dark, fearsome 
and difficult. However, such a tragic experience of life alone yields responses that demand 
seriousness towards life. The serious responses include most of the disinterested norms 
external to the individual’s existential condition.  
For instance, the dwarf’s understanding of time as cyclic and linear is drawn mostly 
from the disinterested approaches to life. The dwarf is thus appropriately associated with the 
spirit of heaviness, which is marked by inelasticity and rigidity.629 But, Nietzsche is also aware 
of the need for the comedy of existence to be made conscious. The tragic existence requires a 
positive response which may not be properly served through the disinterested views on life. 
The joyous vocal discharge that erupts is meant to disable the seriousness from the tragic. 
Hence, laughter is the most positive form of tragic affirmation, an affirmative appropriation of 
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the negative limits of being.630 In this regard, laughter encompasses both the tragic and comic 
dispositions of existence.  
Zarathustra’s non-human laughter gives birth to unstilled yearning. Such laughter is 
correlated to the type Übermensch. It is in the type Übermensch, as ‘the sense of the earth’ that 
the project of singular individuality encounters the tragic pathos and the comic laughter in its 
primal existential bivalence. The type Übermensch, through the tragic pathos and comic 
laughter, according to Nietzsche, depicts an affirmative negation which avoids both a 
pessimistic denial of life and an optimistic fantasy that negative limits can be overcome or 
resolved in some way.631 Nietzsche’s emphasis on comic laughter as a positive response to the 
tragic is not utopic. Instead, it is a response that does not overcome or cancel the tragic 
negativity, but ever remains a work in progress. This is the description of singular individuality 
as a task, expressed as a thirst, and a yearning that will never be stilled. This means that the 
ability to laugh is about overcoming the spirit of gravity which is associated with the fixated 
and the unconditional view of life.  
Laughter is about one’s appropriation of existence at the depth of one’s experience. 
Such laughter must be associated with freedom, along with the willingness to sacrifice 
formality and surrender to structures, which is the hallmark of the becomingness of reality. 
Therefore, laughter is not simply the characteristic of the transfigured man as Strong claims.632 
Rather, laughter is also espoused by those who strive to live the life of the Übermensch, like 
the singular individuals. The espousing of laughter by those in the process of transformation 
is evidenced in the spirit of Zarathustra’s laughing lion.633The lion and its laughter stand for 
the striving that is never stilled.  
In this regard, singular individuality entails the act of the will where the individual 
power is not willed or conditioned from without.634 The act of the will that yields singular 
individuality must involve a continual activity of self-gathering and self-appropriation 
technically described as self-overcoming. For Nietzsche, the journey to human freedom which 
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is the process of singular individuality is undertaken within the domains of the Eternal 
Recurrence governed by unintentionality. 
3.5 The Ethical stance of the Type Übermensch: Extra-Moral Life 
In this section, the argument is that the type Übermensch ought to be recognized as the 
condition of all life from the vantage point of existence governed by unintentionality. 
Nietzsche partially describes what the life of the type entails as: “The complete 
unaccountability of man for his actions and his nature is the bitterest draught the man of 
knowledge has to swallow if he has been accustomed to seeing in accountability and duty the 
patent of humanity.”635 In such a condition, there are no evaluations since one may no longer 
praise, no longer censure, given that it is absurd to praise nature and necessity. Such is the life 
of the type Übermensch. The life of the type Übermensch is beyond good and evil since it 
espouses existence in its unintentionality. The type Übermensch is the symbol for the 
transcendence of good and evil.636 Elaboration on the life of the Übermensch from the extra-
moral sense in some detail is the focus now and how such life puts the Übermensch at the 
centre of individual autopoiesis. 
The ethical stance about the type Übermensch must be demonstrated by appealing to 
the ‘Moment,’ brought about by the Eternal Recurrence. In Beyond Good and Evil, the Eternal 
Recurrence is only affirmed by the type that espouses the will to power simpliciter.637 The 
figure which is introduced here as “[a]nyone like me,” if interpreted from what follows as 
someone who is above tragedy, then it can be credibly opined that it is about the type 
Übermensch.  
Such a figure as Nietzsche describes wants life as tragic, again just as it was and is 
through all eternity. In other words, it affirms life without succumbing to any delusionary 
morality. It is only the type Übermensch as will to power which can pursue life into its abysmal 
state, and yet not succumb to lures of intentional morality. The perspective required goes 
beyond the Western and even the Eastern perspectives on life.638 In this regard, Lampert notes: 
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“The eye confined neither to European nor to Asiatic perspectives is ultimately the eye of 
Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, who transcended the moral view of being and time introduced by the 
historic Asiatic, Zarathustra.”639The privileged seeing for Zarathustra is the perspectival one, 
which is founded on the nature of life as the will to power. Thinking pessimism through its 
depth is only undertaken from the standpoint of beyond good and evil, as an extra-moral stance.  
The extra-moral position towards the world is expressed as the insatiable shouting “da 
capo not just to himself but to the whole play and performance, and not just to a performance, 
but rather, fundamentally, to the one who needs precisely this performance – and makes it 
necessary: because again and again he needs himself – and makes himself necessary.”640 The 
life of the type Übermensch does not deny the reality of the world, which is becoming/chaos, 
instead it affirms it. As Berkowitz alleges, the type Übermensch’s yearning is to affirm the 
world exactly as it is without reference to good and bad.641 In its affirmation of the world as it 
is, the type Übermensch necessarily validates itself. The type Übermensch’s fundamental will 
is prone to necessitating singular individuals. 
The fundamental nature of the will lies in its efficacy. According to Klossowski, 
efficacy, rather than merging with the processes it analyses, it externalizes them by producing 
a sphere outside itself for the verification of its own reason and guaranty.642 Such is the case 
with the Ubermensch in its fundamental drive of will to power. Klossowski further observes 
that the thought of Eternal Recurrence brings about as of necessity the successive realization 
of all possible identities.643 The import of Klossowski’s observation is that once the doctrine 
of the Eternal Recurrence is appropriated, susceptibility to becoming is inevitable. The pointer 
to becoming is the insatiable shout of Da Capo about the play of life.644 Playfulness like 
laughter is an ability that is necessary to the life of the type Übermensch in the extra-moral 
sense.  
At the end of Zarathustra III, Nietzsche speaks of seven seals where the theme of play 
understood in the wider sense as gambling/gaming is raised. Zarathustra presents a 
 
639 Laurence Lampert, Nietzsche's Task: An Interpretation of 'Beyond Good and Evil' (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2001), 117. 
640 BGE, §56. 
641 Berkowitz, Nietzsche: the ethics of the immoralist, 245. 
642 Klossowski, Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle, 138. 
643 Ibid., 57. 
644 BGE, §56. A musical term calling for replay of the music from the beginning. 
 
  164 
 
hypothetical scenario: “If ever I played dice with Gods at the Gods’ table of the earth, so that 
the earth quaked and broke open and pushed up floods of fire:− for the earth is a Gods’ table 
and trembles with creative new words and Gods’ dice-throws.”645 This is basically a 
Heraclitean idea of the world as the gaming table of the divine world-child. The art of gambling 
by its nature is not only experimental but tempting as well.  
Being an experimenter and a tempter, are the nuanced forms of the term Versucher. 
Gaming as an activity, carries within it the result created by the throw, the accident of that 
result, and the necessary conditions that make the throw possible.646 The activity of play is 
characterized by an element of innocence and wantonness. The key point here is the creativity 
involved in the activity of play. The nature of creativity is that it is very conditional or 
perspectival and is never replicated in anybody else playing the same game. As Strong notes, 
if the game is properly played, one truly “wills one’s own will.”647 Playfulness demands always 
beginning anew. That beginning as Julian Young opines: “constitutes an absolute rupture with 
the past, not a modulation or re-creation of the past but a beginning − as the Germans described 
the first moments after the catastrophe of the Second World War − at Stunde Null (hour 
Zero).”648 In the world of flux, as the condition for singular individuality, the danger is 
contentment. To forestall that danger, constant experimentation is needed.  
However, for the game to be deemed sufficiently creative, there must be an element of 
unintentionality in terms of valuing. The life that Nietzsche ascribes to the type Übermensch, 
from the extra-moral perspective is based on the will to power. Contrarily to the intention-
based morality, Nietzsche asserts, 
But today, thanks to a renewed self-contemplation and deepening of humanity, 
shouldn’t we be facing a renewed necessity to effect a reversal and fundamental 
displacement of values? Shouldn’t we be standing on the threshold of a period that 
would be designated, negatively at first, as extra-moral? Today, when we 
immoralists, at least, suspect that the decisive value is conferred by what is 
specifically unintentional about an action.649 
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Nietzsche here celebrates the depth in human self-scrutiny. The fruit of that scrutiny is the 
understanding of life as will to power. Hence, “what is not intentional is what is given or 
granted in our passions and dispositions, what has become instinct.”650 The unintentional is 
the basic disposition that articulates itself as an expression of an overflowing of energy. It is 
on the unintentional realm that the value of an action is to be judged.  
On the unaccountability and innocence, Nietzsche holds: “Everything is necessity – 
thus says the new knowledge; and this knowledge itself is necessity. Everything is innocence: 
and knowledge is the path to insight into this innocence.”651 This new knowledge must be 
based on the instinctual domain, and for the type Übermensch it is essentially as will to power. 
The necessity here must be linked to the act of the will that gives access to existence. From the 
Deleuzian standpoint “Innocence is the game of existence, of force and of will. Existence 
affirmed and appreciated, force not separated, the will not divided in two − this is the first 
approximation of innocence.”652 Whoever may agree with Deleuze, as I do, ought to view 
existence as a play that is itself purposeless. As Strong remarks: “So long as one is playing, he 
is involved in the game by necessity.”653 Hence, the activity of the game is a capsule summary 
for the extra-moral life of the type Übermensch that is lived beyond good and evil, beyond 
utility and the moral antinomies that ordinarily are deemed to shape existence.  
The life of the type Übermensch, is evaluated from its activity where it wills its will 
unintentionally. As Klossowski notes, Nietzsche’s unavowable project is to act without 
intention, which is impossible morality for us, but the total economy of this “intentionless 
universe creates intentional beings.”654 This is insightful in the sense that, through the process 
of individual autopoiesis undertaken within the extra-moral ethical stance of the type 
Übermensch, one can possibly become the best he can be and evolve moralities fitting for such 
enhancement. In this regard, the Eternal Recurrence as affirmed by the type Übermensch is the 
fundamental insight into existence, where there is no Leibnizian pre-established harmony 
“between the furtherance of truth and the well-being of mankind.”655 With the rejection of the 
pre-established harmony, the present becomes the significant site for individual action.  
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Therefore, about the “questionableness of man,” Nietzsche’s possible appropriate 
response could take this line of thought: That life will be valued if ultimately the aspects of the 
life of the type Übermensch, which necessitates self-fashioning as a singular individual are 
embraced.656 More pertinently as Frederick Copleston observes, embarking on the process of 
singular individuality is “an act of defiance, a no-saying, to the meaningless world.”657 It is 
with the thought of Eternal Recurrence that Nietzsche’s forcefulness is manifested on how and 
with what attitude one can confront existence. In this regard, Heidegger considers Eternal 
Recurrence as “the fundamental doctrine in Nietzsche’s philosophy” and “Bereft of this 
teaching as its ground, Nietzsche’s philosophy is like a tree without roots.”658 Given the role 
of the Eternal Recurrence on our perception of time as perspectival, and its ensuing 
repercussions on individual autopoiesis, Heidegger’s claim seems quite plausible. However, 
the type last human being embraces a different moral stance, a morality of custom that is contra 
the doctrine of the Eternal Recurrence, the type Übermensch, and above all, could be 
detrimental to the production of the singular individual.  
3.6 Morality of Custom 
This section examines morality of custom and how it possibly inhibits the appropriation 
of the doctrine of the Eternal Recurrence. It is my considered position that morality of customs 
entails a lopsided manner of facing existence. This is a transitional section that leads into the 
next chapter, African ethno-philosophical underpinnings of shienyu ni shienyu and its 
underlying effects on the project of individual autopoiesis. This section begins with 
Nietzsche’s understanding of the morality of custom, and its aspects contrary to tragedy.  
The morality of custom as a theme in Nietzsche’s corpus starts receiving considerable 
attention at least from 1878. In Assorted Opinions and Maxims Nietzsche alleges, “The origin 
of custom lies in two ideas: the community is worth more than the individual and an enduring 
advantage is to be preferred to a transient one.”659 The preservation of the community is 
privileged in customary morality. Nietzsche also references morality of custom as: “that much 
 
656 That such is the possibility given the thinking in SE, §2. 
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older and more primitive kind of morality.”660 He says that the reason for engaging with such 
a morality was a “question of the value of morality.”661 Nietzsche reviews the various aspects 
of morality of custom from the middle period onwards: 
I dealt especially with the value of the ‘unegoistic’, the instincts of compassion, 
self-denial, self-sacrifice which Schopenhauer had for so long gilded, deified and 
transcendentalized until he was finally left with them as those ‘values as such’ on 
the basis of which he said ‘no’ to life and to himself as well.662 
Pertinent to this text is Schopenhauer’s understanding of the foundation for moral worth in 
actions as un-egoistic, which is the absence of self-interest. For Schopenhauer the only motive 
that fulfils such a criterion of moral worth of an action is compassion.663 Schopenhauer 
understands pity as “the immediate participation, independent of all ulterior considerations, 
primarily in the suffering of another, and thus in the prevention or elimination of it.”664 The 
justification for the involvement in the life of others is founded on the fact of the frustration of 
the will that views existence as punishment. The only appropriate response to such a tormented 
existence is indulgence toward one another. The indulgence takes the forms of forbearance 
and charity among others. Given the torment of existence, for Schopenhauer, we owe each 
other as fellow sufferers, compassion. Our acting motivation is compassion. It becomes a 
customary law, to participate in the sufferings of others. Compassion is supposedly a form of 
alleviating the torment of existence that can be more pronounced with individual existence.  
The thrust of Nietzsche’s engagement with morality lies in its source: “To be moral, to 
act in accordance with custom, to be ethical means to practice obedience towards a law or 
tradition established from old.”665 On the contrary, to be immoral in the realm of custom is to 
practice things not sanctioned by custom, which implies resisting tradition. Acts such as 
benevolence or pitying demonstrate that one is acting according to custom. Customs in general 
were designed not to provide advantages to individuals but to preserve and develop the entire 
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human cultural network.666 The good meant what preserves the community and evil what is 
considered injurious to it.  
In his critic of what he calls the cult of philanthropy, Nietzsche mentions 
Schopenhauer’s stance on compassion and John Stuart Mill’s utilitarianism as those who “gave 
the widest currency to the teaching of the sympathetic affects and of pity.”667 The danger of 
these teachings on the cultural enhancement is the undermining of an individual response to 
the tragic nature of existence. That is why for the yearning for individuality to ensue horror, 
disgust, hate and compassion elements associated with the morality of custom are cried out of 
Zarathustra.668 In the morality of custom, preservation is preferred over overcoming.  
Nietzsche’s problem with compassion is existentially well founded,  since “[o]ur 
personal and profoundest suffering is incomprehensible and inaccessible to almost everyone; 
here we remain hidden from our neighbour, even if we eat from one pot.”669 Highly valorised 
pity strips away from the suffering of others whatever is distinctively personal. Thus, 
Nietzsche’s call to get beyond pity ought to be understood on the account of existence as 
individual and needs to be affirmed as such. Closely related to compassion is problem of 
revenge. For Nietzsche, the spirit of revenge is a tendency to view existence itself as a trial and 
punishment.670 In their powerlessness towards existence they seek the moral standards that 
seem to support their situation. As a form of impotence, ressentiment is the process of 
apportioning responsibility and blame for the pain one suffers.671 The pain in this case is of an 
existential nature.  
But, with ressentiment, one thinks that there is a causal relation between the outside 
world and the suffering/pain wrought by one’s impotence towards it. This relation assumes a 
strong commitment to organizing the outside world, in the belief that this 
commitment will alleviate existential suffering. The organization of the world entails political 
organization, fighting for equality, nationalistic tendencies and identities like 
ethnocentrism, and the incessant search for democratic values. Hence, R. Jay Wallace aptly 
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observes that “the ressentiment of the weak is one of the main sources of modern moral 
consciousness.”672 The ressentiment is responsible for the system of morality that ensues, 
which is fundamentally rationalistic in nature, and thus inappropriate for Nietzsche’s 
individual autopoietic project. The system of morality that ensues from customs fails to factor 
in the transience and the destructive aspect as the immanent character of existence. 
Conclusion 
With this chapter, the coordinates for individual autopoieis are considerably in place. 
Individual autopoiesis, which is meant to yield singular individuality, entails ontology of 
becoming. The fact of becoming is best expressed by the type Übermensch. However, for its 
justification the type Übermensch espouses life as will to power and in that regard it is the 
affirmer of Nietzsche’s vital doctrine of the Eternal Recurrence. It is through the doctrine of 
Eternal Recurrence that the extra-moral life of the type Übermensch is examined. It is clearly 
stated that extra-moral life is about the unintentional nature of actions. In its unaccountability, 
the type Übermensch apparently operates in the ways similar to nature. Nietzsche draws his 
doctrine from Heraclitus and the Stoics, among others. 
Nietzsche inherits from the Greeks the notions of Eternal Recurrence as a cosmological 
and anthropological phenomenon. The Greek ontology of the cosmos is described in terms of 
strife and fire. These two terms justify the cosmos’ ontology of becoming, otherwise called 
transience and destruction. Fire as the principal element of the cosmos entails destruction and 
generation of the same. It is on becoming as an activity of the cosmos that Nietzsche draws 
existential-ethical dimensions for human life. Eternal Recurrence espoused both on 
cosmological and anthropological level elicits the question of value on the human level. Hence, 
appropriation of existence as becoming becomes Nietzsche’s undertaking as an existential-
ethical project. It is as an existential-ethical project that the Eternal Recurrence is developed 
in this dissertation as the possible avenue for undertaking singular individuality. Eternal 
Recurrence as an existential-ethical reality is largely affirmed by the type Übermensch as the 
guarantee of the ontology of becoming. The ontology of becoming entails espousing life as 
will to power, which is a technical way of asserting that life is tragic. In the doctrine of the 
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Eternal Recurrence, the “Moment” is that singular element that extra-moral life of the type 
Übermensch is embedded. It is the “Moment” that returns, and it is within the “Moment” that 
life as such is experienced. It is in this regard, that the ‘Moment’ is not only an autopoietic 
space but demands a world-affirming individual.673 This point is examined in Chapter Five, 
where autopoiesis as such calls for cosmopoieis.  
The affirmation of the Eternal Recurrence by the type Übermensch exposes the limits 
of any existence envisaged outside the realms of will to power. For Nietzsche, morality of 
custom largely espouses superficial understanding of existence. The contrary elements which 
embody the life of the type Übermensch include pity and disinterested standpoints. Nietzsche 
holds the position that life as will to power may never be experienced as such outside the 
appropriation of the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence. And singular individuality may be hard to 
obtain where the ontology of becoming is not appropriated. However, such an assertion needs 
to be fleshed out through a different approach to existence. That approach must be from a 
different setting too, specifically an ethno-philosophical one which valorises the morality of 
custom. As it plays out in Chapter Four, such a morality is grounded in agents as opposed to 
their acts.   
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Part II: Dialogue with Ethno-philosophy and Cosmopoiesis 
 
Chapter 4:  The Ethno-philosophy of Shienyu Ni Shienyu 
It is very possible, both with the individual and with the [ethnic or cultural] 
group, that the mysteries of life and death, survival and destruction, together with 
fear rising from all these mysteries, became the psychological agent that gave 
birth to certain behaviour patterns and to certain redemptive practices.(Placide 
Tempels, Bantu Philosophy, 18–19).  
Introduction 
In the introductory chapter, I stated that this dissertation is situated within two settings: 
Nietzsche’s philosophy and the African ethno-philosophy. In Chapters One, Two, 
and Three, the conditions for the task of individual autopoiesis have been examined, the key 
condition being the appropriation of life as will to power. Life understood and properly 
affirmed as will to power entails overcoming, which is the singular characteristic of the 
type Übermensch. Overcoming is espoused where life is valorised in the extra-moral sense. 
However, opposed to Nietzsche’s life as will to power is the morality of custom. Such a 
morality is marked by a valorisation of the communal life and a stress on what endures over 
and against the transient. In the context of Chapter Three, the morality of custom is opposed 
to the appropriation of the doctrine of the Eternal Recurrence. This chapter focuses on the 
second aspect of the dissertation, African ethno-philosophy, in which the morality of custom 
is discernible. The effects of such a morality on the task of 
individual autopoiesis and cosmopoiesis are relevant to this dissertation.   
One of the anchor claims in the African ethno-philosophy is about fellow-feeling 
expressed as a communal value. Fellow-feeling and its ensuing moral maxims entail modes of 
facing existence, as will be seen in the ethnic genesis of the Abaluyia and 
their moral maxim shienyu ni shienyu.674 In this chapter I argue firstly that 
the shienyu ni shienyu reality must be understood within the communal tenets of ethno-
philosophy as a response to the enigmatic nature of existence; and secondly, that the ontology 
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of shienyu ni shienyu mostly lacks individual prioritization and may thus be inherently 
untenable for the task of singular individuality. Such ethnic maxims seem to conceal the tragic 
aspect of existence. The development of the two claims is structured as follows:  
First, I examine the reasons for the existence of Abaluyia ethnic group.675 It will be 
argued that ethno-philosophical maxims like shienyu ni shienyu are intertwined with 
the genesis and ehancement of the ethnic group.  
Second, I present and analyze the ontology of shienyu ni shienyu. This task demands 
the presentation of its academic source in African philosophy of sociality. Subjecting 
communal claims to scrutiny is at the heart of the current ethno-philosophical setting of this 
dissertation. Thus, before engaging with the outlined themes a brief overview of African ethno-
philosophy is pertinent. 
4.1 Ethno-philosophy and the Communal 
Ethno-philosophy is generally described as “the bodies of beliefs and knowledge that 
have philosophical relevance and which can be re-described in terms drawn from academic 
philosophy, but which have not been consciously formulated as philosophy by 
philosophers.”676 Such beliefs are expressed in thoughts and activities of the people that share 
some common cultural heritage. P. Hountondji a Benin philosopher used ‘ethno philosophy’ 
as an overarching term for works of anthropologists, sociologists, ethnographers and 
philosophers which give the African collective worldviews. The term is first critiqued in 
Hountondji’s seminar paper titled: ‘Remarques sur la philosophie africaine contemporaine’ 
delivered in 1969.677 Hountondji used the term ethno-philosophy mainly as a critique of the 
works of Placide Tempels and Alexis Kagamé among others.678 Hountondji generally critiques 
what Tempels and Kagamé call philosophy when he observes: “[A]pplied to Africa, it is 
 
675 The elaborate analysis of this ethnic group is part of the sections of this chapter. There are several 
designations for this ethnic group for instance, as Luyia, Luhya, and Abaluyia/Abaluhya. The prefix here 
Aba/Ba- implies people, while the suffix, luyia/luhya stands for a homestead or warmth/hearth. Warmth comes 
closer to fellow-feeling, communal. Hence, the term Abaluyia/Abaluhya implies people of the same origin. 
676 Ivan Karp, and D.A. Masolo, “Ethnophilosophy, African” in Routledge Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, ed. 
Edward Craig, Volume 3 (London: Routledge, 1998), 446. 
677 “Remarks on the Contemporary African Philosophy.” It was delivered at a seminar in Copenhagen in 1969 
and then published in Diogene Journal in 1970. It was later reprinted 1976 as the first Chapter of Sur la 
‘Philosophie Africaine’ under the title of ‘Une Littérature aliénée.’ 
678 Tempels is a Belgian Franciscan missionary who worked among the Baluba ethnic group of the present-day 
Democratic Republic of Congo. He wrote a book called La Philosophie Bantoue. While Kagamé is a Rwandese 
philosopher. 
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supposed to designate no longer the specific discipline it evokes in its Western context but 
merely a collective world-view, an implicit, spontaneous, perhaps even unconscious system of 
beliefs to which all Africans are supposed to adhere to.”679 Masolo interprets Hountondji’s 
designation of ethno-philosophy as a merger of ethnography and philosophy.680 Ethnography 
is understood as the study of an ethnic group’s collective, passive, and largely descriptive 
claims.  
From an ethnographer’s standpoint, ethnography deals essentially with the collective 
aspects of community life. According to Alyward Shorter, ethnography deals with descriptive 
accounts of the culture and social institutions of a people.681 In this case, ethnography 
organizes the expectations, not necessarily the regularities, of daily existence. As 
such, Hountondji’s position is that what Tempels and Kagamé were engaged in is not 
philosophy, but ethnography, which hinges on two defining characteristics: (1) it seeks to 
encompass the whole life from the methods of childbirth to the fate of the soul; and (2) it 
regards the customary as more important than the actual.682 Thus ethnographers seek to 
construct the natives’ social order.   
Kwame Anthony Appiah refers to a philosophy where the beliefs are not subjected to 
systematic and critical analysis as a folk philosophy.683 However, folk philosophy is mainly 
oral and as such may be envisaged under ethno-philosophy. Ethno-philosophy aims to explore 
folk philosophies systematically.684 For one to gauge the value of the ontology of shienyu ni 
shienyu as the domain of African ethno-philosophy, it is important to engage with the 
ethnic genesis of the Abaluyia people. It is within this ‘ethnic group’ that the ontology 
of shienyu ni shienyu can be fleshed out. Engaging with the ethno genesis of the Abaluyia 
people will ipso facto entail dealing with some aspects of the communal and the individual. 
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4.1.1 The Abaluyia Ethnogenesis. 
One of the main features associated with African ethno-philosophy is communality. 
This assumption of communality is expressed by Hountondji as “the myth of primitive 
unanimity.”685 It is a misplaced unanimism with an assumption that all men and women in 
such societies not only speak with one voice and share the same opinion about fundamental 
issues, but also share the same origin.686 The Abaluyia ethnic genesis problematizes the 
cherished cliché of African communality. What seems to prevail is the enigma of existence as 
the basis for any valuation of a people. Communality properly rendered may be a work in 
progress. As such, communality demands continual formulation and 
reformulation. Furthermore, it can be claimed that the Abaluyia ethnic genesis justifies the 
need for moral maxims for its survival as an ethnic group.   
The thinking that ethnic groupings are not natural seems to be gaining traction. L. de 
la Gorgendiere et. al, hold that ethnic groupings may not be natural after-all given the origins 
and legends or myths associated with them.687 J. Osogo on the people of western Kenya 
observes that their clan compositions are of more mixed ancestries.688 G. Were cautions against 
the tendency “to associate African societies with homogenous origins and cultures.”689 Rather 
than being fixed, ethnicity is created and re-created through interactions. Hence, according to 
T. H. Eriksen, ethnicity emerges and is made relevant through social interactions and 
encounters as people’s ways of coping with the demands and challenges of life.690 On this 
score, ethnicity ought to be understood as a response to the enigmatic question of existence. 
Nonetheless, justification must be sought, whether strong ethnic inclinations are the befitting 
response to existence as tragic. It can be generally claimed that the Abaluyia ethnic genesis is 
grounded in existential challenges of some sort.  
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The Abaluyia are part of an African linguistic group called the Bantu. The Bantu is a 
group of closely related languages and is considered as one of Africa’s most widespread 
linguistic groups. The Bantu related languages stretch from Cameroon in the west to southern 
Somalia in the east and as far as Southern Africa in the south.691 However, what is presently 
called Bantu is historically held to be the recent offshoot of the African family language, 
Niger−Congo. The region of Niger−Congo is also deemed to be the original dispersal place 
of the Bantu speaking.692 It is commonly accepted that from the Niger−Congo different 
migratory routes were taken until the present settlement of the Bantus in Central, South and 
East of Africa. In Kenya the Bantus are generally grouped as: The western Bantu that 
comprises Abaluyia, Abagusii, Abakuria and Luo-Abasuba; The central Bantu includes, 
Agĩkũyũ, Aembu/Ambeere, Amĩĩrũ and Akamba; and the eastern Bantu coastals are, Wataita, 
Wataveta, Wapokomo and the Mijikenda.  
The defining feature of the Bantu linguistic group is the reference to a human being as 
mu-ntu in the singular form, and then ba-ntu in the plural form. The designation of the term 
ba-ntu is an adaptation by W. H. Bleek from the Xhosa ethnic group of South Africa. Bleek’s 
term bantu is in keeping with the “orthography advanced at the time for Xhosa.”693 For Bleek 
the main characteristic of the Bantu linguistic group is the derivative prefix and pronouns 
whereby only two classes/genders seem decisive to what he calls the ‘Ba-languages.’ In 
relation to the reference of distinctions observed in nature, the restricted prefix to nouns 
denotes reasonable beings, the one in the singular and the other in plural.694 The case in point 
is the designation of ba-ntu/aba-ntu, and mu-ntu/omu-ntu as the human beings in plural and 
singular respectively. The ba-/ aba-, and mu-/omu- as prefixes apply to ‘human beings,’ thus 
ba/aba-, is about people and mu-/omu-, is the singular form, a single person. In addition to 
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prefixes as Mugane observes, nearly all Bantu languages use a root form -ntu, -tu, -ndu, or -
du.695 In the case of Aba-luyia, two variations ba or aba, seem to be in operation. The -luyia, 
in this case is the suffix which provides the ethno genesis of today’s ethnic group called 
Abaluyia/Baluyia. The role of the suffix -luyia in the ethnogenic sense will reveal not only the 
origin, but also who these people called Abaluyia are.  
What is designated as Abaluyia is a conglomeration of eighteen sub-ethnic groups.696 
The migratory movements and periods of settlement of these groups into Kenya are diverse. 
Ng’ang’a remarks that,  
The earliest Abaluyia immigrants arrived in the territory that is today western Kenya 
before 1000 A.D. and the latest waves of immigrants arrived about 1700. The very 
earliest clans to arrive have now disappeared or have been absorbed by clans which 
arrived much later and only their names are still remembered. It would appear that 
the first arrivals passed through Buganda [part of present-day Uganda] on their way 
from Bunyoro or the Congo. […]. A northern route brought the mount Elgon sub-
groups to their present settlement.697 
It is noteworthy that in the period of these migratory movements no Abaluyia ethnic 
group yet existed. Instead, the migration involved the different sub-ethnic groups that would 
later (in the 20th century) come together for existential reasons under the name Abaluyia.   
The past of many ethnic groups in Kenya was not a unified one, since such groups were 
characterized more by regular patterns of interactions. By such interactions people of one 
ethnicity may blend into adjacent ethnicities without a distinct cultural boundary.698 Marked 
ethnic categorization in Kenya may be partly linked to colonial activities. From the 
sociological standpoint, a social category is characterized by a common identity that exhibits 
no necessary or regular patterns of interactions.699 Instead, ethnicity qua ethnicity is founded 
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on social interactions. And social interactions are defined in term of social groups. A social 
group is defined as “a set of individuals who interact with one another in patterned ways, who 
share a culture that contains beliefs about the group and rules of conduct that shape behaviour, 
and who identify with one another.”700 The ethnic group must be understood as a complex 
group owing to its size and the members who exist to carry out the group’s goals. As Eriksen 
notes, ethnicity entails classification of peoples and involves group relationships. Eriksen 
furthermore holds that ethnicity is about group identification and that the identification 
concerns “us,” which is opposed to racism as a categorization of “them.”729 In the Kenyan case 
it is claimed that before the establishment of colonial rule, diverse ethnic groups with varying 
traditions interacted easily.   
However, such interaction must not be construed to mean peaceful coexistence. There 
were persistent raids. But the cultures and even languages experienced widespread 
intermingling and assimilation of elements from other supposedly foreign communities. On 
ethnic labelling as an external factor two positions emerge: Scholars like Le Vine and 
Campbell are of the view that, “the homogenous tribe or ethnic unit was the creation of 
colonialism and missionaries.”701 Then, Vincent G. Simiyu and Ng’ang’a counter such claims 
with assertions that,  
 
ethnic groups existed in Kenya long before colonialism. In fact the only such 
case of ethnicity being created by colonialism was in Rwanda and Burundi. 
Colonialist Belgians attached an ethnic label on the terms Tutsi, Hutu and Twa. 
In the Pre-colonial period the Tutsi and Hutu were socio-economic categories 
and not ethnic groups.702 
 
However, one must be cautious enough and clarify that the external factors that Ng’ang’a 
mentions were meant to advance the set objectives, such as the success of colonial 
administration. The colonialists’ modus operandi may be responsible for the marked 
consciousness of ethnic categorizations, but not for their creation. This point will be more 
 
700 Dean Harper, “Social groups” in International Encyclopaedia of Sociology, Volume Two, ed. Frank N. 
Magill (London: Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers, 1995), 1239. 
701 Ng’ang’a, Kenya’s Ethnic Communities: Foundation of the Nation, XV and Le Vine and Campbell,  
Ethnocentrism: Theories of Conflict, Ethnic Attitudes and Group Behaviour, 1972. 
702Ng’ang’a, Kenya’s Ethnic Communities: Foundation of the Nation, XV. 
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pronounced with the Négritude movement that insisted on black consciousness.703 But 
as Wanyonyi claims, in pre-colonial Kenya ethnicity was a “mere sign of identification. 
Membership was fluid.”704 The fluidity of membership changes greatly with the colonial 
experience.  
Given the colonial experience, identification generally results in statuses: member and 
non-member, ‘your own’ and ‘not-your own.’ The pre-colonial experiences manifest 
tendencies of inclusive identification. For the facilitation of colonial administration, the British 
modus operandi seems to have made ethnic identification exclusive. According to Lord 
Frederick Lugard one of the main architects of the system, continuity and decentralization was 
inevitable for the success of the indirect rule. Lugard remarks:  
The first and most important conditions in maintaining an effective administration, 
co-operation is the keynote of success in its application−continous co-operation 
between every link in the chain, from the head of the administration to its most 
junior member, − co-operation between the Government and the commercial 
community, and above all, between the provincial staff and the native rulers.705 
In places where traditional leadership was nonexistent, the local British administrator had the 
discretion to establish one by picking those who are loyal and compliant to the system. 
However, on a grand scale, the indirect rule for Kenya meant setting up the ethnic groups 
against each other in terms of loyalty and disloyalty to the British system, for easier facilitation 
of the rule.   
The ethnic groups were allocated areas for settlement. In different alienated partitions, 
ethnic groups could easily be lured through incentives of education and political power, based 
on their level of cooperation. On incentive-based loyalty P. Karari notes: “The ethnic 
preferential treatment of colonial authorities nurtured a privileged centre of loyalists and a 
disgruntled periphery of rebels.”706 The strategy of having African reserves seemed to have 
 
703 In the Essay by Jean-Paul, Sartre, and John MacCombie, “Black Orpheus” The Massachusetts Review 6, no. 
1 (1964): 13-52. Accessed May 21, 2020. www.jstor.org/stable/25087216. In Black Orpheus, négritude is 
defined in terms of Heideggerian Existentialist terms as “the-being-in-the-world-of-the-Negro.” This was a 
contingent reference, not fixed, but Senghor enlarged the term négritude and gave it a new orientation as an 
enduring quality of being constitutive of the black race. Refer Moya Deacon, “Trends in African Philosophy” in 
The African Philosophy Reader, ed. P. H. Coetzee, and A. P. J. Roux (New York: Routledge, 2003), 116-147. 
704 Wanyonyi, “Historicizing,” 36. 
705 Lugard, F. D, The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa, 1st edition (London: Blackwood, 1922), 193. 
706 Peter Karari, “Modus Operandi of Oppressing the ‘Savages’: The Kenyan British Colonial Experience,” Peace 
and Conflict Studies: Vol. 25, No. 1, Article 2, (2018): 9. 
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had multiplier effects: firstly, it weakened the pre-colonial interactions among different ethnic 
groups; secondly, it created ethnic suspicions and intensified ethnic consciousness; and 
thirdly, it rendered the Africans divided and suspicious of one another, leaving them open to 
easy conquest. With this system of divide and rule, some ethnic groups, especially those who 
were given some leverage or power, felt included in the administration’s ideals. Such acts, it 
is popularly claimed, may have led to the development of fellow-feeling.   
Analysis of the feelings of inclusion and exclusion justifies the claim that marked 
ethnic categorization in Kenya is due to colonial occupation. The inclusion-exclusion card as 
Wanyonyi observes, eventually planted the seeds of ethno-centricism and the urge for ethno-
cracy.707 The primacy of ethnic organization and rulership was envisaged by different ethnic 
formations as fitting guarantor of their survival. Shadrack Amakoye Bulimo believes that 
“around the second World War, most clan heads realized that political parameters had shifted 
dramatically and only organized societies with a definite ethnic identity could hope to reap 
political benefits associated with economies of scale.”708 The political benefits were 
supposedly an assurance for the existential future. Hence being “included or excluded” had a 
bearing on the community’s existence.   
To share in the largesse of the colonial administration and to safeguard ethnic 
existential interests, ethnic welfare groups emerged. Communal strength and fellow-feeling 
within the group presented some leverage against those who were purported to be weak in 
terms of ethnic mobilization. Thus, the overarching names as the precursor to the present 
day Abaluyia emerged. The notable ones are the North Kavirondo Central Association 
(NKCA) and Bantu Kavirondo Taxpayers’ Association.709 Such associations seem to have 
been an assurance of some better positions at the bargaining table especially at what was called 
 
707 Wanyonyi, “Historicizing Negative Ethnicity in Kenya” in (Re) membering Kenya, Vol. 1: Identity, culture 
and freedom, 37. 
708 Shadrack Amakoye Bulimo, Luyia Nation: Origins, Clans and Taboos (Trafford: Trafford Publishing, 
2013), XIX. 
709 Kavirondo is the area around Lake Victoria, part of the Winam Gulf. Kavirondo is an obscure word that its 
exact designation is not clear. Though it came to refer partly to the people around Lake Victoria, it seems to 
refer to the area around Lake Victoria. Hence various renderings for people around the lake as: South 
Kavirondo, North Kavirondo, or Bantu Kavirondo (the Abaluyia) to distinguish them from the Luos who are 
Central Kavirondo. However, according to Gunter Wagner, the name Bantu of North Kavirondo apparently was 
never used by the natives to refer to themselves. This may not be entirely true, given that they formed an 
association bearing the name, unless, the implication is that the name Bantu Kavirondo Taxpayers Association 
is also a designation. 
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the Native Trust land Boards. Such boards were established to secure the land rights of 
different native ethnic groups which required representations.  
The NKCA was a political native organization like several others spread across the 
colony. The British administration outlawed any movement with a semblance of a national 
outlook. The challenge for the NKCA or Bantu Kavirondo Taxpayers’ Association was that 
although its eighteen sub-ethnic groups had some common customs, and spoke closely related 
dialects of the same language, they lacked an all-embracing name.710 The idea of welfare 
associations was used as an ethnic mobilization. According to MacArthur, NKCA had its 
publication titled “Abaluhya,” here loosely implying kinship, and the publication named the 
people of NKCA “Luyia.”711 The term luyia entails a myriad of meanings.   
Hence, Luyia may denote oluyia, which implies warmth, to be hot. J. Osogo, a Luyia 
historian uses the term okhuyia which means to burn.712 According to Shadrack Amakoye 
Bulimo, there were two types of fireplaces: (1) In the traditional homestead was a fireplace. 
The polygamous man had several wives, each with her own hut in the compound forming a 
semicircular pattern, with the fireplace at the centre, (2) Each clan/community lineage had a 
common hearth/fireplace, which served as a place of congregating for special announcements, 
decisions or declarations on issues.713 Thus, the oluyia space served as a village court where 
community matters could be adjudicated and discussed. In this regard, there is a link between 
khuluyia, being the assembly space in the homestead/community’s and oluyia. And in the 
extended family setting, even though one may have several houses, there is oluyia lulala.714 
There is another usage, from oluyia, implying a fire place, especially in the meadow, where 
the elders of the clan met every morning.715 In this case, the oluyia could serve as an assembly 
site, the microcosm where the practical life played out.  
However, the oluyia is not only a micro setting in the case of a homestead, it is also a 
macro-setting for the community. The people who share a fireplace at a village’s common 
space belong to the same oluyia. But in the words of Bulimo when a group of clans come 
 
710 Ng’ang’a, Kenya’s Ethnic Communities: Foundation of the nation, 16. 
711 MacArthur, “When did the Luyia (or any other group) become a tribe?” in Canadian Journal of African 
Studies, 359. 
712 John Osogo, A History of the Baluyia (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1966), 6. 
713 Bulimo, Luyia Nation, Origins, Clans and Taboos, 68–69. 
714 In Abaluyia language means: one homestead or one assembly space. 
715 MacArthur, “Luyia”, 358. 
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together they form aba-luyia.716 At the oluyia, the fire-place, the elders of the clan met every 
morning to warm themselves from the morning cold of western Kenyan weather. In the process 
the elders also discuss the events and pertinent matters of the community.717 Closely related to 
the designation of an assembly place is the belief that communities used to hold criminal 
tribunals at the junctions of the footpath.718 Such junctions were referred to as luyia, a meeting 
point. Among the different threads of meanings given there is a discernible link between the 
hearth/fireplace (oluyia) and homestead (luyia). The likely thinking is that any functioning 
homestead must have a fireplace as a preparatory space for food and enhancement of 
communion/assembly. Hence, according to J. Osogo,  
It is understandable […] how the name oluyia came to mean tribe, especially as it 
was a common practice for people to ask, ‘to which oluyia do you belong?’ – 
meaning ‘to which fire.’ The oluyia so defined represented a physical location, 
posited at the ‘centre of the public life of the clan.’719 
One’s response to the question of ‘which oluyia’ he belonged to entailed naming one’s physical 
homestead. The homestead in this case becomes “a space where problems, common to all, 
were brought up, discussed and decided upon around the fire.”720 In this regard, the oluyia is a 
common ground, a space of expression, a space of communion where diversity is lived as 
unity. The closest expression to this common space is the case of a polygamous home, “where 
the courtyard outside the main father’s house is called luyia. And all the children are referred 
as children of one Luyia and hence the name Abaluyia.”721 Hence, generally the term Aba-
luyia designates people of the same luyia, the hearth, homestead or simply those who share the 
homestead. The full form is something like abantu baluyia lula, people of the same 
hearth/homestead. Osogo concludes that Abaluyia means ‘fellow tribesmen.’ For the colonial 
political circumstances in Kenya, the name Abaluyia was determined by vote of the North 
Kavirondo Native council of 1942, accepted by the Luyia language committee and adopted by 
the colonial government.  
 
716Bulimo, Luyia Nation, 69. It means the people of the same homestead or hearth.  
717 Aidan W. Southall, “The Illusion of Tribe” in International Studies of Sociology and Social Studies, Vol. X, 
ed. K. Ishwaran, The Passing of Tribal man in Africa (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1970), 35. 
718 Ng’ang’a, Kenya’s Ethnic Communities: Foundation of the Nation, 19. 
719 Osogo, A History of the Baluyia, 7. 
720 MacArthur, “Luyia”, 358. 
721 Ng’ang’a, Kenya’s Ethnic Communities: Foundation of the Nation, 19. 
 
  182 
 
The Abaluyia ethnogenesis seems to have arisen from the realization that for their 
existential survival, given the colonial influence, a unified front was inevitable. Southall holds 
that the emergence of the Abaluyia was “the reaction of younger and more educated men to 
the exigencies of the colonial situation.”722 The plausibility of Southall’s assertion can be 
discerned from the understanding that it is not only the Abaluyia that seem to have engineered 
their ethnic group owing to existential demands. The process of engineering the Abaluyia 
ethnic group may have been a conscious one. But the Abaluyia were not the only group that 
felt an existential threat. G. Muriuki observes that among the Agĩkũyũ there existed different 
kinships and solidarity was needed during periods of existential threats.723 Muriuki is of the 
view that by the end of the 19th century the Agĩkũyũ society was generally un-centralized and 
divided into kinships. The kinship was called mbari (a clan). Even though external threats 
stimulated wider ethnic unity, allegiance to kinship groups remained important. The loyalty to 
the wider community is expressed when individuals introduce themselves as belonging to the 
mbari ya Mumbi.724 Mumbi is the mythical founding ancestor of the Agĩkũyũ people.725 Hence, 
the invocation of the myth of mbari ya Mumbi is relevant for fostering solidarity and unity 
within the Agĩkũyũ community especially when their existential situation is deemed 
precarious. 
Louis de la Gorgendiere et al, in support of their claim that ethnic groupings are non-
natural, observe that, owing to colonial challenges, the Agĩkũyũ needed to submit to a 
coordinating leadership. The need arose from the realization that, given contrasting social 
constructions among them, they needed moral ethnicity or patriotism as the strategy for their 
political nationalism.726 Moral ethnicity here implies the constructed fellow-feeling centred 
around the maxim, mbari ya Mumbi. The politics are important here, because 
the Agĩkũyũ defined themselves as the people who owned the land. The existence of 
the Agĩkũyũ as a people was intertwined with land ownership. Though mythical, 
the Agĩkũyũ’s mbari ya Mumbi seems to represent some common origin for the diverse mbari, 
in terms of ancestry called Mumbi. This may not be the case with the Abaluyia.  
 
722 Southall, “The Illusion of Tribe” in International studies in Sociology and Social Anthropology, 34. 
723 Godfrey, Muriuki, A history of the Kikuyu, 1500–1900 (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1974), 112. 
724 Agĩkũyũ language, which means: the kinship of Mumbi. 
725 Muriuki, A history of the Kikuyu, 1500–1900, 113. 
726Gorgendiere et al, Ethnicity in Africa: Roots, Meanings and Implications, 18.  
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The Abaluyia do not claim any common ancestry. MacArthur puts it 
succinctly: “[T]he Luyia by and large have not and do not claim a common ‘Muluyia’ ancestor 
from whom they all sprang.”727 One recent scholarly work analyses the Luyia composition 
from the clan level, testifying to the fact of discrete entities. It notes that “[t]he 863 Luyia clans 
are amorphous units united only by cultural and linguistic bonds. The political union between 
these clans is a nettlesome issue that has eluded the community since the formation of the 
super-ethnic polity more than seventy years ago.”728 On the difficulty of establishing a political 
union, one can opine that it is a character of constructed communities. To enforce some 
possible semblance of having a unified community, some moral-oriented maxims are 
apparently fashioned. The Abaluyia, as MacArthur observes, “share no myth of a founding 
father, no singular narrative of historical descent and migration, no standard set of cultural 
practices, no common language.”729 Myths and legends are some of the pointers to the fact that 
ethnicity is largely a construction. Where there are no common myths of origin, some moral 
maxims seem to serve the purpose of myths and legends. Nevertheless, it would be grossly 
mistaken to ascribe maxims only to ethnic groups lacking a myth of common origin.  
The belief in common ancestry is vital for the propagation of group formation and it 
matters little whether an objective blood relationship exists.730 The need for joint political 
action can develop into a moral duty or maxim that seeks to bind the members together. Such 
maxims can be like shienyu ni shienyu in the ethno-philosophical domains. 
As Omedi Ochieng observes, such maxims are not only defined as a property of an ethnic 
group, but are envisaged as “consensual and primordial.”731 Such maxims are considered 
consensual knowledge on the basis that they are held and accepted by everyone in the 
designated ethnic group. The maxims for Ochieng are primordial in the sense that they are 
thought of as traditionally handed down and passed on from time immemorial and then 
appropriated by the ethnic group. But whether consensual or primordial or constructivist, the 
underlying principle around ethnicity seems to revolve around the manner of encountering life 
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as tragic. I can therefore claim that communality, understood as a value in ethnic formations, is 
one pertinent way of encountering existence as tragic.   
Thus, unanimity, which Hountodji ascribes to ethno-philosophy, can plausibly be 
understood as a response to existential demands. The question is whether unanimity per 
se aptly encounters the tragic nature of existence. So far, the examination of the genesis of 
the Abaluyia ethnic group has evolved some pertinent nuances for further analysis. In general, 
it has been demonstrated that ethnicity is largely a construction that is informed by the social-
existential conditions. The examination has relied mainly on the ethnographical and some 
sociological underpinnings of ethnicity to arrive at the existential conditions as grounds for 
ethnic maxims. The shienyu ni shienyu moral maxim within the Abaluyia ethnic group must 
now be examined through the broader prism of African ethno-philosophical development.  
4.2 Shienyu Ni Shienyu as Ethno-philosophy 
In the preceding section, the focus was on the ethnographic aspects of ethnicity. And 
one of the emerging themes from ethnogenesis in general is the necessity for moral maxims 
given the constructivist nature of ethnicity. This section concentrates on the philosophical 
discourse around the moral maxim of shienyu in shienyu. The justification for this approach 
is Hountodji’s notion of ethno-philosophy as the merger of the ethnographical and the 
philosophical.732 From the ethnographical perspective shienyu ni shienyu largely serves the 
existential needs of the Abaluyia ethnic group, owing to the circumstances of its emergence. 
Nevertheless, ethnography, though important for this chapter does not override the 
necessity for a philosophical discourse on the moral maxim of shienyu ni shienyu. Such a 
discourse will proceed as follows: firstly, a presentation of the ontology of shienyu ni 
shienyu from the perspective of Maurice Makumba;733 secondly, a contextualization of the 
ontology of shienyu ni shienyu as a communal stance in a broader discourse of African 
philosophy of sociality. In this way Makumba’s tracing of shienyu ni shienyu from African 
Socialism will be highlighted.  
 
732 Hountodji, African Philosophy: Myth and Reality, 62-63. 
733 Maurice Makumba is currently the Catholic Bishop of Nakuru Diocese in the Rift Valley part of Kenya. He 
develops what is called “The philosophy of Shienyu ni shienyu” in the short work, Introduction to African 
Philosophy (Nairobi: Paulines Publications Africa, 2007), 151-164. 
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Makumba’s introduction to his philosophy of shienyu ni shienyu apparently justifies 
the two-fold approach. He discusses the philosophy of shienyu ni shienyu within the 
framework of African socialism, which he claims is dictated by the principle of family-hood. 
Makumba believes that 
[f]or African socialism to have any affinity with philosophy, it should adhere to this 
basic principle [family-hood]. When we say, for instance, that the central values of 
Africa are communal rather than individual, we need to go further to dissect and 
subject ‘communal’ to greater analysis. ‘Communal’ makes no sense without 
reference to a real community. And just which community is the object of African 
socialism’s ‘communal’ values? Is it a closed community that recoils into itself or 
an open community that goes all out for interrelationship?734 
Makumba’s call for subjection of communality to greater examination must necessarily 
encompass the nature of existence as such. Makumba holds the position that African socialism 
is “perhaps best expressed” as the philosophy of shienyu ni shienyu.735 This communal 
approach is not without its challenges. Joseph M. Nyasani, a critic of African philosophy of 
sociality, believes that such a philosophy is “always fostered and nurtured more by the 
ubiquitous physical dangers and the inability of man to manage and safeguard his own fate 
single-handedly and without resorting to the corporate or communal intervention.”736 He 
justifies his criticism by appealing to the psychology of managing fate, rooted in the belief that 
no one single-handedly can tame the forces of nature, except in as far as it became a common 
concern. However, Nyasani’s position can partly be discerned from the ethnogenesis of 
the Abaluyia above. Still, the communal response to and existential threat and its ramifications 
will only be clearer at the end of this chapter. For now, the focus is on Makumba’s conception 
of shienyu ni shienyu.   
4.2.1 Makumba on the Ontology of Shienyu Ni Shienyu 
Makumba’s point of departure is the complex nature of the maxim shienyu ni shienyu. 
The Abaluyia moral maxim shienyu ni shienyu for Makumba, “means far more than it says, 
and as a result it can have far reaching implications in concrete life.”737 Makumba claims 
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further that the maxim shienyu ni shienyu conceals what it means, and that the concealment 
could be intended in some cases. It may not be immediately clear from the text why Makumba 
elects to use the Heideggerian terminology of concealment. But Makumba’s assertion about 
the maxim in Kiswahili language may not leave doubt of what is intended. 738 He alleges, 
“Shienyu ni Shienyu is more easily translated in Kiswahili than English, in which case it is 
rendered as ‘Chenu ni Chenu.’ A perfect translation for perfect concealment!"739 As Makumba 
opines, at first sight the maxim and its translation make very little sense. However, Makumba’s 
use of the term ‘concealment’ is the possible aperture into the interpretation of the moral 
maxim shienyu ni shienyu.  
The meaning of concealment and its object must be clarified. Heidegger in Being and 
Time mainly uses a Greek term a-letheia in his endeavour to explain Dasein’s disclosure and 
hiddenness. He writes, “The goddess of Truth who guides Parmenides, puts two pathways 
before him, one of uncovering, one of hiding; but this signifies nothing else than that Dasein 
is already both in the truth and in untruth.”740 Depending on the translation, uncovering and 
hiding implies un-concealment and concealment respectively. For Heidegger, the term a-
letheia expresses “the essence of truth.”741 The nature of truth for Heidegger entails un-
concealment and concealment. According to Heidegger aletheia is equated to the un-
concealment/disclosure of Dasein through the myriad of beings/entities. Heidegger holds that 
aletheia, which Aristotle equates with “pragma” and “phainomena,” signifies the things 
themselves, “it signifies what shows itself–entities in the ‘how’ of their uncoveredness.”742 In 
this regard, aletheia must be about manifestation of being. In the words of John Caputo, the 
Greek way of truth as correctness (aletheia) of assertions arises from and presupposes the 
 
738 Kiswahili is an African language spoken in Kenya, Tanzania (Tanganyika and Zanzibar), Eastern 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, and parts of Mozambique. Kiswahili language 
borrows heavily from the Bantu languages. It has also some Arabic and Portuguese influence and even some 
German words owing to the German colonization. The native speakers of the language were mainly the Swahili 
people found mainly along the Eastern coast of Africa with strong ties with the ancient Sultanate of Oman. 
However, Kiswahili is today growing into a major African Language used as a national language in Tanzania 
and Kenya. 
739 Makumba, 155. The translation of Chenu ni Chenu into English can be like “Yours is Yours” or “Your Own 
is Your Own.” 
740 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans, John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1962), Section 44, 265. 
741 Heidegger, Being and Time, 265.  
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manifestation and openness of entities themselves.743 This means that the thrust is not simply 
on the un-concealment but being itself. The un-concealment in the words of M. King is the 
phenomena of truth.744 However, in the Heideggerian sense un-concealment does not entail 
the full essence of aletheia.  
For Caputo, aletheia as the realm of un-concealment is the “concealed clue, the implicit 
horizon, the unconceived realm, within which the Greek experience of Being unfolds.”745 
Truth as un-concealment for Heidegger must always first be seized from entities. The entities 
are “snatched” from their hide-out, their concealment. If the untruth as the concealed is the 
source of the un-concealed, then it makes sense when Caputo refers to lethe (concealment) as 
belonging to the heart of aletheia. Caputo believes that lethe as concealment also implies “self-
sheltering.”746 In Heidegger there is a link between concealment and Dasein when he notes, 
To be closed off and covered up belongs to Dasein’s facticity. In its full existential-
ontological meaning, the proposition that ‘Dasein is in the truth’ states 
equiprimordially that ‘Dasein is in untruth.’ But only in so far as Dasein has been 
disclosed has it also been closed off; and only in so far as entities within-the-world 
have been uncovered along with Dasein, have such entities as possibly 
encounterable within-the-world, been covered up (hidden) or disguised.747 
According to Günther Figal, Dasein’s mode of Being is primarily existence.748 Thus the un-
concealment and concealment or truth and untruth are referents of existence. Dasein in its full 
existential-ontological meaning as truth and untruth is the foundation of beings. In this regard 
as Figal observes, Dasein “bears within itself the intrinsic possibility of every concrete factual 
humanity.”749 This means the neutral Dasein is not the one that exists. Instead Dasein exists as 
is expressed in the truth of being as its factual concretion.  
What Figal calls the neutral Dasein is generally understood as the primal source of 
intrinsic possibility that springs up in every existence and makes it intrinsically possible. The 
object of concealment, I believe, is basically existence. Charles E. Scott believes that the word 
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concealment “points to the still unexperienced domain of the truth of being into which dasein 
ek-sists.”750 The focus here is on the domain as the space/source for plurality of beings. That 
domain is one of “letting be” of beings. In this brief exposition on Heidegger’s disclosure and 
hiddenness of Dasein, there is a marked movement from the Greek notion of aletheia to some 
unclaimed realm of lethe where concealment seems to reside. It is unclaimed since, according 
to Caputo, truth as a-letheia is the “opening itself, in which all Being and all truth (as 
phenomena) are given and granted.”751 The concealment becomes the aperture within 
which, as Caputo observes, “every historical epoch occurs and by which it is granted.”752 This 
is existence as the realm within which history unfolds. The task is now to show 
how Makumba envisages the moral maxim shienyu ni shienyu in terms of such notion of 
concealment or otherwise.  
According to Makumba, shienyu ni shienyu’s deliberate concealment is founded on 
three aspects: (1) Its expression in neutral form, (2) in the totality of its rendering and (3) the 
context of its utterance. In the ordinary Abaluyia or Kiswahili language, shienyu or chenu are 
neuter words which imply your thing or simply yours. They refer to possessive objects (things). 
However, even though that ought to be the case, shienyu or chenu as Makumba observes refers 
to a human person. As such he paraphrases shienyu ni shienyu as “Your sister/brother is your 
sister/brother.”753 Ordinarily your sister or brother is understood in terms of blood kinship. 
That seems to be partly intended here but the fact that it is not vocalized is a pointer to much 
more. 
Makumba further clarifies that the word shienyu is always addressed to the individual 
not simply as an individual but as a member of a community. Prior to Makumba, John S. Mbiti 
reflects on the relationship between the individual and the community: 
In traditional [African] life, the individual does not and cannot exist alone except 
corporately. He owes his existence to other people, including those of past 
generations and his contemporaries. He is simply part of the whole. The community 
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must therefore make, create or produce the individual; for the individual depends 
on the corporate group.754 
Mbiti in this text, apart from affirming the centrality of the community, touches on existence 
as an underlying principle, as will be explored below. But the fact that the individual existence 
is explained in terms of what are considerably external forces (other people, past 
generations, and contemporaries) is itself a telling scenario: the actuality of existence demands 
individual qua individual response. However, Mbiti in the above text recognizes the 
community vocation of producing individuals.   
Makumba notes that shienyu in its neutrality conceals the power of community that in 
turn masks existential vagaries. This is likely the point when he explains about ‘your own’: 
The ‘your own’ referred to is the community, as if to awaken in the individual strong 
feelings of belonging, a belonging that is bereft of meaning without the community 
that is the individual’s ‘sponsor’ and whose interests it is important to guard and 
protect as they come, both in particular individuals and in the community at large. 
This sense of belonging is not respected if one does not come to the aid of the 
community in its individuals.755 
The community interests seem to override the individual’s. Coming to the aid of the 
community is an obligatory canon for the sense of belonging. As Bell observes the individual’s 
identity is part of a thoroughly fused collective we.756 And then Mbiti sums up the individual’s 
position in the community’s scheme of things with the assertion, “The individual can only say: 
‘I am, because we are; and since we are, therefore I am.’”757 Mbiti considers this maxim a 
cardinal point in the understanding of what he calls the African view of humanity. This point 
will be revisited later when considering Léopold Senghor on African socialism.  
But a caveat is in order: if Mbiti is taking a Cartesian cue on his “I am,” then one 
wonders if this maxim will not suffer the fate of being contentless. The abstract “I am” may 
not be a purely African position given that empirical underpinnings of relationships are taken 
as paramount. Santosh C. Saha observes that Africans define themselves through a collective 
 
754 John S. Mbiti, African Religions & Philosophy (London: Heinemann, 1969), 108. 
755 Makumba, 155. Refer to the footnote material. 
756 Bell, Understanding African Philosophy, 60. 
757 Mbiti, African Religions and Philosophy, 108. 
 
  190 
 
dream of sharing resources and social equality.758 And such a collective world-view apparently 
affects the African intellectual lot too, who “[b]y choice, as well as necessity due to kinship 
ties, […] are more responsive to and respectful of their immediate social bases of 
support.”759 In this regard, the individual’s sense of belonging, which is communal, manifests 
itself through the accompanying obligations to the “your own.” However, it seems that the 
aspect of the obligation to shienyu, your own is stressed based on something else.  
That “something else” entails the second aspect by which Makumba accounts for 
the concealment of shienyu ni shienyu: totality. The full expression of the maxim 
reads, “Shienyu ni Shienyu khali shihunyi bukundu.” Makumba holds that the “inner and fuller 
meaning” of the phrase shienyu ni shienyu “can only be deciphered” from the added 
piece, khali shihunyi bukundu, which means “even should it stink!”760 Bukundu is a stink 
mainly from something rotten. I interpret the stink in this case to be an indicator of the vagaries 
of existence. Encountering existence is central to ethno philosophical 
tenets. Makumba describes the additional piece to the maxim as that which is “almost always 
left unsaid but almost always implied and is its completion.”761 From the popular wisdom, the 
maxim shienyu ni shienyu with the implication of the full form is resorted to in moments of 
existential threat. Such moments call for marshalling all forces possible for survival, and none 
of such forces can be more formidable than fellow-feeling. The underlying principle 
of shienyu ni shienyu is like what T. U. Nwala refers to as the function of practical 
philosophies of life:762 The practical philosophies of life refer “to the basic beliefs, ideas and 
mores without which […] the community would cease to exist because it must have lost touch 
with reality and the source of their existence.”763 The popular wisdom among 
the Abaluyia ethnic group considers shienyu ni shienyu as one of her main practical maxims of 
life.    
Makumba’s assertion that khali shihunyi bukundu is always left unsaid but always 
implied can be linked to the question of existence. That existence is implied follows from his 
 
758 Santosh C. Saha, “Moral Ethnicity in Sub-Saharan African National Identity Issues: Ethnicity and State-
Building” in Ethnicity and Social Political Change in Africa and other developing Countries: A Constructive 
discourse in State Building (Lexington Books, 2008), 13-14. 
759 Ibid. 
760 Makumba, 155. 
761 Ibid. 
762 T. Uzodinma Nwala, Igbo Philosophy (Lagos: Lantern Books, 1985), 27. 
763 Ibid. 
 
  191 
 
interpretation that: “It does not matter how smelly one of your own is, you have an obligation 
to lend them a hand, almost by oath and under pain of being ostracized.”764 The protection, it 
must be remembered, that though the assistance could be individual, the operative scheme is 
always communal existence. I advance the argument that the moral maxim shienyu ni shienyu 
is one of the possible ways of responding to the tragic nature of existence. And that the power 
of the moral maxim shienyu ni shienyu lies in the aporetic question of existence. Hence, 
shienyu ni shienyu, to apply the words of MacIntyre on existence “disguises and conceals 
rather than illuminates and it depends for its power on its success at disguise and 
concealment.”765 And the way of shienyu ni shienyu seemingly privileges communal response 
towards that which it conceals, existence. P. Tempels apparently says as much on the human 
response amid existential challenges: 
It is very possible, both with the individual and with the [ethnic or cultural] group, 
that the mysteries of life and death, survival and destruction, together with fear 
rising from all these mysteries, became the psychological agent that gave birth to 
certain behaviour patterns and to certain redemptive practices.766 
Makumba’s position that shienyu ni shienyu demands the obligation to protect one’s own in 
both good and evil, is supposedly the redemptive response to the existential enigma. 
The onus now is to unpack what shienyu ni shienyu may be concealing. What is 
emerging so far is that the shienyu ni shienyu maxim seems to encourage carrying one of 
your own’s “existential stinks.” Makumba holds that shienyu ni shienyu “is an instruction, a 
dictum, and a tenet by which every concerned member should endeavour to abide, and whose 
fulfilment all should aspire to achieve.”767 On this belief, shienyu ni shienyu is largely the 
community’s self-preservation dictum as a response to existence. With Makumba’s position 
that shienyu ni shienyu is a dictum that must be honoured, the underlying objective is a 
response to existence. It can be opined that what shienyu ni shienyu seeks to conceal is the 
enigma of existence that is essentially tragic. In this regard the dictum is meant to act as the 
bulwark against the insurmountable question of existence at the individual level.  
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However, the question that will require a response is whether such a communal 
approach to the existential enigma is the befitting one indeed. There are undoubtedly some 
benefits of the communal approach to existence. The communal response to existence is 
intertwined with the values of generosity, compassion, solidarity, and social well-
being.768 Makumba believes that shienyu ni shienyu properly conceived thrusts one into 
inclusive relations. He references such inclusive relationships as helpful and healthy.769 This 
brings to the fore the fact that what is being christened as “helpful and healthy” is the 
communal and not the individual. The underlying weakness here is the tendency to bracket the 
existential reality. With such a valorisation of the communal, there may be little room for 
individual emergence and for that individual to “smell his own existential stink.”  
Even though Makumba observes that one’s own is meant to be “a crucial aperture to 
the other,” he seems to forget that this aperture is itself communally determined. This is 
because the shienyu ni shienyu essentially is addressed to the individual not as individual per 
se but as “a member of the community.”770 To appreciate Makumba’s assertion that shienyu ni 
shienyu is positively meant to be an aperture to the other, it is crucially important to look at his 
sources of justification. Makumba quotes an Ethiopian thinker by the name of Wäldä 
H∂ywåt.771  
For H∂ywåt, “fellow man” is not confined to relatives, friends, or members of the same 
faith. But that fellow man includes all humankind, given that “all men are our fellow 
men, whether they are good or evil.”772 According to Claude Sumner, “[i]n Ethiopia, 
traditional philosophy in its written form is intimately linked with Christianity in general, and 
monasticism, in particular.”773 Such a claim is validated by the fact that certain sayings in 
classical Ethiopian philosophy are traced from some ancient sources, such as “The Book of the 
wise philosophers.”774 Hence, without being dismissive of Ethiopian thought, one must keep 
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in mind the influence derived from the above sources. In this regard, H∂ywåt’s “fellow 
man” and “humankind” may be a largely abstracted Christian response to a complex 
phenomenon. Such abstracted conception may not entirely bring out the existential nuances in 
their concrete form. Furthermore, regarding H∂ywåt’s conception of fellow man it is proper to 
point out his relationship with another Ethiopian’s thinker: Yacob.  
Yacob’s philosophy focuses, among other themes, on the individual’s approach to 
suffering with strong individual underpinnings. In the words of Sumner, “Yacob’s philosophy 
is the fruit of his own personal reflection and not a translation or an adaptation from foreign 
sources.”775 For Sumner, Yacob, given his experience of personal suffering, speaks of divine 
providence in personal terms. Yacob develops his treatise based on his individual searching 
and seclusions. On the other hand, H∂ywåt’s reflection on Yacob’s treatise has an inkling of 
strong collectivism. In this regard, the standard position is that H∂ywåt develops his ethics of 
love based on the doctrine of reason that in turn expresses the will of the creator.776 On such 
grounds, it is plausible for one to claim that Makumba’s “fellow men” appeal from H∂ywåt is 
possibly the rationalization of Yacob’s existential reality. H∂ywåt’s social philosophy, among 
other themes, concentrates on the equality of all human beings. It develops the ethics of a love 
based on the Golden rule as the Christian teaching of mutual love. Hence, the argument 
about shienyu ni shienyu being an aperture to the other could as well be the rationalization of 
what the dictum demands. The dictum as it stands seemingly lacks a determination of the other 
from the individual standpoint. As such, shienyu ni shienyu determines even the realms of who 
the “other” is from the communal perspective.  
Shienyu ni shienyu is a dictum that all concerned should endeavour to abide by, 
according to Makumba. In this regard existence is supposedly encountered at the communal 
level and largely informed by fellow-feeling. The situation is akin to Hollingdale’s description 
of German’s one folk-community. In such a community virtue means: 
[F]eeling with one’s Volksgenossen, loving what they love and hating what they 
hate. ‘Freedom’ consists in entering into the spirit of the folk with all one’s heart, 
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soul, and mind: in any other sense, freedom is merely a cover for a fall from virtue. 
To feel differently from the community, to oppose it, is proof of depravity.777 
In this case one’s identification with the spirit of the folk seems paramount. The underlying 
justification for such fellow-feeling is the character of moral ethnicity. Moral ethnicity refers 
to the “internal standard of civic virtue against which we measure our personal esteem.”778 The 
moral ethnicity standard operates through dictums like shienyu ni shienyu. For Makumba, 
personal esteem is evaluated in terms of how one comes to the help of the needy in the 
community.779 From the domain of shienyu ni shienyu the proponents of communality believe 
that people should freely accept the norms to which they are subjected. In this way any form 
of hierarchy particularly one founded on difference of wisdom and other virtues is eliminated.  
The privileging of community over and against the individual stands opposed 
to singular individuality enhancement. For Nyasani, a stress on community is susceptible to 
some inadequacies relative to the existential response: (1) the inability of the individual to 
assume or rise up to personal responsibility, especially the reluctance to face problems single-
handedly; (2) the psychology of self-atrophy in particular and the deliberate 
penchant for dissolving into the uncanny and impersonal being for the sake of shirking 
responsibility even where it is clearly individualized; (3) The erosion of individual initiative 
and the spontaneous courage to own up to what sometimes may pass for an ineluctably 
personal fate. Nyasani’s explanation for this scenario is that the “ineradicably collective 
conscience and inability to detach oneself from its clutches […] is largely responsible for the 
serious maladjustment of the psychology and management of personal initiatives, creativity 
and, indeed, personal adventure.”780 Nyasani’s assertions will need further scrutiny, but the 
crux of the matter seems to be that a pure communal response to existence tends to hamper 
individual responsibility.  
Anti-communitarians like MacIntyre dismiss the communal on the grounds that “local 
communities are always open to corruption by narrowness, by complacency, by prejudice 
against outsiders and by a whole range of other deformities, including those that arise from a 
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cult of local community.”781 MacIntyre’s concern here is what he perceives as the 
communitarian’s mistake of attempting to make values of a local community normative 
for a larger society, such as the state. In this case, it is comparable to Makumba’s attempt to 
make shienyu ni shienyu an aperture to the larger society. Given its deformities and 
narrowness, the local community cannot be projected as a normative 
standard. Instead, MacIntyre is interested in the flourishing of humanly worthwhile practices 
and virtues and excellences that the communities bring into play.782 Such virtues and 
excellences will entail the quality of the social practices that various local communities enable 
an individual to realize. MacIntyre’s approach seems to be the prevailing condition in 
cosmopolitan thinking today, where the individual is the unit of value and action.  
In the case of shienyu ni shienyu, Makumba believes the normative standard is in terms 
of “the ‘unadulterated’ feeling of obligation to help ‘one of my own,’ which in itself is not 
restricted and does not inhibit my thrust towards the larger human family.”783 However, as it 
was already pointed out such a norm is largely envisioned from the rationalized point of view 
and may not necessarily reflect the existential situation. What seems to prevail even on 
Makumba’s own account is what he calls the “ugliness of shienyu ni shienyu.”784 He mentions 
the forms of ugliness expressed through clannism, nationalism, nepotism, and racism, among 
others. Makumba considers these “isms” inhibitors to the positivity 
of shienyu ni shienyu. Makumba does not venture into the 
possibility that shienyu ni shienyu moral dictum itself could be the greatest possible inhibitor 
for individuals or even communities themselves in encountering the tragic nature of existence.   
Others, such as Kwame Gyekyes, in support of communal inheritance of 
values, believe that identity is formed thorough collective associations and 
obligations. Gyekyes argues:  
In the communitarian moral universe caring or compassion or generosity, not 
justice—which is related essentially to a strictly rights-based morality—may be a 
fundamental moral category. In a moral framework where love, compassion, caring, 
friendship, and genuine concern for others characterize social relationships, 
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justice—which is about relations of claims and counter-claims—may not be the 
primary moral virtue.785 
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that moral maxims justify not only ethnic groups as 
constructions, but embody some existential reality. The fact that such maxims entail the 
enigma of existence is enshrined in what they privilege: the values of compassion. There is a 
form of morality that emerges from such communal moral maxims, which Bell calls the moral 
sense of justice that is “communal and compassion based.”786 The basis of such a morality is 
the endeavour not to cause harm to another human being.  
Nevertheless, the compassion-based morality that seems to ensue from the shienyu ni 
shienyu maxim entails within it a moral conundrum. In the words of Abraham, W.E, in 
morality built on the communal and compassion, “The authorship of actions become more 
interesting than the classification of the act.”787 This means that the doer of the act is what 
determines the classification of the act. In this regard Abraham observes that what might 
generally be perceived as the same act is punished or not according to who did it. Hence, he 
points out further that: “[m]oral epithets [are] attached first and foremost to agents and only 
derivatively to their actions.”788 In this scenario the determination of the right or wrong is in 
terms of who is the agent and such consideration may not be deemed as an expression of 
partiality.  
Makumba ultimately grounds his philosophy of shienyu ni shienyu in what he calls “the 
human person and human values.”789 He explains that the philosophy of shienyu ni shienyu is 
only so “if it assimilates the universal principles of philosophy for application in the 
particularized community situations and such a philosophy should not appear a foreigner in 
the fold of philosophy.”790 Initially, it was seen that shienyu ni shienyu as a moral maxim ought 
to be understood as a response to an existential enigma where the stinks of one’s own are 
shouldered as an obligation. The problem with such an undertaking is that the vagaries of 
existence may never be properly encountered at the individual level. Furthermore, in 
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MacIntyre’s view, the proneness to narrowness and corruption by the local communities makes 
it difficult to make values ensuing from them normative. Instead of propagating universal 
principles drawn from such moral maxims like shienyu ni shienyu, the anti-communitarian 
MacIntyre hold that 
[w]e need to set side by side for comparative study examples of different types of 
local community, examples of such communities at their best and at their worst, and 
most of all examples of communities that have been or are open to alternative 
possibilities and that sometimes move towards the better and sometimes towards 
the worse.791 
The comparative approach of MacIntyre is possibly promising as opposed to Makumba’s 
universalizing endeavour. For MacIntyre, within the different social forms emerge networks 
and a variety of ways in which such networks can be sustained, strengthened, or even 
weakened and destroyed. MacIntyre’s approach seems to be existentially grounded since as he 
notes, “Different conditions pose different threats that in turn require different responses.”792 
These observations seem plausible enough, but they do not factor in Makumba’s standpoint 
which is founded on the African philosophy of socialism. The evolution of African socialism 
and its underpinnings on the individual person further considers the ontology of shienyu ni 
shienyu from a broader perspective. The challenge remains: which is a more-grounded 
response and thus akin to the actuality of existence? So far, the ontology of shienyu ni shienyu 
seems to privilege the communal against individual. Such ontology confirms B. Hallen’s 
observation about ethno philosophy that it: “presents itself as a philosophy of peoples rather 
than individuals.”793 Such characteristic of ethno- philosophy partly explains the inadequacy 
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4.3 Evolution of the African Philosophy of Sociality 
This section examines the evolution of the African philosophy of sociality. In Masolo’s 
words, the discourse on African philosophy is generally associated with the “Western 
discourse on Africa, and the African response to it.”794 Prima facie, Masolo’s assertion could 
imply that the resultant discourse is largely reactionary. Wiredu reflecting on the discourse 
about négritude believes that its focus is on restoring in black people the pride in their being 
and culture that had been eclipsed by colonization.795 J. Paul Sartre in his work Black Orpheus 
interprets négritude first as the Negro’s being against Europe and colonization and secondly in 
terms of Heidegger’s language as “the Negro’s being-in-the-world.”796 From Wiredu’s and 
Sartre’s interpretations négritude tends to be understood through cultural and identity 
connotations. However, to provide a compelling case on négritude one needs to consider its 
originator Aimé Césaire (1913–2008), a black poet, writer and playwright from Martinique.  
Césaire’s notion of négritude is developed in his work: Cahier d' un retour au pays 
natal (Notebook of a Return to my Native Land, 1939).797 According to Mireille Rosello, the 
Notebook represents “an exhilarating moment of resistance” against the racist and paternalistic 
European discourse of the 1930s.798 One form of resistance entails the re-appropriation of the 
term “nègre,” though filled with colonialist undertones, as an identity. Sartre on the 
appropriation of the supposedly negative connotations of the word nègre notes that: “having 
been insulted and formerly enslaved, he [Césaire] picks up the word [nègre] which was thrown 
at him like a stone, he draws himself erect and proudly proclaims himself a black man, face to 
face with white men.”799 However, the appropriation of the term nègre by Césare as it will be 
demonstrated is beyond the question of skin colour. 
In general, the understanding of Négritude is linked to the events of slavery and 
colonialism. On this account, Masolo observes that black peoples “wanted to reaffirm their 
culture, derogated and nearly destroyed by Westernism, slavery, and colonialism.”800 Based 
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on these experiences, it seems the natural response is to seek for self-expression. On historical 
grounds, it is claimed that the Harlem Renaissance, understood as the outcome of political 
groundwork done by different Pan-African currents in the Americas, is the precursor to the 
Négritude movement. Harlem Renaissance is generally associated with Langston Hughes’s 
poems, which urge the new black generation to express its “black personality.”801 Hence 
Masolo’s position: that “Négritude was the black francophone version of this expression of 
black personality.”802 Though this observation is largely credible, it may not project the full 
picture of négritude, especially as it is developed by Césaire. The Notebook is famed for the 
elaborate theorization in “poetic form” of the term négritude:  
My négritude is not a stone, its deafness hurled against the clamour of the day, my 
négritude is not an opaque spot of dead water over the dead eye of the earth, my 
négritude is neither a tower nor a cathedral, it reaches deep down into the red flesh 
of the soil, it reaches deep into the blazing flesh of the sky, it pierces opaque 
prostration with its straight patience.803 
The exact meaning of négritude seems to be shrouded in ambiguity. Nevertheless, in the words 
of Garraway, négritude is “a neologism” that Césaire himself coined and its description in the 
above surrealist image suggests “an association of blackness, organic nature, and the irrational 
forces of the universe, in contrast to inert matter or the immobile, vertical edifices of Western 
reason.”804 The surrealist image here correlates to the early twentieth century movement in art 
and literature that mostly dealt with the subconscious. 
French Surrealism, according to D. Maclagan, is about “individual nonconformity 
whilst simultaneously promoting collective and anonymous forms of creativity.”805 Thus 
surrealists feature the group of the unconventional, experimental or the avant-garde artists that 
promote the realm of imagery. Césaire’s type of négritude must be conceived in terms of this 
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stance of avant-gardism which is seemingly not founded on a fixed object but is dynamic. In 
the words of D. Hopkins, “surrealism owing to its avant-gardism is opposed to being 
assimilated into the system.”806 In general terms, Césaire’s négritude, as it will be seen shortly 
operates basically within the realm of life which is organic.807 Sartre’s interpretation of 
Césaire’s négritude as a becoming which desires to abolish of “all kinds of ethnic privileges” 
ought to be understood on the account of the realm of imaginations.808 The imaginative aspect 
of Césaire’s understanding of négritude has largely been overshadowed by the overarching 
influences of Senghor. For instance, Makumba seems to ascribe a fixed notion of négritude to 
Césaire by alleging that “[h]e coined the word négritude to indicate the dignity or personhood 
of black people.”809 Then Masolo remarks that “Césaire uses the word ‘négritude’ … to 
conceptualize the dignity, the personhood or humanity, of black people.”810 On the contrary, 
Césaire is rather clear that his négritude is not about systems but is surrealistic. However, 
Césaire’s brand of négritude is not the only one.  
The brand of négritude that Césaire is not keen to promote underpins the collective 
understanding in the context of “a general reappraisal of the cultural distinctiveness and vitality 
of African-descended peoples around the world.”811 This brand is linked to the Négritude 
movement in general. The Négritude movement at its foundation involved students from 
Africa and the Caribbean in Paris who included Léopold Sédar Senghor, Léon-Gontran Damas, 
Suzanne Roussy, and Aimé Césaire. They are responsible for developing the concept 
négritude. The context of the movement is the rehabilitation of the term nègre as Senghor 
attests: 
It was against this tendency to use the word Black [Noir] as a noun that the ‘black 
students’ who launched the Negritude movement in the 1930s reacted [this is an 
allusion to the journal L’ Etudiant noir]. Most of them had a solid background in 
classics, including Latin and Greek. So they were not unaware of the grammatical 
dimensions of this problem: they knew that the words Noir and Nègre were related, 
that Noir was of popular formation, whereas Nègre was borrowed from Portuguese 
and of a learned formation… 
 
806 David Hopkins, After Modern Art 1945–2000 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 168. 
807 This is the brand of negritude that hitherto not been allowed to blossom. The focus has largely been on 
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808 Sartre, Black Orpheus, 42 and 48. 
809 Makumba, 116.  
810 Masolo, African Philosophy in Search of Identity, 1. 
811 Garraway, “What is Mine: Césairean Negritude between the Particular and the Universal,” 73. 
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In the 1930s, […] our ultimate goal was to work toward the rebirth of Black African 
civilization toward restoration, and to live its fundamental values, so we decided to 
give back, at the same time, to the word Nègre its truth and thus its dignity. And 
when it became necessary for us to conceptualize our vision and our plan, naturally 
and in the most orthodox manner, Aimé Césaire invented the word Négritude.812 
The text gives the general starting point for the Négritude movement. Both Césaire and 
Senghor initially envisaged the role of négritude in reactionary terms. Makumba on the 
Notebook of Césaire similarly interprets the meaning of the return in identity terms. He opines 
that the return is meant for all black people “to unite behind their common origin in order to 
defend their identity and affirm their culture” against the tenets of Eurocentricism like 
colonialism slavery and slave trade.813 On his part, Masolo believes that Césaire’s idea of 
“return” gives the dignity, the personhood or humanity, of black people’s historicity; it turns 
it into a consciousness or awareness, into a state (of mind) which is subject to manipulations 
of history, or power relations.814 These assertions about Césaire’s Notebook are largely 
plausible but as it was pointed out above in “my négritude,” there are other fundamental aspects 
beyond the identity thesis. These aspects will be explained below (penultimate section of 
Chapter Five). The identity-consciousness thesis is mainly propounded by Senghor. It is from 
Senghor that the discourse on African philosophy of sociality starts. 
4.3.1 Senghor on Négritude 
Négritude for Senghor designates the negro-world. He believes that négritude is 
equivalent to the assertion of the African being.815 Senghor’s négritude is precisely culture 
understood as the sum total of the Africans’ cultural values.816 His thesis entails the search for 
what is constitutively African. In 1966, while addressing the “World Festival of Negro Arts,” 
he notes that “the meaningful political, social, and economic development of the people of 
African descent the world over will only occur when the special values of the Negro cultures 
 
812 This is cited by Christopher L. Miller, Nationalists and Nomads, Essays on Francophone African literature 
and Culture (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1998), 39. 
813 Makumba, 116. 
814 Masolo, African Philosophy in Search of Identity, 1–2. 
815 Leopold S. Senghor, Rapport sur doctrine la propagande du parti Congrès Constitutif du Parti du 
Rassemblement Africain (PRA) mimeographed brochure, 14. Quoted in Lilyan Lagneau Kesteloot, Les 
Ecrivains noirs de Langue francaise: naissance d’ une literature (Brussells: Institut de Sociologie de L’ 
Universite Libre de Bruxelles), 80. 
816Leopold S. Senghor, Prose and Poetry (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), 10.  
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are accorded their full place.”817 Socially, the character of that view is the communal 
prioritization of African society. According to Francis Abiola Irele, Senghor’s conception of 
négritude is an enduring quality of being, constitutive of the Black race, and exempt from the 
exigencies of the historical process.818 I must add that Senghor’s approach seems to be 
unresponsive to existential dynamics. Such a brand of négritude supposedly privileges being 
communal as African’s distinctive manner of relating to the world.  
For Wiredu, in Senghor’s search for what is constitutively African, he stumbles on the 
communal taking “precedence over the individual.”819 Wiredu further alleges that it is with the 
same endeavor that Senghor stresses the importance of the institution of the family understood 
as a kinship unit that includes “all persons, living and dead who acknowledge a common 
ancestor.” Senghor expresses his position on the distinctively Black values as follows: 
In contrast to the classic European, the Negro-African does not draw a line between 
himself and the object, he does not hold it at a distance, nor does he merely look at 
it and analyse it. After holding it at a distance, after scanning it without analyzing 
it, he takes it vibrant in his hands, careful not to kill or fix it. He touches it, feels it, 
smells it […] Thus the Negro-African sympathises, abandons his personality to 
become identified with the Other, dies to be reborn in the Other. He does not 
assimilate; he is assimilated. He lives a common life with the Other; he lives in a 
symbiosis.820 
For Senghor, emotion as a mode of apprehension takes primacy of place among the Black race. 
As Masolo observes with such understanding, Senghor is being consistent with his position 
that culturally every people have “a certain way, particular to every group, of feeling, thinking, 
expressing and acting.”821 Though Senghor is supposedly consistent, one must note reactionary 
vestiges in his claims apart from what was already projected in terms of slavery and 
colonialism. The reactionary inclination is influenced by Western academic discourse about 
Africa and Senghor’s personal experiences. 
In responding to the external academic influence, one is mainly dealing with Western 
discourse about people of Black descent. Hegel in the introduction to The Philosophy of 
 
817 Ellen Conroy Kennedy, ed. “Léopold Sedar Senghor” in The Negritude Poets (New York: Thunders Mouth 
Press, 1989), 121. 
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History divides Africa in three parts: First is Africa south of Sahara which he calls Africa 
proper “the Upland almost entirely unknown to [Europe];”822 second is Africa north of the 
desert, which he calls European Africa; third is the river region of the Nile, which neighbors 
Asia. For Hegel, the land he calls Africa proper (Sub-Saharan Africa) in terms of history “has 
remained—for all purposes of connection with the rest of the World—shut up; it is the Gold-
land compressed within itself—the land of childhood.”823 In Hegel’s thinking, “History means 
nothing but the thoughtful consideration of it.”824 In addition, reflection is considered essential 
to humanity.  
Hegel considers the land of childhood in terms of consciousness, observing,“In Negro 
life the characteristic point is the fact that consciousness has not yet attained to the realization 
of any substantial objective existence – as for example, God, or Law.”825 Regarding these two 
examples, Hegel’s position is that the will is involved and God or law plays a role in the 
realization of one’s own being. In addition, he claims that the Negro has not yet attained the 
“distinction between himself and the universality of his essential being.”826 In such a state of 
affairs, the African remains in the uniform and undeveloped state of oneness of his existence. 
Masolo interprets the Hegelian African state of innocence (childhood) as implying that the 
Sub-Saharan Africans “are unconscious of themselves, as in the natural and primitive state of 
Adam and Eve in the biblical paradise before the emergence of reason and will.”827 The 
Hegelian assertions about people on the basis of their natural context were certainly familiar 
to Senghor when he talks of the particularity of African cultural values above.  
In relation to Senghor’s context in Paris, the standard position is that the exhibitions of 
“art nègre” were a common feature that developed interest in Black performers. Based on the 
success of their dance performances, there developed a popular myth that “Blacks were 
supposedly more in touch with the world of the body, they had an innate sense for rhythm and 
dance and correspondingly no talent for rational and scientific disciplines.”828 Faced with such 
stereotypes, it is claimed that Négritude, and Senghor’s in particular, oscillated between the 
 
822 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Philosophy of History, trans. J. Sibree (New York: Dover Publications, 
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desire to reject such designations and the temptation to accept and proudly celebrate the 
supposedly “non-rational side of their personality as an alleged Black essence.”829 This attitude 
is exemplified in the re-appropriation of the term nègro into Négritude as the black 
consciousness by Africans and Caribbean intellectuals. Now, it is plausible to suggest that 
Senghor’s narrative of the distinctive Black cultural identity is a reaction to the above 
Eurocentric stance about the Black race. That that seems to be the case is demonstrable from 
Senghor’s own experience as a teenager. 
From a personal perspective, Senghor’s project of Black consciousness apparently is 
informed by the youthful experience in Dakar, the Senegalese capital. In 1921, at the age of 
fifteen in a secondary school, he reacted strongly against his teacher-priest who told him that 
they (Africans) were supposedly savages who had no traditions and no civilization and that 
they “were merely responsive to the hollow sound of words, without putting ideas behind 
them.”830 Later in 1966 Senghor reflects on that youthful experience, claiming that he “reacted 
against the things” he was told. He observes, “I was a child. But I had an intuition about African 
civilization, the intuition that we had roots in a profound spiritual tradition.” More pertinently, 
he claims that the experience made him want to defend the civilization his teacher was denying 
and it made him want “to demonstrate and illustrate it.”831 The experience with the teacher-
priest seems to have set the direction of his life as a scholar. On this account, Senghor’s 
négritude crystallized into an identity issue and as such influenced the desire to chart a different 
identity path from the Western one.  
There are two overlapping themes that are apparently pertinent in cultural 
development. The question, “What is to be done?” is frequently displaced by “Who we are?” 
which is about identity.832 These two approaches could be helpful in any attempt to 
differentiate between Césaire’s and Senghor’s stances on négritude. Though both are involved 
in the initial conception of négritude, the two develop different standpoints towards Négritude 
movement. Senghor’s brand of négritude is the one that has mostly influenced the 
understanding and development of the African philosophy of sociality. The underlying fact of 
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Senghor’s identity narrative is the communal characteristic of African society.833 
Communality in this case is articulated in terms of the family. 
The family could entail an entire village or more. This is because it includes all those 
who trace some kinship. In this regard, Senghor further observes that the African is held in a 
tight network of vertical and horizontal communities which bind and at the same time support 
him.834 The ground for Senghor’s claims is what he calls “the spiritual tradition.” The spiritual 
tradition is explained in nuances like the lack of dualism between subject and object, espousing 
the realm of emotions which include compassion. For Masolo, Senghor’s Black man is 
characterized as a man of nature who  
Traditionally, he is thought to live in, with, and by nature. He is a sensualist, a being 
with open senses and without an intermediary between subject and object; he is 
himself subject and object at the same time. He feels more than he sees. It is in 
himself, in his body, that he receives and tests the radiations emitted by objects of 
knowledge.835 
These assertions must be read in conjunction with the motivations of Senghor. He is 
determined to defend the black civilization that his teacher was denying and teach the same to 
his people. In this context of justification, Senghor is criticized for substituting “an idea” with 
“an emotion.”836 Hence, on Masolo’s interpretations above the overriding claim for Senghor 
is the maxim that emotion is Black as much as reason is Greek. The implication of the maxim 
in Senghor’s own words is not  
 that the black man has got no reason as others make me say, but rather that his 
reason is not discursive but synthetic; it is not antagonistic, but sympathetic. This is 
another way of knowing. While the European is analytic by utilization, that of the 
black man is intuitive by participation.837 
I think what Senghor is alleging is that the Black people’s understanding of reason is anti-
Cartesian. Hence, he believes that for the Black people, it is not cogito ergo sum but “I feel, I 
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dance the Other; I am.”838 In the text above, Senghor’s remark, “as others make me say,” is a 
possible reference to the youthful determination to respond to Western discourse about Africa.  
According to Wiredu, it is on “reason as emotions and closeness to nature” that Senghor 
grounds the African philosophy of sociality. Wiredu observes, ‘The communalist cast of 
African society is a social manifestation of the sense of community which the African feels 
with the whole of creation.’ In addition, he holds that “[t]his manifestation traditionally took 
the form of social arrangements of mutual caring and support which ensured for the individual 
a reasonable amount of wellbeing.”839 The individual for Senghor is not devalued, but 
individuality is defined in terms of community, not vice versa. In Senghor’s construction, the 
social arrangement of mutual caring and support centres on the community as the owner of the 
land which is regarded as the main means of production. From this common ownership of land, 
it follows that for Senghor, African society is collectivist or socialist. Some scholars on 
négritude are critical of Senghor’s approach that apparently mystifies the question of Black 
identity. Senghor, in search for identity, seems to forget about the existential conditions that 
led to the question of négritude in the first place.  
For Césaire what needed acceptance is not the colonial stereotype of blackness as 
essential irrationality, instead it is the condition of slavery and colonization. As aptly put by 
Garraway, “what emerges from the memory of the transnational, global black subject–the 
Caribbean child […] and the exhibited African–is the realization that colonial discourse on 
blackness names not a trans-historical essence, but rather an ideological construction that 
obfuscates the real conditions of the oppression rooted in the capitalist economy of the sugar 
plantation.”840 The emergence of African consciousness may not be constructed through the 
rationalized or abstractive discourses that have no guarantee of confronting the existential 
conditions involved.  
I thus hold that the designations “African philosophy of sociality” or “African 
socialism” or “African culture” are all encompassing schemes of thought that can be a 
convenient way of imposing a narrative on a plurality of experiences. Hans Prinzhorn 
reflecting on the psychology of the creators/artists and their works alleges, 
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These works really emerged from autonomous personalities who carried out the 
mission of an anonymous force, who were independent of external reality, indebted 
to no-one and sufficient solely unto themselves. The innate primeval process of 
configuration ran its course, far from the external world, without plan, but by 
necessity, like all natural processes.841 
This point will be further developed in the next chapter on conditions for the possible 
envisioning of the African cultural world. The overarching concern here is that abstraction 
even when associated with attempts to find new ways of depicting some human conditions 
may easily be diagnosed as a “symptom of withdrawal from a reality identified.”842 Senghor’s 
approach seems to seek unanimity in Black identity too quickly without letting the underlying 
existential conditions play out.  
Senghor’s brand of négritude is largely immersed in trying to espouse some African 
niche different from the Western conceptual schemes at all cost, and in the process, it tends to 
be reactionary. Such is Masolo’s position: “Senghor’s version of negritude has been charged 
with being a reactionary movement and of being apologetic to the neo-colonial culture.”843 
Worse still, négritude ascribed to cultural nationalism seems to be lost in what Mbiti christens 
“cultural Zamani” as seeking a revival of interest in traditional music, dance and folk stories.844 
Négritude conceived in terms of developing an all-inclusive consciousness could degenerate 
into imposing structures inimical to differentiation.  
Senghor’s all-encompassing structure, which he calls African socialism, could result 
in what some scholars on négritude have described as a derivative structure dependent on 
colonising culture. Négritude of such a nature “appears as a nineteenth-century European 
conception of culture as discrete, fixed, and grounded in foundational narratives of origin, 
which arguably risks producing new forms of exclusion.”845 Its weakness notwithstanding, 
Senghor’s intention was that the négritude ensuing from African socialism finds some place in 
the social and political institutions. Nyerere’s model of African socialism designated as 
Ujamaa seems to be an attempt to realize Senghor’s intention. 
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4.3.2 Ujamaa: Nyerere’s Model of African Socialism 
Nyerere responds to both the question of identity (who we are) and of action (what is 
to be done). For Nyerere one of the basic assumptions appropriate for economic and social 
organization must be “within each nation state and the decision must be exclusively by the 
people of that nation.”846 In his context Nyerere rightly thought that it is the people of Tanzania 
to decide the path of their country. This section examines Nyerere’s philosophy of Ujamaa 
and its possible influence on the development of singular individuality. With Nyerere there is 
a serious attempt to operationalize some aspects of African socialism as he interpreted them 
mostly from his own Zanaki ethnic group, and some Western philosophical influence.847  
Most of Nyerere’s claims about African socialism are in the form of political speeches 
he made in different fora. Apart from the speeches, there are policy statements too. Nyerere’s 
term for African socialism is his own Kiswahili invention in political context as ujamaa. The 
term ujamaa is specifically chosen as the description of Nyerere’s interpretation of 
socialism.848 Ujamaa is an abstract noun linked to an extended family situation. The translation 
given by Nyerere is family-hood. He writes: “Ujamaa, or ‘family-hood,’ describes our 
socialism.”849 This family-hood is further described as “an attitude of the mind.”850 Nyerere’s 
usage of the term ujamaa entails connotations of extended family setting.  
Nyerere is convinced that ujamaa as an attitude of the mind is what distinguishes a 
socialist from a non-socialist. One of the central claims of Nyerere about socialism as an 
attitude of the mind is its linkage to a moral obligation. The moral aspects of ujamaa are 
described in the following terms: “Socialism is a way of life, and a socialist society cannot 
simply come into existence. A socialist society can only be built by those who believe in, and 
who themselves practice, the principle of socialism.”851 The attitude of mind in question is that 
of brotherhood. Nyerere later while in North Korea told his audience that “a spirit of co-
 
846 This is from Nyerere’s address in Khartoum January 1973. The title of the address is “The Rational choice” 
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operation and human equality” is almost a definition of socialism itself.852 In an address to a 
Swedish gathering in Stockholm in October 1969, he claims that the nature of a co-operative 
movement is the “spirit of brotherhood and common endeavour.”853 Therefore, the nature of 
ujamaa as a family-hood or brotherhood gives it a moral thrust that demands responsibility for 
the greater national good. It is this moral demand for the national good that warrants the 
popular assertion that socialism is reconciled with nationalism.854 Owing to such a moral 
demand, Nyerere is emphatic that “[t]he foundation, and the objective, of African socialism is 
the extended family. The true African socialist … regards all men as his brethren—as members 
of his ever-extending family.”855 From the nature of ujamaa it crystallizes into a basic 
philosophy that hinges on equality and democracy.  
For Nyerere, equality and democracy among the Africans are supposedly “givens,” 
since “[w]e in Africa have no more need of being ‘converted’ to socialism than we have of 
being ‘taught’ democracy. Both are rooted in our own past—in the traditional society which 
produced us.”856 From Nyerere’s prism, equality and people’s self-governing are inseparable 
tenets. In fact, he claims that “Socialism is not possible without democracy.”857 The claims 
around equality and governability of the people as inherently African are complex and need 
unpacking. 
The basis of equality for Nyerere, like Senghor, is land. On land Nyerere appeals to 
what is supposedly traditional African communal ownership. It is supposedly traditional in the 
sense that it is basically drawn from his cultural upbringing which may not be the case all over 
Africa. The cultural anthropologists who have studied Nyerere’s ethnic land ownership system 
testify to the fact that  
[t]he right to use land as well as access to resources was determined by the lineage, 
which, in this context, is another way of saying that the land was communally 
‘owned.’ Traditionally the elders of the various descent groups were entitled to 
allocate land use, that is, they determined which individuals had the right to 
cultivate specific pieces of land. Individual ownership in the Western sense, 
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including the right to sell land individually for cash, was unknown among the 
Zanaki.858 
The Zanaki thinking on land ownership finds qualification in Nyerere’s assertion that: “the 
African’s right to land was simply the right to use it; he had no other right to it, nor did it occur 
to him to try to claim one.”859 In Nyerere’s socialist view land is one of the basic means of 
production and it is God given. The equality factor arises partly from the fact of distribution.  
Some scholars like Wiredu have interpreted Nyerere as credibly stressing the equality 
of benefits. Wiredu alleges that “for Nyerere, socialism is a distributive dispensation and not 
primarily a system of production.”860 While Nyerere’s stress on distribution of wealth and later 
nationalization of private property in his country may warrant Wiredu’s assertion, Nyerere’s 
socialism envisages production too. Nyerere gives an elaborate argument on the value of work 
where both production and distribution are emphasized. Socialism of distribution must be 
envisaged within the overarching value of society.  
In Nyerere’s scheme of things, organized society entails individuals who work and are 
taken care of by the society. He seems to be convinced that in the traditional African society,  
[b]oth the ‘rich’ and the ‘poor’ individual were completely secure in African 
society. Natural catastrophe brought famine, but it brought famine to everybody – 
‘poor’ or ‘rich.’ Nobody starved, either for food or for human dignity, because he 
lacked personal wealth; he could depend on the wealth possessed by the community 
of which he was a member. That was socialism. That is socialism.861  
In addition to land as the basic form of assurance for sustenance, it seems that nothing could 
override the existential advantages of belonging to a larger society. In the above text it will 
seem strange that Nyerere mentions famine as a natural catastrophe. But famine must be 
understood as an existential threat among the people where farming relied heavily on the rain 
patterns. In the words of a Zanaki cultural expert, communal, mutual associations were 
necessary in order to deal with “recurrent conditions” of uncertainties.862 The uncertainties 
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included the insecurity during planting and harvesting with unreliable rains. Mutual 
cooperation could be handy in such moments as a safety net. The mutual cooperation was 
evidenced in periods of work and natural calamities which, as cultural experts assert, 
“constitutes a form of ‘life insurance’ that can sometimes spell the difference between 
flourishing and disaster.”863 It is within such existential conditions that safety was more 
guaranteed in the larger society than as individuals.  
According to Komba, in Nyerere’s traditional African society ‘man was socialized to 
put the common good above individual good.’864 Komba claims further that for Nyerere the 
nature of ‘Africans’ as socialists is founded on the ‘extended family settings’ which were 
governed by three fundamental principles: “living together, working together, and sharing 
equitably the fruits of their work.”865 In such cultural settings people were encouraged to think 
of themselves as primarily members of a community. The three fundamental principles hinged 
on the basic ujamaa feeling “of recognition and respect for one another.”866 From the basic 
moral recognition and respect, communality of various forms could follow in place. Work is 
an inherent part of Nyerere’s ujamaa brand of socialism. He claims, “In traditional African 
society everybody was a worker. There was no other way of earning a living for the 
community.”867 Then he explains the implication of such a daring assertion:  
When I say that in traditional African society everybody was a worker, I do not use 
the word ‘worker’ simply as opposed to ‘employer’ but also as opposed to ‘loiterer’ 
or ‘idler.’ One of the most socialistic achievements of our society was the sense of 
security it gave to its members, and the universal hospitality on which they could 
rely.868 
Work is understood here by Nyerere as an individual’s contribution to communal sustenance. 
The individual’s work is considered as one’s fair share of contribution towards production for 
the commonwealth. He links community working and living with hospitality since he believes 
that  
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[a]ny increase in the amount of wealth we produce under this system [community 
farming] would be ‘ours’; it would not belong just to one or two individuals, but to 
all those whose work had produced it. At the same time we should have 
strengthened our traditional equality and our traditional security. For in a village 
community a man who is genuinely sick during the harvest would not be left to 
starve for the rest of the year, nor would the man whose wife is ill find the children 
uncared for−as he might do if he farms on his own.869 
Here both production and distribution are emphasized. But the two are not ends in themselves, 
since they are geared towards strengthening equality and what he calls traditional security. In 
this regard for the sake of traditional security, existential distribution seems to be privileged. 
Thus, Nyerere believes that uneven distribution of wealth poses danger for the communal 
security that entails caring for one another.  
The theme of hospitality is enshrined in the basic philosophy of ujamaa. For Nyerere, 
human equality and human dignity are basic, and hospitality seems to be the expression of the 
acknowledgement of equal human respect. As seen above, for Nyerere, security, working, and 
hospitality are intertwined. What Nyerere calls traditional hospitality is projected with the 
understanding that every member contributed to the community well-being. On hospitality the 
argument is as follows:  
Those of us who talk about the African way of Life, and, quite rightly, take a pride 
in maintaining the tradition of hospitality which is so great a part of it, might do 
well to remember the Swahili saying: [Mgeni siku mbili, siku ya tatu mpe jembe] 
‘Treat your guest as a guest for two days; on the third day give him a hoe!’ In actual 
fact, the guest was likely to ask for the hoe even before his host had to give him one 
- for he knew what was expected of him, and would have been ashamed to remain 
idle any longer.870 
The standard interpretation is that work and hospitality are constituent elements of ujamaa. 
Work-cum-hospitality as Stöger-Eising claims is “an ethos into which one is socialised.”871 
Nyerere is more emphatic: “There is no such thing as socialism without work.”872 In this 
regard, hospitality is the possible assurance that there is “mutual involvement of all the 
members of a family unit” as it is demanded of by the spirit of ujamaa.873 Hence, it is plausible 
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for one to claim that it is in hospitality that both production and distribution are grounded. 
Nyerere says as much in his assertion that “an individual who can work – and is provided by 
society with the means to work – but does not do so, is equally wrong. He has no right to 
expect anything from society because he contributes nothing to society.”874 However, at times 
distribution seems to be privileged. In the 1967 paper on practical aspects of ujamaa he argues 
that  
it is not efficiency of production, nor the amount of wealth in a country which makes 
millionaires; it is the uneven distribution of what is produced. The basic difference 
between a socialist society and a capitalist society does not lie in their methods of 
producing wealth, but in the way that wealth is distributed.875 
Though Nyerere emphasizes distribution of wealth, he is not so naïve as to forget about 
production where communal participation is demanded. The socialism principle of equality for 
Nyerere demands that production is about meeting the needs of the community. Thus, he 
further posits that the motive of production must be about “the needs of all− not the profit of 
few.”876 Such communal production and distribution require organization.  
In addition he recognizes the need to propagate the principles of “equality and of social 
responsibility,” which are the essence of socialism.877 His conviction is that the African brand 
of socialism, ujamaa, may not survive if it only stops at the national boundary. Makumba had 
insisted that what he called the philosophicality of shienyu ni shienyu “consists in securing the 
good of the other.”878 In Nyerere the basis of that good of the other is founded on the 
affirmative response to the question: “Am I my brother’s keeper? […] Yes, I am my brother’s 
keeper and every human being is my brother.”879 Nyerere needed to develop political 
institutions that were amiable to the reactivation of the ujamaa tenets as he envisaged them. 
Hence the second pillar of African socialism for Nyerere is democracy.  
In his address to parliament on The Arusha Declaration which is meant to be the 
implementation of the politics and economics of ujamaa he observes, “For socialism is not an 
alternative to political democracy; it is the extension of it. It is a system by which political 
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democracy is made an effective reality in the lives of the people, because of their control over 
the instruments with which they earn their livelihood.”880 What Nyerere is alleging here at best 
could be rendered as statements of intent. Firstly, his experience of socialism is basically 
founded on his Zanaki ethnic group and Mill’s utilitarian notions. Secondly, his notion of 
democracy will require tremendous purification to suit the brand of socialism envisaged in 
relation to the size of the country called Tanzania. He states in the policy of his TANU party 
that it aims “to build a socialist state.”881 Nyerere needed a testing ground for his ujamaa 
theorizations.  
Nyerere needed to appropriate the ujamaa philosophy into the practical lives of his 
people. Hence, he launched the ujamaa villages. Such a move was necessitated by the fact that 
ujamaa as conceived by Nyerere was first “enshrined in traditional societies.”882 As such, it is 
Nyerere’s claim that the African is not only essentially a socialist, but a democrat too. The 
weakness in Nyerere’s ujamaa is the overarching nature of the claims that easily gloss over 
the subterranean existential issues.883 The danger with subscribing naively to overarching 
claims, as John S. Saul observes, is the overvaluing of the African unity, nationalism, and 
political independence at the expense of a “frank discussion of the real challenges.”884 The 
overlooking of the relevant distinctions and differentiations within the people of Tanzania 
herself contributed immensely to poor implementation of ujamaa.  
Thus, Nyerere’s claim about being raised in a perfectly democratic and egalitarian 
society must be interrogated within the political leadership of the Zanaki people. Historians’ 
position is that the people of the eastern side of Lake Victoria such as Kuria and Zanaki “were 
not ruled by chiefs but councils of elders.”885 In such places without central authority of leaders 
called chiefs the Germans appointed them from among the local people. It is through such 
appointments that Nyerere’s father became a chief. In communities that lacked a centralized 
authority in a sense ruled by a council of elders “there are no sharp divisions of rank, status, 
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or wealth.”886 In traditional Tanzania a scenario of a council of elders does not obtain 
everywhere.  
Among the Chagga people on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro they had a defined chief 
who wielded central authority. In this regard it may not be surprising that they are also among 
the least influenced by Nyerere’s ujamaa and developed tenets towards hierarchical thinking. 
The Chagga people exhibited accounts of privileges of rank, differences in wealth and 
power.887 In the absence of one central authority like among the traditional Zanaki, mediation 
was done through the council of elders. Such mediation seems to have adopted consensus 
building as a way of arriving at decisions. However, as Stöger-Eising observes, faithfulness to 
the authority of the council and its determinations became critical in the Zanaki way of life.888 
The demand for faithfulness ought to be justified on the account of weak structures and as such 
the logic of demanding moral obligations like ujamaa.  
Another key element about the Zanaki situation is the consensus model of mediation 
by the elders. The common position is that the elders discussed matters at great length 
supposedly “till they agree.”889 Nyerere will later utilize such supposed positions of consensus 
making in what he called the African democracy. Stöger-Eising, in view of Nyerere’s notion 
of “African democracy,” argues that  
African democracy means ‘they talk till they agree’. His call for consensus finding 
through lengthy debates, the assumption that there is a true national interest which 
discussion will eventually bring to light, his emphasis on popular participation – in 
short, grass roots democracy – need to be traced back to his own experiences with 
the non-hierarchical society in which he grew up.890 
Democracy in Nyerere’s purview is largely linked to striving for consensus on the part of the 
people in matters of their well-being. As Wiredu observes, Nyerere’s standpoint on democracy 
seems to favour a socialist society suffused with an ethos of “cooperativeness as opposed to 
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personal competitiveness.”891 It must be understood that Nyerere’s ujamaa is an attempt to re-
engineer a nation-state founded on some constructed notion of brotherhood/family-hood. In 
advancing the consensus form of democracy Nyerere‘s position is that “the majority must be 
willing to maintain the argument until the minority has been convinced of the correctness of 
the decision which has been made.”892 The ultimate purpose is cooperation in the 
implementation of the decision by “everyone.” Nyerere’s ujamaa is obsessed with the 
satisfaction of the greatest number, “the-everyone” mantra.  
In Nyerere’s call for the quickest and greatest possible benefit to the people one cannot 
help but discern John Stuart Mill’s utilitarianism of distributing the greatest good to the 
greatest number. This is a plausible claim on the basis that Nyerere encountered Mill’s 
philosophy during his time at Makerere University and Edinburgh University.893 The principle 
of utility in Mill largely deals with the ultimate end of an action. In one of his claims on the 
subject he asserts that “[t]he creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the 
Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote 
happiness.”894 According to Mill scholars this passage gives the “clearest statement in 
Utilitarianism of Mill’s moral theory.”895 For Mill the notion of right in the text implies 
morally right given that he is speaking of the creed or theory of the moral foundation. In this 
text, Mill identifies the principle of utility with the greatest happiness as the probable 
estimation for right or wrong.  
Mill’s actions are right in so far as they increase happiness. But the right action ought 
to be “morally best” action which in the words of Crisp means “morally best in utilitarian 
terms.”896 Mill considers utility as a moral standard. In the words of D.G. Brown, Mill’s moral 
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doctrine entails “the acceptance of Utility as the foundation of morality.”897 The principle of 
utility for Mill is the theory of life which is the promotion of happiness. Furthermore, Mill 
states what greatest happiness entails as “the ultimate end, with reference to and for the sake 
of which all other things are desirable.”898 In this regard Mill considers happiness understood 
as the desirable end as the directive rule of human actions.  
Ultimately, the standard determination of happiness is not the individual agent’s “own 
greatest happiness, but the greatest amount of happiness altogether.”899 The happiness 
altogether implies general happiness. Mill holds the position that the utilitarian morality 
recognises in human beings the power of ‘sacrificing their own greatest good for the good of 
others.’ However he holds further that: “A sacrifice which does not increase, or tend to 
increase, the sum of happiness” is considered as wasted.900 On the contrary the befitting 
sacrifice is one devoted to happiness of others or to some of the means of happiness of others, 
“either of [humankind] collectively, or of some individuals within the limits imposed by the 
collective interests of [humankind].”901 Mill’s position of the greatest happiness as a moral 
principle finds its place in Nyerere’s assertions in his ujamaa philosophy.  
In the remarks during the ten-year anniversary of the Arusha Declaration (1977), 
Nyerere writes that the national ethic which is a socialist ethic is about “a concern for the well-
being of all rather than a pride in material goods for their own sake.”902 However, one of 
Nyerere’s strong utilitarian nuances is about wealth and leaders:  
It is a ‘tool’ entrusted to them for the benefit of the people they serve. It is not 
‘theirs’ personally; and they may not use any part of it as a means of accumulating 
more for their own benefit, nor as an ‘insurance’ against the day when they no 
longer hold the same positions.903 
These words mirrors Mill’s on disinterestedness as a utilitarian demand from individuals: “the 
happiness which forms the utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct, is not the agent’s 
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own happiness, but that of all concerned. As between his own happiness and that of others, 
utilitarianism requires him to be a strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent 
spectator.”904 In disinterestedness, according to Mill, lies the essence of utilitarian ethics where 
self-sacrifice responds to the golden rule of loving one’s neighbour as oneself. Ultimately, the 
utilitarian ethic demands that laws and social arrangements place happiness of the whole high 
on the scale. Such a conception about happiness of the whole partly colours Nyerere’s ujamaa 
programme. In one of his remarks about development and Tanzania, Nyerere asserts, “By 
developing the people of Tanzania, we are developing Tanzania. For Tanzania is the people; 
and the people means everyone.”905 Nevertheless, despite the rhetoric on ujamaa it seems to 
have failed to realize fully its two core tenets of equality and democracy. 
Nyerere’s enthusiastic motives for re-orientating his society through ujamaa villages, 
as some scholars opine, hinged on his objective of “detribalizing the people in the interests of 
unity and building the nation on the pattern of African socialism and a classless society.”906 
One observation is warranted here. Nyerere’s notion of traditional Africa society being 
classless is not entirely the case given what has been already stated above about the Chagga 
people being hierarchical with clear disparities in terms of property. Furthermore, Tordoff 
testifies to the existence of classes in West Africa. He observes,  
In the forest kingdoms of West Africa and the emirates of (what was to become) 
Northern Nigeria, society was sharply divided between a chiefly strata, often 
supported by a well-organised bureaucracy, and commoners. Office-holding 
(especially at the higher levels) and wealth went hand in hand, though some 
commoners became successful traders.907 
Nyerere was aware of this fact of class existence even in his country of Tanzania. The 
justification for this claim is his conception of ujamaa as an attitude of the mind. As such it 
needed to be constructed, and seemingly Nyerere needed some anchor notion that could 
encompass the new society of Tanzania that he envisaged.  
It is on distribution that Nyerere’s conception of the classless society could be 
sustained. As Coulson aptly observes, Nyerere’s denial of class conflict in African society 
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must be identified with “socialism as concerned with moral obligations.”908 This understanding 
seems to be shared with Stöger-Eising’s who interprets Nyerere’s ujamaa as “an ethos into 
which one is socialised rather than an ideological perspective that comes with the radicalisation 
of the proletariat.”909 It means ujamaa has more to do with the dynamics of the extended family 
unit than class conflicts associated with production in modern economy. Furthermore, the 
nature of moral constructions is basically to envisage abstract overarching scenarios which 
serve particular purposes.  
4.3.3 Brief Critique of Nyerere’s Ujamaa 
On the issue of de-ethnicisation, Nyerere seems to have largely succeeded in fashioning 
a unified nation out of the multifaceted ethnic groups and races that form today’s Tanzania. 
The success of a unified nation developed into strong nationalistic tendencies mostly evident 
in the inward-looking character of Tanzania. However, the experts’ opinion is that the 
unification aspect of ujamaa succeeded mostly due to Kiswahili language. In the words of J. 
Blommaert political ideology when it permeates language “construction of cultural identities” 
ensues.910 With ujamaa, Nyerere’s endeavour was the construction of a new society which 
could be understood as an attempt in cosmopoiesis. On the political scale and specifically on 
independence, Nyerere like other African leaders of the time was taken into the romantic ideal 
about “the pre-European [ethnic] past, idealizing it as a time of perfect democracy in which 
everyone helped everyone else, in order to ground the evolving African socialism of today on 
this old [ethnic] heritage.”911 On the part of Nyerere that idealizing was needed in the form of 
a ujamaa philosophy as a possible way of galvanizing the people of a newly independent state.  
In Nyerere’s ujamaa, there are nuances that are not discernible in many other African 
independent states then. It is Tanzania that attempts to construct their nationhood after their 
political independence. Nyerere after political independence claimed that “political freedom is 
[…] no longer enough.”912 That is largely what ujamaa set out to achieve through the design 
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of new structures as a way of changing the existing situation of poor human life. One of the 
major critics of the aftermath of the African colonial struggle, Frantz Fanon, in his observation 
of what he calls “This Africa to come,” asserts, “Colonialism and its derivatives do not 
constitute, truly speaking, the actual enemies of Africa. […]For my part, the more I penetrate 
the cultures and the political circles [of Africa] the more the certitude imposes itself on me that 
the great danger that threatens Africa is the absence of ideology.”913 Ideology in this case is 
understood as a programmatic self-understanding that leads to origination of values, methods 
and styles. Fanon’s assertion could have been entirely credible without Nyerere’s ujamaa.  
The attempt at the utilitarian packed experiment of the quickest and the greatest 
possible benefit to the masses remains largely unobtained. The question that looms large over 
the ethno-philosophical approaches to social change is about the apparent lack of the necessary 
ingredients for the re-making of society. What seem to be largely forgotten is that social 
orientation is cultural in nature, in the sense that it is about affirmation of life first and foremost 
on the individual level. In this regard, Nietzsche proposes gradualness and a lesson from 
history of cultural development, in which the spirit of will to power is indispensable. 
Conclusion 
In contrast to the first three chapters of this dissertation, in which encountering 
existence is an individual task, in the present chapter, the African ethno-philosophy advocates 
a communal affirmation. More pertinently, against Nietzsche’s individual autopoieisis, 
elements like utilitarian-based happiness, preservation instead of overcoming, morality of 
compassion and fellow-feeling seem to be promoted. These elements form what in Chapter 
Three was described as the morality of custom. However, owing to the stress on the communal 
and the enduring, the full spectrum of existence as will to power fails to be grasped. The 
vagaries of existence are literally concealed from the individuals when the communal response 
is highly valorised.  
The fellow-feeling moral maxims like shienyu ni shienyu or Nyerere’s ujamaa are 
conceived as models of affirming existence as tragic. However, though well-intentioned, such 
responses evolve overarching strait-jacket approaches that are repugnant to the task of singular 
individuality. African philosophy of sociality largely stresses the identity account, 
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overemphasizing the overriding conceptual schemes. The case in point is Senghor’s Black 
consciousness and identity mantra, in which historical happenings are simply glossed over. 
Also, Nyerere’s claims about ujamaa, as an attitude of the mind with the ensuing abstract 
notions of brotherhood, are devoid of the sense of the tragic. As such, the consequence is 
resorting to preservation models wanting in deep examination of the existential conditions.  
In the philosophy of sociality, the key ingredients of developing culture founded on the 
quality of individuals are seriously impaired. For instance, Nyerere espouses cooperation at 
the expense of competition. The ujamaa system largely focuses on the “activities of the 
masses” geared towards the satisfaction of the greatest number.914 Most of the characteristics 
espoused in ethno-philosophy—fellow-feeling, utilitarianism, Black consciousness and 
ujamaa—provide little room for an individual encounter with existence as such. I hold that the 
Senghor’s failure and Nyerere’s minimal success are due to their overarching claims, which 
disguise and conceal the nature of existence as tragic. With such flaws, it may not be surprising 
that African philosophy of sociality has not engineered much needed social development.  
In this regard, Nietzsche’s position that in the absence of the acknowledgement and 
appropriations of life as will to power, social development is compromised, seems to hold true. 
In other words, the culture that lacks the sense of tragedy denies itself the ground for anything 
further. Hence, envisioning a new society in Nietzsche’s parlance requires appropriation of the 
tragedy that demands singular individuality. It is on singular individuality that any meaningful 
social development could possibly ensue. The centrality of the tragic in social development is 
the missing link in African philosophy of sociality. Chapter Five engages with the issue of 
social development within Nietzsche’s philosophy of tragedy. Hence, individual autopoiesis 
centred on tragedy must be considered as the privileged space for cosmopoiesis. 
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Chapter 5:  From Autopoiesis to Cosmopoiesis 
For now we have to make the transition from the inward event to an assessment of 
the outward event; the eye has to be directed outwards so as to rediscover in the 
great world of action that desire for culture it recognized in the experiences of the 
first stage […]. SE, §6. 
Introduction 
This chapter proposes that Nietzsche’s philosophy, in prioritising individual 
autopoiesis, ipso facto demands cosmopoiesis. It will be shown that, in Nietzsche, individual 
autopoiesis is not for its own sake but for the enhancement of human life as it is encountered 
in social spheres. This chapter problematizes some stances found in Chapter Four, thus 
enhancing the critical dialogue between individual autopoiesis and ethnophilosophy. Overall, 
the African philosophy of sociality as it is presented in the African socialist tenet of shienyu ni 
shienyu, provides a limited space for proper individual enhancement. The response to existence 
is the common denominator between Nietzsche’s project of individual/human enhancement on 
the one hand, and the African ethno-philosophical tenet of shienyu ni shienyu on the other. But 
the quality of the response depends on how the nature of existence as tragic is made manifest. 
This is elucidated in Nietzsche’s evaluation of the Italian Renaissance and my examination of 
African philosophy of sociality.  
In the preceding four chapters on how the tragic existence could be encountered two 
overarching positions have emerged. They could be framed as the singular individuality 
response and the communal response. The focus on singular individuality as Nietzsche’s 
privileged response to existence forms the first three chapters of this dissertation. Then a 
communal response to the enigma of existence is more pronounced in chapter four. In the 
current Nietzsche scholarship, there are two main positions about the thrust of his philosophy: 
first, that Nietzsche commits himself only to social enhancement in general; and second, that 
Nietzsche’s commitment is towards the production of singular individuality. In Chapters One, 
Two, and Three, Nietzsche’s positive stance towards the production of singular individuality 
as the embodiment of his philosophy is argued for as the whole thrust for autopoiesis. In 
Chapter Four, however, the communal is privileged in responding to existential challenges 
within a particular African milieu. This final chapter must establish which of these two 
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responses (singular individuality and communality) properly affirms existence as tragic? Any 
privileged response must of necessity promote individual autopoiesis.  
This chapter is structured as follows: firstly, I present the nature of autopoiesis and its 
correlation to tragedy in Nietzsche; secondly, consideration of the role of singular individuality 
in cosmopoiesis entails what Nietzsche calls the great world of action. It is shown that what 
has often been unnoticed is that Nietzsche proposes a formidable social change program which 
demands in-depth historical knowledge. It will also be argued that the failure of the 
Reformation for Nietzsche is a solid proof that it lacked not only historical knowledge but, 
more pertinently, the sense of the tragic; and thirdly, it is argued that any cosmopoiesis in 
Nietzsche’s parlance is inseparable from the type Übermensch, as the affirmer of life as will 
to power and embodiment of the doctrine of the Eternal Recurrence. The fourth and the final 
part of the chapter attempts to go beyond the African philosophy of sociality and seek a glimpse 
at the tragic, through two propositions: (1) Within the African philosophy of Césaire and Frantz 
Fanon, and (2) My proposition that instead of embracing one’s own (shienyu ni shienyu) one 
needs to espouse the tragic world as shibala.915 Hence, one’s own becomes the tragic world 
within which singular individuality is envisaged. 
5.1 The Nature of Individual Autopoiesis in Nietzsche 
Autopoiesis as a term is not used anywhere in Nietzsche’s corpus. However, numerous 
Nietzschean designations about the individual task have largely similar nuances. References 
in Nietzsche yield some nuances of poiesis: Nietzsche’s demand that individuals develop out 
of themselves the capacity “to replace what has been lost, to recreate broken moulds.”916 In 
Schopenhauer as Educator Nietzsche believes that “[n]o one can construct for you the bridge 
upon which precisely you must cross the stream of life, no one but you yourself alone.”917 In 
The Gay Science he writes about having one’s “own practical and theoretical skill interpreting 
and arranging events” of one’s life and giving “style to one’s character.”918 All these nuances 
about the individual task are understood from the standard interpretation as self-cultivation or 
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self-making or fashioning. It is from Greek thought especially that of Aristotle, from which 
some original nuances about poiesis must be sought. 
Aristotle in the opening sentence of Poetics explains the nature, scope, and effects of 
poetry. He understands poetry as the inquiry into “how stories are put together.”919 The 
importance of Aristotle’s Poetics lies in the fact that it is one of the earliest works in Greek 
thought to deal with an analysis of poetry as art. More importantly the work deals with the skill 
behind Homer or Sophocles as masters in putting together a story.920 In his Nicomachean 
Ethics Aristotle gives three types of knowledge: episteme, technē and phronesis.921 The three 
stand for what is rendered as scientific knowledge, craftsmanship-production and wisdom 
respectively. About the productive knowledge Aristotle believes that  
[p]roduction and action are different (we can rely here also on our popular 
accounts). So the practical state involving reason is different from the productive 
state involving reason. Neither, therefore, is included in the other, since action is 
not production, nor production action. […]. 
Since production and action are different, skill must be a matter of production, not 
action. There is a sense in which fortune and skill are concerned with the same 
things, as Agathon says: `Skill loved fortune, and fortune skill.'922 
There is a distinction between production and action, because the Greeks, as Giorgio Agamben 
notes, “made a clear distinction between poiesis (poiein, ‘to pro-duce’ in the sense of bringing 
into being) and praxis (prattein, ‘to do’ in the sense of acting).”923 In poiesis the origin of the 
product is in the maker and not in the thing made.  
Furthermore, in Aristotle, the term poetry is a derivative of poiein, in two broad senses:  
In one sense it refers to a large class of activities that include makings of all kinds, 
such as shipbuilding, carpentry, as well as the composing of poems and paintings. 
In a second more specific sense, it refers to what we would call the poetic arts, such 
as tragedy, comedy, and epic.924  
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Thus, poetry is an example of the larger category of the productive arts which concern the art 
(technē) of making something. But my concern is the specific sense of poetry. As Agamben 
remarks, “the essential character of poiesis” for the Greeks in general was not the practical 
aspect “but its being a mode of truth understood as unveiling, [a-letheia].”925 The justification 
lies in the understanding of tragedy as a poetic art.  
In tragic art one gets the image of the nature of existence. As Schacht observes in 
relation to Nietzsche, tragic art is the “potential foundation and guiding force of an entire form 
of culture and human existence.”926 The link between tragedy and poiesis is that poiesis unveils 
existence as tragic. Existence itself is chaotic and generally indifferent to general human 
designs. Nietzsche seems to have been aware of that link between tragedy, poeisis and the 
Greeks when he remarks, “Only from the Greeks can we learn what such a sudden miracle-
like awakening of tragedy means for the innermost foundation of the life of a people.”927 
However, Nietzsche is also aware that understanding of life as tragic is first and foremost at 
the individual level. On the tragedy of life expressed in the enigma of time, Nietzsche writes, 
“Man, […] braces himself against the great and ever greater pressure of what is past: it pushes 
him down or bends him sideways, it encumbers his steps as a dark, invisible burden which he 
would like to disown and which in traffic with his fellow men he does disown.”928 The enigma 
of time expressed in “it was” for Nietzsche is the password which gives conflict and suffering 
access to man as a reminder of what his existence fundamentally is.  
As is seen in Chapter Four above, any privileging of fellow-feeling has a high 
possibility of cushioning the individual’s encounter with existence as such. For Nietzsche, any 
weakening of the sense of tragedy from the individual level has ripple effects. On the need for 
the Dionysian spirit (the emblem of life as tragic) Nietzsche holds,  
Dionysian loosening of the chains of the individual manifests itself first of all in a 
reduction of the political instincts, to the point of indifference or even hostility, then 
just as certainly on the other hand Apollo the genius of the principium 
individuationis is also the builder of states, and the affirmation of the individual 
personality is indispensable to the existence of the state and the sense of home.929 
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In the absence of the tragic approach to life the quality of the institutions is also left wanting. 
For Nietzsche cultural development demands what he calls “the tremendous power of tragedy 
which stimulates, purifies, and discharges the whole life of the people.”930 In this regard it can 
be credibly asserted that the role of tragedy in cultural development is similar to the power of 
strife vital for cosmic balance that is encountered in Chapter Three.931 To have the sense of the 
tragic, good philology is paramount.932 Good philology entails letting the actuality of existence 
as chaotic express itself without undue interference in terms of imposing conceptual schemes. 
This understanding of existence introduces an element of contemplation in the concept of 
poiesis. 
Poiesis as linked to the unveiling of truth in the poetic arts is elucidated by Hannah 
Arendt on the predilection of contemplation in Greek philosophy.933 Arendt envisages the 
affinity between contemplation and poiesis as part of the Greek mind: 
And the reason for this predilection in philosophy is by no means the politically 
inspired suspicion of action […], but the philosophically much more compelling 
one that contemplation and fabrication (theoria and poiesis) have an inner affinity 
and do not stand in the same unequivocal opposition to each other as contemplation 
and action. The decisive point of similarity, at least in Greek philosophy, was that 
contemplation, the beholding of something, was considered to be an inherent 
element in fabrication as well, inasmuch as the work of the craftsman was guided 
by the ‘idea’, the model beheld by him before the fabrication process had started as 
well as after it had ended, first to tell him what to make and then to enable him judge 
the finished product.934 
Whatever is happening in this assertion of Arendt is similar in one fundamental way to 
Caputo’s elucidation about a-letheia in Chapter Four on Makumba and the ontology of shienyu 
ni shienyu. Caputo’s main allegation is that a-letheia is the space within which all “Being” and 
truth as phenomenon are guaranteed and made possible. This seems to be the implication of 
poiesis as the unveiling of truth in the current context of poetics. That truth is essentially tragic. 
And as Schacht observes, “In tragic art attention is focused upon individual figures who are 
no mere ordinary human beings” but the great and sublime forms.935 From Chapters One, Two 
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and Three above, these human beings of great sublime forms must be those espousing qualities 
of the type Übermensch. One of the defining qualities of the type Übermensch is that of 
overcoming as the affirmation of life. Nietzsche’s operative scheme seems to be such that only 
those who espouse the qualities of the type Übermensch could firmly be deemed to be on the 
path of singular individuality. 
Caputo’s idea of poiesis as the unveiling is present in Plato and later in Aristotle. In the 
Dialogue Theaetetus, Socrates remarks that the “sense of wonder is the mark of the 
philosopher. Philosophy indeed has no other origin.”936 This Platonic assertion is repeated by 
Aristotle in his Metaphysics, though in a different context when he avows, “For it is owing to 
their wonder that men both now begin and at first began to philosophize.”937 More pertinently 
for the consideration of poiesis Aristotle links wonder to ignorance and myth since “the lover 
of myth is in a sense a lover of wisdom, for myth is composed of wonders.”938 Thomas Aquinas 
interprets Aristotle’s “love of myth” as a characteristic of the poets. Aquinas’s justification for 
comparing the philosopher to the poet is “that both are concerned with wonders.”939 The 
philosophers themselves are moved to philosophize because of wonder.  
Philosophical wonder owes its origin, according to Socrates to a “good genealogist who 
made Iris the daughter of Thaumas.”940 This is in reference to the goddess Iris that was at 
everyone’s beck and call and related to wonder (Thaumas) as her father.941 Given the singular 
place of what Arendt calls the “shocked wonder” (thaumazein) in Plato’s and Aristotle’s 
philosophy, wonder must be conceived as a state of contemplation and as the end of 
philosophy.942 When these notions of a-letheia, contemplation and wonder are applied to 
philosophers as poets, then poiesis seems to have a deeper sense. In the words of Agamben, 
poiesis “constructs the space where man finds his certitude and where he ensures the freedom 
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and duration of his action.”943 It is my considered position that such a notion of poiesis implies 
that the individual creates space within himself for being productive.  
In this regard poiesis and praxis seem to be intertwined in the individual human being, 
expressed by Agambon as follows: 
This productive doing [poiesis-praxis domain] now everywhere determines the 
status of man on earth – man understood as the living being (animal) that works 
(laborans), and, in work, produces himself and ensures his dominion over the earth. 
[…] An artistic pro-duction, which has now become creative activity, also enters 
into the dimension of praxis, albeit a very peculiar praxis, aesthetic creation or 
superstructure.944 
The nature of poiesis must be thought of in terms of the space it renders in the unveiling of 
reality. However, as was demonstrated in Chapter Two on will to power, the domination sought 
is first and foremost understood as individual form-giving. The nature of poiesis, as Agamben 
holds, lays in “the production of truth and in the subsequent opening of a world for man’s 
existence and action.”945 Hence, poeisis is never an end in itself, as will be demonstrated from 
Nietzsche’s works, where singular individuality properly conceived is the privileged space for 
cosmopoiesis. It has been established that from the Greek understanding, poiesis is generally 
about the conditions that prevail within the individual himself as an aesthetic reality. In other 
words, the process of individual self-production demands some optimal conditions. Key 
among the conditions is the knowledge of existence as essentially tragic.  
5.1.1 Poiesis and Tragedy in Nietzsche 
Nietzsche in “Attempt at a self-criticism,” the 1886 preface to The Birth of Tragedy he 
speaks of art “as the highest/real metaphysical activity of man.”946 This statement may not 
really imply the works of art per se, but more importantly, the human beings as artists of their 
lives. In the same work Nietzsche calls for “our greatest dignity in our meaning as works of 
art.”947 Such an artist is associated by Nietzsche later in 1887 with “those who suffer from the 
over-fullness of life” and they cherish the Dionysian art and tragic view of life.948 This vision 
of art as poiesis is consistent with Nietzsche’s earlier impressions of Schopenhauer as the 
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“magical outpouring of the inner strength.”949 In the words of Richard M. Shusterman, 
Nietzsche identifies the philosopher with the poet, since both try to interpret and so reshape 
the world.950 In this circumstance, Nietzsche’s case about the fashioning of singular individual 
is essentially drawn from Greek notion of tragedy. The ground for any interpretation and 
reshaping of the world in Nietzsche’s purview is not removed from the individual reality.  
Nietzsche believes “the individual in the feeling of possessing all his powers” demands 
translating them into action.951 The obtaining argument from this assertion and many others 
about poiesis and contemplation is that these two features provide access to existence as tragic. 
In the words of Schacht, tragic art constitutes a sort of transfiguring mirror for Nietzsche. 
However, in this mirror “we see reflected neither ‘appearances’ idealizingly transfigured, nor 
the character of the reality underlying them symbolically expressed. We are confronted instead 
with an ‘image of life’ – reflections of the (and our) human condition, highlighting both the 
individuation it involves and the fate bound up with the latter.”952 The nature of transfiguration 
entails the defining form of a thing.  
In this context of life as tragic, the kind of transfiguration envisaged is one that pertains 
to the perception of individual existence. Schacht argues that this existence is “individual 
rather than merely a part of an inexhaustible and indestructible flow of life, and is human rather 
than above and beyond the conditions to which man is subject.”953 The tragic conditions that 
the subject man is exposed to demand that poiesis first and foremost be conceived on the 
singular individual level, which ipso facto leads to the transformation of the external. Such 
singular individuals, in the words of Zachary Simpson, are like the tragic artists who can 
become “immersed in the object of art—which is existence—without succumbing to it.”954 
The philosophy of sociability in Nietzsche seems to lie in what entails existence, which is 
tragedy. In this regard Nietzsche’s understanding of the properly cultivated individual is the 
privileged space for social action.  
The theme of individual self-production is prominent in Nietzsche’s corpus. In 
Schopenhauer as Educator, Nietzsche speaks of every human being as “uniquely himself to 
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every last movement of his muscles.”955 For Nietzsche, artists are the ones who attempt to 
reveal such uniqueness of the human being in its nakedness. But more pertinently for human 
beings, the fact of man’s existence demands of him/her to be “the true helmsman of [that] 
existence.”956 Now, as a true helmsman, one must take what Nietzsche calls the bold and 
dangerous line with this existence. This implies embracing life as tragedy. In the same work, 
individual production is linked to the one who “feels himself perfect and boundless in 
knowledge and love, perception and power and who in his completeness is at one with nature, 
the judge and evaluator of things.”957 On the basis of this fullness such a one is called to “bring 
together what belongs together.”958 For Nietzsche culture demands of the singular individual 
not only the “inward experience” of that individuality but also the “assessment of the outward” 
event that eventuates into the world of action.959 This amounts to alleging that singular 
individuality demands involvement in social life. In this regard Lawrence J. Hatab notes in 
relation to the power domain in Nietzsche that “self-development never leaves the world 
untouched; some ‘Other’ will always be affected.”960 From the cited texts so far, it can be 
claimed that individual autopoiesis properly undertaken for Nietzsche leads to cosmopoiesis. 
This will be further elucidated in this chapter.  
In Schopenhauer as Educator, on how can man know himself, Nietzsche opines “it is 
a painful and dangerous undertaking to tunnel into oneself.”961 Then about Daybreak he holds, 
“In this book you will discover a ‘subterranean man’ at work, one who tunnels and mines and 
undermines.”962 Hence, Nietzsche’s assessment of the human milieu is crucially important 
before any social programme could possibly be undertaken. Such analysis of the world is 
meant to dissuade one from misrepresenting it. 
After assessment of the human milieu Nietzsche holds that there is a final demand, for 
action (Tat). The action as Tat entails the perfection of the social world of humanity. That 
action is described by Nietzsche as a “struggle on behalf of culture and hostility towards those 
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influences, habits, laws, institutions in which” the singular individual fails to recognize the 
goal of culture, the production of great individuals.963 On this account, Nietzsche seems to 
provide the standard upon which communality may be evaluated and the basis for any social 
advocacy. The individual engagement in culture is the process of continuous, enabling 
conditions for ‘self-production.’  
5.2 Nietzsche on the Perfection of the Social World of Humanity 
In Nietzsche’s view, the perfection of the social world of humanity presupposes two 
necessary conditions. First is the appropriation of the sense of tragedy, which for Nietzsche is 
projected in the capacity to affirm the Eternal Recurrence. In Chapter Three, it was 
demonstrated that the type with the capacity to affirm the doctrine of the Eternal Recurrence 
is the Übermensch. And the Übermensch as a type is the one within which the singular 
individuals can be envisaged. The implication is that the one who appropriates the sense of 
tragedy is most likely to espouse the character of singular individuality. The second condition 
is the deep knowledge of the human historical reality. Nietzsche in Schopenhauer as Educator 
seems to project knowledge as the transitioning element to action. After describing the 
continual production of individual great men as the objective of culture, he remarks,  
I have to describe the further stage of this [commitment to culture], and I realize 
that here my task is more difficult. For now we have to make the transition from the 
inward event to an assessment of the outward event; the eye has to be directed 
outwards so as to rediscover in the great world of action that desire for culture.964 
 
For Nietzsche, the enhancement of culture is enshrined in the continual fashioning of singular 
individuals. The longing for singular individuality according to Nietzsche must be employed 
by the individual as “the alphabet by means of which” he/she can understand the aspirations 
of humankind as a whole.965 This section of the dissertation seeks to engage with the 
parameters within which Nietzsche’s singular individuality or human enhancement ought to 
be understood. Such parameters will similalrly obtain for Nietzsche’s conditions for individual 
autopoiesis in critical dialogue with ethno-philosophy and cosmopoiesis. 
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According to Young’s interpretation, for Nietzsche, community interests take 
precedence over those of the individuals.966 For Kathleen Higgins, Nietzsche censures the 
crowd mentality since it constrains the individual to conformity.967 Nevertheless, Higgins 
holds that Nietzsche’s negative projections of the herd or crowd are not simply restricted to 
these groups but are extended to individual members of these categories. Ultimately, according 
to Higgins, Nietzsche’s community is largely composed of exceptional individuals.  
There are other Nietzsche scholars like B. Leiter and Ansell-Pearson who believe that 
for Nietzsche, society is only valuable insofar as it is a means to producing exceptional 
individuals.968 Their position seems to be consistent with Nietzsche’s stance in Schopenhauer 
as Educator on humankind’s task of continually producing individually great men.969 Finally, 
Clark and Wonderly believe that the good and the source of community is its value which 
depends on the things that it facilitates. And the greatest of that value is the “true individuality 
and especially the exceptional individual, one who exhibits the highest form of 
individuality.”970 On this account, Clark and Wonderly allege that Nietzsche might 
accommodate a richer notion of community value than is commonly supposed. Hence, the 
community in some respects could be accorded the value that Nietzsche attributes to the 
exceptional individuals.  
One key feature of these interpretations of what Nietzsche is “committed to” is their 
lack of a clear foundation in “existence as tragic.” Right from his lectures on Greek state to the 
later period, as in Twilight of Idols, Nietzsche provides a programme for social action whose 
basis is tragic existence. Hence, the response to whether Nietzsche is “committed to” singular 
individuals or the flourishing community must consider his own programme as laid out in 
Schopenhauer as Educator. The realization of the singular individual, though paramount, is 
not an end in itself and is apparently a work in progress. That seems to be the import of 
Nietzsche’s allegation that  
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Culture demands of him [an individual], not only inward experience, not only an 
assessment of the outward world that streams around him, but finally and above all 
an act, that is to say a struggle on behalf of culture and hostility towards those 
influences, habits, laws, institutions in which he fails to recognize his goal, which 
is the production of the genius.971 
In this regard any social involvement or struggle must be geared towards the production of 
great individuals. For Randall Halle, Nietzsche understood individual transformation as the 
goal and collective transformation as an outcome.972 The justification of such an interpretation 
is based on the fact that Nietzsche envisages progression from within and not from without the 
individual sphere.  
For Nietzsche, value does not arise from outside life, but is perspectival. Values are 
inherent to the conditions of the one who values. The values are not supervening upon the 
world. The highest value for Nietzsche encompasses a maximally affirmative attitude toward 
life. In the interpretation of E. E. Sleinis, in Nietzsche’s philosophy, life is valuable to the 
degree that the affirmation of it is attained.973 Examination of Nietzsche’s programmatic 
passage above (from Schopenhauer as Educator) may provide some justification of this claim, 
that Nietzsche’s commitment whether to individual or community, properly conceived must 
be founded on existence as tragic. Let me now examine how Nietzsche justifies need for the 
sense of tragedy in human enhancement. 
5.2.1 The In-Depth Knowledge of History: A Prelude to Social Involvement  
In an unpublished text, The Greek State (1871–72), Nietzsche believes that the 
justification for the existence of the Olympian state lies in the generation and preparation of 
the genius. Nietzsche alleges that “[t]he actual aim of the state, the Olympian existence and 
constantly renewed creation and preparation of the genius, compared with whom everything 
else is just a tool, aid and facilitator, is discovered here through poetic intuition and described 
vividly.”974 This text precedes what he claims later in Schopenhauer as Educator, namely, that 
“[h]umankind must work continually at the production of individual great men—that and 
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nothing else is its task.”975 Nietzsche is not making these claims at this point in time without 
any basis. He has a historical backing given the lectures he attended during the early years at 
the University of Basel under Jacob Burckhardt, a Swiss historian. In a letter to Carl Von 
Gersdorff Nietzsche writes,  
Jacob Burckhardt gave a public lecture on ‘Historical Greatness’ – entirely within 
the scope of our own thoughts and feelings. […] I’m attending a one-hour-a-week 
lecture course of his on the study of history, and I think I am the only one in the 
class of sixty who follows his deep trains of thought, with their strange breaks and 
twists whenever they touch on something delicate.976 
Apart from the appreciation that Nietzsche exhibits in the letter about these lectures, he also 
describes Burckhardt as the most singular man. Nietzsche not only developed a peripatetic 
relationship with Burckhardt, but also admired a certain philosopher in common with him: 
Schopenhauer. According to Nikola Regent, Burckhardt “exercised a dominant influence in 
the shaping of Nietzsche’s views of two great historical periods, (Greek) antiquity and the 
Renaissance.”977 Nietzsche’s first mention of the Renaissance appears in the The Greek State 
where it is construed in the same light as the Greeks, with the title of “political men par 
excellence.” He claims that 
actually history knows of no other example of such an awesome release of the 
political urge, of such a complete sacrifice of all other interests in the service of this 
instinct towards the state – at best, we could honour the men of the Renaissance in 
Italy with the same title, by way of comparison and for similar reasons.978 
Burckhardt’s lectures made the Renaissance meaningful for Nietzsche. In the context of The 
Greek State, Nietzsche apparently learned from Burckhardt the connection between the state, 
society, and the creation of higher men.979 To clarify this claim, some acquaintance with the 
Renaissance spirit as it is presented by Burckhardt could be helpful.  
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Jacob Burckhardt (1818–1897) in one of his works, translated into English as The 
Civilisation of the Renaissance in Italy analyses how Middle Ages Italy gave birth to individual 
singularity. 980 The work has three main parts: “The State as a Work of Art,” “The Development 
of the Individual,” and “The Revival of Antiquity.” My focus will be on the development of 
the individual. As Regent states, “[I]t provided Nietzsche with a conception of the Renaissance 
man.”981 For Burckhardt in Middle Ages Italy human beings were at first conscious of 
themselves in terms of generic categories, as members of a race, a people, party or 
corporation.982 These categories then were melted into the state. And on the spiritual level man 
became a spiritual individual. Due to a political situation of having despotic governments, Italy 
of thirteenth and fourteenth centuries developed a strong inclination towards a free personality. 
Consequently, the individuals were not afraid to show their nature and character. Burckhardt 
continues that at the close of the thirteenth century Italy was swarming with exemplary 
individuals like Dante because it was no longer under the spell of race. He refers to Dante as 
“the august poet” who through “wealth of individuality” was the greatest herald of his time.983 
Before further claims of Burckhardt are presented, it is pertinent to ascertain on what grounds 
his assertions about the Renaissance ought to be taken.  
One argument against Burckhardt’s conception of the Renaissance in Italy is what 
some scholars have “contended that Burckhardt’s Renaissance is more truly a reflection of the 
ideas and ideals of the author and his age than of the reality he sought to portray.”984 It may be 
granted that many features of mid-nineteenth century culture were alive to Burckhardt. 
Clarification is required on whether Burckhardt’s portrayal of the Italian Renaissance is meant 
for factual exactitude or whether, as Erich Heller posits, “[i]ts authority is of a different 
nature.”985 It seems rather clear that Burckhardt’s preoccupation is not the chronological 
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history of the Italian Renaissance in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Nevertheless, 
Burckhardt draws freely from the chronicle sources of the likes of Matarazzo, “the Chronicler” 
of Perugia. The difference in the nature of authority lies in what these chronicles mean for 
Burckhardt: the authenticity of the mind, imagination, and spirit of the Renaissance. Hence, 
Heller believes that the spirit of Renaissance for Burckhardt reveals “the quality of the life of 
the period, or the Geist of the epoch.”986 What Burckhardt is doing is a history of culture.  
Examining the history of culture is more difficult since it is not about ordinary 
techniques of critical investigation and, in fact, “it is not a technique at all, but rather creative 
sympathy.”987 The creative sympathy entails engaging with the values attached in this case to 
the Italian Renaissance spirit. Hence Burckhardt’s history is not about “the parts but the totality 
of Renaissance spirit.”988 The history of culture from the realm of creativity becomes what 
Heller notes of Burckhardt, that “throughout his life, history remained for him a poetic 
activity.”989 This is a pertinent development in relation to the role of poiesis in the scheme of 
singular individuality as it is demonstrated above (see the nature of poiesis above). Considering 
history as a poetic activity amounts to looking at history as the space for the production of 
singular individuals and states as works of art.990 In the case of Italy at the end of the feudal 
system there was no strong power to realize a national unity. Burckhardt observes that in the 
absence of national unity emerged a multitude of political units in the form of republics and 
despots. The situation of the balancing of power that later necessitates statecraft is described 
as follows by Burckhardt: 
In them for the first time we detect the modern political spirit of Europe, surrendered 
freely to its own instincts, often displaying the worst features of an unbridled 
egoism, outraging every right, and killing every germ of a healthier culture. But 
wherever this vicious tendency is overcome or in any way compensated a new fact 
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appears in history−the State as the outcome of reflection and calculation, the state 
as a work of art.991 
The point of focus for now is the notion of the state as a work of art. It is not a given reality 
but a task. In this regard Nietzsche believes that the manner of living in the Renaissance 
essentially demands the need to create.992 As it will be seen below, one of the justifications for 
Nietzsche’s appeal to an in-depth understanding of history, especially of the Renaissance, is 
possibly to show that with optimum conditions singular individuals are possible and even a 
new remaking of community is possible. However, as Nietzsche will observe in 1878, 
statecraft must always remain in progression since:  
The state is a prudent institution for the protection of individuals against one 
another: if it is completed and perfected too far it will in the end enfeeble the 
individual and, indeed, dissolve him – that is to say, thwart the original purpose of 
the state in the most thorough way possible.993 
Hobbesian and Machiavellian nuances can be discerned in Nietzsche’s assertion: Thomas 
Hobbes’s condition of war of “every man, against every man,”994 a situation prevailing in the 
absence of a common power; and what Nietzsche calls the domination of virtue.  
Nietzsche observes that “one can achieve the domination of virtue only by the same 
means as those by which one can achieve domination of any kind, in any case not by means of 
virtue.”995 He believes that the philosopher who comes closest to the description of the 
domination of virtue via non-virtuous means is Machiavelli. In Beyond Good and Evil, he calls 
for the imitation of the “tempo of Machiavelli.” 996 In this regard, as Regent observes, for 
Nietzsche war is conceived as an art-work.997 “War” here is understood as the space for 
enhancement of great individuals when understood through the scheme of the domination of 
virtue. Some scholars, like Hatab, interpret Nietzsche’s “war” as the necessary obstacle. He 
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observes that, for Nietzsche, life “is an overcoming of some obstacle or counterforce, so that 
conflict is a mutual co-constitution of contending forces.”998 It is opposition that generates 
development.  
Burckhardt on the Renaissance envisages not only statecraft, but above all the 
fashioning of man. For Burckhardt, in the words of Heller, “Man, […] not a Hegelian 
Weltgeist, is the centre of history.”999 This means that for Burckhardt, unlike for Hegel, no 
system could be expounded apart from and beyond historical aspects of human life. The history 
of culture must be understood in this case from Burckhardt’s own conception of culture.  
The term culture according to Nelson and Trinkaus refers to “the generally shared 
outlook on life and characteristic modes of responding to situations on the part of a given 
socially related group of people.”1000 This means that the history of culture deals with groups, 
institutions and political organizations, mental and emotional attitudes, not for their own sake 
but in relation to life. Thus, Burckhardt’s consideration of the Italian Renaissance is relevant 
to this project of singular individuality once it is recognized that “his primary aim was to depict 
the characteristic states of mind and underlying patterns of the Italian people during the 
fourteenth, fifteenth and seventeen centuries.”1001 One such underlying pattern involves 
statecraft, which similarly influenced the creation of the singular individual. Hence, 
Burckhardt on the development of the individual observes, “In the character of these states, 
whether republics or despotisms, lies […] the chief reason for the early development of the 
Italian.”1002 Nietzsche on the positive forces within the Italian Renaissance notes one of them 
as the “unfettering of the individual.”1003 And behind the emergence of such individuals there 
are some underlying reasons. 
According to Burckhardt, Italians of the fourteenth century knew little of false modesty 
or hypocrisy in any shape, since “not one of them was afraid of singularity, of being and 
seeming unlike his neighbour.”1004 This is because the despot fostered to the highest degree 
his own individuality and that of the men whom he protected or used as his tools. Such men 
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were forced to prove themselves as poets or ministers and for that matter, they had to know 
and muster all the inward resources of their own nature (temporary or permanent). More 
importantly for culture, Burckhardt observes that fourteenth century Italian despotism led to 
the private man.  
The private man means, the individual indifferent to politics, and busied partly with 
serious pursuits and partly with interests of a dilettante. The individual with such interests 
developed a highly cosmopolitan thinking and acting and avoided attachment to a fixed 
residence. It is within such a milieu that there arose the “all-sided man,” l'uomo universal who 
apparently belonged to Italy alone.1005 During the Italian Renaissance there emerged artists 
who produced new and perfect works that have had a lasting impression on humanity. Among 
the artists, one notes especially Dante, who pours out a personal force in his writings. 
Burckhardt observes that Dante finds a new home in the language and culture of Italy and even 
beyond, whereby he attains a cosmopolitan flavour with the expression “My country is the 
whole world!”1006 The overarching reason for the greatness of this period is the space it 
provides for the emergence of singular individuals. In a letter to his friend Rohde in 1870 
Nietzsche writes,  
I have delivered a lecture on ‘The Ancient Musical Drama’ before a mixed 
audience, and Feb. 1st I shall deliver a second on ‘Socrates and Tragedy.’ Every day 
I get to like the Hellenic world more and more. There is no better way of 
approaching close to it than that of indefatigably cultivating one’s own little self.1007  
The espousing of the Hellenic and Renaissance world for Nietzsche stems, as Church notes, 
from the belief that culture is central to individual ethical perfection and human excellence.1008 
Nietzsche’s praise of the Italian Renaissance must not only be conceived within the framework 
of its promotion of singular individuals, but also as the basis for an effective social 
involvement. One case in point for Nietzsche where social involvement fails given the lack of 
proper singular individuals and historical assessment, is the Reformation. 
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5.2.2 Nietzsche on Failure of the Reformation 
Though Nietzsche is largely read as an individual enhancement thinker, he has some 
tendencies that privilege community. Nevertheless, the failure of institutions is blamed on 
weaknesses of particular/influential individuals in society. Nietzsche scholars who hold that 
he cherishes the enhancement of society appeal to The Birth of Tragedy, particularly on the 
communal myth. Young, in support of the communitarian outlook in Nietzsche, holds that “the 
health of a society and of the individuals who belong to it, depends on a communal ‘myth’ or 
ethos, a shared understanding of the proper life of the community as a whole and of individuals 
in it.”1009 This outlook is founded on the role of myth in Nietzsche. Apparently arguing against 
the emerging critical-historical spirit of his time Nietzsche defends myth since 
without myth every culture forfeits its healthy, natural creative force: only a horizon 
defined by myths completes the unity of a whole cultural movement. Only myth 
can rescue all the forces of imagination and of the Apollonian dream from their 
aimless roaming. The images of myth must be the omnipresent but unnoticed 
daemonic guardians, under whose protection the young soul grows to maturity and 
whose signs enable the grown man to interpret his life and his struggle: and even 
the state knows no more powerful unwritten laws than the mythical foundation 
which guarantees its connection with religion, its growth from the mythical 
notions.1010 
Nietzsche describes myth as “the compressed-world image.”1011 What the myth compresses is 
the phenomenon of life, whose interpretation, as Young opines, depends on the communal 
ethos.1012 The concern with myth at this point in Nietzsche’s philosophy must be linked to 
what J.P. Stern calls “the cultural situation of the German Empire of 1871.”1013 One such 
situation is the patriotic concern with the past. The aphorism under consideration from The 
Birth of Tragedy is generally interpreted as “an intensely nationalistic passage.”1014 In this 
regard, myth possibly serves the purpose of claiming the unity of the whole. In Young’s 
interpretation Nietzsche’s “unity of people and culture” points to his commitment to the 
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communitarian outlook.1015 For Nietzsche, myths serve as assurances for identity since “the 
man without myth” lacks roots.1016 In The Birth of Tragedy it is commonly held that Nietzsche 
espouses the rebirth of German myth.  
In support of a supposedly communitarian outlook, Nietzsche in the same text refers to 
the German Reformation and its architect Luther. In Nietzsche’s interpretation, the German 
Reformation grew from the original force of the power of myths. The Reformation sought to 
reform the Catholic Church that was threatened by secularism and political crises. Two 
references to Luther are relevant here: (1) Luther’s adaptation of Catholic liturgical songs out 
of which the future melody of German music sprang1017; and (2) Luther as one of those who 
sought the inner necessity for the restoration of the German cultural spirit.1018 The period in 
which Nietzsche seeks the cultural restoration of Germany seems to coincide with the rise of 
nationalism. But as Large suggests, it is the period of overt cultural nationalism in which 
Nietzsche co-opts Luther for his cause.1019 There is a sense in which one can say that such co-
opting was bound to happen. This is justified as follows: 
As observed by Giles Fraser, “Luther so shaped the cultural landscape of subsequent 
generations that Nietzsche cannot have been but influenced by the theological revolution 
instigated by Luther.”1020 This assertion is demonstrable from the early Nietzsche’s list of the 
great Germans. After The Birth of Tragedy in his lectures he writes about the spirit of 
Luther.1021 The German greats are given as Luther, Goethe and Schiller.1022 Another list has 
Schopenhauer, Wagner, Goethe, Schiller, Luther and Beethoven.1023 In 1875, when Nietzsche 
was working on Richard Wagner in Bayreuth the order is Luther, Goethe, Schiller, 
Schopenhauer, Beethoven and Wagner.1024 Nietzsche’s recognition of Luther in relation to 
German cultural development seems incontestable.  
In linguistic circles, Luther’s writings hastened the development of German as the 
language of intellectual life. The use of the Bible translated by Luther acted as the regeneration 
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of German literature. Fraser holds that Luther’s translation of the Bible “was the decisive move 
in establishing the East Central dialect of Early New High German as the basis of written 
German.”1025 Max Baeumer believes that “Nietzsche saw the Prussian State (or later the 
German Empire) and the Lutheran Church as the two institutions that determined the national 
life and glory of Germany.”1026 More pertinently, as Large observes, the nationalistic 
appropriation of Luther continued into the twentieth century Germany.1027 Young and others 
who interpret the communal myth as the pointer to Nietzsche’s commitment to the 
communitarian outlook may need to re-look at what is said in the foreword to The Birth of 
Tragedy.  
Nietzsche fathoms the seriousness of existence when he warns that “those readers 
would be mistaken who approach this collection of ideas with an opposition between the 
patriotic movement and aesthetic indulgence in mind, an opposition between bold seriousness 
and the serenity of play.”1028 He further remarks about what he calls a “serious German 
problem […]which we place right in the centre of German hopes, as the point around which 
they twist and turn.”1029 Nietzsche becomes more pointed when he talks of an aesthetic 
problem being taken seriously and then the “seriousness of existence.” Nevertheless, the myth 
can still support the communitarian position. In the words of Baeumer,  “Wagner’s Teutonic 
operas and Nietzsche’s The Birth of Tragedy out of the Spirit of Music […]were determined in 
many respects by the national condition and nationalistic attitudes of the time.”1030 In any case 
the German perception of existence at this point in time could not escape such national attitudes 
as manifested and personified in its hero Luther.  
Still, in The Birth of Tragedy’s 1886 preface. Nietzsche in his opening statement notes, 
“Whatever may lie at the bottom of this questionable book: it must have been a question of the 
greatest interest and appeal, as well as a deeply personal question.”1031 On these scores The 
Birth of Tragedy is about existence which can be properly encountered at the singular, 
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individual level.1032 And in any case Nietzsche presents communal myth rightly as an 
abbreviation of a phenomenon.  
According to G.S. Williamson myth can be understood in three possible ways: First as 
‘mythology’ which is a system of narrating symbols and rituals; second as ‘mythos’ which 
implies the timeless basis of the human, and third as ‘mythus’ which is the “veil or veneer of 
appearance that would make the tragic insight of pessimism bearable.”1033 Among the three 
the standard interpretation is that the third one is privileged in The Birth of Tragedy. Myth as 
a veneer on life is an aesthetic understanding. It is credible that for Nietzsche life requires a 
communal myth for it to be encountered but it may not be an abiding standpoint for him. Life 
is an enduring theme in Nietzsche. In the words of Reginster, Nietzsche sees “the affirmation 
of life” as the defining achievement of his philosophy.1034 Williamson observes that Nietzsche 
and others interpreted Wagner’s phenomenon within the context of romantic scholarship on 
myth.1035 Nietzsche’s distancing himself from Wagner focuses also on Luther’s cultural 
heritage. One such heritage is nationalism, and Luther seems to be part of that package that 
Nietzsche needed to leave behind.  
Hence, the narrative of a communal myth in support of a communitarian outlook as 
Nietzsche’s commitment may not go beyond the Nietzsche of 1873. It is not an enduring 
position in Nietzsche and even in the early period communal myth is arguably a response to 
existence which is ultimately experienced as an individual phenomenon. In the words of Large, 
it became clear to Nietzsche that Luther is a protagonist in a “historical narrative which no 
longer sweeps through from the Greeks to the present with majestic vagueness.”1036 Luther’s 
spirit apparently lacks broader historical context, given that it served the immediate 
nationalistic German needs. Instead, cultural enhancement that aims at production of great 
individuals may not ensue first and foremost from the restrictive nationalistic approach. The 
German Reformation on Nietzsche’s account failed to capture this trend of the Enlightenment. 
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In support of the singular individual as the focus of any human enhancement in Nietzsche is 
the development of the notions of the Enlightenment and German Reformation.  
From the outset, according to Nietzsche there may be great individuals who “appear 
[as] blunt and forceful spirits capable of great enthusiasm whose development is nonetheless 
retarded.”1037 One such development considered retarded is Luther’s Reformation. Initially, 
the stunted development is not ascribed to individuals as such but to the fragility of science. 
Nietzsche observes that “science was as yet unable to raise its head.”1038 In this regard, and as 
Ruth Abbey seem to recognize, Nietzsche acknowledges scientific thinking as the source of 
social progress.1039 Science here among other implications stands for the rigorous method,1040 
the critical reflection,1041 and the focus on the human being as a historical reality.1042 In the 
absence of a strong scientific stance there are possibilities of conjuring “up again an earlier 
phase of humankind.”1043 One such case of backward movement is Luther’s Reformation and 
the stifling of the Renaissance spirit. One wonders why the Lutheran Reformation among 
others should be held responsible for the delay of the Enlightenment if the problem is that of 
a weak scientific spirit. According to Nietzsche, historical philosophy is a necessity for 
whoever ventures in exposing human attitudes for progression.  
Nietzsche partly understood the Renaissance Italians as those who appropriated for 
themselves the wisdom of antiquity. As such he praises Plutarch with a call to  
[s]atiate your soul with Plutarch and when you believe in his heroes dare at the same 
time to believe in yourself. With a hundred such men – raised in this unmodern way, 
that is to say become mature and accustomed to the heroic – the whole noisy sham-
culture of our age could now be silenced forever.1044 
Nietzsche considered Plutarch an untimely figure and one of the bearers of “the banner of the 
Enlightenment.”1045 Nietzsche ascribes to Plutarch a motto of daring and believing in himself. 
In 1784 Berlinische Monatsschrift posed a question: What is Enlightenment? It was put as a 
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footnote question by Zöllner and responses came from among others Mendelssohn and Kant. 
In his response, Kant adopts the rationalist’s motto Aude Sapere with a slight but with an 
important variation as the Enlightenment motto.1046 About Horace as a Latin poet in his own 
day it is claimed “he was not just a modern poet but also a daring innovator who had to win 
acceptance on the face of conservative taste.”1047 Horace’s poems are mainly thematic.  
In general, his themes include the perennial enslavement of men to money, power, 
superstition, and sex. Such themes form a background to his maxim Aude Sapere (Dare to be 
wise). Horace writes “Well begun is half done: Dare to be wise. Start now. The man who 
postpones the hour of reform is the yokel who waits for the river to pass; but it continues and 
will continue gliding and rolling forever and ever.”1048 This part of the poem caught the eye of 
the rationalists who rendered it as “Dare to be wise.” Kant interprets it as “Have courage to 
use your own understanding!”1049 Though it is not clear whether Nietzsche ever read Kant’s 
article on the Enlightenment, it is pertinent to observe that the Enlightenment is associated 
with the individual daring spirit. However, Nietzsche acknowledges the philosophical mode 
of life of Horace as not only “established by reason and habit,” but “directed towards joy in 
living and in one’s own self.”1050 Daring may be a needed spirit if one intends to be untimely 
in Nietzsche’s view.  
For Nietzsche, Luther represents the opposite of the daring spirit as opposed to 
Plutarch. In the view of Large, which is largely the standard interpretation, Nietzsche’s respect 
for the Enlightenment grows in proportion to his respect for the noble humanism of the Italian 
Renaissance, which he sees as its cradle. Consequently, “Luther’s Protestant Reformation 
becomes vilified as the baneful antithesis of those noble flowers, Renaissance values, its 
manliness a sad mockery of Renaissance virtủ, its overall success one great cultural calamity 
[…].”1051 The noble humanism of the Italian Renaissance in Nietzsche’s estimation contained 
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within it what is called “the positive forces” required by modern culture.1052 The positive forces 
were generally meant to espouse the nature of the Enlightenment as an attempt to free 
humankind from superstitious religion, traditional philosophy and from oppressive political 
and social institutions.1053 On the contrary, the German Reformation is labelled as “an 
energetic protest by retarded spirits who by no means had enough of the world-outlook of the 
Middle Ages and greeted the signs of its dissolution, the extraordinary transformation of 
religious life into something shallow and merely external.”1054 The German Reformation here 
seems to be the generic German hostility to the Enlightenment as he later described it in 
Daybreak.  
However, there may not be any serious distinction for Nietzsche between Luther’s 
spirit and the German Reformation. In the first clearly negative designation of Luther, 
Nietzsche refers to him as one of the “retarded” spirits.1055 This rendering of Luther and the 
German Reformation it is not entirely something new; Nietzsche is being consistent. In the 
words of Baeumer, Nietzsche’s evaluation of Luther “whether affirmative or negative, always 
portrays [his] image of the German national character.”1056 For Nietzsche, Luther seems to 
personify everything German. Therein is the consistency. Nevertheless, Nietzsche’s critique 
of Luther tends to be exaggerated and founded on his own Lutheran up-bringing.  
In Daybreak, the contribution of the Germans of the eighteenth century to general 
culture is stated as follows: firstly, the German philosophers are termed speculative since they 
“were content with concepts instead of explanations;” secondly, the German historians and 
romantics are said to have brought “into honour older, primitive sensibilities,” especially 
Christianity, the folk-soul, folk-lore, folk-speech, the medieval world and oriental asceticism; 
then thirdly, the natural scientists are said to have “fought against the spirit of Newton and 
Voltaire.”1057 For Nietzsche these three groups in Germany supposedly delayed cultural 
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progression in Europe. The claim about the Germans being delayers of the Enlightenment is 
only apparent here.  
Later, in Anti-Christ, Luther is held solely responsible for the German Reformation. In 
a considerably over-arching claim about the three German groups above, Nietzsche is emphatic 
that “[a]mong Germans one will understand immediately when I say that philosophy has been 
corrupted by theologian blood. The protestant pastor is the grandfather of German philosophy, 
Protestantism itself is its peccatum originale.”1058 To substantiate his claim, Nietzsche makes 
reference to the German college of Tübingen, whence such major German philosophers like 
Leibniz and Kant trace their roots. Furthermore, Nietzsche remarks that in the German 
academic world at that time, three quarters were composed of “the sons of pastors and 
teachers.”1059 These claims of Nietzsche seem to augment the standard understanding that 
Luther is a representative man in the history of German culture and is considered as the father 
of the German religion.  
Hence even if Nietzsche makes general cultural claims, there is still individual 
culpability in the background. In Anti-Christ on the Renaissance, Nietzsche makes a general 
assertion that “[t]he Germans have robbed Europe of the last great cultural harvest Europe had 
to bring home—of the harvest of Renaissance.”1060 Then, he elaborates on what the 
Renaissance stood for as the revaluation of Christian values and establishment of the noble 
values. On the contrary, that process was disrupted and hence Nietzsche asks, “What 
happened?” The German monk Luther is presented as being anti-Renaissance.1061 It is largely 
true that Nietzsche occasionally refers to epochs. For instance, he refers to the eighteenth 
century as “the century of enthusiasm,”1062 and the Middle Ages as the “era of the greatest 
passions.1063 The point is that for Nietzsche there are figures that warrant such general 
designations. In this regard, the foremost German delayer of the Enlightenment is Luther, due 
to the Reformation he initiated.  
In Nietzsche’s scheme of things, the Reformation, apart from being a political reaction, 
also reveals the psychological state of Luther as a person. Nietzsche ascribes to Luther an 
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inkling towards “unconditional trust,”1064 the equivalent of “the convinced man as a 
fanatic,”1065 and projected as a man of “vindictive instincts.”1066 These are mostly noted as 
negative characteristics throughout Nietzsche’s philosophy. In one of several descriptions of 
conviction, he considers it “the belief that on some particular point of knowledge one is in 
possession of the unqualified truth.”1067 The person who makes claims about possessing 
convictions in matters of knowledge is perceived to lack scientific inclinations. The claim to 
possession of unqualified truth is ascribed to one who is “retarded.”1068 The vindictive instincts 
in Nietzsche’s view are about the weak will, given that self-mastery is impaired.1069 
Luther, on Nietzsche’s account, lacks the basic ingredient for cultural enhancement 
which is “the individual self-knowledge” as the condition of one who “enriches everything out 
of one’s own abundance.”1070 Earlier in Schopenhauer as Educator an exemplary individual is 
one that oozes with “magical outpouring of the inner strength.”1071 But Luther in Anti-Christ 
is described as “[t]he religious man [who] thinks only of himself.”1072 In the words of Large, 
Nietzsche presents Luther as a tortured soul “who emerges from a troubled childhood, a 
dangerous fanatic who finds it impossible to live at peace with himself, a fundamentally violent 
man with psychopathic tendencies […] thus in need of piety.”1073 These designations against 
Luther characterize a man lacking in singular individuality. However, such histrionics may be 
pointers to Nietzsche’s own childhood experiences of religion, from which he later seeks to 
dissociate himself.  
Still the polemics against Luther must be understood contextually. In 1879, in a letter 
to Peter Gast, he writes, “Dear friend, as to Luther, it is a long time since I have been able with 
honesty to say anything to his credit; this is the outcome of a mass of material about him to 
which Jacob Burckhardt called my attention.”1074 He then refers to Janssen’s History of the 
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German People. Nietzsche through this book seems to discover Luther’s nationalistic 
tendencies. However, the accuracy of this reason for despising Luther seems doubtable. The 
mentioned book is of 1879, while according to Bluhm “Nietzsche changed his view on Luther 
radically between 1876 and 1878 with the appearance of Human, All Too Human.”1075 Hence, 
the standard position is that Nietzsche’s earlier positive rendering of Luther is not removed 
from the general opinion held by most Protestants of the time. It can as well be added that such 
a positive opinion of Luther was largely related to nationalistic tendencies. In this regard, 
engagement with Luther seems to manifest one thing that was encountered in Chapter Two: 
the type Übermensch and form-giving.  
For Nietzsche, Luther in his weak will represents the type that turned out badly which 
is the opposite of the type Übermensch. Nietzsche interpreted the Enlightenment in terms of 
life enhancement. Luther is presented as a poor discerner of historical realities since “[w]hat 
Luther saw was the corruption of the Papacy, while precisely the opposite was palpably 
obvious: the old corruption, the peccatum originale, Christianity no longer sat on the Papal 
throne! Life sat there instead! The triumph of life!”1076 The implication here is that the 
Reformation was not necessary, given the course of the Enlightenment. On account of 
Nietzsche’s linking the course of the Enlightenment with Renaissance and life, Luther lacked 
the perceptions that entail the fundamental will which is the will to power. Based on the scheme 
for commitment to culture given in Schopenhauer as Educator which entails the organization 
of the drives and the in-depth knowledge of the history of culture, Luther seems to lack both. 
For a better nuanced analysis, a brief look at the will to power as the fundamental will and 
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5.3   Cosmopoiesis and the Type Übermensch  
Nietzsche in Anti-Christ perceives Luther as the pathological fanatic, “the antithetical 
type of the strong, emancipated spirit.”1077 The context of this assertion about Luther is the 
analysis opposing scepticism and conviction. In Chapter One, Montaigne’s scepticism is about 
being un-dogmatic as the mark for respect for the becoming nature of life. Then in Chapter 
Two, the strong willed are associated with those who have internalized the phenomenon of 
overcoming governed by the will to power. The strong wills and the emancipated ones espouse 
the activity of life as becoming and valorisation of the historical through and through. In 
general terms for Nietzsche life is meant to be the instinct for growth/power and “where the 
will to power is lacking there is decline.”1078 In Nietzsche’s estimation, Luther seems to lack 
what entails strong wills. The purpose of this section is to show how Luther, not necessarily 
as a person but as a type, affected positively or negatively the Reformation and the course of 
the Enlightenment. The section will also delve into the possible reasons as to why Senghor’s 
and Nyerere’s communal character of African socialism fails in properly orientating new 
societies (cosmopoiesis).  
In Chapter One, scepticism is justified on account of the becoming nature of reality 
which may not warrant dogmatic approaches. Hence, for Nietzsche the one who wants to do 
great things is necessarily a sceptic. He is such because he sees what Nietzsche calls “five 
hundred convictions beneath one—behind one.”1079 It is such unprecedented openness that 
obtains the unconstrained perspective that is aligned to strong wills. Some Nietzsche scholars 
on Anti-Christ, such as Gary Shapiro, believe that Zarathustra is referenced as a great intellect 
given his scepticism because of his “non-narrative view of the world.”1080 Shapiro’s view is 
that Zarathustra’s life espouses the totality of experience and links such totality to the doctrine 
of Eternal Recurrence.  
The implication here is that the Eternal Recurrence as a non-dogmatic thought knows 
no isolated agents in “the sequence of events, but only the interconnection of all events; it 
knows no beginning, middle and end of the narrative but simply the continuous circle of 
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becoming.”1081 Based on what is elaborately discussed in Chapter Three, it can be plausibly 
claimed that Zarathustra so described espouses the “Moment.” One of the activities that ought 
to be associated with the “Moment” is overcoming. In overcoming, anything that seeks 
preservation must be fought. More pertinently, grand passion in Zarathustra is overcoming as 
a character of life itself which is “that which must always overcome itself.”1082 Life in the case 
of overcoming is will to power.  
In the Notebook materials life, is understood by Nietzsche as a multiplicity of forces 
linked to “a common mode of nutrition” called life.1083 The focus is on life, not in a universal 
realm, but “human life” as a biological concept.1084 Such a conception of life for Nietzsche is 
the condition which makes all feelings, ideas, and thoughts possible. These three (feelings, 
ideas, and thoughts) stand for life’s character of a resistance to all other forces, analysis, and 
evaluation. Life as a grand passion, therefore, entails the perspectival character which is 
essentially non-dogmatic. This apparently means that convictions may be needed, but it 
becomes problematic when one privileges some of them and presents them simpliciter. A brief 
note on dogmatism is needed, given its nineteenth century linkage to experience and system-
building philosophies.  
In modern philosophy, reflection on dogmatism is given much weight in Kant and then 
later in Nietzsche. For Kant the problem of dogmatism originates in the peculiar nature of 
reason that “in one species of its knowledge is burdened by questions which, as prescribed by 
the very nature of reason itself, it is not able to ignore, but which, as transcending all its powers, 
it is also not able to answer.”1085 With the enduring questions, the work of reason always 
remains incomplete and in this situation reason is compelled to resort to a priori principles, 
thus overstepping the possible empirical employment. Although used by reason, a priori 
principles transcend the limits of experience. Kant refers to the field of these controversies of 
reason as metaphysics. Hence, for Kant, dogmatism is first associated with going beyond the 
limits of experience. In the preface to the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, he is 
more pointed against dogmatism as a “procedure of pure reason, without previous criticism of 
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its own powers.”1086 The dogmatic principle in this case is the appeal to the a priori realm. In 
the words of Clark, dogmatism is Kant’s name for philosophical systems that uncritically 
assume the capacity of pure reason.1087 It must be discerned whether Nietzsche understands 
dogmatism in Kantian terms of pure reason.  
Nietzsche associates dogmatic claims to finality, un-conditionality and audacious 
generalizations.1088 The generalized claims normally originate in particular contingent 
conditions and are then mistakenly asserted to be so un-conditionally. In this regard, Clark’s 
position is that Nietzsche’s anti-dogmatism targets all spheres of knowledge that attempt to 
monopolize claims to truth.1089 The problems with monopoly in truth-claims lie in the mistaken 
belief that one possesses the truth.  
In the realm of interpretations there is some consensus that whatever is rendered as 
dogmatic is mostly an “objectification of a singular experience into a general belief” that 
fundamentally weakens the spirit of free inquiry.1090 Such objectification must be said to partly 
account for much of what Nietzsche posits as justification for the failure of the German 
Reformation. In Richard Wagner in Bayreuth two elements must converge to achieve 
greatness: “greatness of spirit in those who accomplish it and greatness of spirit in those who 
experience it.”1091 The implication is that no event possesses greatness in itself. In the case of 
the German Reformation, its successes or failures are inseparable from the person of Luther 
and the general German social milieu.  
I have shown that for Nietzsche, the German Reformation failed mainly because of 
Luther’s supposedly weak spirit. Nietzsche believes that convictions firmly held, like 
dogmatism, are not only anti-will to power, but also shatter the possibility for the life of the 
type Übermensch to flourish. The type Übermensch is embodied as Danto opines, by whoever 
is “in possession of instinctual drives which do not overpower him. He is the master and not 
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the slave of his drives.”1092 Given the mastery over the drives such a person is in a position to 
make something of himself (he is autopoietic). The language of mastery over the drives 
pertains to the psychology of the type Übermensch which is the will to power. One must restate 
that the will to power as the psychology of the type Übermensch functions as the explanatory 
key for whoever espouses this type. The will to power so understood may warrant Karl Barth’s 
conception of it as “the supreme and proper form of human existence.”1093 The implication of 
understanding the will to power in such Barthian terms must be read consistently with notions 
of becoming/chaos/strife/agon/tragedy as the essential marks of existence.  
Such an existence is the tragic one which demands the life of the individuals and 
whatever ensues from them as a work in progress. The weak wills which espouse unqualified 
demands through fixed identities and institutions have largely failed to grasp ontology as that 
which is becoming. The type Übermensch which is becoming simpliciter is, as I stated in 
Chapter Three, the affirmer of the Eternal Recurrence. In the words of Magnus, the Eternal 
Recurrence is offered by Nietzsche as an attitude of the life of the type Übermensch.1094 Such 
an attitude is of being in the world, as in the involvement of the activity of life which is 
characterized by overcoming as the essential attribute of the type Übermensch.  
The attitude of the type Übermensch is that of the highest affirmation of life as it is 
stated in Chapter Three. Attitudes in Nietzsche indicate “symptoms” (are perspectival) as in 
the conditions of whoever embodies the attitude. In Twilight of Idols Nietzsche speaks of the 
possession of values as “symptoms” for or against life.1095 As an attitude of affirmation, as in 
the case of the type Übermensch, it entails the condition of the over-fullness of life. Following 
the interpretation of the Eternal Recurrence as an ethical-imperative, such an affirmation is 
about being disposed towards the “Moment.” The final question in The Gay Science on the 
Eternal Recurrence is “how well disposed would” one have to be oneself and to life to crave 
nothing but the ultimate eternal confirmation.1096 The “Moment” in Beyond Good and Evil is 
described as “beyond good and evil and no longer, Like Buddha and Schopenhauer, under the 
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spell and illusion of morality.” And finally through such a moment one opens up to “the most 
exuberant, most living and most-world affirming man” the embodiment of the Eternal 
Recurrence.1097 It is the considered position of this dissertation, that ultimately, for Nietzsche, 
life as tragic is experienced through the embodiment of the “Moment” that could be possible 
for some through the type Übermensch. Only for some, since the Eternal Recurrence is an 
ethical selective process. It is within the “Moment” that Nietzsche envisions his revaluation of 
values.  
However, revaluation and the incorporation of the doctrine of the Eternal Recurrence 
are intertwined in Nietzsche. First and foremost, revaluation is like the Eternal Recurrence, 
conceived within the type Übermensch described in Dionysian terms of excess and proof of 
strength. However, revaluation is explained as a shadowy question mark that casts a “shadow 
over him who sets it up.”1098 Now such language is not simply being introduced here; it is 
present in Schopenhauer as Educator about productive uniqueness, in that when someone 
becomes aware of such uniqueness, “there appears around him a strange penumbra which is 
the mark of his singularity.”1099 Based on these two accounts, revaluation, tragedy, 
individuality, and the Eternal Recurrence are correlates. Revaluation, as Werner J. Dannhauser 
observes, is “the hardest and greatest of all tasks.”1100 The doctrine of the Eternal Recurrence 
is similarly conceived in such terms as the “greatest weight,” the “hardest” or “most difficult 
thought.” The difficulty of revaluation and the Eternal Recurrence lies in what they reveal as 
life in its twin aspects of creativity and destructiveness.  
Hence, the attitude in question is about the embodiment of existence as tragic in its 
twin manifestation of creativity and destructiveness. The type Übermensch in affirming the 
doctrine of Eternal Recurrence, contrary to Buddha- or Schopenhauer-like resignation, 
embraces creativity and destruction. In the appropriation of creativity and destruction lies the 
greatest challenge in embracing Nietzsche’s tragic philosophy. Nevertheless, it is within this 
tragic conception that Nietzsche underscores the credible re-making/cosmopoiesis of society.  
The tragic approach to life loathes overly prescriptive and systematic designations that 
largely seek to preserve identities. As such, communal responses to existence, such as Senghor 
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and Nyerere’s ujamaa, seem deficient on the account of tragedy. Firstly, their appreciation of 
the tragic aspects of their own peoples’ experiences of slavery and colonialism is hastily 
rationalized through their evolution of systems. Secondly, the two African thinkers largely 
lacked the thrust of historical knowledge in their estimations of what entails social change. 
Nyerere mostly operated on the level of ideology. The nature of ideological accounts is to be 
dogmatic and uncritical of the underlying principles which are mostly existential. Within 
African thinking, there are some thinkers like Aimé Cesairé and Frantz Fanon who attempt to 
embrace the tragic, especially the African experiences of slavery and colonial activities as the 
springboard for possible social change. Their position lends credence to my argument that the 
sense of existence as tragic could be the basis for any individual and social enhancement. 
 
5.4   Beyond African Philosophy of Sociality 
The section on African philosophy of sociality (Chapter Four) considered two thematic 
questions: one on identity (who I am) and another on action/activity (what can I do). The 
section engaged in depth with the African identity approach of Senghor and Nyerere. The main 
weakness that emerged from the identity thesis is the evolving of the overarching frameworks 
and hasty solution to an aporia. Senghor and Nyerere in their search for a sort of identity seem 
to gloss over the theme of existential enigma or simply elect to avoid whatever could be 
possibly agonistic. I propose that the best response to Senghor’s and Nyerere’s overestimation 
is the theme of actuality, guided by the question: what can I do? In Aimé Césaire’s Notebook, 
reflecting on the squalid living conditions of life, he poses the question: “What can I do?” and 
responds, “I have to begin.” This response ensues into another question: “Begin what?” and 
there follows the final response: “The only thing in the world worth beginning: The End of the 
world, no less.”1101 I think the implication here is the call to break away from the imposed 
conceptual schemes in the name of identity and face the tragic aspects of the present existence 
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5.4.1   Aimé Césaire and Frantz Fanon: Towards African Existential Philosophy 
I begin with Césaire’s less considered and largely unfamiliar brand of négritude. As 
pointed out in Chapter Four, Césaire’s négritude does not seek to be tied to a fixed notion of 
identity. Instead it cherishes the experimental nature of life. Césaire remarks that his négritude 
goes deep down the flesh and pierces opaque prostration with its straight patience. In his 
Notebook the existential fact is privileged when he alleges that the Martinican people are 
“swayed” from their own cry, and yet that could have been the only cry of their own.1102 The 
cry is expressed in generic forms of poverty, hunger, rebellion and resentment. These are 
generic forms of the reality of suffering. In the thinking of Césaire the reality of suffering 
before seeking for any redemption must be acknowledged. The suffering alluded to here is 
related to “the critical analysis of the historical conditions of oppression.”  
This amounts to the narrative argued for in this dissertation, that the starting point of 
social change is the existence taken on its own terms. Such an approach favours the concrete 
life forms, in the case of Africa, the basis could be the existential challenges that ensue from 
slavery and colonialism. Instead Senghor’s and Nyerere’s African socialisms are generally 
founded on the reactionary models derived from “colonial subjection and to a certain myth of 
the black.”1103 This means that whatever clichés of communality some African thinkers have 
ascribed to themselves as their stellar identity, in some ways (as was shown in Chapter Four) 
these clichés are a constructed response to the Western discourse. In any case, the response to 
existence qua existence ultimately demands an individual input, and mere glossing over may 
not be sustainable. Such a response entails a break away from the overarching tendencies, and 
this is the meaning of revolt in Césaire. 
The revolt is aimed against the interiorized and mystified sense of identity. The position 
is that this “revolt” warrants the stress on action as the essential aspect of the opening up of 
possibilities. The concept of “revolt” for Césaire ought to be understood in the context of 
deconstruction of the pre-colonial and colonial discourse around African philosophy of 
sociality.For Césaire, the nature of “revolt” must be gauged in the highest existential terms 
possible in the first person: “I declare my crimes and that there is nothing to say in my defence. 
Dances. Idols. Relapse. I too have murdered God with my laziness my words my gestures my 
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obscene songs […].”1104 These words indicate the call for aversion towards claims that are 
dogmatic in nature and seemingly unresponsive to the existential conditions as such.  
As discussed in Chapter Four, what Senghor calls black consciousness as a given 
reality fails to capture the existential conditions. Césaire’s response to Senghor’s identity-
oriented négritude is the development of the life-oriented type. Césaire’s rebellion is directed 
towards generally abstractive approaches like Nyerere’s ujamaa. Hence, action as a form of 
“revolt” is envisaged as an affirmation confronting the squalid conditions of existence without 
hiding under overarching identity moral maxims like shienyu ni shienyu. Such a form of 
identity founded on Black consciousness, Césaire calls the “old négritude” which is gradually 
cadaverising.1105 One contends that the death of the identity-based approach, though not fully 
realizable, is above all initiated when the tragic nature of existence is brought to the fore.  
Césaire, in a later reflection, though sympathetic to what he calls the old Black 
“courteous civilizations,” is rather emphatic that aspiring to “return” to them would be 
misplaced. He instead advises, “For us, the problem is not to make a utopian and sterile attempt 
to repeat the past, but to go beyond. It is not a dead society that we want to revive.”1106 The 
“going beyond” here implies continual “revolt” or resistance against any hegemonic system 
that includes what has above been called the critical analysis of the historical conditions. The 
objective of the revolt is the vision of a new society founded on the existential conditions. 
Those existential conditions must entail as Césaire opines “all the productive power of modern 
times, warm with all the fraternity of olden days.”1107 In the case of the African identity, 
tragedy must be encountered in the experience of the evolving life conditions. One of the 
proponents on the African existential conditions as the locus for social change is Frantz 
Fanon.1108 Fanon’s starting point is that every human problem must be considered from the 
standpoint of time.1109 This time is infused in an individual existence. In this regard Fanon 
explains further, “In no fashion should I undertake to prepare the world that will come later. I 
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belong irreducibly to my time.”1110 One considers this assertion vital on existential grounds 
given that whoever is alive to the coordinates of life is most likely to be aware of the 
becomingness it entails.  
But more pertinently the commitment to one’s existential condition will demand 
“revolting” against the pre-established categories and maxims in encountering life. The pre-
established categories and maxims will include Senghor’s and Nyerere’s versions of African 
socialism that lay stress on the ideal of identity but are tremendously deficient in the agonistic 
character of existence as such. The challenge in Senghor and Nyerere is partly letting the past 
identities determine even the envisioning of their future. In Fanon’s diagnosis the problem 
envisaged here is situated in temporality. He explains that those who refuse “to allow 
themselves to be enclosed in the substantialized tower of the past” could be the ones who hold 
possibility for social change.1111 However, apart from “revolt” against the past, Fanon 
envisages new possibilities from those who refuse to hold the present (l’actualité) as definitive. 
This amounts to affirming the fact of becoming that even though it is unsettling, remains the 
appropriate means of envisioning social enhancement.  
The possibility for social enhancement for Fanon hinges on two characteristics of life: 
(1) solidarity in action, not identity and (2) the body as a cultural sphere. The theme of action 
is related to “revolt” against unsolicited categorizations and fixations with prior domains. But 
this is not about ignorance of the past. On the contrary, Fanon advocates for the celebration of 
human cultural history which entails action. On cultural history, Fanon calls for the need to 
“recapture” the whole past of the world.1112 Solidarity with the past is not about identities but 
about activities, especially those that have tended to enhance culture. Fanon believes that 
“[e]very time a man has contributed to the victory of the dignity of the spirit, every time a man 
has said no to an attempt to subjugate his fellows, I have felt solidarity with his act.”1113 The 
credibility of solidarity in action is founded on the fact of the human condition as such.  
The challenge with the responses attributed to African socialism is mainly that of a 
poor historical sense that largely reduces life forms to levels of identity. Fanon’s demand for 
solidarity is action-oriented or existential. Though solidarity with all human beings is vital in 
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Nyerere’s ujamaa, I think it is mainly an abstract sense of solidarity. This is not the case with 
Fanon’s action-oriented solidarity, which is not solidarity with “all human beings” in the 
abstract but with “actions” that particularly says no to subjugation.1114 Such solidarity in action 
does not necessarily seek to create a type of Schopenhauer’s community of “fellow-sufferers,” 
resigned to such subjugations, but, in terms of the “revolt,” creates a community with an edge 
over its subjugations. The basis for such a “revolt” is the individual as the singular unit of the 
subjugations. This leads me into Fanon’s second element: the body as the cultural sphere.  
Fanon ends his work Black Skin, White Masks with what he calls his final prayer: “O 
my body, make me always a man who questions!”1115 The body domain here must be gauged 
in existential terms that ipso facto are linked to time. Fanon applies Merleau-Ponty’s notion of 
the body as an object of consciousness in his attempt to explain black existential reality. For 
Merleau-Ponty, the body is considered as one’s point of “view upon the world” and “one of 
the objects of that world.”1116 An object according to Merleau-Ponty is inhabited. The horizon 
within which the world is experienced is the body. Hence he believes that “[t]he body is the 
vehicle of being in the world and, for a living being, having a body means being united with a 
definite milieu.”1117 Fanon develops this notion of the body by ascribing it to the Black reality. 
In his critique of Senghor, he holds that the mistaken universal situation of Black 
consciousness is resolvable through appreciation of Black concrete existence. Fanon seems to 
appeal to Merleau-Ponty in his assertion of what he calls one fact that “Wherever he goes, the 
Negro remains a Negro.”1118 The reality of being Black is experienced from a corporeal 
domain.  
Fanon is analysing the reality of being Black from the colonial context of French 
colonies and particularly in France. Hence, it is in the body that the Black is attacked or lynched 
and as he observes, “It is as an actual being that he is a threat.”1119 Fanon sees a need to embrace 
the Black existential situation, which cannot be gauged on fixed categories or past modalities. 
The body becomes an element of culture when its role as the object of consciousness is 
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acknowledged. In Merleau-Ponty’s construction, “the body can symbolize existence, […] 
because it actualizes it and because it is its actuality.”1120 I find Fanon’s and Merleau-Ponty’s 
understanding of the body relevant for highlighting the sense of existential tragedy in the 
African ethno-philosophical thinking. With the stress on the body as an existential compass, 
the notion of becoming cannot be side-stepped. If becoming is prioritized, then 
indeterminateness, also called “the priority of the unforeseeable”1121 is important as well. The 
unforeseeable must be understood relative to the argument advanced in this dissertation about 
encountering existence on its own terms.  
However, as shown in Chapter Four, there is a communal response to existence too, 
but its challenge is mainly an inadequate answer to the question, how can man face existence 
on its own terms? The “bold and dangerous line with existence” is first and foremost an 
individual endeavour that slowly filters into the social arena. The stance advanced in this 
dissertation is that the community’s role is mainly to lay bare existence as tragic. An alternative 
to the African ethno-philosophical thinking of shienyu ni shienyu is proposed and constructed 
in terms of existence as tragic, rendered as shienyu ni shibala, as a possible horizon for 
conceiving social change.1122 
 
5.4.2   Shienyu Ni Shibala: Appropriating the Sense of Tragedy 
In the contemporary setting, one thinker who attempts to encounter a modern sense of 
life is Charles Taylor. In one of his works Sources of the Self, The Making of the Modern 
Identity, he refers to Max Weber’s disenchantment with modernity, claiming that the 
dissipation of our sense of the cosmos as a meaningful order has destroyed the horizons in 
which people previously lived their spiritual lives. He goes on to observe that the modern 
standpoint is opposed to frameworks, and there is no horizon that can sink to the 
phenomenological status of the unquestioned fact.1123 Taylor’s solution to this disenchantment 
is the appeal to the human agent. For him, the human agent presupposes the senses of 
inwardness, freedom, individuality, and embeddedness in nature.  
 
1120 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 167. 
1121 Bernasconi, “The Assumption of Negritude: Aimé Césaire, Frantz Fanon, and the Vicious Circle of Racial 
Politics.” Parallax, 73. 
1122 Shienyu ni shibala: your own is the ‘tragic world.’ 
1123 Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self, The making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1989), 17. 
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Without contestating the primacy of human agent, one could concur with Taylor that,  
the starting point is the quality of the individual (individuality). Not frameworks, but the 
individual affirmation of the tragic life through self-overcoming, serves as the starting point 
for facing existence as such. As Blondel observes, for Nietzsche the problem of the value of 
life must take precedence over the tendency to horizons or speculative knowledge.1124 Desiring 
frameworks is not only inimical to the development of culture/life, but it is a contradiction 
about the nature of culture as largely anti-institutional. On Nietzsche’s account, “[e]very 
philosophy which believes that the problem of existence is touched on, not to say solved, by a 
political event is a joke and pseudo-philosophy.”1125 Existence requires a cultural response, 
and the nature of institutions to turn individuals into contented inhabitants of the earth must be 
continually checked. For the African ethno-philosophical thinking of shienyu ni shienyu, 
moving forward, the fact of tragedy needs to be made clearer through a new thinking away 
from identity-seeking to an open-ended realm of shienyu ni shibala.  
Shibala here entails the world in its existential element of being tragic. This dissertation 
has generally advanced the Nietzsche’s claim that the embodiment of existence as tragic is the 
terminus aquo for singular individual’s autopoiesis. Such a tragic embodiment of existence 
presupposes a philological exercise of genuinelly listening where, one is required to be a true 
helmsman of his life. This need for listening to existence implies that 
what shienyu ni shienyu conceals must be made the starting point for any cosmospoiesis to be 
properly conceived. Chapter Four showed that the maxim shienyu ni shienyu seeks to conceal 
existential stink through fellow-feeling. However, cultural development demands open 
engagement with the existential stink through shienyu ni shibala. This maxim is a way of 
rendering existence in tragic terms.  
Though sounding pessimistic, shienyu ni shibala implies the honest way of rendering 
the human condition. It is out of this honesty that affirmation of the same could be envisaged 
through cultivation of singular individuality. In other words, what is demanded of the 
community is not concealing the vagaries of life but possibly laying them bare as the basis for 
the individual navigating his way through them. In Nietzsche’s terms, facing shibala is the 
appropriation of the becoming nature of life espoused by the type Übermensch. The societal 
 
1124 Blondel, Nietzsche: The body and culture, 52. 
1125 SE, §4. 
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responsibility must go beyond Makumba’s obligation of simply lending one’s own a hand. On 
the contrary, the role of the society is possibly to expose one’s own to the vagaries of existence. 
This seems to be a big challenge owing to the ingrained philosophy of sociality. 
However, one radical proposal, consistent with the embodiment of tragedy as the 
starting point, can be proffered in favour of shienyu ni shibala. The world (shibala) designates 
a realm where the individual is left to his own imaginations without communal protection. 
Shibala stands for vulnerability since it portends danger and considered an uncharted domain 
where the individual should not venture outside the communal framework. The argument here 
is that it is this world that needs embracing first from the singular level and then communally. 
It is within such an uncharted realm that the question, ‘what can I do?’ is properly posed. The 
nature of the shibala is explained in two ways. 
From the African ethno-philosophical perspective, the notion of ‘the world’ as a scary 
realm must be explained within the phenomenon of curse. For the ontology of shienyu ni 
shienyu to function, it must be tied to some ancestral lineage (see Chapter Four on the 
ethnogenesis of the Abaluyia). The ancestral lineage in the descending order consists of the 
dead members; the elders who are the living custodians of the community; and the junior 
members. Here the elders are considered as the representatives of “the entire legal and mystical 
authority of the lineage.”1126 Such a mystical lineage encompasses moral maxims like shienyu 
ni shienyu. Owing to this authority, the elder is supposedly conferred mystical powers over the 
juniors. Hence, a curse implies the removal of the mystical protection of the lineage from the 
juniors. This is what Makumba describes as ostracising. The curse supposedly removes the 
protective powers of the lineage over the individual.  
The supposedly “cursed individual” is considered exposed, ostracized from the lineage 
of the community, and as such is “outside.” The image of being “outside” projects the world 
in its proper spectrum as a dangerous space given that one has no attachment to the lineage. 
Therefore, the radicality in encountering shibala hinges on the courage to embrace being 
“outside” the lineage, in a revolt from the identity-based maxims. Hence, embodying existence 
in its tragic form calls for the willingness to be exposed to the “world” as “a dangerous place 
 
1126 Igor Kopytoff, “Ancestors as Elders in Africa” Africa: Journal of the International African Institute, Vol. 
41, Number 2 (Cambridge University Press, April 1971), 131. 
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to be in when one is not attached to a kin-group.”1127 It is within this dangerous space that the 
possibility of singular individuality can be fashioned. Engaging with the world as a dangerous 
space is akin to Nietzsche’s call for taking a “bold and dangerous line with existence” as a 
condition to singular individuality.1128 Accordingly, this dissertation, dialogically 
extends Nietzsche’s idea of life as will to power to Abaluyia’s notion of existence. 
In Zarathustra’s second part “On Redemption” the following scene is given: 
Zarathustra is surrounded by the cripples and the beggars. The hunchback tells Zarathustra: 
“The blind you can cure and the lame make to walk again; and from him who has too much on 
his shoulders [the hunchback’s conditions], you could well take a little away  −  that, I think, 
would be the right way to make the cripples believe in Zarathustra!”1129 Zarathustra declines 
the request of the hunchback by appealing to popular wisdom which suggests that “[i]f one 
takes the hump away from the hunchback, one thereby takes away his spirit.” The focus here 
will be specifically on the hunchback as a symbol for the tragic nature of existence in Abaluyia 
ethnic group.  
Among the Abaluyia people the hunchback (Sikufu) is interpreted negatively since it is 
considered as a sign of existence gone awry and as such, a terrible sight to behold (human 
existential malady). The term sikufu (literally, what burdens) shares the same etymological 
root with omufu (the dead one). The hunchback for the Abaluyia symbolizes the ultimate 
burden of existence. And yet removing the hunchback is regarded as removing the spirit of 
existence. The spirit (Geist) is understood by Nietzsche as “the life that itself cuts into life: 
through its own torment it increases its own knowledge.”1130 The spirit of existence is 
expressed through suffering. The spirit is thus an instrument used by life to enhance itself.1131 
This is Nietzsche’s later description of life as the will to power.  
In the Notes, Nietzsche describes the becoming nature of the world as follows: “it 
becomes, it passes away, but it has never begun to become and never ceased from passing 
away – it maintains itself in both. – It lives on itself: its excrements are its food.”1132 Such 
terms as “lives on itself” or “its excrements are its food” show what overcoming entails. 
 
1127 Kopytoff, “Ancestors as Elders in Africa”, 131. 
1128 SE, §1. 
1129 Z, II, 20 (On Redemption). 
1130 Z, II, 8 (On the famous wise men). 
1131 Kaufmann, Nietzsche, Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist, 271. 
1132 WP, 1066. 
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Zarathustra does not endeavour to remove deformities. Instead, everyone is to take on the 
burden of existence (as the spirit, which is the way to self-perfection/singularity).1133 That spirit 
is the one that essentially defines life as overcoming. The picture from Zarathustra is that all 
human beings are maimed in one way (severed limbs and fragments) or the other, and the only 
redemption Zarathustra proposes is affirmation (of the type Übermensch). He demands to 
redeem that which has passed away and to re-create all “It was” into a “Thus I willed it”—
“that alone should I call redemption.”1134 Willing the past is untenable since we cannot break 
into the cycle of time. The non-deceptive picture of the human condition is the knowledge of 
its tragedy. And Nietzsche’s response to tragedy is individual affirmation (“Thus I willed it”) 
as a continuous task. 
Conclusion 
The overarching thematic thrust of this chapter has been the justification of the claim 
that, in Nietzsche, autopoiesis presupposes cosmopoiesis. Cosmopoiesis in Nietzsche is the 
realm of social action referenced in Schopenhauer as Educator as “the outward event.”1135 In 
this final chapter of the dissertation it has been demonstrated that the picture of life as tragedy 
or the will to power not only envisions singular individuality through autopoiesis, but is central 
to any re-making of the society. The in-depth analysis of the general notion of poiesis in Greek 
thought entails its artistic sense as the privileged space for production. That space is the tragic, 
where art ensues. It is in this sense that poiesis is regarded as a pointer to existence as 
essentially chaotic. In this chapter, consideration of poiesis as a tragic domain in Greek thought 
brings about a realization that Nietzsche’s sense of tragedy is nuanced. In Chapter One, 
Nietzsche’s sense of tragedy is mostly from Schopenhauer’s existential considerations. But 
there is a more basic understanding of tragedy from the domain of chaos as becoming. Hence, 
poiesis becomes a process of giving style or fashioning of sorts. Though mostly 
unacknowledged, this is a lesson from the Aristotelian understanding of Poetics. However, 
Nietzsche concretizes the relevance of tragedy into the human individual sphere and by 
 
1133 Refer to the introductory material of the Cambridge translation of Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Introduction is 
by Adrian Del Caro and Robert Pippin, XXXI. 
1134 Z, II, 20 (On redemption). 
1135 SE, §6. 
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extension a guarantee of social change by appealing to the in-depth knowledge of history and 
the outcome of the German Reformation.  
Cosmopoiesis demands not only the acknowledgement, but the appropriation of the 
tragic sense. Hence, autopoiesis must be made always the goal with cosmopoiesis as the 
outcome. This is the import of Nietzsche’s programmatic assertions about culture in 
Schopenhauer as Educator as a struggle and hostility towards those influences, habits, laws, 
institutions in which the goal of singular individuality is indiscernible. In this regard, if 
Nietzsche at all praises some epochs, it is because they are sufficiently promising in realizing 
the goal of singular individuality and not merely for their sake. This is what Nietzsche learned 
through his engagement with Jacob Burckhardt’s history of culture. Through Burckhardt, 
Nietzsche came to discern the underlying force for individuality and statecraft as the sense of 
the tragedy. Though Nietzsche is scanty in details about poiesis, it is clear that, from his 
lectures on The Greek State to the assertions in Beyond Good and Evil, he understood tragedy 
as an artwork. Such an understanding is founded on Burckhardt’s history of culture in which 
the Italian Renaissance history is prominent. From the Renaissance, Nietzsche not only 
captures the spirit of culture as a response to life as tragic, but also discovers in it the 
continuation of the Enlightenment spirit that is fundamentally individual. 
But, for Nietzsche, inimical to the positive history of culture espoused in the 
Renaissance is the Reformation. In general terms, the Reformation on Nietzsche’s analysis is 
bereft of the spirit of cultural enhancement. Inherent in the spirit of the Reformation is the 
notion of communal myth. On account of the need for revival of German culture, Nietzsche 
initially had dalliance with the Wagnerian music which is coupled with the spirit of Luther. 
However, this dalliance came to an end when Nietzsche realized that they (Wagner and Luther) 
espoused retarded spirits that basically are anti-Enlightenment. Luther’s Reformation comes 
to epitomize that anti-Enlightenment spirit. Among other characteristics, such a spirit entails 
scepticism, value for the historical sense and above all the appropriation of life as the will to 
power. Unfortunately, in Nietzsche’s estimation, Luther is lacking in all these. It is such a lack 
that accounts for the failure of the Reformation. Though Nietzsche is critical of Luther, this 
criticism is not holistic enough. Nietzsche’s polemics against Luther are mostly around the 
areas of nationalism, history, and culture.  
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More pertinently, Nietzsche seems to criticize Luther mostly as a type that espouses 
the retarded spirit deficient in the sense of life as will to power. Furthermore, in light of this 
dissertation’s appropriation of Nietzsche’s philosophy of singular individuality as a task, the 
failures in Luther’s Reformation are also discernible in the African philosophy of sociality. 
The problem with the African philosophy of sociality as espoused by Senghor and Nyerere is 
the inadequacy of the sense of existence as tragic, which largely accounts for their failure. 
However, this chapter also shows the opening within the African philosophy itself where there 
is a possibility of transitioning from shienyu ni shienyu as identity-oriented thinking to 
embracing the tragedy through shienyu ni shibala. In embracing shibala (tragic world), new 
solidarity emerges: solidarity in action as opposed to solidarity in identity.   
 
  267 
 
General conclusion 
The two parts of this dissertation—Nietzsche on individual autopoiesis; and critical 
dialogue with ethno-philosophy and cosmopoiesis—find their nexus in the sense of existence 
as tragic. Through the positive reading of Nietzsche’s philosophy on tragedy, it has been shown 
that tragedy necessarily warrants a commitment to singular individuality. However, individual 
autopoiesis as the process of singularity demands, apart from having mere sense of the tragic, 
the appropriation of the optimal conditions that espouse such existence. It is on the 
appropriation of the tragic, that the African ethno-philosophy of shienyu ni shienyu and its 
claims for social change are found wanting. Additionally, the question of whether Nietzsche 
is committed to singular individuality or to communal human enhancement must be 
undertaken within the framework of his philosophy of tragedy. It is shown that for Nietzsche, 
wherever the tragic is deeply espoused, singular individuality emerges through the process of 
autopoiesis as the privileged response to such existence. On the contrary, where the tragedy of 
existence is not properly espoused, communal-cum-universal responses that are not well-
grounded ensue. Thus, where the sense of life as will to power is weak, the chances are that 
there will emerge a poor conception of what entails cosmopoiesis.  
This dissertation has brought to the fore some nuances about Nietzsche’s corpus which 
has not been hitherto sufficiently examined. One such work is Schopenhauer as Educator. It 
is rather clear that the existential questions posed in this work find better and clear treatment 
in the later works. This early work, however, as revealed in this dissertation, is a serious work 
in the development of Nietzsche’s philosophical themes. The theme of singularity in Nietzsche 
starts to appear in Schopenhauer as Educator, where conditions for its production are laid out. 
The underlying narrative in this work is that singular individuality is credibly presented as the 
solution to an existential aporia. The solution entails the parameters laid out in Schopenhauer 
as Educator, and comes to fruition in Nietzsche’s doctrine of the Eternal Recurrence. There 
are two overriding questions in Schopenhauer as Educator: “But how can we find ourselves 
again? How can man know himself?” It is largely demonstrated that these questions guide not 
only what Nietzsche is doing in Schopenhauer as Educator, but also his philosophical journey. 
It has been demonstrated that the “how” points to the fact of singularity as a task. However, 
such a task requires an inducer, who in Schopenhauer as Educator is called the Exemplar, a 
role later assumed by the type Übermensch. The type Übermensch is marked by striving or 
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overcoming. Striving as a process of individual differentiation in Schopenhauer as Educator 
is grounded in honesty about the constitutional and existential conditions of human reality. 
Honesty emerges as another pertinent element from Nietzsche’s philosophy in this 
dissertation. The solution to the question, how do we honestly respond to existence? 
Nietzsche’s critique of the uncharted path to individual autopoiesis is largely founded on what 
he refers to as the youngest of the virtues: the virtue of Honesty. Nietzsche’s affirmation of the 
centrality of drives and affects as the physio-psychological phenomenon is reasonably justified 
in what entails the Nietzschean virtue of honesty. Part of that honesty is the realization that, as 
a task, singular individuality presupposes hard work where embracing of becoming is 
paramount. This means that singular individuality is a struggle in self-examination, as opposed 
to self-contentment. The struggle for honesty in the process of individuality entails continuous 
purifications and evaluations, which is difficult. Such difficulty in evaluations is explained in 
Daybreak as either original or adopted modes.1136 Hence, honesty properly pursued entails 
striving, struggle, and inner strength, brought to the fore as the nature of life: will to power. 
Therefore, in Nietzsche, the authentic mode of existence accrues from attempting to live by 
the “original evaluations” which espouse life as will to power. However, in Schopenhauer as 
Educator these characteristics are embodied in the exemplar. One of the pertinent inferences 
from Chapter One is that, already in Schopenhauer as Educator, Nietzsche has a scheme for 
the key facets of his philosophy that later develop as will to power and the Eternal Recurrence, 
under the auspices of the type Übermensch and its nemesis, the type last human being. 
However, what distinguishes one type from the other is honesty towards existence.  
Honesty towards existence is a result of Nietzsche’s philological training. There is a 
correlation between philology and Nietzsche’s virtue of honesty. Philology as the art of 
“reading” well is employed by Nietzsche in his “listening” to existence. This paradigm aids 
Nietzsche’s radicalization of the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence, employing its cosmological 
underpinnings in the explanation of its existential-ethical imperative for individuals. Good 
philology for Nietzsche does not falsify through hasty universalization and overarching 
 
1136 D, § 104: All actions may be traced back to evaluations, all evaluations are either original or adopted- the 
latter being by far the most common. Why do people adopt them? From fear- that is to say, we consider it more 
advisable to pretend they are our own – and accustom ourself to this pretence, so that at length it becomes our 
own nature. Original evaluation: that is to say, to assess a thing according to the extent to which it pleases or 
displeases us alone and no one else- something excessively rare! 
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frameworks. Good philology, applied to philosophy of sociality, with its hastily superseding 
identities, glosses over the existential issues, due to a poor conception of reality as becoming. 
Such a poor philology promotes a technics of preservation inimical to cosmopoiesis. 
If overcoming, as stated, is the singular designation of the type Übermensch, then 
preservation is the apt description of the type last human being in Thus Spoke Zarathustra. The 
type last human being essentially lacks honesty towards existence. Where the virtue of honesty 
is in doubt, even the origination of value is thrown into disarray. The virtue of honesty as good 
philology in Nietzsche’s case must first and foremost be applied to the one who claims to 
value. 
Thus, another pertinent inference from this dissertation concerning Nietzsche’s 
philosophy of tragedy is not only the locus of value, but the perspectival nature of the one who 
values. Any philosophy that misunderstands the human physiological basis of valuations is 
bound to falsify not only the human reality, but anything ensuing from it. Such is the case in 
The Gay Science, in which the claim to pure objectivity is a disguise: 
 
The unconscious disguise of physiological needs under the cloaks of the objective, 
ideal, purely spiritual goes to frightening lengths−and often  I have asked myself 
whether, taking a large view, philosophy has not been merely an interpretation of the 
body and a misunderstanding of the body.  
Behind the highest value judgements that have hitherto guided the history of thought, 
there are concealed misunderstandings of the physical 
constitution−of individuals or classes or even whole races.1137 
 
Nietzsche’s values are necessarily traceable from the reality of human beings. From 
Schopenhauer as Educator onwards, I show various nuances to misinterpretations of human 
reality. They include the contentedness that latches on to the conventional operations opposed 
to striving and promoting utilitarian ends in life. The utilitarian ends, like the simply happy 
person, lack the realization that true individual cheerfulness presupposes tragic knowledge and 
being burdened with the toils of existence. Singular individuality is embarked on in the 
environment where affirmation of the terrors of existence and its nature as becoming are 
paramount. Consequently, the type Übermensch, through its psychology of the will to power 
 
1137 GS, Preface, 2. 
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and the affirmation of the doctrine of the Eternal Recurrence, becomes the guarantor for 
singular individuality.  
Nietzsche’s notion of psychology is also quite innovative and works in tandem with 
the type Übermensch. In Chapter Two, the underlying psychology of the type Übermensch, 
the will to power, gives the mechanism for the fashioning of singular individuality. The 
psychology envisaged as the will to power is the privileged path to the reality of life as tragic 
in the sense of its terrors that accrue from its nature as becoming. Consistent with the types 
Übermensch and the last human, psychology for Nietzsche is also understood in a two-fold 
manner. The psychology akin to the type Übermensch is drives-based, while the last human in 
Nietzsche’s examination aligns itself with a psychology tied to conventional morality. The 
drives-based psychology espouses life as will to power, unveiling the path to the tragic nature 
of human existence. It is only through the will to power that one can possibly tunnel into life 
as the basic human drive. Effective individual autopoiesis and subsequently cosmopoiesis may 
not obtain in the absence of the knowledge of the depth of life as fundamentally tragic and 
chaotic. Life conceived as basically will to power does not envisage its analysis from a 
privileged standpoint which could be universalized. Instead, the will to power typifies the 
human condition and human actions in their diversification. When drives-centred psychology 
is privileged, the will is no longer considered as a faculty but an affect of command. Thus, in 
conjunction with his privileged psychology of the types, Nietzsche’s reflection on the 
efficaciousness of the will is unparalleled in his time.  
The will to power is the fundamental will that is perpetually efficacious. The will in its 
own overcoming is pure becoming. Pure becoming is an aspect of the type Übermensch, 
incomplete in the absence of power. The power here entails form-giving. And when the type 
Übermensch unleashes form through its psychology of will to power, it justifies itself through 
differentiated entities. Hence, the will to power as the psychology of the type Übermensch 
enables overcoming and form-giving which are essential characters for singular individuality. 
It is owing to its psychology that the type Übermensch is proposed as the reservoir of boundless 
possibilities, only realizable through diverse singular individuals. One pertinent conclusion at 
this juncture from Chapter Two is that, ultimately the notion of tragedy, as becoming and 
horrific aspects of life, is summed up as will to power. Nevertheless, the will to power as the 
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psychology of the type Übermensch is also Nietzsche’s response to morality, that conceives 
the will as a faculty.  
The psychology tied to conventional morality is vilified by Nietzsche on its 
universalistic claims and approaches. The basic assumption of a conventional morality is the 
primacy placed on intentions in acts. Such a morality operates on other assumptions and 
opposites like the unified self/subject; cause and effect; the doer and the deed. Its general 
operative framework is the existence of opposites, within which there are enduring realities 
opposed to Nietzsche’s becoming. The key aspect of intention-based morality is that of 
consciousness. For Nietzsche, consciousness serves a peripheral role and is very much 
removed from individual endeavours as such. Hence, it does not aid much in understanding 
life as will to power. In any case, consciousness, like the search for intentions, is inimical to 
life-enhancing undertakings, given the rationalization and overarching claims that accrue from 
it. The two psychologies (the drive-oriented and the conventionally oriented) consequently 
yield strong and weak wills, respectively, depending on their promotion of life as will to power. 
In Nietzsche’s scheme, weak wills are akin to the last human, best represented by the dwellers 
of the Motley Cow in the prologue of Zarathustra. If actions are to be valued differently, in 
relation to the will, then it is the realm of unintentionality that one needs to turn to. 
The realm of unintentionality, which has hitherto not received much attention, could 
be the starting point for developing the ontology of becoming. In this regard, ontology as a 
broad area of “metaphysics that focuses on reality as becoming” is an avenue for examining 
the question of tragic existence. One characteristic of intention-based morality is the 
categorization of actions as good and evil. Chapter Three shows that to transcend such 
categorization, the life of the type Übermensch must be conceived on an extra-
moral/unintentional domain. Such an unintentional life of the type Übermensch is marked by 
transience and destruction. The life of transience and destruction justifies the type 
Übermensch’s singular character of overcoming and form-giving. It is in Nietzsche’s doctrine 
of the Eternal Recurrence that the type Übermensch’s transience and destruction properly plays 
out. However, Nietzsche sources the doctrine from Greek thought about the cosmos and 
radicalizes it in the search for a suitable way of interiorizing life as will to power. For the 
Greeks, the nature of the cosmos is marked by becoming. Such becoming correlates with the 
principle of the cosmos, fire, where destruction is part and parcel of its continual existence. 
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Nietzsche learns from Heraclitus the notion of strife as the basic justification for the cosmos, 
founded on the harmony of the opposites. Hence, the ontology of becoming takes life on at its 
own game, as will to power, undertaking individual autopoiesis and the ensuing social 
development. How the ontology of becoming can be undertaken is seen in the radicalization 
of the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence.  
Nietzsche radicalizes this doctrine, not only when he brings in the question of the value 
of such existence, but also in his demand that Eternal Recurrence must be incorporated into 
individual, ethical reality. Through this incorporation, one may face the question of tragedy in 
espousing the character of the type Übermensch. Such a demand means that the doctrine of the 
Eternal Recurrence as an ethical-existential formula helps interiorize the enigma of existence 
as tragic. The type Übermensch exhibits overcoming and form-giving, which are the roles of 
the will to power because of its lifestyle. Such a lifestyle is marked by an unintentionality best 
described as the “Moment,” in the doctrine of the Eternal Recurrence.  
The task of singular individuality which presupposes overcoming and form-giving will 
only happen in embracing the “Moment.” The doctrine of Eternal Recurrence fundamentally 
seeks to emancipate the will from the tyranny of time. The conception of time as cosmic or 
linear fails the test of implicating the human being properly into the phenomenon of existence 
as tragic. In fact, Nietzsche’s philosophy, from the larger perspective, intends to liberate the 
individual from the anguish of existence. The solution lies in Nietzsche’s revisionist 
understanding of time as perspectival. The term “perspectival” here implies the integration of 
the personal element as constitutive of one’s condition. The attitude towards time as presented 
in the doctrine of the Eternal Recurrence has ripple effects on the affirmation of life through 
singular individuality and cosmopoiesis. The question is how does Nietzsche make time a 
material element of human life? Or more simply, how does he reconcile time and the will? The 
existential torment of the will is worsened by its inability to will backward. It is the considered 
position of this dissertation that such a reconciliation and healing of the will is what the notion 
of the “moment” accomplishes through the appropriation of the doctrine of the Eternal 
Recurrence.  
In the late Stoic philosopher Aurelius, the moment is the “space” within which every 
activity of life is undertaken. Though Nietzsche fails to acknowledge Aurelius’s observation 
on the moment, he conceives the “Moment” as the quintessential aperture to life as will to 
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power. The “Moment” is described by Nietzsche in the following terms: “the Moment is 
related to eternity”; as a sort of “centripetal” force where “all things, knotted together so tightly 
that” it “draws after it all things that are to come.” The “Moment” is also described as “pure 
becoming.” In this regard, the “Moment” contains the conditions for the plenitude of reality as 
action. This action in its fullness entails transience and destruction, and as such, the 
descriptions of the “Moment” fit life as will to power, best espoused by the type Übermensch.  
However, the relation of eternity to the “Moment” is a major insight in Nietzsche’s 
attempt to heal the will from the torment of time. In traditional Western philosophy and 
theology, the tendency is to decouple eternity from the realm of time. However, Nietzsche 
conceives of eternity and time under one realm of becoming. It is in this regard that eternity 
implies “no end.” Nonetheless, eternity must be justified as time in singular individuality. 
Eternity as pure becoming becomes the source of differentiation and thus the source of time as 
a perspectival reality so conceived in singular individuality. Now eternity as pure becoming is 
espoused in the unintentional life of the type Übermensch, marked with no praising and no 
blaming. Therefore, appropriating the doctrine of the Eternal Recurrence is hugely important 
in transfiguring the human into the life of the type Übermensch thus guaranteeing the 
possibility of embarking on the trajectory of individual singularity. However, Nietzsche’s 
notion of the ‘Moment’ as some contemporary philosophy shows, evolves the question about 
the value of the present. 
The nature of Nietzsche’s critique is value oriented with an arguably singular focus on 
conditional tenets of whoever values or possesses values. The present becomes the meaningful 
locus for action. However, more pertinently, Nietzsche’s philosophy of the “Moment” has 
reverberated in Michel Foucault, with his ontology of the present as a form of critique. For 
Foucault, clearly echoing Nietzsche’s critique, alleges that  
 
That criticism is no longer going to be practiced in the search for formal structures 
with universal value, but rather as a historical investigation into the events that have 
led us to constitute ourselves and to recognize ourselves as subjects of what we are 
doing, thinking, saying. In that sense, this criticism is not transcendental, and its goal 
is not that of making a metaphysics possible: it is genealogical in its design and 
archaeological in its method. Archaeological -- and not transcendental -- in the sense 
that it will not seek to identify the universal structures of all knowledge or of all 
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possible moral action, but will seek to treat the instances of discourse that articulate 
what we think, say, and do as so many historical events.1138 
 
Foucault makes a plausible point regarding the events constituting the subject in the present. 
However, it is not sufficiently radical compared to Nietzsche. For Nietzsche, the “Moment” is 
the capsule of the fundamental demands for overcoming and form-giving. In Nietzsche, the 
point of departure is the physio-psychological situation of the one who values. In the 
“Moment,” one finds the summary of the life of the type Übermensch marked by 
unintentionality, where overcoming thrives. However, the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence as 
espoused by Nietzsche, when appropriated (through the “Moment”), allows for understanding 
of the cosmic or linear recurrence in better light. One such light is the realization that life 
merely seen as cyclic is too superficial to be lived. 
The envisaged superficialities unfavourable for the appropriation of the doctrine 
include the morality of custom and its allied notion of pity as the supposed alleviation of human 
suffering. The approaches of the morality of custom to the existential enigma lack depth not 
only in their understanding of tragedy, but also and more so in their response. The morality of 
custom seeks to alleviate suffering through preservation strategies like utilitarianism and 
fellow-feeling. The communal maxims inspired by conventional morality, while attempting to 
confront the enigma of existence, mostly descend into universalized-disinterested responses. 
To appropriate the sense of the tragic, firstly, proper knowledge of existence as such is 
paramount and then secondly, a commensurate response that promotes its affirmation through 
singular individuality must be promoted.  
Chapter Four elucidates the morality of custom of an ethnic group in which fellow-
feeling is privileged as the suitable response to the enigma of existence. It explores the morality 
of custom, not from Nietzsche’s perspective, but from an African ethno-philosophical stance 
of shienyu ni shienyu. It is such a morality of custom that is put into critical dialogue with 
Nietzsche’s condition of individual autopoiesis. What is problematized is the shienyu ni 
shienyu’s valorisation of the communal through fellow-feeling as a response to the enigma of 
existence. Hence, its shienyu ni shienyu as a fellow-feeling moral maxim is considered 
 
1138 Michael Foucault, “What is Enlightenment?” Qu' est – ce que Lumiéres? In The Foucault Reader (New 
York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 41. 
 
  275 
 
pertinent for existential reasons. Such moral maxims unfortunately do not escape from the 
challenge of overarching claims.  
Such claims are found in Senghor and Nyerere’s approaches to African socialism 
where much emphasis is placed on an abstracted African identity. In their search for an 
overriding African character, they fail to raise the existential questions of slavery and 
colonialism and their effects on the African individual. Given that the existential challenges 
are not deeply probed and analysed, the solutions are largely found inadequate. Hence, from 
the moral maxim of shienyu ni shienyu and African sociality, what ensues are identity-based 
claims, weak on individual existential condition. The existential challenges demand a question 
geared towards action, not identity. Some of the cultural features inimical to individual 
enhancement prevalent in African philosophy of sociality include unbridled fellow-feeling; 
morality of pity; utilitarianism; and the general stress on the overarching moral maxims. If one 
is to enquire as to why for instance Senghor’s or Nyerere’s projects failed, the response lies in 
answering the question, what can I do? Answering this question largely demands affirming 
and plunging oneself into existence as tragic. 
Chapter Five, “From Autopoiesis to Cosmopoiesis,” recapitulates the claims of the four 
chapters with the affirmation of tragedy as the basis for world-making. The notion of tragedy 
as I have explored in this dissertation is two-fold: 1) the specific understanding as the horrific, 
the absurd, and the dreadful; 2) the broad understanding as chaos and becoming. Such a 
conception of tragedy summarized as the will to power is the ground for poiesis. Making 
presupposes chaos and is also the aesthetic process. As the world-making process, 
cosmopoiesis presupposes honesty with existence, as demonstrated by reference to Nietzsche’s 
engagement with the history of the Italian Renaissance. Hence, apart from tragedy as the 
quintessence for not only autopoiesis but cosmopoiesis, in-depth knowledge of history is 
needed for any sustainable social change. From the knowledge of history, one dialogues with 
the underlying spirit which has brought about meaningful cultural enhancement. In the absence 
of the sense of the will to power/tragedy and an in-depth sense of history, one is bound to 
evolve overarching schemes that rarely amount to meaningful change. Such is the case with 
the example of Luther and the failure of the Reformation. In this regard, reference to critical 
dialogue is not simply with the ethno-philosophy, but also within Nietzsche’s condition of 
autopoiesis, particularly his program for social change. While Nietzsche is overly and 
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unjustifiably polemical against Luther, the point is that the latter as a type is considered 
inimical to life as will to power.  
On the part of the African ethno-philosophy of shienyu ni shienyu and its weaknesses 
regarding individual enhancement, the proposal is to develop some form of African existential 
philosophy opposed to philosophy of sociality. The idea of existential philosophy is needed 
for the reality of existence as tragic to shine forth. Hence, it becomes paramount to face the 
horrific existence symbolized by the “world,” (shibala) as a space for evolving individual 
singularities. 
A positive reading of Nietzsche on tragedy, especially with its emphasis on action of 
the will, opens frontiers beyond categories of identity. The forms of life, as opposed to 
particular identities, become the avenue for engagement. Nietzsche’s philosophy of tragedy 
with the focus on the singular individuality opens new frontiers for re-examination of what 
entails social transformation. Nietzsche’s focus on singular individuality could be promising 
enough in today’s cosmopolitan thinking. How promising that could be is a matter of further 
research. However, one pointed outcome from this dissertation that often goes unnoticed is the 
need to re-think the excessive valorisation of “abstraction,” which could remove one from the 
existential demands of life. Nietzsche, the proponent of the affirmation of life as will to power, 
is about overcoming “universality in favour of singular individuality.” Through cultivation of 
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